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Shine on rising oceans and evaporating seas 
Shine on our Frankenstein technologies 
Shine on science ... 
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Justice then consists in not transgressing the customs of the city in which one enjoys citizenship. So a 
man would employ justice best for his own interests if he were to regard the laws as important when 
witnesses were present, but, when no witnesses are present, he were to regard the demands of nature 
as important. For the demands of the laws are artificial, but the demands of nature are necessary. 
And the demands of the laws are the result not of natural disposition but of agreement, but the 
demands of nature are exactly the opposite. So if a man transgresses the demands of law and his 
transgression is unnoticed by the parties to the agreement, he escapes without either shame or 
penalty. But if the transgression is noticed he does not. If, on the other hand, a man does what is 
really an impossibility and violates one of the inherent demands of nature, if all mankind fails to 
notice it the harm is no less and if everyone aware of it the harm is no grater. For the injury he 
suffers is not in appearance but in truth. 
 
Antiphon (480-411 BC)1 
 
 
This thesis explores the mechanisms and dynamics of public intervention in managing the 
risks of petroleum activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. As Norway’s decidedly 
most important industrial sector and the greatest single contributor to the Norwegian 
economy, the benefits and revenues extracted from this industry normally receive the 
bulk of public interest and awareness. Although the risks involved have been addressed, 
encountered, and coped with since the drilling of the first exploration wells in the mid 
1960s, they compete with the benefits in terms of public attention only in passing 
moments when the dangers involved surface as accidents or serious near-misses, or when 
the opening of new petroleum fields triggers serious environmental concerns.  
 
Public intervention for managing and reducing risks predominantly takes the form of 
regulation. And conversely, it can be argued, regulation as such is predominantly 
motivated by a perceived public need to respond to some type of risk. But not all risks are 
regulated, and those that are, are of very different kinds. And the magnitudes, means, and 
methods of regulation vary, not necessarily corresponding to the nature of the risks 
involved or to their societal and technological contexts in any patterned or predictable 
manner.  
 
                                                 
1 Papyrus fragment (re)discovered in 1915, possibly from the larger text “On Truth”, reprinted in Sprague 
(1972). 
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As a field of academic interest, the regulation of risk as such is not very old, and has 
developed in a rather piecemeal way (Hutter, 2001; Hood et al., 2001). Partly, this is 
probably due to the highly multidisciplinary nature of the subject, involving the legal and 
socio-legal disciplines, most branches of social science, as well as the disciplines relevant 
for understanding the particular composition of risks to be studied. The study of risk 
regulation not only cuts across disciplines, but is thus also potentially unbounded in terms 
of scholarly relevance. In the same vein, the actual regimes of risk regulation cut across 
societal contexts, ranging from the level of political attention and statutory legislation, the 
administrative channels of execution and law enforcement, and down to the particular 
social, institutional, and technological contexts in which the risks are situated. Studying 
risk regulation thus involves encounters with daunting bodies of knowledge and vast 
amounts of actors and institutions, linked together in loosely and tightly coupled systems 
of interference and complexity. Apart from understanding (as far as possible and 
necessary) the nature of the risks involved, the study of risk regulation addresses 
questions about of how public policies and priorities emerge, how they are transformed 
into rules and policy instruments, how these are enforced and practically implemented, 
how the regulated parties respond, how the regulatory authorities respond to the 
responses, and so on and so forth. Research topics may include normative justifications 
of public intervention, their actual public legitimacy, the ‘external’ explanation of policy 
behaviour, the incentives for dealing adequately with risks in the absence of regulation, 
and the conditions and mechanisms that influence regulatory compliance, including the 
impact and role of the public watch dog position.  
 
The epitaph to this introduction, despite its ancient origin, evokes just these rather basic 
queries about how human conduct unfolds within the boundaries of ‘natural’ and man-
made controls. It points to the ‘arbitrary’ nature of culture, the ‘cultural’ nature of man- 
made laws, the strategic aspects of law-abiding behaviour, and the accompanying 
necessity of ‘witness accounts’ when man-made rules are violated, as contrasted with 
nature’s demands, which cannot be defied with impunity. Antiphon was at odds with 
some of his more famous contemporaries, in not seeing culture and society as analogous 
to nature. Culture and society were not seen as governed by godly forces, teleological 
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purpose or ‘natural’ propensities, as was the more common view of the ancient 
philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle. Seeing customs as established by human 
agreement only, makes the old sophist Antiphon a ‘modern thinker’ in our terms. That he 
may be interpreted here as arguing normatively that laws (or customs) should be followed 
only when transgressions involve the risk of public attention and sanction, is perhaps of 
secondary importance as against the factual claim that nature will ‘strike back’ regardless 
of societal controls, but is arguably less ‘modern’ (Audi, 2000). Regulations and their 
systems of ‘artificial’ controls are embedded within larger contexts and networks of 
checks and balances, both external and internal to the market economy of production, no 
more ‘natural’ than the ‘natural’ market of neo-classicist economy (Habermas, 1996; 
Hutter, 2001). Seeing the potential law abider as simply a reluctant and cynical calculator 
ignores the multiplicity of mechanisms and motives that govern compliance with societal 
norms. The dividing line between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ is not clear cut, and the content 
and context of modern public regulation and risk management constitutes (and reflects) a 
‘second nature’ of cultural and societal conditions and controls. The boundaries are also 
blurred by the way in which risks are ‘measured’ or ‘experienced’, the social and 
psychological mechanisms of amplifications or diminutions of risk,  the mechanisms of 
their management and their embeddedness in social checks and balances. But the idea of 
‘truth’ being fulfilled or encountered only when nature ‘strikes back’ as against the 
arbitrary and coincidental nature of (artificial) social controls would still have at least a 
metaphorical significance in the modern world of pervasive regulation and sophisticated 
control mechanisms. But we are not willing to wait for the natural forces or the forces of 
man-made technologies, to appear as the moment of truth. And questions about the 
sufficiency and adequacy of ‘natural’ social controls (such as those embedded in markets 
and economic life) in furthering or protecting public and democratic interests and values, 
are in themselves of a highly public and democratic nature.  
Themes, context, and scope 
Within this larger thematic context, the present case study appears as just that: a case 
study. But even when limited to the level of a case study, the potential magnitude of 
issues to be covered, theoretically as well as empirically, is overwhelming. The questions 
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that may be raised in the study of risk regulation cannot and shall not be explored with 
equal depth and force, although an understanding of the broader and overall aspects of 
both the ‘case’ and the ‘topic’ will be attempted. The point of departure in this case, 
provides direction for the research project, as it specifically addresses the introduction of 
the concept of culture as part of the regulatory policy and vocabulary. More precisely, the 
main background for this research project is a recent regulatory reform including a new 
provision requiring the petroleum industry to develop a “good and sound” culture in the 
area of health, safety and environment, referred to as HSE culture.2 
 
The new regulations were launched in 2002 and HSE culture was given much attention as 
an inventive, potentially productive, and occasionally even decisive ‘approach’ for 
improving HSE conditions in the industry. The integration of HSE culture as part of a 
regulatory strategy was considered unique, and was highlighted in all the relevant public 
policy documents. The primary purpose of the thesis is to account for how and why this 
particular concept was introduced, and to study how it has been integrated and applied 
within the regulatory framework and as part of the regulatory strategy. But the provision 
was also part of a broader regulatory reform and it grew out of a regulatory philosophy 
that relied heavily on systems of self-regulation and risk management within the industry, 
notably by addressing the organizational conditions of regulatory compliance, such as 
resources, competencies, and control systems. The introduction of the HSE culture 
provision thus has to be studied within the context of the regulatory regime as a whole, 
including the types of risk involved, the structure of actors and interests, and the patterns 
and styles of interaction between regulatory bodies and the regulated industry. Also, there 
are broader contexts of administrative policies and industrial relations that influence how 
systems of regulation evolve. Finally, as will be elaborated below, HSE culture came to 
be associated with a range of wide-ranging and profound questions about the 
understanding and management risks. All these factors then justify and necessitate a more 
comprehensive approach. The overarching purpose of the study is thus to understand the 
                                                 
2 The research took place within the framework of a larger research program funded by the Norwegian 
Research Council: Health, Safety and Environment in the Petroleum Sector. The program covers a series of  
issues that influence health, safety and environmental conditions within the sector, notably technological 
change and organizational features, including also HSE culture.  
 4
causes and consequences of the introduction of HSE culture as a regulatory requirement 
in the Norwegian petroleum sector, within the context of the regulatory regime as a 
whole. Technically, HSE culture then serves as both the ‘dependent’ and the 
‘independent’ variable. Substantially, however, the study concentrates on the ‘story’ of 
how HSE culture has evolved as a conceptual device for framing and reframing socially 
embedded understandings of risk and its management within the regulatory and industrial 
context.  
 
It has been of some importance to outline the complexities and trajectories of this story in 
a naturalistic fashion, but also to recount some academic contexts encountered along the 
way, despite the risks involved in having to deal with, at least marginally, too many 
research traditions. Given the purpose of the study, at least three such traditions, in 
themselves highly interdisciplinary and ‘unbounded’, must be considered. First, there is 
the study of regulation and regulatory regimes, with several academic roots, such as 
economics, law, socio-legal studies, and policy studies. Second, there is the study of risk 
management, with academic roots in engineering, risk analysis, and organization studies. 
As indicated above, these research traditions are combined in the study of risk regulation 
regimes, and cover in principle all areas of regulation intended to control risks in society, 
such as to protect the interests of the citizens, employees, consumers, or the environment. 
Third, there is the study of culture, with multiple roots in the social sciences, primarily in 
sociology and social anthropology. The latter, being my own disciplinary background, 
will serve as a vantage point for the approaches chosen, perhaps giving this study some 
distinctive quality. That position suits the case, as this particular piece of empirical reality 
curiously impose a cultural perspective upon itself, thus making the corresponding 
cultural modes of scholarly interpretation doubly appropriate. As the story unfolds, the 
ethnographic approach and the phenomenologically inspired analysis of organizational 
sense-making, to borrow a phrase from Weick (1995; 2001), should appear all the more 
relevant. A more comprehensive discussion of these traditions and perspectives will be 




The literature on risk regulation has been increasingly concerned with the un-clear 
boundaries between the regulatory regimes and the systems and practices of risk 
management at the corporate level, sometimes referred to as the ‘co-option of regulation’ 
or the ‘decentring’ of regulation, where public and private forms of regulation constitute 
a mix of regulatory forms (Black, 2002; 2006; Hutter, 2001). What can be seen as 
regulatory compliance from the regime perspective, can be seen as risk management from 
the corporate perspective. That particular framing may also depend on the use of terms; 
sometimes risk management is used as an overall term for all systematic or organized 
attempts to control risks, irrespective of the location of its ‘agency’ (Baldwin et al., 1998; 
Royal Society, 1992). These boundaries have been particularly blurred by the 
introduction of statutory systems of self-regulation or so-called ‘enforced self-regulation’ 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). Such legal approaches do not only address risk issues as 
such. Rather, they may introduce ‘meta-rules’, indicating and specifying how 
organizations should deal with risk, by requiring the establishment of risk management 
systems that may include methodologies and processes of risk assessments, thresholds of 
risk acceptability, administrative structures and resources, feed-back systems to correct 
deviation and failure, internal monitoring and audit arrangements. Another related feature 
contributing to blurring boundaries is the shift from traditional ‘command and control’ 
regulation to purpose-oriented regulation. Instead of describing in detail how a given 
purpose should be achieved (e.g. by specifying the height of a fence, or the size of a 
window), purpose-oriented legislation attempts to leave such details to the regulatee. It 
merely states in a functional manner what purpose should be accomplished. Together 
these characteristics are intended to put more responsibility in the hands of the regulatee, 
and at the same time create more leeway and flexibility as to how legal requirements 
should be satisfied (their purpose given).  
 
The regulatory regime for occupational health and safety in the Norwegian petroleum 
industry has followed both these paths, and has served also as a national benchmark for 
similar regulatory reforms on an expanding scale. But organizational perspectives on 
regulation were also inherent in the important legislative reforms on occupational health 
and safety in the 1970s, notably The Work Environment Act of 1977 (WEA).  The WEA 
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emphasized local responsibility, involvement and participation, and it set up requirements 
for decision-making and problem-solving arenas that would further communication, 
learning-processes, and task-oriented improvements within the local work-place context.3 
This legislative practice developed partly as a response to increasing difficulties in setting 
and controlling specified standards, particularly apparent in the area of occupational 
health. It was believed that a focus on organizational features and local workplace action 
would be more instrumental in improving working environment conditions.4 The WEA 
was applied to the offshore industry after some political strife, and served partly as a 
corrective to the more managerially oriented philosophies of quality control and safety 
management that was emerging (Ryggvik, 2000). 
 
Philosophies and systems of self-regulation have become increasingly sophisticated and 
complex, intended to penetrate deeply into the organizational make-up of the regulatees. 
Investigators of regulation (as well as regulators and regulatees) are thus confronted with 
variously composed amalgams of risk management and organizational designs (Hale and 
Hovden, 1998; Hutter and Power, 2005). The concept of ‘culture’ has been present in the 
organizational literature for some time, and has gradually found its way into the literature 
on organizational risk through such seminal works as Man-Made Disasters in the late 
1970s (Turner, 1978). The concept of HSE culture has its origins in the term safety 
culture that appeared gradually in the 1980s, and was linked to the broader concept of 
organizational culture, indicating that failures in communication, ill-structured ways of 
thinking and information processing, lack of commitment to safety, etc., were important 
causal antecedents of accidents. ‘Bad cultures’ became a buzz-word for both practitioners 
and investigators in explaining accidents and sub-standard risk management practices, 
                                                 
3 Although seldom mentioned in the national literature as a source of inspiration (Gustavsen, 1984; 1990), 
this reform largely followed the same line of regulatory philosophy as was advocated by the British 
Robbens report, later to be materialized in the Health and Safety at Work Act in 1974. This legal approach 
was goal-based, encouraging a participative model of self-regulation, and involving the workforce actively 
in the improvement of local working conditions (Baldwin, 1986; Hutter, 2001). The Norwegian reform was 
largely inspired by the so-called socio-technical school developed at the Tavistock Institute, emphasizing 
the necessity of participative models of work-design, and by more general developments in labour relations 
towards the democratization of working life (Gustavsen and Hunnius, 1981). 
4 ‘Occupational health and safety’ is used here interchangeably with ‘working environment’. The latter 
term indicates a broad approach to all environmental factors affecting the mental and physical health and 
wellbeing of the workers, which is reflected in the WEA.  
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often as a response and an alternative to the sometimes unhappy reliance upon 
increasingly complex and bureaucratic management systems.  
 
By introducing ‘HSE culture’ as part of the regulatory framework, a ‘new dimension’ has 
thus been added to the organizational line of regulatory philosophy, arguably as an 
attempt to penetrate further into the self-regulatory mechanisms and placing even greater 
responsibilities in the hands of the regulatee in the attempt to make them regulate 
themselves. The White paper preceding this regulatory reform specified that a good 
culture implied that HSE aspects should be integrated as part of the common values of 
the regulated organizations, to be reflected in established attitudes, competencies, and 
behaviours. The reform thus also reflected and reinforced values held dear in the 
established legislative practice and public policy of work life that were corroborated with 
the WEA reform. The provision was launched with some ostentation, declaring Norway 
to be the first country ever to require industrial companies to develop their ‘HSE culture’. 
The White paper preceding the new regulations made several references to this new 
concept, emphasizing the idea of “continuous improvement and learning”. Subsequent 
ministerial Letters of Award to the regulatory agency had HSE culture high on the 
agenda, as a priority issue to permeate all relations with the industry.5 However, the 
provision also generated some demanding challenges for the petroleum authorities, both 
in terms of interpretation, enforcement, and overall strategy. Integrating HSE culture in 
supervisory practices proved difficult, and the status of the provision in terms of its 
regulatory enforcement was subject to much uncertainty. These processes evolved in the 
face of organizational experimentation and discontinuity, which exacerbated the 
difficulties involved in developing conceptual understandings of ‘HSE culture’ that could 
be sufficiently shared and appreciated within the agency. Also, a diversity of ‘cultural 
programs’ appeared within the industry, adding to the proliferation of (sometimes 
contested) risk management strategies associated with the ‘cultural turn’. At the end of 
the research period, the status of HSE culture as part of the overall regulatory strategy 
                                                 
5 The regulatory structure is to be described more elaborately later. At the time of the reform, the relevant 
agency was the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD). In 2004, health and safety issues were separated 
from the NPD and organized in a newly established agency, the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
(PSA). References are thus sometimes made to either, sometimes to both, depending on time and context. 
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was not altogether clear. The obviously attractive, and perhaps also trivial, insight that 
cultural properties and processes play a significant role in how organizations encounter 
and manage their risks, was an important driving force during the initial stages of the 
process. As the real task of making the concept ‘operational’ within the regulatory 
context, the original enthusiasm faded. In fact, at the end of the research period (2006), 
no such enthusiasm was any longer apparent, and key policy documents mentioned the 
concept only in passing, if at all. What had happened to the HSE culture? 
 
The present study will try to trace this process by investigating how key actors have tried 
to interpret and make sense of HSE culture within the operational context of enforcing 
the law and pursuing the regulatory purposes. How was ‘culture’ to be distinguished in its 
parts and as a whole, how was it related to other regulatory requirements and approaches 
to organizational risk, and how did the concept of culture make sense in the regulatory 
practices of supervision and in other encounters with the industry? Although the focus of 
this study is mainly on the regulatory authorities, the questions posed involve the whole 
spectre of actors within the regulatory space, notably the industry, trade unions and 
worker representatives, and other actors, such as various experts, consultants and even 
the research communities within which the study itself was situated.6 
 
As noted, the cultural experiments were not conducted in isolation, but took place within 
the larger contexts and discourses of risk and its corporate and regulatory management. 
Thematically, these can be related to some of the key dimensions of risk management 
identified in the important Royal Society publication on risk from 1992,  and later 
referred to as representing “recurrent sets of opposing views in risk management”, that 
partly reflected “competing world views” (Hood and Jones, 1996: 9; Royal Society, 
1992). Indeed, the introduction of ‘HSE culture ‘appeared as a trigger in provoking such 
competing world views; or perhaps more modestly, the cultural turn was enacted within 
the context of already existing conceptualizations and controversies about the 
understanding of risk and its management. Seven such dimensions were identified in the 
                                                 
6 The term ‘regulatory space’, originally coined by Hancher and Morgan (1989), will be used occasionally 
throughout as a shorthand phrase to denote the complex web of regulatory issues and processes, and the 
interrelated involvement of public and private actors in the different facets of regulation.  
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Royal Society publication, not assuming that all positions clustered around the extreme 
ends, but rather as a way of ordering the debates and some of their associated 
assumptions.7 These dimensions can be briefly summarized as sets of opposed doctrines. 
(1) The doctrines of anticipationism vs resilience, divided in how they value the use of 
causal knowledge of system failure to ex ante actions for better risk management 
(anticipationism), vs a focus on inherent unpredictabilities related to complex system 
failure and the need for resilience in order to cope with whatever risks that may appear. 
(2) The doctrines of absolutionism vs blamism, divided in that the former value a no-fault 
approach in order to promote information flows and learning processes, whereas the latter 
argue that the targeting of blame gives strong incentives for decision makers (at all 
levels) to ‘take care’. (3) The doctrines of quantificationism vs qualitivism, divided in 
how they rely on quantifiable factors in risk management. (4) The doctrines of design vs 
design agnosticism, divided in how they judge the availability of secure knowledge in 
terms of institutional design. (5) The doctrines of complementarism vs trade-offism, the 
former claiming that good management smoothly combines economic goals with safety 
goals, whereas the latter claims that trade-offs are inevitable and inherent. (6) The 
doctrines of narrow vs broad participation differ in how they value the specialized 
advice of experts, as against the broader involvement of lay people. (7) The doctrines of 
outcome specification vs process specification, divided in how they rely on specified and 
‘evidence-based’ standards for physical products and structures, as against a more 
process-based and discursive negotiation of regulatory options.  
 
The main point here is that the context, into which the ‘cultural reform’ was introduced, 
was inhabited with complex and comprehensive risk management discourses and 
controversies, providing a contested and dubious landscape for its implantation. 
Now, these opposing doctrines were not always replicated in exactly these forms, and the 
dimensions were occasionally given their own specific twists, as will be evident below. 
                                                 
7 It may be added to this that the dimensions also represented an attempt to allow for a more ‘relativist’ and 
less ‘objectivist’ discourse in the risk debates, not assuming that opposing views could be ‘settled by 
science’, or reduced to a question about scientific certainty. It should be noted also that this contribution 
appeared in one of six chapters, in conjunction with a chapter on risk perception, both of which were firmly 
placed within the psychological and social scientific research traditions. Subsequent debates occasionally 
referred to the publication as “four chapters good and two chapters bad”, thus confirming the need for 
breaking up the scientistic hegemony in the risk debates (Hood and Jones, 1996). 
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They also blurred and blended into new composite forms and oppositions, the most 
important of which appeared to be the relationship between individual responsibility and 
external framework conditions in the understanding and politics of risk management. 
This latter dimension in fact had two important and intricately related aspects. One was 
the ‘factual/instrumental’ aspect; that of which risk management strategy would actually 
promote safety in the most efficient manner: strategies addressing individual behaviour, 
or ones that addressed organizational, technological and economic ‘conditions’. The other 
aspect was moral: how should the borderlines be drawn between external ‘shapers’ and 
the variously located individual agents in the normative attribution of responsibility and 
blame? 
Notes on methodology (and meta-theory) 
The data in this study were for the most part collected in the years 2005-2006. The 
methods employed are primarily documentary studies, qualitative interviews, and 
participant observation. The latter was for the most part not participative in the ideal 
sense, and included attendance at a number of conferences, seminars, meetings, 
workshops, etc. The research process included several weeks of fieldwork at the 
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA), were I was provided with a fully equipped 
office and admitted access to internal databases, web sites, and other documentary 
sources. I could freely move around in the organization on my occasional visits, arrange 
and conduct interviews, have informal talks with employees, and participate in relevant 
meetings. I participated in two supervisions during the fieldwork period, and I also had a 
short but intensive week on an offshore production facility. A more detailed outline of 
methods and data collection is provided in Appendix I. 
 
This strategy and methodological makeup of the research process are tentatively adapted 
to the research questions outlined, and are predominantly placed within an interpretive 
and phenomenological social science tradition. The exploratory research processes 
adopted within this tradition involves a continuous interaction and dialogue between 
theory, concepts, and evidence rather than a deductively oriented testing of pre-defined 
hypotheses (Ragin, 1994; Strauss and Corbin, 1994). In this tradition, theory must 
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communicate with data in a manner that allows for mutual transformational patterns, 
indicating both proximity and distance to empirical phenomena. Ideas and concepts must 
been clarified in the course of the research process and modified in the face of 
experiential evidence. The approach builds on realist and naturalist foundations, but is not 
‘positivist’ in the sense that some fixed reality is taken be to ‘out there’, only to be 
discovered through proper research methods. Social realities are fluid, changing, and 
continually (re)produced; ‘theorizing’ about them is a highly contextual and complex 
process, historically and socially situated, and open to constant revision and self-
reflection (Moore and Sanders, 2006). Meta-theoretical questions thus underlie any 
interpretation, explanation, and representation of the social world. They are occasionally 
invoked in discussions about culture and risk management, but perhaps less often in the 
study of regulatory regimes within the context of policy analysis (Shrader-Frechette, 
1991). Assumptions are always made about conceptual and substantial understandings, 
both in terms of how actors use ‘local’ theories and linguistic representations to interpret 
and explain their environments, but also in terms of the explanatory and interpretive 
representations of these processes. At both levels, the interpretive and explanatory 
endeavours are highly theory-laden, particularly so, since the concepts and linguistic 
representation involved are often highly abstract and far removed from the observational 
periphery, to borrow a phrase from Quine (1953). Still, at the empirical level, such 
representations are employed within these very observational contexts, sometimes bluntly 
denotative, sometimes cautiously referential, and sometimes reflexively conditional.  
 
Giddens uses the terms ‘first-order concepts’ and ‘second-order concepts’ in addressing 
what he calls the ‘double hermeneutic’ of social science “introducing frames of meaning 
associated with certain contexts of lives to those of others” (1984: 248-5). It may be 
argued that this hermeneutic is more plural than singular, and also more multifarious than 
just being ‘double’. Acts of interpretation in complex expert-societies are multilayered, 
including also ‘natives talking back’, partly though languages and contextual codes 
similar to those of the external observer or researcher, thus involving complex 
interactions between frames and contexts being imposed from several directions. There is 
another paradoxical twist added to these ‘multiple hermeneutics’ following from the 
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research questions posed here; studying how ‘culture’, as a concept with locally 
understood empirical meanings, is transformed and made applicable in the socially 
enacted worlds of risk regulation involves several levels of analysis. Furthermore, 
regulatory world views are also cultural phenomena, and the ‘regulation of culture’ must 
be understood within the context of these ‘cultures of regulation’. 
 
Penetrating the local rationalities or irrationalities (however defined and distinguished) 
will be more important in the pages to come, than exploring their ‘external causes’. 
Although external and positive theories of why regulatory regimes develop as they do 
shall be briefly considered, there is in fact no conclusive evidence on the relative 
explanatory power of either of these; rather, there is a variety of external and internal 
mechanisms that shape regulatory decision-making and policy choices in each case, 
justifying the relevance of in-depth case studies. The role of internal and institutional 
processes has been discussed by drawing attention to the significance of regulatory 
discourses, world views, cultures, and even local ‘tribes’ (e.g. Baldwin and Cave, 1999; 
Hood et al., 2001). However, instead of using this as an opportunity to explore local 
rationalities in a ‘charitable’ way, there seem to a recurring taste for rather patronizing 
interpretations of bureaucrats and policy agents. In public choice theory they are for the 
most part (to the extent that they bother to work) seen as following their own interests 
(Niskanen, 1971). In policy analysis, they appear as victims of legislative myopias, and 
more concerned with avoiding blame than following the public interest (Hood et al., 
2001). Institutional analysis, perhaps as an overstated reaction against economistic and 
rational models, tend to portray bureaucrats as caught in organizational anarchies and 
cognitive mind-traps, often inverting the procedure of rational problem-solving by 
making solutions search for problems rather than the other way around; or they appear as 
conformist cultural dopes, following established routine, ‘standard operating procedure’, 
and ‘administrative rituals’ (March and Olsen, 1979; 1989). And if they’re not rule-
following traditionalists, they’re victim to the latest managerial fashion, mostly in order 
to gain external legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1983; Powell and DeMaggio, 1992). 
Even ‘cultural theory’ has made its way to political and institutional analysis, reducing 
the socio-cultural systems to instances of the two-dimensional grid/group typology first 
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devised by Mary Douglas (1978; Thompson et al., 1990). It might be noted in passing 
that anthropologists may have been more willing to grant rationality (or reasonableness) 
to ‘primitive peoples’ and ‘tribal societies’ than political scientists sometimes are willing 
to grant to the Weberian crusaders of rationality – the bureaucrats, depending of course, 
on just how ‘rationality’ is to be understood.  
 
On the face of it, the present case could easily lend itself to these somewhat patronizing 
portrayals of regulatory myopia, organizational anarchy, corrupted goals, confused 
means, administrative ceremonies, and garbage can processes. Of course, no 
organizations are exempt from such phenomena. But overall, I shall argue, ‘my’ 
bureaucrats appeared as rationally committed to the thoughtful and considerate pursuit of 
the public interest, even when considering their cultural experiment.8 And in the end, it 
will also be argued, the very question of rationality in risk regulation should be 
approached with a considerable amount of modesty and reflection, both as seen from the 
‘inside’ of government and from the ‘outside’. I concentrate, however, on the ‘upstream’ 
side of how regulatory goals are pursued from the point of view of the regulatory agents, 
leaving, for the most part, the ‘downstream’ side of regulatory outcomes and overall 
‘effectiveness’ to those more able. 
 
It shall be argued later that assumptions made in the analysis of risk management have 
similarities to rationality assumptions on a more general level; risk management involves 
strong commitments to rationality, as this concept has been explored in other contexts 
(Elster, 1989; Føllesdal, 1982; Lukes, 1982; Shrader-Frechette, 1991). Rationality 
assumptions may take the form of representing rational beliefs and practices as ‘self-
explanatory’, whereas non-rational (or less rational) ones require ‘external’ or causal 
explanations. A number of such external explanations are produced within various 
disciplines to account for these inferior rationalities ‘from the outside’ (ranging from 
psychological mind-traps, cultural biases, moral self-deceptions, to the ‘false 
                                                 
8 These portrayals are of course caricatured; the departure from sterile economistic models in policy 
analysis, toward more socio-cultural analysis is quite justified. However, the latter often rely on 
assumptions of a “rationality deficit”, placing the analyst in the role of a judge from the outside. The 
patronizing and essentially degrading portrayals often lack an appreciation of the intricacies and trade-offs 
of bureaucratic practice, even if more ‘naturalism’ was what the new institutionalism sought for.   
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consciousness’ of the alienated working class). Alternatively, it is argued, practices must 
be understood as ‘local epistemes’, to be judged on their ‘local causes of credibility’ 
(Barnes and Bloor, 1982). Both views, and a number of intermediaries, have their 
specific justifications and implications. I argue here neither for ‘complete symmetry’ 
between researcher and researched, nor for ‘complete asymmetry’. Although these 
concepts, related to debates about rationality assumptions and relativism, are often used 
in anthropological encounters with ‘radically different others’, they are equally applicable 
when working in ‘familiar’ cultures; they may even be more important to consider in 
such contexts, as difficulties of interpretation do not always impose themselves in the 
same way (due to the very same ‘familiarity’). However, establishing the role of 
rationality assumptions within these complex worlds, encountered simultaneously by 
both actors and observers, involves a considerate engagement with the contexts in which 
tasks are to be solved, as cultures evolve in just these task-solving encounters with the 
environment (Barth, 1972; 1989; 1994).  
 
Under any circumstance, just by addressing these issues, considerable evidential primacy 
must be given to the local experiences and knowledges of the actors studied, seeing social 
reality as fundamentally shaped by human consciousness and purpose within locally 
understood contexts (Barth, 1981). In the anthropological tradition this is normally not 
reduced to a simplistic or naïve embracement of the ‘native’s point of view’, however. 
Rather, the local and subjective world views must be interpreted, understood, and related 
to the presumably less context-bound and comparative constructs, understandings and 
theories of the social scientist (Kaplan and Manners, 1972). This is in line with the tenets 
of grounded theory, keeping multiple perspectives, that “contributes to building theory 
inclusive of lay conceptions and helps to prevent getting captured by those” (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1994: 280). They provide the following advice to interpretive researchers:  
 
They accept responsibility for their interpretive roles. They do not believe it sufficient 
merely to report or give voice to the viewpoints of the people, groups, or organizations 
studied, Researchers assume the further responsibility of interpreting what is observed, 
heard or read” (p. 274). 
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Cultures are not to be studied by some magic art of introspection or by trying to see the 
world just as it is perceived by the informants. Rather, what is perceived is, in the words 
of Clifford Geertz, “what they perceive ‘with’ – or ‘by means of’ or ‘through’ … by 
searching out and analyzing the symbolic forms – words, images, institutions, behaviors 
– in terms of which, in each place, people actually represent themselves to themselves 
and to one another”. The trick is, he proposes more bluntly, “to figure out what the devil 
they think they’re up to” (1983: 58).  
 
Transposed to the case at hand, this attempt to ‘look over the shoulders of the natives’ 
thus involves both ‘indigenous’ and ‘exogenous’ understandings of how ‘culture’ was 
culturally enacted in the regulatory encounters with risk. And as should be made clear 
from the outset: it was not hard to imagine the troubles involved in making sense of 
culture as a meaningful and even productive and instrumental approach to the 
management of risk. At some junctures during the fieldwork these troubles indeed 
appeared as ‘ill-structured’, and trying to join in with my interlocutors in their endeavours 
appeared at times as oscillating between witchcraft and magic. But like the accident 
investigator: only allowed the ‘luxury of hindsight’ was it possible to reconstruct a 
version of these endeavours. Following the insights of accident and investigation 
research, it would be all the more important to penetrate the perspectives of local actors 
as they appear in just those contexts were understanding and action in fact take place 
(Hale et al., 1997; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997).  
 
Making sense of culture, given a long history of locally adopted social science concepts 
and managerial systems and quick fixes that had orbited the industry for quite some time, 
often turned out to be an intellectually confusing and straining task. This was a space 
densely populated with the modern sophists of the consulting business, and partly also the 
R&D business, both adding significantly to the proliferation of models, nomenclatures 
and accompanying boxes and arrows. Among the virtually indefinite range of modelling 
options, a number of actors made a living by making their specific merchandise stand out 
as slightly different from the lot, thus adding to the jumble of solutions available for how 
the conceptual and virtual landscape of organizational encounters with risk should be 
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understood and arranged. Lamenting this predicament, one informant expressed both his 
concern and his appreciation for being given the occasion to ‘think out loud’: 
 
I really believe in the work that’s done now, and it’s really high time that we have more 
people in with a deeper knowledge, who have a scientific approach to this, that’s 
important for me…. and also, in the busy everyday life it’s not always that easy to get a 
chance to reflect on these things .. so when you’re having an interview or dialogue like 
this it’s really an input to clarifying some of my own thoughts and opinions. It’s 
important for me to have the historical perspective, to look back and reflect on what 
we’ve been doing. (HSE manager) 
 
Studying risk regulation in the socially, organizationally and technologically complex 
world of offshore petroleum industry often triggers reflections about whose frames and 
contexts are imposed upon whom. The role of the fieldworker would more often than not 
be that of the apprentice, with the informant as the master. This applied not only to the 
technological complexities involved, but also to the fine art of conducting audits, 
enforcing the law, and choosing, as rationally as possible, between available strategies of 
intervention. Sometimes my interlocutors were able to penetrate some rather confusingly 
composite enquiries, provide straight responses and illuminating practical examples 
(sometimes reframing the queries). In other words, the questions didn’t always deserve 
the answers they got, and the meaning and significance of the latter would generally be 
more fully appreciated only when reviewing them later. Furthermore, this is a space 
populated with social scientists of most flavours, and the accompanying bodies of 
knowledges and terminologies. Stepping outside, taking the perspective of a distant 
observer and timid analyst, ‘framing’ or ‘bracketing’ these worlds in ‘objectifying’ 
representation, at least warrants a reasonable portion of careful academic self-reflection. 
Indeed, the awareness of the disciplinary (over)crowdedness and multiple experiential 
contexts also had its local expressions. Sometimes the ‘natives’ would remind me of the 
dubious role and authority of external observers and researchers, as against the 
interpretive constraints that were imposed by the regulatory context; as was commented 
by one of my key contacts within the Petroleum Safety Authority: 
 
If a researcher has a brief talk with an offshore worker in the coffee-shop it’s bluntly 
referred to as ‘empirical data’, while our own extensive experiences from supervisions, 
investigations, and innumerable encounters with the industry, is often ignored or degraded; 
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we should really be more willing to appreciate the vast body of accumulated knowledge 
possessed by our own people. 
 
 
The qualitative methodologies of fieldwork and ethnography are clearly challenged in the 
study of regulatory regimes in complex society. The ‘field’ potentially covers a number 
of actors and places, located in ever expanding spheres and contexts; from the offshore 
work-site to the world’s largest corporations operating in global markets, from the audit-
styles of agency officials to the arenas of national and international policy making. The 
term ‘multi-sited ethnography’ has emerged as a response to the gradual departure from 
what has been referred to as the ‘quadruple S’ (synchronous single-society study) of 
traditional ethnography (Hannerz, 2003; Hylland Eriksen, 2003; Marcus, 1995; Marcus 
and Fisher, 1986). Complex, and increasingly global, social worlds must be approached 
by accessing different locations, actors, processes, and bodies of knowledge, all of which 
are differently situated in disparate and sometimes untraceable contexts. It may take more 
than the lifetime of an ardent ethnographer to track down only selected samples of these, 
in particular within the highly expert-based and multidisciplinary worlds of risk 
regulation. Strategically choosing the ‘best sites’, relying on existing representations 
(including those of the informants) is a matter of simple necessity, and painful 
compromises must be made given the time and resources available.  
 
Two final points should be noted here, both of which ‘twists’ the theoretical and 
methodological scope of the study. First, the case itself, as the facts on the ground 
gradually appeared, prompted a certain reorientation of focus. The introduction of HSE 
culture served as a reminder that organizations, and bureaucracies in particular, are 
linguistic communities where relations between concepts and phenomena oscillates 
between implicit meanings and continuous negotiation, and that the latter may absorb 
much organizational energy. The processes of making sense of internal and external 
environments simultaneously involve both epistemic and linguistic capabilities, 
sometimes seamlessly bound together in dynamic social interaction (Taylor, 1985; Searle, 
1996). Second, this again serves as a reminder that case studies of social phenomena both 
require and allow for contextual readings of their emerging and dynamic properties. In 
terms of methodological design, this has the effect that arenas and methods of 
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investigation have to be adopted to the simple fact that empirical phenomena sometimes 
materialize in unexpected ways, as may become evident below. 
A brief outline of chapters  
Given the cross-disciplinary nature of this study, imposed on it by the reality it portrays, a 
rather comprehensive survey and discussion of the relevant concepts, theoretical 
approaches, and research traditions is provided in Chapter 2. The chapter briefly reviews 
some approaches to the study of risk regulation regimes, and tentatively adopts a model 
for how such regimes can be analyzed. The development of enforced self-regulation and 
the accompanying concern with risk management approaches is of particular importance, 
as the interest in corporate cultures may be interpreted as derived from and extending 
these regulatory philosophies. The theories and practices of risk management have 
gradually incorporated social and organizational perspectives, including also the role of 
‘culture’. The concept of safety culture has attracted much attention from the 1980s and 
onwards, but has been subject to both conceptual and substantial debates, including the 
question of whether the building of ‘strong cultures’ could be seen as a way of coping 
with complex high-risk industries.  
 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the industrial context, including a brief historical 
account of the Norwegian petroleum industry, the developments of the regulatory regime, 
and an overview of key risk factors and the indicators used for measuring them. This 
chapter also reviews the politics of risk and some of the important controversies and 
debates among key actors, notably the industrial actors, the unions, and the authorities. 
The present framework of regulations, authorities, and industrial actors are outlined in 
Chapter 4. This includes also a brief review of the broader national context of public 
administration and regulatory policies and discourses. The origins and rationales behind 
the culture-provision and the context in which it appears are also presented in this 
chapter. The regulatory practices and strategies are presented in Chapter 5, portraying 
comprehensive, frequent, and multifaceted patterns of interaction between the authorities 
and the industry. The enforcement strategies are largely accommodative with a 
considerable degree of complicity between regulator and regulated. This is reflected in 
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industrial responses to regulations and regulatory practices, but must be interpreted 
against the high level of interaction, the large amounts of resources and economic and 
administrative capacities of the actors, and the high stakes implicated for the oil 
companies in the face of possibly compromising their attractiveness as licence holders (or 
contractors). In this chapter we address the relationship between systems oriented and 
organizational approaches to the analysis and management of risk, and the post hoc 
attributions of causes and responsibilities when damage is done, or nearly done. 
Corporate rather than individual sanctions clearly appear as the preferred reaction, 
reflecting a systemic and organizational understanding of causation and preventive risk 
management.  
 
Chapter 6 reviews the follow up of the culture provision. Being a core topic of the thesis, 
this may seem late, but understanding this process would be difficult without first 
mapping out the broader industrial and regulatory context. As noted, the concept of HSE 
culture set off a number of questions about risk management. Although the new provision 
was launched with the optimistic hope of having added a ‘new dimension’ to those 
focusing on technology and management systems, organizational discontinuities caused a 
loss of momentum in the follow up process, and the ‘culture-project’ did not appear as 
fully integrated within the agency.  
 
Risk management and regulatory roles are perhaps best elucidated in concrete events - 
accidents or near misses. These events show the trajectories of how situations unfold 
within technological and social contexts. The regulatory responses materialize in almost 
every step of such events, and also in the final sanctions employed, including the last 
resort of the law. Chapter 7 traces with some detail one of the most serious and bespoken 
incidents (a serious near miss) during the Norwegian petroleum history, thus providing a 
window into the (un)successful management of real-life industrial risks. Both serious 
accidents and the ‘cultural mood’ served as triggers for the launch of large safety 
programs within the industry. Chapter 8 discusses these, and some of the underlying risk 
management ideas they implicitly or explicitly convey. Many of the programs address 
safety culture, or what has emerged as its associated meanings, largely focussing on the 
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‘sharp end’ of individual behaviour on the offshore facilities. The largest and most 
comprehensive of these, is reviewed in some detail, and also the debates and 
controversies it has aroused. Chapter 9 draws together these partly disparate traces of the 
cultural experiments and the broader regulatory context in which they traversed. Based 
on extensive accounts from agency officials, primarily those in leading positions, the 
chapter discusses the enigmas of ‘HSE culture’, why it was never made operational as a 
standard against which compliance could be measured, and outlines the gradual and 
emergent understanding of the comprehensiveness of culture as a concept per se and the 
troubles this caused for the regulators.  
 
The last two chapters are of a more theoretical nature. Although drawing on the 
regulatory experiences in general and the attempts to relate these to ‘culture’, Chapter 10 
discusses the position of culture as an anthropological concept and proposes a 
multidimensional model of culture that reflects the great diversity of usages, but still map 
the cultural terrain in a distinct manner. It is also argued, however, that 
conceptualizations of culture, belonging as it does to the ‘commons’ within the 
conceptual landscape of social science, would effectively resist ‘colonializing’ attempts 
linked to specific theoretical approaches. Against this background, the regulatory 
encounters with ‘culture’ appeared as fairly reasonable, enlightened, and even ‘rational’. 
Chapter 11 draws together these discourses of risk, rationality and culture and discusses 
the conditions for how regulatory world views emerge within the regulatory space and for 
how they can be understood. I argue against some conventional approaches to the 
understanding of risk regimes and political bureaucracies more generally, in an attempt to 
revitalize the idea of such bureaucracies as fairly rational systems, institutionally framed 
and indigenously conceived for the purpose pursuing the public interest.9 
 
                                                 
9 The text could perhaps be seen as consisting of three main parts. Thus, chapters 3-5 provides an outline of 
the risk regime as such (the context); chapters 6-9 analyze the process of integrating HSE culture in this 
regulatory context; chapters 10-11 discuss some theoretical implications, partly based on the empirical 
record, partly as a general contribution to academic discourses on the understanding of culture, risk and 
regulatory regimes. 
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2. Risk, regulation, and culture 
 
As noted, this text has committed itself to the difficult task of drawing together several 
academic traditions and conceptual frameworks, largely as a consequence of the 
problems posed by the manner in which these particular slices of empirical reality are 
composed. They appear as ‘natural’ phenomena disrespectful of disciplinary boundaries. 
Concepts perform different tasks in this landscape, to the insiders as well as to the outside 
observer, and their demarcations are neither given nor totally arbitrary. This chapter 
provides, first, a brief discussion of the rather basic concepts of risk, regulation and 
culture, and second, an outline of theoretical approaches that will provide the framework 
for understanding the case within these intersecting and interdisciplinary academic 
contexts.  
Concepts 
‘Risk’, ‘regulation’ and ‘culture’, share at least one attribute: they are all concepts on a 
very high level of generality and abstraction, and appear most of all as just designating 
loosely encircled thematic fields. They fit the definition of hypernyms, the linguistic term 
for super-ordinate concepts that cover a broad range of phenomena, themselves 
classifying a number of subordinate terms. But to analyze these concepts semantically as 
hierarchically ordered structures of meaning is of course to hide the complex ambiguities 
contained in each of them. Even much simpler words than these must still be understood 
as provisional labels operating in specific social contexts and variably acquiring their 
pragmatic meaning through dynamic and essentially communicative processes of linking 
words to objects and observables, and to ideas and other concepts (Searle, 1996; Taylor, 
1985). A brief conceptual excursion is justified here, also because the understanding and 
application of these words turned out to be a crucial preoccupation of the actors studied, 
both as conceptual creations and as something obviously or possibly found in the real 
world. But whereas risk and regulation were well established terms within the local 
nomenclatures, supported by ‘standards’ and definitions provided by ‘experts’, culture 
had no such status. It was a matter of both ‘practical’ and ‘empirical’ interest whether it 
could be used without one, given its newly acquires status as a legal provision.  
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Risk and regulation 
At the most general level, the concept of risk oscillates between scientistic perceptions of 
calculable probabilities and cautious perceptions of uncertainty and unpredictability; both 
perceptions and their intermediaries are embedded within cultural, social and political 
environments, including also the normative valuations of the gravity of the possible 
outcomes involved, as against the possible benefits (Royal Society, 1992; Shrader-
Frechette, 1991). A common procedure for analyzing or assessing risks involves three 
constituent components or stages: (1) identification of the hazard, (2) estimation of the 
level or magnitude of potential harms, and (3) evaluation of its acceptability. The second 
of these stages include the assessment of probabilities of possible adverse outcomes, the 
risk level sometimes quantified as the product of the two. Treating the concepts of risk 
and regulation in conjunction evokes the associated concept of risk management, 
sometimes treated as synonymous, and denoting the efforts and measures taken to “shape 
who can take what risks and how” (Royal Society, 1992: 136). Broadly conceived, risk 
regulation then involves a number of actors, ranging from policymakers, regulators, 
industrial actors etc., each playing different roles in the total effort to manage risks, 
including the whole process of identification, estimation, and evaluation.  
 
There is no clear separation between these elements in the process of risk management, 
which will involve continuous reassessments of how much risk reduction is achieved 
through the various human, technological, and organizational measures taken. A 
rationalistic approach to the question of when and how to intervene by risk management 
efforts, such as statutory regulations, involves both an assessment of the nature and 
magnitude of the risks, and a strategic and proportionate deployment of regulatory 
resources. Ultimately, rational risk management will allocate the proper amount of 
resources in a manner that would reduce risk effectively according to the overall 
valuations of both ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’. As would be evident, the task of defining, 
identifying and measuring risks is far from simple and straightforward. The ‘technical’ 
perspective on risk is largely probabilistic, using more or less advanced methods for 
making predictive claims from historical and statistical data on past incidents. The 
magnitude of risk then follows as the product of these probabilities and the quantified 
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values assigned to the possible outcomes. The possibility of calculating such probabilities 
depends largely on the availability of historical data. For many hazards historical records 
will be absent or sparse, making quantifiable probability assessments difficult or 
impossible. Even with available data, prophesies about future events will be intrinsically 
difficult due to the number and nature of conditions that would go into the estimate, in 
particular when human behaviour in complex socio-technical systems is taken into 
account. Judgements about risk involve some basic uncertainties about just how history 
will ‘repeat’ itself, and ultimately encounter our limited knowledge about the future.  
Added to this are the problems associated with valuating the possible outcomes. To 
measure the value of one relatively specific outcome, such as the loss of a (statistical) 
human life provoke ethical considerations about the comparability of young and old, the 
careful and the careless, voluntary and involuntary risk takers, the rich and the poor, etc. 
And in the real life risk evaluations, such losses may have to be compared to the value of 
other potential losses that might deserve intervening action, covering a diversity of 
human, material, economic, and environmental hazards. The technical and expert-based 
approach to risk is thus profoundly challenged, and the importance of public and 
democratic involvement appears as fundamental in risk evaluation (Shrader-Frechette, 
1991; Wynne, 1992).  
 
There is also a tradition, however, of analyzing public, or ‘lay’, perceptions of risk as 
‘facts’, and explaining these in terms of their psychological, sociological or cultural 
causes. A number of factors are thus seen to influence the way we perceive risks, such as 
catastrophic potential, familiarity, immediacy or delay of harm, voluntariness and 
personal control (in facing the risk), moral or economic considerations about who will 
suffer and benefit, and the possibility of blaming the (assumed) risk-creators.10 Such 
studies may be used for different purposes. They may simply map out actually manifested 
risk perceptions and explore the mechanisms operating in the formation of beliefs and 
attitudes about risk as such. They may serve as input to risk evaluations in a genuine 
attempt to take account of what people (variably affected by the risks in question) 
actually value before intervening priorities and strategies are decided upon. But they may 
                                                 
10 For overviews, see Baldwin and Cave 1999; Kasperson, 1992; Royal Society, 1992; Slovic, 1992. 
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also be used to demonstrate how lay perceptions ‘deviate’ from expert-based judgments 
(such as about probability), ‘explaining’ how these deviations result from faulty 
reasoning and judgment, thus justifying the need for ‘insulating’ public risk decisions, 
and also for educating and enlightening the public about the ‘real’ risks.11 We shall return 
to some problems and questions associated with these three perspectives later, in 
particular the latter ‘deficiency’ hypothesis.  
 
To summarize, risk management (and regulation) involves transformations of hindsight 
perceptions to foresight predictions or prospects and the attribution of value to the 
possible outcomes. To establish a certain level of protection against some identified 
hazard is often a highly complex undertaking, and involves the assessment of a number 
of interrelated technological, human, organizational, and socio-cultural factors, including 
also assumptions about expected external preconditions for maintaining levels of 
acceptable risks in the future (von Weiszacker, 1996; Wynne, 1992).  
 
Comprehensively defined, the societal management of risk appears as a major purpose of 
statutory regulation. The rationale and justification of regulation is normally to avoid or 
reduce the likelihood of some unwanted consequence of harming people, the 
environment, or material and economic assets and systems.12 Despite the undifferentiated 
and perhaps tautological impact of this comprehensive view, it’s still a reminder that, on 
an overall level, regulation is always a symptom and an expression of what society at any 
time defines as values and valuables that will not be properly attended to without 
regulatory interventions. We shall bear these complexities of risk regulation in mind in 
the following discussion, noting that both risk evaluation and management takes place in 
the face of profound epistemological indeterminacy and morally challenging 
considerations. Nevertheless, decisions about regulatory interventions are recurrently 
taken, increasingly justified as ‘risk-based’ (Hutter, 2005; Black, 2006).  
                                                 
11 See for instance Breyer (1993). Critical discussions are provided by Wynne (1992; 1996), Shrader-
Frechette (1991), and Sunstein (2002). 
12 It might also be argued that, even if regulations positively define societal goals to be achieved, such as 
the adequate provision of services, the implicit rationale is to reduce the risk that they are not. And 
inversely, the ‘genuine’ or ‘pure’ risk regulations will often be phrased as goals to be achieved, not only as 
harms to be avoided. Of course, some linguistic trivialities are also involved here, as when ‘safety’ is 
defined as a goal. 
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Culture 
Raymond Williams (1985) once judged culture to be “one of the two or three most 
complicated words in the English language” and Anthony Giddens (1989) has referred to 
culture as the most comprehensive and widely used social science concepts, next only to 
the concept of ‘society’ itself. The concept of culture has a long and rich history in the 
social sciences. But its impact and application has been most thoroughly felt in the field 
of anthropology where it thematically almost converges with the discipline by definition. 
In the American tradition ‘cultural anthropology’ frequently appears as the academic 
label per se (as in text-books and university departments). Being a concept so much 
linked to the very identity of the discipline, it has been difficult to restrict its meaning for 
analytical purposes. Rather, ideas about culture have reflected a variety views about 
human societies as such, and definitions have accordingly reflected favoured aspects of 
social life. 
 
Etymologically, ‘culture’ is derived from the Latin word colere or colera, meaning 
literally to cultivate, and is used thus also in a biological sense. Humanistic notions, also 
reflected in the institutionalized applications of modern society, carries some more or less 
evaluative norms about what ought to deserve the name of culture, including sometimes 
prescriptions for how and when persons (or groups) should be regarded as ‘cultured’ or 
‘cultural’. In modern social science, these evaluative and ‘compartmentalized’ notions 
(literature, music, art, etc.) are largely absent. At the most general level, culture, as 
opposed to nature, refers to the ‘nurture’ of human making, as the “learned, accumulated 
experience … those socially transmitted patterns for behavior characteristic of a 
particular group of people” (Keesing and Strathern, 1998: 15). Turning from such 
comprehensive approaches to authorized definitions has been a precarious enterprise. 
Even seemingly innocent standard definitions contain references and terms that will soon 
open up like a Pandora’s box, releasing much, or most, of what social science is all about: 
Customs, traditions, world views, values, norms, practices, beliefs, meaning, identity, and 
even: ‘way of  life’. As may be recalled from the myth, only hope remained when 
Pandora finally was able to shut the box. Although the myth is normally not related to its 
biblical counterparts in symbolizing human hubris and defiance of the celestial order, one 
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might certainly hold that eating from the tree of knowledge in this case has caused a 
Babylonian confusion of languages.   
 
As far back as in 1952 some 160 definitions of culture were counted in the 
anthropological literature (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952). The tremendous rise and 
growth of social science, and anthropology in particular, since that time would render a 
repetition of any such exercise virtually impossible, if not meaningless. Many accounts of 
culture now appear more as reflexive discussions rather than as constricting definitions, 
simultaneously addressing the virtues and vices of the ‘concept’ as such, and its place in 
the semantic landscape of social theory. The counter-reaction to the definitional attempts 
has centred both on the futility of conceptually imprisoning 'culture’ by outlining some 
specified inventory of  ‘culture-components’, and much less the mechanisms governing 
them. The reactions may sometimes even appear as iconoclastic sanctions against the act 
of imaging the ‘sacred’, the heart of the discipline. More commonly, however, they 
reflect a less zealotry attitude, pointing to the amount of wrecked ventures into the 
essentials of ‘culture’, dissociated from social processes (Barth 1989; 1992). If used at 
all, it should be kept as a wholesale label covering phenomena for which we have 
developed more precise conceptual instruments. Although some ignore or dismiss 
‘culture’ altogether as being too comprehensive and general for analytical or scientific 
purposes, there are also attempts to revitalize the concept and to adapt it to the 
disorganized and complex socialities of an increasingly globalized world (Borofsky, 
1994; Marcus and Fisher, 1986; Ortner, 1999; 2006).  
 
Despite all differences and ambiguities in anthropological thinking about culture, 
warnings recurrently appear against treating culture as the kind of uniform, coherent and 
‘thing-like’ construct typically found in older notions of “Trobriand culture”, “Balinese 
culture”, “French culture”, or even “Western culture”. It has even been argued that the 
critique of the culture concept primarily has been concerned with the problem of 
essentialism (Ortner, 2006). Keesing (1994) notes that despite this professional 
awareness, there is still an almost irresistible temptation in applying these reified and 
essentialist notions, partly due to a self-reinforcing linguistic and conceptual efficiency, 
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but also due to  the historical interest (even a “vested” one) in encapsulating the radical 
‘otherness’ of peoples subject to anthropological intrusion, observation, and ‘textual’ 
transformation. The idea of cultures as bounded, self-contained universes of ideas and 
customs developed in parallel with a functionalist understanding of social structures as 
neatly woven together in self-perpetuating patterns. These notions of culture and society 
were adopted by the wider society and applied to complex, contemporary ways of life, 
such as when ‘national culture’ has served as frames of reference in deliberate attempt to 
provide nationalist ideologies for nation states. The notion of culture thus served societal 
purposes in the post-war period, as defining or redefining what was to be reconstructed 
(Goody 1994). As a possible remedy to this danger of ‘misplaced concreteness’, it has 
been suggested that the noun culture be replaced with its adverbial form, ‘cultural’ 
(Keesing, 1994), or even to think of culture in a ‘verbal’ form (Hylland Eriksen, 2003). 
But as noted by Keesing, ”our own diseases may strike us down from unexpected 
directions” (1994: 303). We may note how ‘culture’ appears in ordinary public usage, as 
a sweeping statement, as a mysterious ‘core’, as a deep-seated ‘cause’, etc., taken as a 
short-hand expression for bringing order to ‘disordered appearances’. The dangers of 
essentialism and reductionism are inherent in such concepts.  
 
Defying the urge to provide new definitions of culture, we will at this point settle for a 
more provisional understanding of the term as different configurations of elements that 
seem to recur in constituting the inventories of ‘the cultural’. These elements may be seen 
to form a more or less patterned ‘matrix’ which include explicit or implicit normative and 
emotive prescriptions and bodies of knowledge and beliefs that are shared by social 
actors and communicated and reinforced through mutually understood (notably 
linguistic) symbols, thus providing viable recipes for relatively continuous patterns of 
social behaviour. A more elaborate presentation and discussion of this ‘cultural matrix’ 
and its applicability in the organizational management of risks will be provided in a later 
chapter, after first having explored how the ‘natives’ within the regulatory space 
themselves managed to ‘use culture’ in managing risk. 
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The concepts combined: culture and risk management 
With culture entering into the domain of risk and its management in societal and 
organizational contexts, new rounds of conceptual explorations have taken place, drawing 
on both the organizational literature and more broadly on social science definitions. Thus, 
norms became norms about safety, beliefs became beliefs about risk, and so on. The 
concept of culture has a somewhat intractable history in this broad field, including studies 
of how public perceptions of risk can be seen as somehow culturally conditioned (ie. 
Douglas and Wildawsky, 1983). What is of most interest here, is how culture is 
employed, first as a contributing factor in the explanation of why organizations fail to 
manage their risks and then, consequently, how aspects of organizational culture have 
come to be seen as important in managing and reducing risks. 
 
Although it can be argued that ‘cultural phenomena’ are intrinsic to the academic study of 
organizations, the actual labelling of ‘organizational culture’ as a thematic approach is 
more recent, and has now appeared as a loosely encircled sub-discipline within the field 
(Martin, 2002; Martin et al., 2004). It has served as a framework for addressing the inner 
lives of organizations in terms of informal structures, norms, world-views, and ‘lived 
experiences’, etc., often by using in-depth, qualitative, and interpretive methodologies. 
By addressing organizational culture one would be able to get inside of the dynamic real 
life of organizations as it was experienced by participants, inaccessible to the more 
superficial, mechanistic, and rationalistic perspectives (Smircick and Calás, 1987; Martin, 
2002). This literature developed partly as a reaction and a remedy to the negligence of 
traditional organization science, partly through a rephrasing of established perspectives 
and vocabularies, but also by providing substantially new perspectives to organizational 
studies in general, and thus also to how organizations deal with risk.  
 
A more comprehensive discussion of the emerging role of cultural dimensions in the 
study of organizational risk is provided later. However, some preliminary observations 
might be noted. First, the notion of safety-culture or HSE culture seems on the outset as a 
less complex field of exploration than culture as such. It’s not like addressing a ‘way of 
life’, and is thematically even more bounded than ‘organizational culture’, socially and 
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conceptually. Second, it oscillates between the descriptive-analytic and the normative-
evaluative. In a sense, the idea of HSE culture suggests a return to the evaluative notions 
of culture in setting ‘normative standards’, including prescriptions for the values, skills, 
knowledges, designs etc., which are required in order to become fully ‘cultured’ or 
‘cultivated’. Although it is also used simply to describe and analyze the ‘cultural state of 
affairs’, there is normally an underlying normative implication of ‘its’ potentially 
cultivating role in the management of risk.13 Third, it follows that culture in this sense is 
legitimately made subject to intervening strategies, just as organizational culture was to 
be instrumental in creating competitive firms (all though the legitimacy of either may 
differ14). Addressing a relatively bounded set of issues within relatively bounded social 
contexts, it is potentially amenable to shaping forces hardly imaginable in the wider 
society. 
Understanding risk regulation regimes 
The purpose here is not to provide any comprehensive presentation or discussion of 
models and theories of risk regulation regimes, but rather to attune the reader to the 
multifaceted and sometimes blurred sets of dimensions and variables employed in 
analyzing them. We also discuss briefly the combined development of purpose based 
regulation and self-regulation, and on how these developments reflect increasing levels of 
complexity in the societal management of organizational risks.  
Theories of regulation 
There are several theoretical approaches to the comparative study of regulatory regimes 
at a macro-level. These may have two purposes. First, they can have a normative purpose 
of accounting for when regulations are justified, and for how they should be devised in 
order to succeed. These approaches have stronger roots the general risk management 
literature, or in the disciplinary traditions specific to the regulated sectors. Thus, 
economists are interested in which regulatory mechanisms are necessary for the smooth 
                                                 
13 Note that Hale and Hovden (1998) argues for a descriptive definition, excluding implicit evaluative 
norms. 
14 It reached a peak in terms of market attention during the 1980ties, as a managerially oriented catch-word 
for that present or absent magic so crucial for the performance and commercial success of companies, often 
referring to the endeavours of the Japanese (e.g. Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Peters and Waterman, 1982). 
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and efficient operation of markets, and health- and safety professionals will be interested 
in how regulations can be furnished in order to promote the goals of health and safety. 
Second, regulation theory may provide a more disinterested and distanced explanatory 
account of why certain patterns of regulation develop, paying specific attention to causes 
of varieties between regimes. These approaches are largely developed within the 
framework of policy analysis with disciplinary roots in political science. The theories 
themselves may still not differ in terms of issues addressed, only in how they are framed. 
Thus, the pursuit of public interests in the face of ‘market failure’ appears in the literature 
as both a normative justification and a positive explanation of regulatory intervention 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Hood et al., 2001). Normative theory is supposed to provide 
recipes for regulatory intervention; positive theory provides post hoc explanations of it, 
sometimes by using the ‘norm’ as the benchmark against which the explanations are 
justified. Thus, if regulatory behaviour deviates from the prescribed norm of correcting 
market failure, however defined and understood, some other mechanism is called upon to 
explain why (such as bounded rationalities or other ‘interests’). The nature of these 
explanations may depend on whether these deviations are seen as intended, as 
unintended, as accidental, or as ‘causal’. These distinctions are important for the 
argument developed later, and we present alternative theories below with that in mind. 
 
Theories of regulation focus alternatively on contextual factors that shape the regulatory 
content, such as the public interest, private interests, pressure groups, the media, and also 
on internal processes within the regulatory institutions (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). 
Regulatory content, the ‘results’ of these external (contextual) or internal (institutional) 
‘shapers’, cover a number of properties, ranging from the design and severity of rules and 
their enforcement, the structure of regulatory institutions, to the overall policies, 
purposes, and strategies of regulatory intervention. The compartmentalization of, and 
interrelations between, such dimensions of regulatory regimes are not very firmly 
established, and analytically, categories, concepts, and explanatory conditions both differ 
and overlap. Lamenting the immaturity of this academic field, it has recently been argued 
that “the analysis of regulatory regimes today is in the sort of position that organizational 
studies was in the 1950s” (Hood et al., 2001: 58). As a remedy to this dismal predicament 
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they suggest a framework for outlining an ‘anatomy’ of such regimes. We shall return to 
this anatomy below. First, we briefly consider the ‘contextual’ theories, in particular the 
‘public interest’ theory.  
 
Public interest theories start with the assumption that the regulatory process is (or should 
be) shaped by efforts to pursue the public good, focusing on the public-spiritedness of 
trustworthy and disinterested regulators, often informed by expert knowledge. The policy 
makers identify and evaluate the risks and regulate those that are not considered to be 
appropriately contained and managed within the context of market mechanisms or other 
social controls. Interest group and private interest theories focus on how different 
stakeholders (private business, expert groups, consumer groups, etc.) are able to influence 
regulations through lobbying, mobilizing resources, etc. Institutional theories focus 
largely on internal processes within policy making and regulatory institutions.  
 
From a public interest perspective, the correction of market failure is conventionally 
taken as a point of departure. Market failure may include a number of factors, not always 
uniformly categorized. Recurring themes include first of all failure of competition due to 
market power such as monopolies (natural or ‘unnatural’), externalities that are 
inadequately reflected in prices and economic decision-making, informational problems 
and asymmetries between buyers and sellers, transaction costs, and organizational 
failures (such as principal-agent problems). Additional market failures may variably be 
related to distributional justice, bargaining powers in the labour market, planning and 
coordination needs, and so-called ‘windfall’ or excess profits (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). 
The justification for (and explanation of) health and safety regulations are predominantly 
related to externalities and information inadequacies. Externalities point to the failures of 
incorporating social and public costs in the price mechanism, as when the costs of 
damage to the environment or to the health of consumers or employees are not reflected 
in the price of products and thus not ‘paid for’ in the marketplace. Regulation may 
compensate for this by ‘internalizing’ the externalities through taxes/levies or more direct 
interventions. Information inadequacies refer broadly to the lack of full knowledge about 
the ranges, prices, and qualities of available products that might adequately satisfy a 
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given consumer need. Ultimately, the range of such ‘deficiencies’ is almost infinite, at 
least when the more fundamental questions about ‘need’, ‘quality, ‘satisfaction’, etc., are 
introduced. But even the ordinarily evoked information problems cover a broad range of 
factors, such as missing price overviews, product specifications, lack of expertise, etc. 
Within the context of organizational risk in corporate firms, unequal bargaining powers 
must also be considered a critical ‘market failure’. In fact, a considerable amount of 
regulatory effort is devoted to balancing these relative powers (e.g. through requirements 
about worker participation in decision-making, the establishment of arenas for joint 
problem-solving, and the appointment of safety representatives,). Such requirements also 
contribute importantly to countering information inadequacies and asymmetries.15 
Modelling regulatory regimes (the regime anatomy) 
As noted, the study of regulatory regimes has been marked by a lack of comprehensive 
and analytically digested models available for capturing their composite and 
multidimensional nature. This has made comparative analysis difficult, and may, partly at 
least, explain the unclear status of competing theories. We return therefore to the model 
developed by Hood et al. (2001), which suggests some basic dimensions and properties 
specifically designed for making such comparative analyses. Although a comprehensive 
explanatory account, or even description, is not within the scope of this thesis, it’s still a 
service to the research on regulatory regimes that terms, variables, and analytical 
categories are shared and recognizable within the research communities. Some problems 
with the model will also be discussed, however, related both to the analytical 
categorizations and to the explanatory schemes and strategies adopted.  
 
Two basic dimensions are distinguished in this model: the control system itself, and an 
instrumental-institutional dimension. The elements of the control system are information-
gathering, standard-setting, and behaviour modification, taken to constitute basic and 
universal features of control systems in a general cybernetic sense. The instrumental-
institutional dimension is divided into regime context and regime content, reflecting the 
commonly used distinction in policy analyses between ‘states of the world’ and ‘policy 
                                                 
15 Such mechanisms thus operate outside the ‘marketplace’ as such, indicating that the organizational 
context (‘the firm’) provides other mechanisms for correcting such ‘failures’.  
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choices’; in this case between characteristics of the risks within the societal context (the 
‘world’) and the content of the regulatory regime itself (the ‘policy’). As will be evident, 
these contextual dimensions correspond roughly to the various explanatory models 
discussed above, subdivided into type of risk, public preferences and attitudes, and 
organized interests. Regime content is subdivided into regulatory size (e.g. severity of 
regulatory standards, surveillance intensity etc.), regulatory structure (like degrees of 
fragmentation and complexity), and regulatory style (like rule-orientation, dedication or 









Regime context    
Type of risk     
Public preferences and attitudes    
Organized interests    
Regime content    
Size     
Structure     
Style     
 
      Table 2.1. Anatomy of regulatory regimes (adapted form Hood et al., 2001) 
 
The various properties of the context and content variables can thus be expressed in all 
the three components of the control system. This facilitates an analytical model for 
understanding and assessing how regime content reflects or responds to the worldly 
context in which its impact is supposed to make a difference. Information gathering 
processes can be analyzed in relation to the availability of data on the particular risk, the 
public pressures for providing information, etc. Standard setting can be analyzed in 
relation to how the specific type of risk can be encapsulated by standards, how interest 
groups may influence the levels of protection chosen, etc. Behaviour modification can be 
analyzed in relation to expected public responses to control measures, the conditions for 
monitoring regulatory compliance, etc. These basic analytical categories can be further 
subdivided into more fine-grained differentiations, depending on the purpose, scope or 
depth of the research, but also on the ‘degrees of freedom’ contained in the regimes under 
study; that is, “how far variation in one element of a regime is linked to variation in 
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another” (Hood et al., 2001: 35). The empirical complexities of variation thus limit 
analytical parsimony, and disaggregations of the composite dimensions can be made 
almost ad infinitum. It is sufficient at this point to concentrate on the second and third 
levels of disaggregation in order to provide a more elaborate outline of the model.  
 
Starting with the context dimension, type of risk corresponds roughly to the ‘public 
interest’ model, in the sense that an ardent and responsible public regulator would be 
expected to solely consider the nature of the risk at hand, as against a carefully 
considered need for regulating them. It thus addresses the level or magnitude of risk, and 
the degree of residual risk, referring to the idea that regulations are only supposed to 
cover risks that are not handled by other systems of societal control. The functioning or 
failure of markets is thus taken to be one crucial benchmark for identifying such residual 
risks. The second basic context dimension addresses the nature of public attitudes and 
preferences toward the risks in question. This can be measured in terms of media salience 
or other indications of public attention and pressure. Sometimes also referred to as the 
opinion-responsive model of regulation, it is based on the conventional view that 
regulation is shaped by public opinion, for example as responses to major accidents 
(sometimes referred to as regulatory ‘tombstones’). The ‘responsiveness’ will in turn 
depend on the uniformity, consensus and coherence of the opinions voiced. The third 
context dimension corresponds to the hypothesis that regulation is interest-driven, and 
addresses the impact of organized interests that populate the regulatory space, such as 
private business, unions, activists, lobbies, professionals, and experts. The role of such 
interests may be measured in terms of strength, influence, degree of consolidation, etc. In 
the model, it should be noted, even the regulators and the regulatory bureaucracy are 
included in this dimension; they are then (sometimes at least) reduced to the status of 
‘interest group’ on a par with others.  
 
Turning to the content dimension, size refers to overall investments made in reducing 
risks. First of all this is to be measured in terms of ‘policy aggression’, that is how much 
risk is tolerated and the strength of the regulatory ambitions and levels of intervention in 
reducing risk levels. This includes also the total of regulatory resources (skill, attention, 
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costs, etc.) which is provided and required from the parties involved. This is arguably the 
most important dimension of regulatory content. It may also be the most difficult 
dimension to measure, depending of course, on the nature of the risks in question. 
Structure refers to two rather distinct aspects, the first partly overlapping with the size 
dimension as it is taken to cover the particular mix of public and private actors and 
resources within the regulatory space. A high degree of mix thus reflects a large amount 
of non-state bodies and resources involved in the control system, covering third-party 
assessors, compliance costs, systems of self-regulation, etc. The second aspect of 
structure refers more directly to the institutional complexity of the regime and is 
measured as the degree of organizational fragmentation, overlap, and density of actors 
(i.e. self-regulating bodies, local authorities, regulatory agencies, ministries or central 
government departments, courts, etc.). The division of labour between these bodies can 
be laid down along vertical and horizontal dimensions, allowing for a multitude of 
institutional arrangements. The vertical dimension accounts not only for the distribution 
of tasks but also for the distribution of authority within the institutional hierarchy. The 
horizontal dimension would indicate the degree of specialization on the various 
hierarchic levels, such as the scope of responsibilities, goals, functional roles, target 
groups, etc. Regulatory style, also overlapping with the other two, is primarily meant to 
cover the operating conventions and processes involved in the control system. Partly, this 
is indicated by the degree of rule-orientation, such as the density of rules and 
enforcement measures, and the extent of non-discretionary ‘command and control’ 
approaches. Partly this dimension also cover the more informal and ‘cultural’ aspects of 
the regime in terms of the ‘commitment’ and ‘zeal’ with which the regulators pursue the 
regulatory objectives.  
 
In sum, this model of regime anatomy provides a rather inclusive and comprehensive 
framework, enabling the integration of nearly all salient dimensions and variables that 
have been discussed in the regulatory literature. One particularly important virtue of the 
model is the way it facilitates a discussion of how the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ regime 
properties are distributed across the spectre of control components, and also, how aspects 
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of regime content reflect the worldly contexts in which they are embedded. It thus 
provides an adequate ‘scenery’ for the multifarious inventory of regime properties.  
 
As noted, no attempt will be made here to systematically assign ‘values’ to each of these 
dimensions based on the empirical record to be provided later. Rather, the model will 
serve as an initial ‘sensitizer’ to the comprehensive nature of such regimes. In fact, we 
will even add to this complexity by briefly discussing some of the problems involved in 
actually applying the model for analytical and explanatory purposes. Apart from the 
problems of determining and assigning ‘values’ to the selected set of variables, these 
problems are related to the subsequent possibility of providing explanatory accounts for 
why regimes develop as they do, at least on a very generalized level, by using predicted 
adherence to behavioural norms as the explanatory benchmark without also questioning 
the conditions and assumptions involved in setting up such norms in the first place. We 
discuss this briefly below with particular reference to the problems in assigning values to 
regulatory size (in terms of ‘net risk toleration’). Obviously, regulatory size must be 
considered against the type of risk involved. Regulatory size will thus be relative to the 
expected outcome or acceptance level based on evaluations of ‘residual risk’. Cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) may be applied in deciding whether regulations appear necessary 
and justified by examining if the expected benefits will outweigh regulatory cost.16 Such 
approaches reintroduce the difficulties involved in estimating and evaluating risk, 
however, but frame them even more ‘explicitly’ by attaching monetary estimates to the 
values involved (i.e. such as estimating the value of life, or a ‘statistical life’, as against 
the value of certain kinds of environmental damage). They appear even more ambitious 
than risk evaluations, since ultimately, one needs to estimate the probability that a given 
‘benefit’ (risk reduction) will result from a given regulatory intervention. Providing such 
evaluations would involve extremely complex considerations related to regulatory 
                                                 
16 CBA has been promoted by OECD initiatives on regulatory reform through so-called regulatory impact 
analysis, but are variably employed in member countries (OECD 1997; 2002; 2004). Salient examples are 
President Reagans Executive Order 12291 of 1981, which required regulatory agencies to produce 
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) based on cost-benefit considerations, and British requirements on  
regulatory proposals to submit Regulatory Appraisals that include a Compliance Cost Assessment (CCA). 
Sometimes these analyses are referred to a Risk Cost-Benefit Analysis (RCBA), reflecting that both the 
costs and the benefits are based on the calculations and evaluations of the risks involved (see Shrader-
Frechette, 1991; Sunstein, 2002). 
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compliance in very diverse organizational and economic environments. In addition to 
such ‘technical problems’, cost-benefit models may also contain some serious biases, 
related to distributional concerns, as they tend to take the market place valuations and 
present distributions of wealth as given, although such biases may be corrected in more 
sophisticated approaches (i.e. Shrader-Frechette, 1991; Sunstein, 2002). There are still 
intrinsic dangers involved in reducing questions of risk evaluation and regulation to 
matters of simple calculation; to let ‘hard’ figures take precedence over ‘soft’ factors may 
be tempting in the face of all the difficulties involved in appreciating the complexities of 
the latter. It has even been argued that, since regulation often occurs where markets fail, 
“there tends to be an absence of good market-based data in exactly those circumstances 
where there is a case for regulating. This suggests that CBAs will be at their least 
persuasive or reliable where the need for rational and effective regulation is greatest” 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 92). 
 
Normatively, it may of course be argued that these considerations somehow must be 
reflected upon under any circumstance; whether or not they are systematically conducted, 
the final decisions will nevertheless reflect implicit priorities. But in terms of assigning 
values to these variables as benchmarks for further analysis, assuming that they reflect 
explanatory mechanisms, is highly problematic. In particular, this has implications for the 
public interest theory. In assessing this theory we cannot assume that ‘correcting market 
failure’ provides clear recipes for regulation, and even more so, that regulation can be 
explained as reflecting only such concerns. Questions can be raised regarding the 
possibility of unitary conceptions of the ‘public interest’, the expertise and efficiency that 
actually shapes the regulatory processes and outcomes, and also the very notion of 
’market failure’ as a ‘scientifically neutral’ and unambiguously measurable property, 
disregarding how (economic) transactions and systems are socially embedded in webs of 
culture, power, politics, and normative valuations. There will thus be important public 
justifications for (and explanations of) regulatory interventions, not solely reducible to 
market failure considerations, but also reflecting a broader social policy agenda (Baldwin 
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and Cave, 1999). This is, of course, evident in the extensive regulation of the public 
sector itself, where market considerations are largely irrelevant.17 
 
The distinctions between these approaches to regulatory regimes are not clear-cut, and 
their relative explanatory weight is not clearly established. Institutional theory and 
regime-internal factors have received much attention and the public interest perspective 
much criticism (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Hood et al., 2001). The present study attempts 
to combine both, although more through exploratory than through strictly explanatory 
analysis. It also point to the role of ideas (such as ‘HSE culture’) as an ‘independent 
factor’ in regulatory processes, all though ideas has been criticised for being inseparable 
from the interests that carry them (Hood, et al., 2001). The purpose in this study is to 
understand the regulatory processes primarily through the perspective of the regulators 
and to unpack regulatory world views from within. This may involve an ‘institutional, 
public interest bias’, but may also allow for insights into case-specific mechanisms.  And 
as will also be evident later, the impact of other contextual factors than the ‘nature of the 
risks’, such as expert influence, business pressure, or other stakeholders, will often be 
mediated through the regulatory processes in a manner that does not always make it clear 
which ‘theory’ is actually being substantiated. If the regulator for instance chooses to 
follow expert advice, respond to business or union interests, this may still be interpreted 
as perfectly rational accommodations to the ‘public interest’. Expert advice may be 
considered ‘good’ and even necessary for the pursuit of the regulatory purpose, 
competing interests sometimes need to be balanced, and attention to the concerns of the 
regulatee may improve regulatory compliance. Regulation involves many such balancing 
                                                 
17 Certainly, the regulation of public services, like the ones related to quality standards or distributive 
justice in health and education, may be considered as ‘proxy regulations’ of ‘proxy-markets’, and the 
‘market-like’ mechanisms operating between users and providers will justify interventions even in the 
absence of a ‘profit motive’ of the latter. Such regulations often encompass quite different contexts of 
actors and stakeholders, such as semi-autonomous non-profit service-providers and local governments. But 
a market failure approach would in most such cases appear inappropriate. State regulations of 
municipalities often follow the same kinds of rationales and forms as the regulation of private businesses, 
and they may often be identical, such as in the case of occupational health and safety, where most 
regulations apply equally to all organizations, private or public (including also the regulatory agencies 
themselves). It would seem rather awkward to account for these regimes in terms of very different 
rationales operating in the two cases. And even when specific regulatory interventions may be motivated by 
market failure considerations, they may also be applied to other areas, disconnected from what motivated 
the intervention in the first place. 
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acts and trade-offs that call for sensitivity to the specificities of each case, including 
considerations about what really constitutes a case (Ragin and Becker, 1992). A 
regulatory regime will cover a number of specific areas of risk, and the mechanisms 
governing these may in fact differ in each case.  
We shall return to some of these issues later, questioning also the role of theoretical 
assumptions made in various explanatory models, in addition to the difficulties involved 
in how the various dimensions of risk context and content can be measured against the 
complexities of regulatory regimes. And further, as the main purpose of the model is to 
facilitate explanations of regime varieties by systematic comparisons, there are also some 
questions to be raised about how this configuration of variables capture the operating 
mechanisms within the regulatory space. This will point also to some important 
methodological implications inherent in explanatory models. From a conventional 
‘hypothesis-testing’ approach, a common critique against the public interest perspective 
is that it is too open-ended for explanatory purposes. Broadly conceived, almost any 
regulatory intervention could be taken to match the scope and variety of hypothesized 
predictions. One solution has been to use a ‘minimal intervention’ assumption based on 
‘strong’ and liberalist conceptions of market failure (Hood et al., 2001).18 I shall argue 
later that what may thereby be gained in explanatory power, may be lost in exploratory 
scope, and in fact also unduly underestimating the value of the public interest 
perspective. The value of explanatory models for understanding regulatory behaviour 
must be considered against a benchmark of ‘indigenous reasonability’ rather than some 
restricted and incidentally chosen ideals of ‘rational’ choice.  
Rule-making, rule-following, and trust 
We turn now briefly to some particularly relevant aspects of regime content and context, 
some of which cut across the distinctions provided in the model. In face of the questions 
posed here, intervention strategies that are adapted to fit external conditions of 
                                                 
18 Regulatory intervention according to a market-liberal model would accordingly be restricted to ‘private’ 
compensatory measures in the face of failures of markets to let risks be reflected in the price mechanism, in 
the availability of insurance systems or tort law processes. Hood et al. restrict the search for market failures 
to information problems and opt-out costs (that is, the individual costs for any exposed actor of avoiding, 
preventing or reducing the risks).   
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compliance are the most important, and point to a very basic attribute of regulatory 
regimes as a control systems. Although some point to the more or less unbounded 
continuities of regulatory systems, from statutory legislation, public agencies, down to 
the internal control systems and procedures of the regulatee (Black, 2002), regulators and 
the regulated are also to some extent insulated in terms of information flows and 
organizational boundaries (Reason, 1997). Regulators attempt to penetrate these 
boundaries, but are constrained by the resources available and the difficulties involved in, 
virtually, managing the risks of others. As noted by Reason, even complex technological 
operations are relatively simple in comparison to the task of maintaining safety: Safety is 
a ‘dynamic non-event’ that requires a clear understanding of complex interactions in 
socio-technical processes. It is against this background we must understand the attempts 
to harness the internal regulatory resources of the regulatee through self-regulatory 
approaches.  
 
Several variables are relevant in characterizing the diversity of self-regulatory systems, 
the most important of which, in this context, is the degree of governmental involvement 
and statutory regulation. Statutory rules can specify a number of requirements for internal 
risk management which involve a variety of supervisory arrangements at various levels. 
As noted, mandatory self-regulation with oversight by governmental agencies has been 
referred to as systems of ‘enforced self-regulation’ (Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992).  
Several justifications are claimed in support for such systems. The expertise argument 
point to the privileged position of ‘insiders’, in terms of professional and in-depth 
knowledge of the relevant sectors and the regulated objects and processes. Added to this 
is the assumed increase in legitimacy and compliance that might follow from self-
imposed and expert-based obligations. Low costs to government and more efficient 
enforcement are also taken to justify self-regulation, following from the premise that 
firms will establish well-informed rules subjected to their own internal systems of 
monitoring and control. The flip side of self-regulation is, of course, that both rules and 
internal enforcement practices may be self-serving, and distrust in the motivations, 
incentives, and practices in firms necessitate supervisory interventions from government 
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bodies, who face an even more difficult task of monitoring heterogeneous systems of 
internal rules and compliance measures (Reason, 1997).  
 
Self-regulation is often contrasted with so-called ‘command and control’ regulation, 
which impose standards backed by legal sanctions. Such rules may provide conditions for 
market entry or they may prohibit certain activities altogether. Normally, they oblige 
regulatees to comply with fixed technological, organizational, and behavioural norms. 
The force of the law is made to bear directly upon non-compliant behaviour, providing a 
direct link between the regulatory requirement and its (potential) enforcement. A number 
of weaknesses have been identified with such regulations, however, particularly related to 
the informational demands and the specialized expertise needed in order to set and target 
the standards and to predict how a certain specified standard would face up to the 
contingencies and trajectories of the diverse environments in which it shall fulfil the 
given purpose (Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992). Specified design or input standards, 
applied to constructions, equipment, operational modes etc., may be attractive due to 
feasibility of enforcement and predictability for regulatees. This may be an economical 
way of processing and digesting the information and knowledge needed to link means to 
ends, and even resourceful regulatees may need that kind of accumulated and 
‘instrumental’ knowledge acquired from the privileged pinnacle position of observant 
regulators. But inappropriate standards and fixed solutions imposed on the regulatee, 
reduce flexibility and hamper innovations in technology and the organization of work 
processes. Performance or output standards escapes some of these problems since 
regulatees may themselves design the processes in order to meet the standard, but are still 
not directly furnished to guarantee that regulatory goals are met. Target standards make 
this connection explicit, simply by stating the goals directly. Problems are encountered, 
however, in enforcing such standards, and their application may require resourceful and 
motivated regulatees, able and willing to figure out what means will lead to the desired 
ends, even when voluntary industrial standards are available as accepted recipes.  
 
So-called risk based regulation require regulatees to engage even more deeply in the self-
regulatory processes as they are required to document through risk analyses how more 
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loosely defined purposes can be met and are thus expected to identify and implement 
preventive measures at all stages of a process that may lead to hazardous outcomes. The 
concept of risk-based regulation contains the notion that some level of risk must be 
accepted, but risk regimes are increasingly ambitious to the extent that all risks within a 
given sector or area are seen as potentially reducible toward a minimum or even zero. 
Often, however, risk based regulation may define certain norms or principles of 
‘acceptable risk’. The most ambitious and sophisticated forms of self-regulation appear in 
these systems oriented requirements, obliging the regulatees to mobilize all their 
organizational resources in the management of risk, also referred to as ‘regulated risk 
management’. Managerial interventions may be directed towards all stages of a process 
from the ‘prime movers’ to ‘final outcomes’, including the promotion of organizational 
resilience in order to face non-predictable or non-preventable errors and accidents.19 
 
These systems of self-regulation require some level of trust. In an obvious but important 
sense, this trust is imposed on the regulators in the face of the informational asymmetries 
and the ‘decentred’ nature of the regulatory systems (Black, 2002). Ultimately, regulatees 
are expected to fully ‘internalize’ the regulatory purposes and act autonomously 
according to desired goals and standards. From a purely economistic perspective the 
regulatee could of course calculate the net costs of compliance against the risk of 
authority sanctions. Thus it has been suggested that many firms will comply only if the 
anticipated sanctions following from exposed non-compliance exceeds the compliance 
costs.20 There are at least two problems associated with this ‘amoral calculator’ model. 
First, the actual compliance cost will often be inherently difficult to isolate, making the 
assumption that only cynical calculation guides action accordingly difficult to ‘test’. 
                                                 
19 We do not provide any elaborate discussion here on the different notions of risk-based regulation (see 
Hutter, 2005). We may only note at this point, that several requirements on principles and methods of risk 
analysis and risk reduction has been introduced in the Norwegian petroleum sector, such as  ALARP (As 
low as reasonably practicable”). The ‘zero-philosophy’ has been introduced as an ultimate goal or vision, 
based on the idea that harms always have a cause, and that these causes can be found and ‘contained’ by 
being manipulated or removed. And even when the ‘primary cause’ cannot be directly contained, the 
effects can still be controlled and managed in order to minimize damage. 
20 It has even been suggested that the proportion of such calculative firm behaviour may amount to some 20 
percent of the “average population of regulated enterprises in most regulatory programs” (Bardach and 
Kagan, 2002: 65);  although given some support from qualitative studies, they make it clear that this is 
basically an assumed estimate of the amount of ‘bad apples’ The main point is rather that regulators could 
do better in assuming that the major proportion of apples is good. 
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Costs would have to be measured against possible benefits, and the ‘risk’ of sanctions 
would have to include both the chances of being detected in the first place and an 
assessment of the expected magnitude of the sanctions (ranging from the size of a fine to 
possible market expulsion). There may certainly be implicit calculations involved in 
shaping the impact of some of these factors, but the image of purely amoral profit-seekers 
would be hard to substantiate on a general basis. Second, even if some degree of 
calculative behaviour cannot be ignored, additional motivational mechanisms operate in 
various mixtures and with variable impact from case to case. It’s thus been suggested that 
a sense of social and moral responsibility play a significant role in how firms respond to 
regulations, and that corporate actors often are “concerned to do what is right, to be 
faithful to their identity as a law abiding citizen, and to sustain a self-concept of social 
responsibility” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 22). Although this ‘political citizen’ image 
of the regulatee partly builds on accounts of self-proclaimed motives, the impact of social 
responsibility may play a significant role, at least when backed by concerns about 
maintaining a good public reputation (particularly in the eyes of any market-access 
regulators). There is evidence, however, that the force of such motivations depend on the 
degree to which regulations and the accompanying enforcement practices are perceived 
as necessary, reasonable, and consistently applied; and conversely, that non-compliance 
may result when these conditions are not met, leading to what has been termed 
‘principled disagreement’ (Kagan and Scholtz, 1984).  
 
Thus, there is no uniform explanatory scheme that can account for how firms respond to 
regulations. As noted by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), the firm may have “multiple 
selves”; the search for ‘basic’ motivational forces does not produce any coherent picture 
provides no unequivocal templates for regulatory action. Compliance as well as non-
compliance may be the result of divergent mechanisms, such as attention to and 
knowledge of requirements, the professional ability to act on them, and the organizational 
capacities that can be mobilized in dealing with risk. The impact of such mechanisms can 
change from case to case within a single firm, and responses to regulation may diverge in 
different parts of the organization (Braithwaite et al., 1994; Corneliussen, 2004; Hutter, 
2001). This ‘organizational failure’ approach, assume neither wilful defiance nor 
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normative commitment, but recognize the simple fact that organizations often fail to 
manage their risks, even in the face of ‘sufficient’ managerial capacities (such as 
resources, knowledge, technical ability) and willingness to comply. Organizational 
perspectives on how organizations deal with risks have been increasingly reflected in new 
regulatory designs (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992).  
 
The regulatory strategies and enforcement policies will reflect these perceived images of 
compliance rationalities in various ways. Not in the sense that one supposed image of the 
firm ‘dictate’ a certain regulatory strategy. On the contrary, a sparsely resourced and 
hesitant firm may provoke unyielding regulatory responses in order to ‘teach them a 
lesson’, or it may incite a soft and educational approach. Such choices may reflect 
particular strategies against single firms, whole business areas, or general regulatory 
strategies, but they may also reflect local practices and even personal preferences or 
‘styles’ of single inspectors; not only regulatees but also regulators have multiple 
selves.21 Encounters between them are correspondingly multifarious experiments, 
oscillating between trust and distrust in enacting the basic control structure (Power, 
1997). Stereotyping images of ‘the other’ is still a part of the rhetoric in these local 
enactments.  
Culture and organizational risk 
Cultural approaches to risk management coincides more generally with the development 
of organizational and social perspectives, designated as characterizing the ‘third age of 
safety’, following the technological approaches and the ‘human factors’ approaches, and 
partly conceived as a process of “maturation” in the field. (Hale and Hovden, 1998).22  
The organizational, social and cultural approaches to risk management are thus often seen 
in consort, but their relation to technological and individual factors appears in different 
shapes and configurations. Their impact might be indicated by pointing to the key role 
that organizational and socio-cultural causes have played in recent major accident 
                                                 
21 Indeed, for several of the Norwegian regulatory bodies, in particular those with geographically dispersed 
offices, it has been a major challenge to ‘harmonize’ individual and local enforcement practices.  
22 Analogous classifications distinguish between the person model, the engineering model, and the 
organizational model (Reason, 1997). 
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investigations. In the analysis of the Columbia spaceship accident, the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board (2003) highlighted the organizational, social and cultural 
background conditions that lead up to the accident and their recommendations likewise 
pointed to how such conditions would be critical for the safety of future spaceflights. It 
even suggested that the “NASA culture allowed flying with flaws” (2003: 107). Two 
comprehensive investigation reports on the explosion in the BP refinery in Texas in 2005, 
causing 15 fatalities and nearly 200 injuries, both highlight their ‘safety culture’ as an 
important background condition for why the accident occurred, providing extensive 
analyses of organizational deficiencies indicative of this diagnosis (see CSB, 2007; Baker 
et al., 2007). 
 
The development of organizational approaches to risk is often traced to two important 
books, Man-Made Disasters by Barry Turner (1978) and Normal Accidents by Charles 
Perrow (1984). In the foreword to the latest edition of Man-Made Disasters, it was 
claimed that Turner “hit dry ground in Europe”, that there was no “disaster sociology” at 
that time, and that the book was “received with curiosity” (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997: xi). 
The reason, however, was largely accounted for by the more general lack of interest in 
accidents and disasters within main stream social science and organizational studies. A 
coupling of these areas was gradually to emerge, however, and the “failures of foresight” 
during the “incubation periods” of ignored warning signs, as analyzed by Turner, became 
key points of reference in the organizational and systemic understanding of accidents 
(Turner and Pidgeon, 1997).23 Likewise, Perrow, in the afterword to the second edition of 
                                                 
23 The foreword by Diane Vaughan also mentions the contribution of James Short (1984), whose ideas 
captured the interest of scholars, together with Perrow’s theory, and urged sociologists to emphasize the 
social aspects of risk and not leave risk analysis to psychology. Note however also an analysis by Koht 
(2000), pointing to the historical development of more complex and systems oriented models in 
investigative commission reports in the US and in Norway. He argues that, in fact, such models appeared in 
US reports as early as the beginning of the twentieth century, concurring with and influenced by the 
Progressive movement in politics and with the emergence of the administrative sciences. A parallel 
development occurred in Norway, but much later (from the 1960s), and largely following the entry of new 
professions into the investigative commissions, and the waning of the judicial influences. The changes were 
particularly apparent in the decline of individual error as the prime target of causal attribution (and the 
associated attributions of blame and culpability). It may be noted that these were both large scale events 
with pervasive societal impacts, such as The Pearl Harbor attack, but also ‘ordinary’ organizational 
accident, such as some major accidents on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.  
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Normal Accidents, pointed to the gradual shift in how accidents and organizational risks 
are interpreted; even in the media, it has become  
 
almost routine .… to mention that there is no single cause of accidents, that while operator 
errors are frequently involved they are hardly a sufficient explanation of the accidents, and 
that we are dealing with complex systems in which a series of failures can come together in 
a way that no one can anticipate” (Perrow, 1999: 353). 
 
As noted, the role of ‘culture’ has attracted much attention in the literature on 
organizational risk since the 1980s, and ‘safety culture’ has appeared as one of the most 
frequently used terms in the safety management literature. The origins of the term or at 
least of its impact in the understanding of organizational risk and failure are often traced 
to its use in the reviews of the Chernobyl accident in 1986. It has been noted, however, 
that the post-Chernobyl discussions reduced ‘culture’ to a rather simple combination of 
administrative procedure and individual attitudes, and that its impact on the emergence of 
cultural approaches to safety “…stemmed much more from a rhetorical attempt to 
reassure Western publics that Chernobyl could not happen here, than from any direct or 
systematic social science analysis of the deep and complex issues involved” (Pidgeon, 
1998: 203). In the same vein, Union Carbide, after the Bhopal accident, reassured the 
public that their US plants were safe, implicitly assuming that better (‘Western’) safety 
cultures made them so. But only eight months after Bhopal, their chemical plant in 
Institute, West Virginia had a similar accident; only chance circumstances prevented a 
catastrophic outcome (Perrow 1999: 358-59).24  The use of such wholesale diagnostic 
labels and catch-all explanatory accounts (good culture/bad culture) was later criticised as 
undifferentiating smoke-screens, unable to distinguish and appreciate the complex 
combination of conditions involved, for overlooking those conditions related structural 
properties of complex systems, and for ignoring how risk and its management is also 
caught up in webs of economic pressures and power (Perrow, 1999). These controversies 
seem to have haunted the cultural turn within risk management research up to the present, 
simultaneously addressing questions about what culture really is, and ‘its’ contribution to 
the understanding of accidents and risk management.  
                                                 
24 In fact, both Union Carbide and the occupational safety authorities (OSHA) had made inspections in the 
plant and found only some minor faults that were remedied. According to Perrow, the implicit assumption 
in both cases was that their safety culture was good. 
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 These ambiguities of ‘cultural mechanisms’ have thus been present almost from the start. 
Turner focussed on failures of organizational rationality, knowledge, and information 
processing; culture was in this context seen as much as an obstacle to safety as the 
opposite. This duality is related to the way in which culture frames and shapes patterns of 
interaction and communication within and between people and groups of people, thus 
either facilitating or encumbering flows of critical knowledge and information, and 
likewise either facilitate or encumber the proper awareness and interpretations of warning 
signals in the ‘incubation period’. This duality is expressed as follows:  
 
Part of the effectiveness of organizations lies in the way in which they are able to bring 
together large numbers of people and imbue them for a sufficient time with a sufficient 
similarity of approach, outlook and priorities to enable them to achieve collective, sustained 
responses which would be impossible if a group of unorganized individuals were to face the 
same problem. However, this very property also brings with it the dangers of a collective 
blindness to important issues, the danger that some vital factors may be left outside the 
bounds of organizational perception (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997: 47).  
 
 
On the positive side, the socio-cultural ‘qualities’ of organizations could thus be 
mobilized as social-cognitive resources to be utilized in intelligent, sensitive, and critical 
analysis of discernible ‘signals’ and available evidence. This required active learning 
processes, not only through mechanical registration and digestion of past events and 
‘lessons’, but by engaging in broader analyses of types of events across organizational 
boundaries, using multiple hypotheses, questioning received assumptions, and cherishing  
the ability to imagine the unexpected.  
 
Awareness of the complexity of information processing in decision-making contexts 
prompted a focus on the difficulties involved in interpreting the nature of signals in the 
information flows, and that the ability to distinguish ‘true’ warning signals from the lot 
would typically be the privilege of post-event investigators. The politics and power 
mechanisms involved in both foresight prospects and hindsight (re)constructions were 
also apparent; both in the sense that external pressures from stakeholders would often 
favour risk-taking, but also in the sense that hindsight interpretations and explanations of 
organizational failure would be embedded in contexts of conflicting interest. In the 
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optimistic version, ‘safe cultures’ would enhance the ability to take care of all this in a 
balanced manner, facilitating appropriate interpretation of signals, active learning, 
creative foresight, and at the same time resisting economic pressures and powerful 
stakeholders. In the second edition of Man-Made Disasters, the double edged nature of 
culture was reformulated in the face of the optimistic beliefs that safety cultures could be 
somehow ‘engineered’:  
 
We can ask if it is possible to have .… an institutional culture which supports resilience and 
reliability in ill structured contexts; or is this a fiction, a dangerous smoke screen behind 
which the reality and resistance of organizationally generated mistakes, and in particular 
blindness to certain forms of error, will always lurk (Pidgeon and Turner, 1997: 187). 
 
 
This duality of cultural and social-cognitive aspects of organizational risk has recently 
been rephrased by Hutter and Power (2005), embedded in their concept of ’organizational 
encounters with risk’. The phrase indicates that the way organizations deal with risks may 
be perceptually restricted, cognitively framed, and culturally embedded, and thus not 
adhering to the rational risk management model of well calculated decisions founded on 
full knowledge of possible outcomes and their respective probabilities. Rather, 
organizational encounters with risk are “characterized by a lack of clearly agreed or 
coherent data sets of historical event frequency in which judgments of probability are 
problematic and where possibilities of rational calculation are limited, if they exist at all” 
(2005: 10). The concept also suggests that indicators of risk, when they are known or 
discovered, do not cause uniform or predictable responses, but are filtered through 
amplifying or attenuating mechanisms intrinsic to organizational life. They may be 
enlarged and augmented or suppressed and denied during the ‘incubation period’ where 
potential dangers evolve. The signs are there, but are not properly attended to, interpreted 
or acted upon.  
 
Partly, these mechanisms are due to the cognitive and organizational limits to information 
processing. Every stone cannot be turned, not everything can be attended to, interpreted, 
or critically examined. Organizations develop hard-wired routines, fixed procedures, and 
cognitive scripts in order to deal with complex processes, turbulent series of events, and 
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flows of information. Even ‘learning and self-critical cultures’ must narrow things down 
and make hasty decisions based on limited knowledge and ill-structured processing of 
information. Potential insights to be gained from post-event investigations may be biased, 
as the hindsight discoveries is a ‘reflexive luxury’ not available within the context of 
rapid decision-making, where overloads of information must be processed, understood, 
and acted upon. Something must be forgotten or ignored in the process of directing 
institutional visibility and attention. Encounters with risk are thus couched in processes of 
organizational sense-making. These encounters may appear as sudden and unexpected, or 
as latent and gradually emerging, often escaping management systems based on 
calculated predictability, organizational stability, and fixed routines. Even in 
organizations that are professionally attuned to managing risks, such processes of sense-
making may in fact cause a systematic re-interpretation of ‘error-signals’. This is what 
Vaughan found in her analysis of the Challenger accident, where constant risk awareness 
became almost a collective mental trap, and overloads of failure-signals resulted in a 
‘normalization of deviance’ (Vaughan, 1996).  
 
The analysis in Normal Accidents had a more systemically pessimistic view on the 
possibility of safety in high risk industries, beyond the dualities and paradoxes of culture.  
Perrow’s contribution grew out of the sociology of organizations, and identified innate 
structuring of linkages and sequences in complex systems as inherently dangerous, 
sooner or later causing irreversible ‘entrapments’. Complex interactions and tight 
couplings in systems made them inherently vulnerable to accidents. These structural 
properties also lead to fundamental contradictions in terms of organizational and 
managerial design, since decentralized decisions were needed for handling interactive 
complexity, while centralization was needed for handling tightly coupled systems. 
Interactive complexity could only be managed close to the operational level as it 
depended on a considerable amount of discretion and personal judgement. Tight 
coupling, however, where single but interdependent components of production processes 
could lead to chains of unexpected events, could only be organized through detailed 
procedures and centralized control. Furthermore, external pressures, economic interests 
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and power would jeopardize these inherently vulnerable systems even more, adding to 
the systemic risks.  
 
The so-called High Reliability Theory (HRT) was partly phrased as a critique of Perrow’s 
pessimism, and tried to demonstrate how ‘High Reliability Organizations’, even with 
tight coupling and complex interactions, could be still able to avoid accidents (Roberts, 
1990; 1993). Such high reliability could be achieved through organizational design and 
management, by making safety a paramount priority, and by allowing for structural and 
organizational redundancy (overlap, duplication, communication, etc.) in order to contain 
the vulnerability of single system components. Whereas Normal Accident Theory (NAT) 
pointed to the impossibility of fully preparing for the unpredictable trajectories of 
possible accident scenarios, HRT argued that this could be achieved by continuous 
training, simulations of trial and error learning processes, and imaginative foresight in 
preparing for the unexpected. HRT argued for the possibility of coping with the structural 
contradictions between centralization and decentralization through a common ‘culture of 
reliability’ that could facilitate flexible and alternate decision-making processes on all 
levels adapted to the situation and the context. The concept of ‘mindfulness’ has been 
introduced as a cover-all concept for this organizational ‘state of mind’, indicated by a 
collective capability to “notice the unexpected in the making and halt its development” 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001: 3). Mindful organizations have an underlying style of mental 
functioning with five crucial characteristics, reminiscent also of the virtue-side of 
Turner’s culture: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, 
sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise. Following 
these principles, organizations should develop complex expectations and models, give 
‘strong responses to weak signals’, avoid arrogance and hubris, and breed vulnerability.  
 
Normal Accident theorists have objected to the implicit ‘harmony-model’ of HRT, 
ignoring the possibility (and probability) of faulty reporting, denial of responsibility, 
blaming, and internal and external power mechanisms (Sagan, 1993). The unitary culture 
model was partly also seen as requiring a kind of discipline and socialization, not 
compatible with democratic expectations and values of modern society. Perrow admits 
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that cultural properties and administrative designs, related to organizational redundancies, 
safety commitment, the humanization of work, etc., may contribute to better safety, but is 
still critical of the unquestioned confidence in how these essentially rational management 
models are able to cope with situations of high complexity and tight coupling. The 
principles of redundancy (many layers of protection) and diversity (different varieties of 
protection) has also been criticised for making the systems too complex and opaque, and 
sometimes in fact increasing interactive complexity and creating a false sense of safety 
among operators and managers (Rasmussen, 1993; Reason, 1997). Perrow argues instead 
for a ‘contingency theory’ of system accidents, that take account of critical system 
characteristics that will determine the number of unexpectedly interactive failures and the 
degrees of coupling that will determine their impact. Such system characteristics may 
range from socio-technical designs and information processing capabilities, to 
organizational controls and the ‘organizational density’ of the relevant environments 
(such as industrial structure, interest groups, regulators etc.). Disregard of these system 
properties is an inherent weakness of cultural and managerial explanations and designs; 
in particular, it will divert attention from the role of power and economic interests. 
Vaughan’s analysis of the Challenger accident, locating the underlying causes in social-
cognitive processes of ‘normalization’, was later to be criticized by Perrow as being too 
‘culturalist’, underestimating the importance of external economic pressures and power-
relations in the decision-making processes, thus noting that “we miss a great deal when 
we substitute culture for power” (1999: 380).25 Economic interests dominating the 
external conditions for organizational safety will mitigate necessary redundancies (even 
when structurally possible and ‘available’). Similar arguments have been put forward by 
Rasmussen (1997).  
                                                 
25 This, despite the accounts provided by Vaughan about just these external pressures. We may note that 
power and economic forces gained a more prominent position in her analysis of the Columbia accidents, 
including also a somewhat adjusted reanalysis of both accidents seen within a broader historical 
perspective, perhaps as a response to Perrows critique. The distinctions may be due to some subtleties 
regarding the analysis of causal processes and ‘sequences’, as when external forces are seen to shape 
social-cognitive (or cultural) processes. This double edged view on culture has its parallel in 
anthropological theory, in particular within the so-called power shift tradition (Ortner, 2006). Culture is 
thus seen as both “enabling (allowing people to see, feel, imagine, understand some things), and 
constraining (disabling people from seeing, feeling, imagining, and understanding other things)” (p. 13). 
There is thus a double parallel, depending on how one analyze the role of power in the processes of 
‘disabling’ and ‘enabling’. 
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 Disregarding for the moment the question about different conceptual locations of ‘the 
cultural’, what distinguish these schools then is not that they disagree in seeing the 
structural conditions of interactive complexity and tight coupling as inherently vulnerable 
and potentially catastrophic, but rather the nature and degree of the risks involved and the 
ability to manage them. While these controversies ultimately were related to whether or 
not certain very high risk industries should be allowed altogether, such as nuclear power 
plants, the ideas of HRT could still offer risk management strategies that could be applied 
in less controversial areas, where outcomes were not catastrophic.  
 
The proliferation of cultural perspectives in the literature on risk management has caused 
a disordered multitude of conceptual understanding of culture, and no general consensus 
exists on the impact of cultural factors in understanding and managing organizational 
risk. This lack of consensus is thus not only ‘empirical’. Rather, the majority of the 
numerous articles that have appeared on safety culture address and lament the conceptual 
troubles of ‘culture’. Some address those troubles specifically, and provide suggestions 
for conceptual clarifications.26 The diversity of disciplinary and methodological 
approaches have not made this easier, and even within the same ‘traditions’, divergence 
may be more apparent than convergence. Within psychometric paradigms, a variety of 
competing and overlapping ‘culture scales’ have been developed (Cox and Cheyne, 2000; 
Lee and Harrison, 2000), cultural components, variously arranged, appear in different 
models of risk management and accident analysis (Hopkins, 2006b; Reason, 1997), and a 
number of definitions are used, drawing on several academic traditions (psychology, 
anthropology, sociology, etc.). Some of these divergences are rooted in different 
conceptions of how culture should be understood and studied. Notably, this is evident in 
the contrast between the (primarily psychological/psychometric) view that culture is to be 
located in ‘the mind’, somehow as the configuration of ‘attitudes’ and ‘perceptions’ to be 
extracted from validated questionnaires, as compared to but separable from observable 
behaviour, and on the other hand, the (predominantly anthropological) view that cultural 
                                                 
26 The following titles may serve as indications of this predicament: “Safety culture: Philosophers stone or 
man of straw” (Cox and Flin, 1998),  “Cultures confusions” (Hale, 2000),  “Much Ado About Safety 
Culture” (Guldenmund, 2006). 
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properties are located and produced in ongoing processes of social interaction, to be 
understood primarily through qualitative fieldwork studies.  
 
Rather than examining these overlapping and competing positions, at this point only a 
brief sketch of some recurring themes and contrasts will be presented. First, there is a 
recurring imaging of cultures as ‘onion-like’ phenomena, indicating that culture is a 
‘layered’ property with some basic and deep rooted assumptions and epistemes at ‘its 
inner core’, surrounded by observable  behaviours and more superficial manifestations, 
such as stated or ‘espoused’ values at ‘its outer layers’, sometimes elaborated through a 
distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘climate’ (Glendon and Stanton, 2000; Guldenmund, 
2000; 2006). Second, there are various ideas of organizational distribution of cultural 
dimensions, displaying (safety) cultures alternatively as integrated and coherent, as 
differentiated and divergent, or as amorphous and fragmented (Martin, 2002; Martin et 
al., 2004; Richter and Koch, 2004). Third, there is a thematic or componential 
localization of the cultural as basically designating informal and relational aspects of 
organizational behaviour and interaction, as opposed to ‘structural’, ‘rational’, and ‘ 
formal’ aspects (Hale, 2000). Associated with this latter thematic localization are the 
attempts to identify culturally conditioned patterns of interaction that influence 
organizational redundancies, such as safety alertness, work-mate interference, no-blame 
attitudes, reporting practices, and learning processes. We shall return to a more 
comprehensive discussion about culture in a later chapter, only noting at this point the 
diversity of approaches available on the academic menus.  
Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this chapter has been to give a brief outline of some important and 
intersecting academic contexts that provide a background for studying how risk can be 
regulated through culture. Some convergence appears by keeping the perspective more 
attuned to the problems involved when regulation engages ever more intensively with the 
organizational preconditions for safe and reliable operations. Regulatory ambitions thus 
ascend beyond the level of simple rule-following, and the accompanying risk 
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management philosophies will extend beyond the single loops of simple cybernetic 
systems.  
 
An additional purpose has been to convey a sense of the complexities involved in the task 
of integrating culture as part of a regulatory strategy and repertoire. Risk regulation 
regimes constitute complex societal systems, covering a broad spectre of ‘contextual 
shapers’ and content dimensions, appearing in a multitude of possible configurations. 
They operate on a number of levels, and the regulatory agents within such regimes have 
the difficult task of promoting regulatory goals through various mechanisms of ‘remote 
control’, only marginally able to influence directly the processes within which the risk 
management systems are supposed to fulfil the regulatory purpose; requiring ‘good safety 
cultures’ would appear as a tempting step to influence such processes.  
 
We may note that the introduction of culture in the risk management literature was 
largely related to safety. And as we shall see, the introduction of culture as part of the 
regulatory strategy was largely inspired by the HRT literature, notably through the 
popularized version of James Reason (1997), which was primarily occupied with the 
management of major accident risks. Although major accident risk looms large in the 
Norwegian petroleum industry, the regulatory system has since the 1970s integrated a 
comprehensive collection of risk factors within one single regime, including occupational 
health and working environment. This made the process of translation and adaptation 
even more difficult, as these divisions between safety and occupational health already 
from the beginning represented somewhat distinct traditions, each of which covering 
rather disparate kinds of risks, and requiring a diversity of management strategies.  
 
In the next chapter, we will look at the historical developments preceding this cultural 
turn, and the industrial and institutional context within which it appeared. As will be 
evident, this development may in itself be interpreted as a process of cultivation. 
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3. The development of the industry and the regime27 
 
The Norwegian petroleum industry – a brief introduction 
The Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) is the largest in Europe, three times larger than 
the Norwegian land area. In 2006 Norway was ranked as the world’s tenth largest 
producer of oil and the fifth largest producer of gas.28 Since the first oil discoveries were 
made in 1969, the petroleum industry has generated enormous wealth for Norwegian 
society and is by far the most important source of income for the country.29 The 
petroleum industry covers a complex of actors, technologies, and natural resources. A 
number of national and international companies are engaged in the industry, and some 
80 000 people have their employment directly linked to the petroleum sector, of which 
some 22 000 work offshore. The petroleum resources on the shelf consist of a limited 
number of relatively large fields, some of which are among the largest in the world. 
Extracting these resources involves complex processes of interaction and cooperation 
between the actors involved. The industrial value chain ranges from seismic investigation 
and resource exploration, drilling, operations and production, and finally, to 
decommissioning. Technologies include a variety of fixed and floating offshore 
platforms, sub-sea facilities, pipeline systems, and several onshore terminals. Actors who 
participate in the industrial supply chain range from the oil companies responsible for 
developing and managing the petroleum fields, down through a complex hierarchy of 
                                                 
27 As briefly noted in chapter 1, the data presented here primarily cover only the period up until and 
including the year 2006. Unless otherwise stated, updated facts about the NCS are based on Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy / Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2007). Main sources for the historical overview 
are: Hanisch and Nerheim (1993), Olsen and Sejersted (1997), Ryggvik and Solbakken (1997), and 
Kindingstad and Hagemann (2002). These sources cover many of the same topics, and specific references 
are basically only given when the source appears as unique. 
28 Due to low national consumption (Norway has only 4.8 mill. inhabitants and a rich supply of 
hydroelectric energy sources), the overwhelming portion of produced petroleum is exported. Norway was 
in 2006 ranked as the world’s fifth largest exporter of oil and the third largest exporter of gas, amounting to 
more than half of total exports from Norway. Production levels in 2006 amounted to 2,8 million barrels of 
oil pr day and 88 billion standard cubic metres of gas (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy / Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, 2007).  
29 Total revenues from the petroleum activities now exceed NOK 300 billion each year, representing 
approximately one third of the total revenues in the fiscal budget. The bulk of these revenues come from 
direct taxes and ownership in licences. Revenues are transferred to the so-called Government Pension fund 
– Global, the size of which passed NOK 2000 billion in 2007 (Ministry of Finance: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en). 
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suppliers and contractors (such as drilling, constructions, equipment, engineering, marine 
systems and services, transportation, maintenance and modification, well services, etc.).  
 
The petroleum industry is of course highly regulated in terms of both resource- and risk 
management, and regulatory policies cover sometimes highly politicized decisions 
regarding the overall pace of production, the opening up of new fields in environmentally 
vulnerable areas, general policies regarding the allocation of licenses, as well as standards 
for health, safety, and environmental protection. But regulation includes also the day to 
day monitoring and supervision of industrial behaviour.  
 
The Norwegian ‘oil-era’ started in 1962. The European branch of the American oil 
company Phillips Petroleum made a formal proposal to Norwegian authorities, 
suggesting that the company were granted an oil and gas concession, practically covering 
the whole of the Norwegian continental shelf. In return, they would conduct a full 
geological survey of the shelf. Petroleum activities had already commenced outside the 
Dutch coast in the late 1950s, thus drawing attention to the possibilities of finding 
petroleum elsewhere in the North Sea.  Phillips was at the time only a minor company in 
the petroleum industry, which was dominated by the ‘seven sisters’, Shell, Esso, British 
Petroleum, Mobil, Chevron, Texaco, and Gulf. No seismic surveys had been conducted in 
the North Sea, and the Norwegian authorities were certainly not prepared for such an 
initiative. Instead of receding ownership rights in return for seismic surveys, however, a 
process started of establishing jurisdiction in the North Sea. Sovereignty over the 
Norwegian continental shelf was proclaimed in 1963, and agreements about the 
principles of division of the shelf were signed with Great Britain and Denmark in 1965.30 
National ownership to the natural resources on the shelf was determined by statute, 
authorizing the government to award licenses for exploration and production. The NCS 
was divided into 37 quadrants, each comprising 12 blocks. In the first licensing round in 
                                                 
30 Two ministries were involved in this process, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of 
Industry. The legal department in the former had the main responsibility for responding to the proposal. 
They had recently employed some very able young legal experts, primarily assigned for dealing with the 
preparation of Norway’s future relationship with EEC. All of them were later to occupy leading positions in 
Norwegian society, within the political system, the legal system, the academia and in private business and 
industry. Their role forms part of the national mythology, sometimes perhaps overstating the heroic impact 
of single individuals. 
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1965, 78 blocks were awarded, granting rights to exploration, drilling, and production. It 
took four years, however, before the first significant discoveries were made in the 
Ekofisk field. Several large fields were discovered during the 1970s and 1980s (such as 
Frigg, Statfjord, and Sleipner). In 1980 the first licenses in the Norwegian Sea (north of 
62°) were awarded, and during the 1990s the Norwegian petroleum era reached also the 
Barents Sea. Thus far, approximately one third of the total petroleum resources have been 
recovered.31 The NCS is now considered ‘ripe’, with many maturing fields. No new 
discoveries of large fields are expected, and future production will consist of smaller 
reservoirs, tail-production, and the employment of new technologies for maximum 
extraction from existing fields.  
 
A dominant theme during the first years was to attract the interest of the oil companies 
without compromising national interests in keeping control of the natural resources and 
the economic benefits. The first oil fields were developed by foreign companies, such as 
Phillips petroleum, Mobile, and Exxon. As the first oil-discoveries were made, the 
national interest gained force, and a process of Norwegianization developed from the 
early 1970s. In 1971, a broad political consensus was established regarding the main 
goals of Norwegian oil-policies, expressed in the so-called “ten oil-commandments”. 
Most of these confirmed established policies regarding the overall national control of 
activities on the shelf, but more proactive and ambitious goals were added, including the 
active promotion of national expertise and industrial participation.32 A Norwegian state-
                                                 
31 This amounts to more than 4 billion standard cubic meters of oil equivalents (scm). Of the remaining 
resources, 5,4 billion scm are proven resources, while some 3.4 billion scm is the estimated amount of 
undiscovered resources. The current yearly level of production (some 250 million scm.) is expected to 
increase somewhat for the next 5-6 years, followed by a steady but slow decline. Some of the older large 
fields, such as Ekofisk and Statfjord have an expected cessation around 2025-30.  
32 As part of the process of Norwegianization, a Royal Decree was issued in 1972, requiring that licensees 
should use Norwegian goods and services, when competitive. The national industrial capacity for 
participating in the oil industry developed gradually, with some crucial milestones in industrial 
achievement. These projects utilized several industrial elements familiar within the established industrial 
structure, such as design and welding of hull, navigational systems, the construction of concrete 
installations, etc. The construction of the Ekofisk tank in 1971-72, was a test case for the development of 
Norwegian engineering and use of domestic industry. Later, the so-called Condeep platforms were 
introduced, as a unique Norwegian design for platform construction (they were made of concrete, to be 
founded directly on the seabed). Semi-submersible drilling platforms were developed, most of which were 
built in Norwegian shipyards. Dynamic positioning systems, used for moving and keeping vessels and 
installations on correct locations, were developed at the technical university in Trondheim. Other 
achievement included a monitoring system for directing all functions on a production platform from a 
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owned oil company was to be established that would take active part in the petroleum 
activities and also manage the financial interests of the state. The company, Statoil, was 
established in 1972, and was given a substantial share in the awarded licenses. Gradually, 
it was to be developed as a major operating company, first though a process of 
knowledge transfer, and eventually through formal operating responsibilities.33 In 2006, 
Statoil was the largest operating company on the NCS, with some 60 percent of the 
operatorships. The other major Norwegian company operating on the NCS, Norsk Hydro, 
was also given a crucial role in the process of Norwegianization. Hydro was Norway’s 
largest industrial company, but with no experience from the petroleum sector. Gradually 
it acquired a major role as the second largest operator on the shelf.34  
 
The NCS currently comprises some 50 production fields in operation, 8 exploration 
fields, 20 exploration wells, 8 land sites, and more than 13 000 km’s of pipelines. 15 
fields are located in the Southern North Sea, with Ekofisk and Sleipner (gas) as the 
largest.35 ConocoPhillips is operator for the Ekofisk field, and Statoil for Sleipner Øst 
and Sleipner Vest. In the Northern North Sea, 28 fields are currently producing. The a
covers some of the richest oil fields in the NCS, such as Statfjord, Gullfaks and Snorre, 
and a large gas field (Troll), all of which are operated by Statoil. The large Oseberg field 
(mainly oil) is operated by Hydro. The Norwegian Sea covers eight fields. The oil field 
Draugen was the first to come on stream in this area in 1993, and the large gas field 
Ormen Lange started production in 2007; both of these are operated by Shell. In the 
Barents Sea, no fields are yet in production, but the Snøhvit gas field is scheduled to start 
rea 
                                                                                                                                                 
single location (offshore and onshore), supply ships specifically designed for offshore missions, and 
technologies for the survey and interpretation of seismic data.  
33 In 1985, state participation in the petroleum activities was reorganized through the establishment of SDFI 
(the State’s Direct Financial Interest), giving the state a direct share in the licenses that was not linked to 
Statoil’s commercial participation. The arrangement was still administered through Statoil until 2001, when 
it was transferred to Petoro, a new state-owned company established with the sole purpose of managing the 
SDFI. At the same time, Statoil was partially privatized, and made subject to the ordinary legislation for 
limited companies. 
34 After the collection of data was concluded (Dec 2006), a decision was made that the two companies be 
integrated into one large petroleum company, StatoilHydro (including only the petroleum related part of 
Hydro). These companies are for the purpose of this study still treated separately. Much discussion has 
ensued in the aftermath about the dominant role of this new company, and the HSE authorities have been 
granted additional resources in order to rebalance power relations.  
35 These also serve as hubs for the activities in the area, providing infrastructure for further transport 
through the Norpipe and Zeepipe systems. Oil is transported to Teeside, Great Britain, and gas to Emden 
Germany. 
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production in 2007. An extensive network of pipelines connects these petroleum fields 
with a number of onshore facilities in Norway, Great Britain, France, and Germany.36 
Offshore, there are more than 70 fixed installations and more than 20 mobile drilling rigs. 
 
There are more than 300 production licenses and operatorships in these petroleum fields, 
divided among some 30-40 companies. Almost all the operating companies participate in 
several production licenses, typically comprising 3-5 cooperating licensees, but normally 
with the operating company as the largest owner/shareholder. Some ten companies only 




Company Operatorship Production 
license 
Field 
Statoil ASA 100 173 50 
Norsk Hydro Produksjon AS 68 135 49 
Talisman Energy Norge AS 15 48 8 
BG Norge AS 14 23  
Lundin Norway AS 14 24 2 
Total E&P Norge AS 13 72 40 
ENI Norge AS 12 47 16 
Marathon Petroleum Norge AS 11 19 5 
BP Norge AS 10 15 5 
AS Norske Shell 10 23 7 
ConocoPhillips Scandinavia AS 10 12 9 
ExxonMobil E&P Norway AS 9 24 16 
Table 3.1: The largest operators and licencees on the NCS, 2006  
Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Energy / Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2007) 
 
Measured in terms of work-hours, the bulk of offshore activities (more than 60 percent) 
are carried out by contractors and suppliers, Drilling and well operations account for most 
of these, followed by construction and maintenance, and catering services.37  
                                                 
36 The largest pipeline network is Gassled, encompassing 9 pipelines for gas transport with a total length of 
some 6600 kilometers. Some oil is transported through pipelines, but the bulk of the produced oil is loaded 
offshore onto buoy loader shuttle tankers and transported to national and international destinations. Gassled 
is owned by several petroleum companies, with Statoil and Petoro as the largest shareholders. It is operated 
by Gassco AS, a 100 percent state owned company responsible for the transport of Norwegian gas to the 
markets. The Gassled system includes two gas processing plants on the Norwegian west coast; Kårstø and 
Kollsnes, both of which are operated by Statoil. Other onshore facilities include Tjeldbergodden (methanol 
plant), Sture terminal (storage/processing), Mongstad (crude oil terminal), Snøhvit (gas) and Slagentangen 
(oil refinery). All of these onshore facilities were incorporated into the petroleum legislation framework in 
2004.  
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Institutional and regulatory developments  
The motives for regulating the Norwegian petroleum industry are several, the arguably 
most important of which is related to the so-called ‘windfall profit’ or the economic rent 
made available from the rich supply of natural petroleum resources. Although huge 
investments and operational costs are required in order to extract these resources, the 
potential for profits instigate and justify correspondingly strong regulations. The trade-off 
defining this ‘correspondence’, the level or amount of regulation in relation to possible 
profits, has been subject to continuous assessment and rivalry. From the very start, the 
regulatory framework reflected the tradeoffs between providing incentives for the oil 
companies to engage in, invest, and produce, and at the same time to maximize the values 
extracted for the public through taxes, levies/royalties, and direct participation. The 
burdens and benefits of health and safety regulations have been part of these overall 
considerations.  
 
The development of the health and safety regulations can be divided into several phases, 
depending on the criteria used for defining a ‘phase’.38 Some critical milestones may still 
be identified: the first safety regulations of the exploration and drilling period from the 
mid 1960s; the regulation of fixed installations in 1976, the introduction of the Working 
Environment Act in 1977; the introduction of internal control systems during the 1980s; 
the so-called NORSOK-process during the 1990s; and the new regulatory framework 
established in 2002. Various mixtures of contextual and institutional forces have 
contributed in shaping these developments. 
 
The first rudimentary safety framework was issued by Royal Decree in 1965, preparing 
for the first rounds of petroleum explorations. In 1967, regulations were expanded and 
contained 130 sections, mainly covering safety issues. These regulations were largely 
based on the British system, including a heavy reliance on standards and ‘best practices’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
37 Adding to these are a number of transport services, such as helicopter transportation of personnel and 
supply ships transporting the large amounts of goods needed in the petroleum activities (construction parts, 
water, diesel, oil, cement, steel-pipes, plates, equipment, operational supplies, etc.), including also the 
return of surplus and garbage.  
38 Hovden (2002) identifies four such phases, while Ryggvik (2000) portrays a more fine grained 
development. 
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developed in the industry. The role of existing regulatory systems of health and safety 
was marginal, except regarding some requirements specific to maritime activities (life-
belts, lanterns, navigational rules, etc.). These latter influences were partly instigated by 
some serious accidents, such as the collapse of the Sea Gem rig in the British sector, 
causing 13 fatalities, and a collision between the Ocean Traveller rig and a supply ship in 
the Norwegian sector, causing a hole in the supporting legs of the rig. These accidents 
partly replaced trust in industrial ‘self-regulation’ with a more critical attitude. The 
regulations did not, however, appear to have jeopardized the ‘cost balance’ in such a 
manner that the companies were deterred from engaging in the exploration activity. In the 
case of occupational health and safety, such considerations were more prominent, and the 
existing legislation for occupational health and safety was not applied to the offshore 
activities except for some provisions about working hours. Thus, “a zone of regulatory 
exclusion” had been granted to the emergent industry (Ryggvik, 2000: 72).  
 
Regulations in the early years were developed in close cooperation with the industry. The 
political administration was handled at the ministerial level, with limited resources and 
little knowledge about the emerging petroleum industry. Thus, the industry was from the 
beginning invited to participate in the development of policies and regulations. The 
administration had to rely on their knowledge, and benefit from a good cooperative 
climate. As the story goes, the head of the Norwegian government’s Oil Advisory Board, 
Jens Evensen, invited all the relevant petroleum companies to the ministry, gave them 
three hours to agree on an educational program for the public officials; but adding: “If 
anyone tries to fool us, we will never forget it. That company will never be granted any 
licenses in Norway!” (Kindingstad and Hagemann, 2002: 29).  
 
Balancing the risks of capture against the risks of regulatory and professional 
marginalization was thus ingrained in the encounters with the industry from the very 
start. Powerful and resourceful companies with first hand industrial and technological 
expertise would have the upper hand in negotiating with the state bureaucrats, creating a 
delicate but unavoidable balance between trust and suspicion. But the state had ‘big 
sticks’ and the informational asymmetries were gradually to be reduced (though not 
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removed) by promoting internal checks and balances and by building up regulatory 
capacities and professional expertise.  With the large increase in oil-related tasks, The 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) was established as an administrative regulatory 
body in 1972. The NPD was given the dual task of resource- management and safety 
regulation. Their role in resource management was largely to develop knowledge and 
documentation about petroleum resources and reserves, and to provide advice to the 
ministries in awarding and following up licenses. In the case of safety regulations and 
supervision, the NPD would gradually acquire a more independent role, although all 
major legislative proposals and decisions rested with the governmental ministries and the 
parliament.  
 
As the industry expanded steadily during the 1970ties, a new regulatory framework for 
fixed installations was proposed. This reflected a new regulatory policy relying more 
heavily on industrial self-management, thus also foreshadowing later internal control 
reforms (Ryggvik and Smith-Solbakken, 1997). The regulations of the first generation 
had frequent references to industrial standards and ‘good practice’ in the industry. This 
was absent in the new proposal, and stronger and more prescriptive provisions provided a 
clearer mandate for authority intervention. These provisions could interfere directly with 
the technological designs of platforms, such as a stated preference for the separation of 
living quarters from operational processes. To have living quarters placed on top of a 
petrochemical plant had gradually emerged as an unacceptable solution. The regulatory 
powers of the NPD were most conspicuously demonstrated in 1976, just after the 
regulations had been issued, when Mobil Oil was ordered to reconsider the construction 
of the Statfjord B platform and build a separate flotell. The letter postponed the upstart of 
production by one year and was later referred to as the ”most expensive letter in 
Norwegian history”.39 The platform was reconstructed, but included living quarters, 
which were placed as far away from the production areas as possible. The case not only 
demonstrated the powers of the NPD; it was also indicative of the willingness on the part 
of the regulators to accept alternative solutions if these could be justified as sufficiently 
                                                 
39 The statement originated from the first director of Statoil, Arve Johnsen; it was later framed and glazed 
and returned to the NPD as an unforgettable moment in the national petroleum history (Kindingstad, 2002: 
164-67). 
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safe. This latter approach would also gradually appear as a key principle in the regulatory 
philosophy.  
 
The safety regulations largely supported a managerially based control system and were 
thus in some opposition to the ideas of the new Work Environment Act that was 
underway, which emphasized participation, empowerment, and mobilization of lower 
echelons of the work force (Ryggvik, 2000; Ryggvik and Smith-Solbakken, 1997). The 
question of whether the proposed WEA should be applied to the sector was highly 
debated. The industrial actors, supported by the Ministry of Industry, argued against 
inclusion. The act was radical and new, and objections were in particular related to some 
critical provisions, such as giving elected safety representatives the authority to stop 
dangerous work. However, several driving forces worked for inclusion. The unions, but 
also the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Municipal Government and 
Labour, responsible for the new act, argued for the full application of the act to the 
offshore sector. Public attitudes appeared to support full inclusion: there was no reason 
why levels of protection should not be as strong offshore as onshore.40 The Alpha 
accident in 1975, causing 3 fatalities, prompted the same conclusion. Thus, from 1977, 
the same year that the act was implemented, it was also applied to the offshore activities. 
However, floating installations fell under the maritime jurisdiction, and was not included 
in the general petroleum safety regulations until 1992. The introduction of the WEA 
greatly improved conditions for offshore workers, regulating working hours, providing 
protection against unwarranted dismissals, and facilitating a more efficient involvement 
in decision making. For several years, a double regulatory track was thus followed, 
containing somewhat different regulatory philosophies, WEA and the safety regulations. 
The latter was more managerially oriented in emphasizing management systems and 
leadership responsibilities, while the former promoted and even presupposed active 
worker participation.  
 
                                                 
40 The significance of public support in this process (also reflected in some of the large newspapers) may 
have been just as important as the pressures form unions within the corporatist system. The public appeared 
sceptical towards the great multinational companies, in contrast to the close ties that had developed 
between the industry and parts of the government apparatus (Bjørnson, 1993; Ryggvik, 2000). 
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Gradually, new regulatory needs appeared, in particular subsequent to several serious 
accidents, such as the Bravo blow-out in 1977. The report from the accident commission 
after Bravo focused largely on organizational and systemic causes, preparing the way for 
corresponding philosophies of regulation. The report identified a number of causal 
antecedents, such as bad equipment, violations of safety regulations, improvisation, long 
working hours, and lack of competence in critical operations. But other underlying causes 
were seen as major contributors, such as the prevailing ‘can do’ managerial ethos of the 
company. The operating company (Phillips) was criticized for not having an internal 
organization more dedicated to safety, and the commission argued that an internal safety 
system with clear distribution of responsibilities and more rational planning had to be 
developed. They also called for a work culture more dedicated to safety. 41 The accident 
also triggered a discussion about possible administrative and political goal conflicts in the 
regulatory system. As a result, health and safety issues were separated from the resource 
management. The NPD was left intact, but safety regulations were transferred to the 
ministry responsible for the WEA, and the agency was correspondingly split in two 
divisions, each reporting to ‘their own’ ministries.   
 
The first guidelines for ‘self control’ for licensees was issued in 1979, and in 1981 these 
were elaborated and renamed as guidelines for ‘internal control’, requiring that 
management systems for safety be developed. New risk- and performance-based 
provisions were given, and in 1980 the first guidelines for risk analysis were introduced, 
including partially quantified risk acceptance criteria (such as for the availability of 
efficient escape ways). Also, the guidelines introduced a ‘quantified cut-off threshold’ 
related to the ‘impairment frequency of types of accidents that could be disregarded’ in 
risk evaluations, the so-called ‘10-4 criterion’. This caused considerable attention, and was 
                                                 
41 Although the report identified both ‘technical failure’ and ‘human error’ as important causes, it also 
noted that the operator in question had not slept for 30 hours when the ‘errors’ were committed, and 
pointed most decisively to the “underlying cause” as related to the observation that “the organizational and 
administrative systems were on this occasion inadequate to assure safe operations” (NOU, 1977: 8). The 
report was part of the Report to the Storting (nr 65, 1977-78). The influence of Bravo and the subsequent 
investigation has thus been considered more important for the regulatory development than the disastrous 
Alexander Kielland accident (se p. 72 below). Whereas the investigation of the former emphasized system 
features and organizational failures, the investigation of the latter focused largely on technical aspect (see 
also Ryggvik, 2000). 
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an attempt to engage the industry more actively in risk evaluations and to indicate that 
offshore risk levels should be within a generally accepted range.  
 
During the 1980s there was a considerable improvement in health and safety conditions. 
Oil prices were high and safety costs were not critical in the face of large company 
profits. The position of the NPD was considered strong, partly due to the attractiveness of 
new licenses (Hovden, 2002; Ryggvik, 2000; Ryggvik and Smith-Solbakken, 1997). The 
assignment of new fields was partly based on the safety performance of the companies, as 
judged by the NPD, a point that was repeatedly made clear to the industry. Pressures 
were also put on the operators to monitor the safety performance of their contractors and 
to include this as part of the contract. During the 1980s the internal control principles 
became firmly entrenched within the regulatory system. Goal oriented rules replaced 
prescriptive rules, and the new regime with systems audits and accompanying 
verifications was established (Dahle, 1994). Towards the end of the 1980s, this system 
spread to the land-based industries, and would gradually appear as an general regulatory 
philosophy in a number of regimes (Statskonsult, 2002). The risk management systems 
were developed with increasing degrees of sophistication, but also with much regulatory 
detail and documentary overload. Excessive bureaucratization thus appeared as a major 
concern in trying to make these management systems fulfil their intended purpose. Also, 
criticism was voiced against the managerial bias associated with the safety systems. Both 
unions and researchers claimed that worker participation suffered, and that health and 
safety issues largely became the province of professional company experts and 
consultants (Haukelid; 1998; 1999; Ryggvik, 2000).  
 
But regulatory interventions also included more direct interferences in designs, 
technologies, and solutions, such as requirements regarding systems for remote drilling in 
order to reduce the high injury rates in these operations.42 Towards the end of the 1980s, 
however, a significant drop in oil prices reduced profits and increased competition. This 
lead to the establishment of the so-called NORSOK program, the main purpose of which 
                                                 
42 These interventions caused objections from the industry and much discussion about ambitions, technical 
solutions, progress, and deadlines.  
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was to make the Norwegian petroleum industry more competitive through joint efforts 
that involved both the industrial actors and the state.43 More cost efficient and flexible 
technological and organizational solutions were deemed necessary, and a number of joint 
routines, procedures, and standards were developed and included as part of the regulatory 
strategy. The fixed 10-4 criterion was abandoned and replaced with more generally 
formulated requirements to define safety goals, risk acceptance criteria, and to document 
that their safety systems could reassure that the goals were met.44 The new risk regulation 
was more specific in outlining the risk analysis process than risk thresholds and 
methodology (Dahle, 1994).  
 
There was a gradual awareness during the 1990s that new regulatory reforms had to be 
initiated. Fluctuations in oil prices provided unstable attention to risk, and although 
maintenance of the established risk levels was a stated purpose of the NORSOK process, 
the pressure on efficiency, cost-cutting, downsizing, etc., caused increasing concern 
about the effects on health and safety (Hovden, 2002). Furthermore, there was a 
perceived need for restructuring, simplification, and harmonization with international 
standards. The regulatory process started in 1998 with the establishment of internal 
working groups, and involved extensive collaboration with the industry, unions, and 
various expert groups (see also next chapter).  
Working conditions and unionization 
The early years are sometimes referred to as the ‘Wild West’ or ‘Texan’ period 
(Haukelid, 1998). They were dominated by the multinational oil companies, such as 
Phillips, Exxon and Shell, and accompanied by large contractor companies, such as 
Brown & Root, Haliburton, and Schlumberger. Given the exemptions from the general 
working environment legislation, authoritarian management behaviour and anti-unionist 
policies moved the power balance clearly towards management and company interests. 
                                                 
43 NORSOK: ’Norsk Sokkels Konkurranseposisjon’ (Norwegian Offshore Cost Effective Initiative) 
44 The 10-4 criterion was considered to have had the “unfortunate effect”, according to one of the ‘NPD  
veterans’ that it: “promoted the use of risk analysis to serve as evidence to the NPD that decisions taken 
were sound decisions, hence not complying with the intended purpose of ensuring sound internal decision-
making processes within the companies. The result was a development towards ‘number-crunching’ 
exercises, through which, one might rather disrespectfully say that almost anything could be proved” 
(Dahle, 1994: 380). 
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Although no comprehensive registrations systems existed at the time, occupational 
accidents appeared to be almost routine and considered as a normal and integral part of 
the job (Ryggvik and Solbakken, 1997).  
 
Apart from the many indigenous reports, an indication of the risk exposures is given by 
the fact that seven fatalities were registered in the period from 1967-71, a number to be 
measured against the fact that only two rigs and less than 350 workers were involved in 
the exploration activities (Ryggvik, 2000). Safety measures were mostly of the superficial 
and costless kind, such as putting up ‘smoking prohibited’ signs. The drilling culture was 
‘instrumental’ and task oriented, with the experienced drilling experts as the local heroes 
of craftsmanship. This managerial and instrumental working culture included rough and 
sometimes humiliating and brutal treatment, and disregard of even serious injuries and 
fatalities. Sudden and unwarranted dismissals could follow from minor transgressions or 
protests. Apart from such apparent deterrence mechanisms, several reasons may account 
for this acquiescence and risk tolerance from the workers (Ryggvik and Smith-
Solbakken: 1997: 95-96). Partly, they may have had some self-interest in ‘filtering’ the 
work force, as clumsiness, laziness, inefficiency etc., would be seen as a risk to everyone 
and also contrary to masculine codes of conduct gradually adopted and admired by the 
Norwegian workers themselves. A kind of ‘duality’ thus developed in the appreciation of 
the work situation, combining resentment of bad treatment and a certain fascination with 
the rough style, the latter probably reinforced by the experience of being part of the ‘oil-
adventure’. Also, low level managers and supervisors largely participated in operational 
work processes and could take the role as forerunners in problem solving and risk taking, 
thus contributing to a certain feeling of communion between leaders and workers. Harsh 
and authoritarian leadership styles were then associated with the accomplishment of 
tasks, not with a fixed order of domination and subordination, as rank orders were largely 
ignored in the free time. The period is rich on shop-floor narratives, including also 
episodes were workers would retaliate toward unpopular managers.  
 
In the construction phase throughout the 1970s, shop floor relations seem to have 
changed somewhat, as Norwegian workers gradually became more familiar with tasks 
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and technologies, and thus more self-confident and intolerant towards harassment. They 
would exploit their practical knowledge against managerial inexperience, typically 
‘reversing’ the formal hierarchy by exposing the incompetence of supervisors. Even 
outright negligence or defiance of orders would occur, often justified, as the stories go, 
by juxtaposing their own craftsmanship with ‘stupid orders’. A stronger worker’s 
collective thus developed during the 1970s (Ryggvik and Smith-Solbakken, 1997). But a 
high degree of risk acceptance at the shop floor level was also part of this rough culture, 
including a typical macho attitude towards personal injuries, which extended far into the 
1980s, in particular on the drilling platforms (Haukelid, 1998).  
 
The petroleum industry was only gradually incorporated into the Norwegian system of 
organized labour relations and general agreements. Union history in the early years is 
complex, combining national strategies, local initiatives, and shifting alliances. Several 
local interest groups appeared and disappeared, some of them organized as local 
‘company unions’, partly in order prevent the impact of strong industry-wide 
unionization. The national labour confederation (LO) had problems with establishing 
themselves in the emerging industry, in part because of anti-unionism among oil 
companies. It seems that several large companies such as Phillips and Mobil worked hard 
to keep unions out, hoping that they could ‘operate on their own’. But also, workers did 
not constitute a uniform collective, and it was hard to define and categorize groups with 
common denominators and interests. The LO wanted to use the general industrial model, 
ie. that all workers be organized together in one union for offshore employees with a 
corporative system based on centralized negotiations.  
 
Some critical events contributed to consolidating and strengthening the unions (Ryggvik 
and Smith-Solbakken, 1997). In 1978 an open conflict developed, starting with what has 
been termed ‘the oil-worker revolt’. On 20 May 1978 an unplanned strike among 600 
Brownaker workers at Eldfisk (Alpha and Bravo) broke out. An American supervisor had 
physically attacked a Norwegian foreman for conducting a job based on outdated plans 
and drawings. The foreman was also fired. The same day another foreman was fired 
because he overslept (himself claiming that he wasn’t woken up). The chief safety 
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representative asked for a meeting, but was also fired. A spontaneous strike then broke 
out, and the condition set for returning to work was that the supervisor be removed from 
his position. The strike was declared illegal, but the supervisor was finally transferred to 
the British sector. This incident introduced the most comprehensive wave of strikes in 
Norway since WWII. Unrest typically occurred among contractor employees. These were 
short-timers, the business was competitive, and strike-demands were often met, largely 
because of the enormous costs involved in delayed production. The right granted to the 
safety representatives to stop dangerous work also appeared in this period as a powerful 
weapon.  
 
At the turn of the decade, two major unions dominated the petroleum industry: the  
LO union, NOPEF, which largely organized employees in the contractor and supply 
industry, and OFS, who organized the majority of the offshore operator employees. OFS 
had largely grown out of the local company unions, and was for many years operating 
independently of any national confederation.45 Whereas the LO unions were bound by 
the national consensus of modesty and solidarity as part of the corporate agreements, 
OFS was from the beginning more independent, aggressive, and anti-authoritarian. Their 
more sector-oriented, activist, and self-assertive policies attracted accusation
irresponsibility and selfishness, and lack of solidarity with broader groups of workers. 
But they managed to create a unity among quite diverse groups in the industry. Their 
partial successes made them an attractive alternative for contractor workers in NOPEF 
and other unions, and there has naturally been a competition for members and attention 
between the two. The wave of industrial unrest was gradually brought under more control 
throughout the 1980s, moving toward fuller integration into the national corporative 
system. The balance of power and strategic alliances between the unions and workers, the 
industrial companies, and the state, have shifted throughout the petroleum era, depending 
on several factors; some of these may be related to structural and external factors, such as 
s of 
                                                 
45 OFS (The Federation of Offshore Worker Unions) became member of the nationwide union YS in 1997. 
It was incorporated into a larger cluster of industrial federations in 2005, with the new acronym SAFE (The 
Federation of Oil Workers Trade Unions Within the Energy Sector). The same happened with NOPEF (The 
Norwegian Federation of Oil and Petro-Chemical Workers), which since 2006 is part of the Industry-
Energy Federation. The number of organized workers is generally high (80-90 percent), and the two unions 
are about equal in strength. OFS/SAFE has a stronger foothold among the operating oil-companies, 
whereas Industry-Energy (NOPEF) are stronger in the supply/contractor industry and the rig companies.  
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labour market conditions; but also single events, such as the triggers and outcomes of 
strikes, have had an impact.46 The role and strength of workers and their unions in the 
development of risk levels and management strategies have however been strongly 
emphasized by historians of this period (Ryggvik, 2000; Ryggvik and Smith-Solbakken, 
1997). The relative contribution of pressures from below is still hard to evaluate very 
accurately, especially as these worked in consort with a strengthening of regulatory 
pressures. The implementation of the internal control reforms, new technologies, and a 
more committed leadership, had made HSE-concerns a legitimate and integrated part of 
the industrial management philosophies and practices. Staffs of safety personnel with 
fairly independent roles could also interfere in management decisions, and together with 
increased worker mobilization and self confidence, this contributed to making priority to 
HSE issues inescapable. Throughout the 1980s, there were substantial improvements in 
safety and a substantial drop in the number of accidents (see below). But, as noted above, 
the drop in oil prices throughout the 1990s instigated a process of downsizing, 
restructuring, increased use of contractors, etc., jeopardizing the achievements made and 
also instigating stronger external pressures on the fragmented unions. 
Risks in the petroleum industry 
Health and safety risks related to the offshore petroleum activities cover an extensive 
number of areas, both in terms of causes of hazards and in terms of possible outcomes.47 
                                                 
46 A comparison with the British sector has been conducted for filling out this picture (Beck et al., 1998; 
Ryggvik, 2000). In Norway, strikes proved to be a powerful weapon, in contrast to the British sector. 
Economic framework conditions were more favourable in Norway. Unemployment was low, and the risks 
of activism were not perceived as too great. In Britain, however, unemployment was high. Also, from 1981, 
Thacher’s aggressive anti-union policy worked against activist strategies. Norwegian oil workers were full 
of self-confidence, prompted by successful strikes, whereas British Workers suffered from resignation and 
demoralization. In the British system, the provisions regarding the role of workers representatives were 
thus excluded from the Health and Safety at Work Act, due to efficient resistance from the industry. The 
use of corporate channels may also explain the differences, since Britain had a more decentralized and less 
corporatist national union (TUC), compared to the Norwegian LO. As noted, workers in Norway also 
gained considerable public support, and a correspondingly critical attitude towards foreign oil companies. 
However, internal dynamics of the various conflicts must also be considered. The success of the first 
strike(s), motivated further action. Filling out this picture, it could be noted that after the successes of the 
‘revolts’ starting in the late 1970s, a turning point occurred in 1990. An illegal strike was curbed by well 
prepared and strongly organized employers, which made a lasting impact, also on platform culture 
(Ryggvik and Solbakken, 1997). 
 
47 We concentrate here is on the risks regulated within the jurisdiction of the PSA. Main sources are to be 
found on the PSA websites (http://www.ptil.no/English/Helse+miljo+og+sikkerhet/Fakta_statistikk). Other 
 71
Risks include a large variety of factors, such as helicopter transport, fires and explosions 
(of hydrocarbons or other substances), blow-outs from wells, lifting and crane operations, 
and falling objects. Outcomes include fatalities as the worst case, in particular within the 
scenario of major accidents; they include occupational injuries, from cuts and bruises to 
serious and invalidating accidents, and also occupational illness, often as the result of 
long term exposures to various hazards (like noise, chemicals, bad ergonomics, etc.). 
Risk indicators are now broadly categorized in terms of major accidents, occupational 
accidents and occupational health, each of which will be briefly considered below. It 
should be noted, however, that the relationship between these broad categories have been 
increasingly focussed, drawing attention to the effects that the general working conditions 
have for operational safety. Physical and mental strain and stress may affect not only the 
health of individual workers, but also operational safety in the execution of tasks. And the 
regulatory requirements, addressing the underlying causes of risk (management, 
organization, operations, etc.), do not distinguish between the various outcomes that may 
result.48 
 
Seen in a long term perspective, there has been a tremendous improvement on some 
salient risk indicators, such as fatal accident rates. The first fatal accident occurred in 
1967. Since then there has been 260 fatalities, including fatalities related to major 
accidents.49 The capsize of the Alexander Kielland flotel in 1980 account for almost half 
of these, and the majority of fatalities have thus occurred as a result of major accidents 
(53 percent); and if we include helicopter accidents (17,7 percent of the total), fatalities 
related to major accidents account for 73 percent of the total number. Occupational 
accidents account for 23,8 percent, and diving accidents for 5,4 percent. If we only 
considerer figures after 1981, however, occupational accidents account for 64 percent of 
all fatalities. During the 1980s, a considerable reduction in the number of fatalities was 
achieved. Until 1980 there were 88 fatal accidents on the shelf. From 1980 to 1990 
                                                                                                                                                 
or more specific sources are provided throughout the presentation. An overview of risk indicators is 
provided in Appendix 2. 
48 This was particularly pointed out in the White papers from 2002 and 2006 (Ministry of Labour and 
Government Administration, 2002; Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, 2006). 
49 Major accident is defined by the PSA as an accident in which at least five persons may be involved, or an 
accident caused by failure of one or more of the system’s integral safety and preparedness barriers. There is 
no universal definition of the concept but this one is often applied. 
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(disregarding the Alexander Kielland capsize) there were only 13 fatalities, in spite of the 
fact that the level of activity had quadrupled. Seven of these were diving accidents. From 
1990 to 2000, there were 7 fatalities related to occupational accidents, and since 2000 
there have been only 3. The last fatal accident offshore was in 2002. Fatal accidents have 
now reached a status of extraordinary concern and attention. Their measurement in terms 
of so-called FAR values (fatal accident rates) does no longer seem meaningful, as one 
single death would cause great fluctuations.50 As noted, diving accidents account for a 
relatively large proportion of the fatalities, 17 in total numbers, although no such 
fatalities have occurred since 1987. Long term and serious health impairments have also 
been registered for divers, however, in particular among the so-called pioneer divers (in 
the period 1965-1990). The extent and magnitude of these delayed injuries (such as 
decompression sickness, changes in organic/neurological functions, etc.) have been 
subject to much scientific, professional, political, and also legal, controversy.  
 
The tools and methods for registering and analyzing risk have improved dramatically 
over the years. A milestone in this respect was the initiation of an ambitious and large 
scale project towards the late 1990s, aiming to make a general and comprehensive risk 
evaluation for the whole NCS. Risk evaluations and reporting practices had thus far 
largely been conducted for individual risk indicators separately, such as occupational 
accidents, gas leaks, fires, well kicks51, etc. The project was titled “Trends in Risk Levels 
– Norwegian Continental Shelf” (in Norwegian termed with the acronym RNNS), with 
the stated objective to obtain “a more unbiased and measurable basis on which to 
evaluate developments in the overall risk of major accidents taking place, as well as to 
                                                 
50 Fatal accident rate is measured as the statistically expected number of fatalities per 100 million work 
hours. Comparisons with onshore industries are difficult on a general level, but in relation to comparable 
industries, such as refineries, the offshore industry scores considerably better. A study for the period 1988-
1997 measured average FAR values for offshore and refining industries to a little less than 3 against a little 
more than 6, thus more than twice as high for refineries (Vinnem, 1998). Compared to international 
statistics in the petroleum industry, the Norwegian shelf is not extreme however, despite reluctance by 
some to fully trust those figures, especially for some third world countries (see 
http://www.ogp.org.uk/Publications). 
51 Well-kick means loss of control over a well, resulting in uncontrolled backflow of drilling liquid. It is an 
indication of a blow-out due to the well taking in gas, oil, or water. 
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identify which problem areas constitute the largest contributors” (NPD, 2001).52 
Important additional objectives were to identify potential areas for making regulatory 
changes and to use the knowledge acquired as a basis for identifying research and 
development needs.53 The project has made extensive use of expert groups representing a 
variety of disciplines (risk analysis, statistics, social science, technological expertise, 
etc.). The project also involves extensive collaboration with the industry, both in terms of 
expert assistance and in terms of data collection. The NPD, and later the PSA, have had 
the main responsibility for the project and for the production of reports. In terms of scope 
it covers all production and mobile units on the NCS, the transport of personnel by 
helicopter, and the use of vessels inside the safety zone around the installations.54 The 
first report (the pilot project) appeared in 2001 (NPD, 2001), covering historical trends 
and making an overall assessment of data gathered for the period 1996-2000.  
 
The project has been followed up each year since then and results are presented in 
comprehensive annual reports, which continually evaluate short and long-term changes 
and trends in risk exposure. The project now covers the whole spectre of risks to 
personnel, divided into the three main categories of major accidents, occupational 
accidents, and work environment factors. Both qualitative and quantitative indicators are 
used, including quantitative risk analyses related to major accidents, comprehensive 
questionnaire surveys, interviews with selected key informants, fieldwork on selected 
installations, and conferences and workshops targeted against specific risk areas. A 
number of methodological limitations related to risk estimates has been addressed and 
partly compensated for since the project was initiated. Indicators exclusively based on 
                                                 
52 RNNS: RisikoNivå på Norsk Sokkel. All reports are available, with summaries in English, at: 
http://www.ptil.no/English/Helse+miljo+og+sikkerhet/Risikonivaa+paa+sokkelen/. We refer henceforth 
primarily to the year that the reports cover. 
53 The current and ‘updated’ purpose of the project is to: “(1) measure the results of  HSE work in the 
petroleum industry; (2) help to identify areas which are critical for HSE and in which priority must be 
given to identifying causes in order to prevent unplanned events and accidents; (3) improve understanding 
of the possible causes of accidents and their relative significance in the context of risk, in order to create a 
reliable decision-making platform for the industry and authorities in regard to preventive safety measures 
and emergency preparedness planning” (PSA, 2007).  
54 The project is limited to factors which fall under the PSA’s area of jurisdiction. Helicopter transport is 
restricted to transport between the helicopter terminal and the installation (point of departure to point of 
landing on installation/arrival at heliport). The land installations (eight specified installations, of which two 
are in the construction phase) have been incorporated in the project from 2006 
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past/historical events would not directly uncover changes in underlying conditions 
influencing risk levels, such as deteriorating maintenance of technical systems. Also, the 
number of events related to individual hazards may be limited, in some cases amounting 
to very few or even none in the course of a year. Measuring the performance of different 
barrier functions against major accidents has been an important additional source for 
determining changes in risk levels. Furthermore, criteria precision, procedures, 
judgments, and attitudes, all of which may affect registration and reporting practices, 
have been discussed and addressed.55 
 
An assessment of the overall distribution of risk factors was made just before the start of 
the RNNS project, identifying major accidents, occupational accidents, and helicopter 
accidents as representing respectively 30/30/40 percent of the risk to personnel (Vinnem, 
1998). Thus, the helicopter flight represented by far the single most dangerous activity in 
the industry. A crucial contribution of the RNNS project was the development of uniform 
indicators for assessing risk. 21 categories of ‘defined situations of hazard and accident’ 
have been identified, providing a comprehensive set of indicators for evaluating risk 
levels, both individually and through the total assessments made. Important categories 
include hydrocarbon leaks, fires, well kicks, structural damage, injuries, illness, etc. (see 
Appendix 2 for an overview). A number of measurements are developed for each of these 
categories, including parameters for normalizing against the level of activity, such as the 
number of man-hours, the number of drilled wells, volumes of produced hydrocarbons, 
etc. Also, methods are developed for comparing the risk contribution of the various risk 
factors, both within and between the categories.  
Major accident risk 
The long term improvements in risk levels are reflected in the frequency of major 
accidents. In the period up to 1980 there were five such major offshore accidents, in the 
                                                 
55 The measurement of changes in the efficiency of the barriers (e.g. fire-walls, fire-fighting, and detection 
systems) has improved, and other uncertainties and limitations have partly been compensated for, e.g. 
through relatively thorough quality control of the data and the establishment of more precise criteria, such 
as thresholds for reporting gas leaks. The impact of possible underreporting of such leaks is reduced by 
including only leaks greater than 0,1 kg/s  in the statistics; this is a substantial leak that normally will result 
in alarm and munster on the installation, and thus be difficult to avoid reporting.  
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1980s there were two. There have not been any major accidents since 1992, and the last 
major accident with fatal outcomes (helicopter accidents excluded) occurred in 1986. 
Measuring the risk of major accidents now depends largely on analyses of incidents 
related to a selected sample of the 21 indicators. Important indicators include 
uncontrolled discharge of hydrocarbons, fires, well incidents, and construction-related 
incidents. Data related to barrier performance, work accidents, and working environment 
factors are also included.  
 
The annual number of occurrences related to major accidents has varied between some 50 
and nearly 120 in the period from 1996-2006. Non-ignited hydrocarbon leaks (gas leaks), 
well incidents, and ships on collision course account for the largest contributors in 
absolute numbers. In judging the risk, however, absolute numbers are of less value since 
the relative contribution of each occurrence varies widely. Still, these event types taken 
together contribute most to the total indicator (see below) for loss of life in connection 
with major accidents on production installations. For mobile installations, damage to 
supporting structures, is a major contributor. Gas leaks are considered an important 
contributor to major accident risk. From 1996 there has been an overall decrease from 
more than 30 such leaks to 15 in 2005. There are some large fluctuations, however, with 
2000 and 2002 as peak years, both with more than 40 registered leaks. The risk potentials 
vary greatly with the size of the leaks, however, classified in three categories (0,1-1 kg/s, 
1-10 kg/s, and >10 kg/s). Leaks larger than 10 kg/s are considered extremely dangerous, 
and there are six such occurrences in the last ten years. All leaks above 0.1 kg/s are 
classified as substantial, however, and even the smallest of these could have serious 
consequences if they ignite, particularly in enclosed spaces. The high level of leaks has 
caused much attention and concern over the last years. Comparisons with the British 
sector have shown a considerably higher frequency on the NCS, adding to the 
understanding that improvements were both necessary and possible. Following an 
initiative from the NPD/PSA, the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) 
implemented a project in 2003 in order to reduce the number of leaks larger than 0.1 kg/s 
by 50 percent (measured against the average for 2000-2002) by the end of 2005. 
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According to the figures from the 2005 report, the goal was met, and more ambitious 
targets were set; but the figures are still considerably higher than in the British sector.56  
 
An aggregate risk indicator for major accidents has also been developed, based on the 
frequency and severity of incidents and on the weighted potential of each incident for 
causing fatalities (the statistically anticipated number of fatalities). The total risk estimate 
for major accidents is thus arrived at through a relatively complex model, but is presented 
only as a calculated indicator, not as explicitly showing the risk level (see Appendix 2). 
After a significant deterioration in safety from 1996 to 2000, no clear changes in the 
aggregate risk level estimate have been observed since 2000, however. Improvements in 
some indicators seem to be offset by deteriorations in others, and annual variations have 
been relatively large. Also, despite a reduction in the total number of incidents, the 
potential consequences of some of these have been so severe that the overall risk appears 
unchanged. It is generally emphasized in the RNNS reports that a long-term perspective 
is necessary and that single and perhaps unpredictable incidents could soon change the 
overall picture. Even if general trends are difficult to identify, the RNNS data still reveal 
the relative contribution of different risks, and are thus important sources for identifying 
areas in need of special attention. 
Occupational accidents 
The present reporting system for occupational accidents and injuries was introduced with 
the WEA in 1978. Currently, some 400 injuries are reported to the PSA annually. ‘Injury’ 
includes death, absence from the next shift, or medical treatment, but excludes first aid 
treatment. The risk indicator used is the frequency of injuries per 1 million man-hours. As 
for the major accident risks indicators, injury rates are best analyzed in a long term 
perspective, and minor changes from year to year would normally not be statistically 
significant. In this long term perspective, the rates have decreased steadily, fluctuating 
between 30 and 40 up until the mid 1980s, where it stabilized around 25, and is currently 
approximating some 10 injuries per million man-hours. There are large differences 
                                                 
56 Se 2006 report. Partly this is also due to parallel reductions on the British sector. Based on a five year 
average (2000-2005), it has been estimated that Norwegian figures (normalized against platform years) are 
some 3 times higher than British figures. The frequency of ignited leaks has been higher on the British shelf 
however. 
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between groups, however, making it more enlightening to look at figures for different 
kinds of work (from drilling to catering services), and different categories of facilities, 
notably production installation and mobile rigs (see Appendix 2 for statistics from 1997-
2006). The frequency of injuries on mobile rigs has generally been higher, but has also 
been subject to the greatest improvements. In particular, the frequency of injuries related 
to drilling and well operations has been high. During the first years of systematic 
registration, there were more than 70 injuries per 1 million man-hours related to these 
activities on production installations, accounting for the general view that these were the 
most dangerous parts of offshore operations. But the frequencies gradually approximated 
the general average, and were superseded in 1996 by construction and maintenance work. 
The registration of man-hours on mobile rigs was first established in 1990, and had then 
the highest frequency of injuries of all categories, mobile as well as fixed (more than 50). 
The average for all groups on mobile rigs during the 1990s was relatively stable, ranging 
somewhere between 31 and 35, and in fact increasing toward the end of the decennium. 
In particular, increased frequencies among operations and maintenance contributed to 
this, going from around 13 in 1990 to 40 in 2000. Since 2000, however, there has been a 
significant decrease in the relative amount of injuries for all categories. Figures for 
drilling and well operations on mobile rigs are particularly striking, going from around 50 
in 2000 to some 11 in 2006. The total frequency on mobile units was reduced from 33,7 
in 2000 to only 10,7 in 2006. For the first time the level of injuries in mobile rigs was 
then at the same level as for fixed installations. Frequencies have generally been higher 
for contractor employees, partly reflecting the fact that they generally perform more 
dangerous jobs (such as drilling and well operations), but these differences have also 
levelled out.  
 
The reporting system singles out serious occupational injuries, which generally account 
for less than 10 percent of the total injuries.57 Compared to onshore refineries in Norway, 
levels are about the same. Frequencies for serious injuries generally follow the trends for 
all injuries. They showed an increase in the second half of 1990, followed by a significant 
                                                 
57 Serious injuries are defined according to several specific criteria, such as serious fractures, loss of 
consciousness, injuries that cause long term sick leaves, or permanent invalidation. 
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decline since then, except for a peak in the years 2000 and 2001, with more than 2 
injuries per million man-hours. Since 2004, the frequency has oscillated around 1 serious 
injuries per million man-hours, which is significantly below the average for the last ten 
years. The total number of serious injuries in 2006 was 22 on production installations and 
13 on mobile units. Mobile rigs still make the largest relative contribution to serious 
injuries. (with a rate of 1,7 in 2006 compared to 0,8 on production installations). 
Compared to the British sector, the frequency of serious injuries has been roughly the 
same, but with significantly higher fatality rates in the British sector.58  
Occupational health 
All though occupational accidents traditionally have received much attention in the 
petroleum industry, as in other industries, the magnitude of risks (and costs) related to 
occupational illness have in fact been estimated to be higher.59 Risks related to 
occupational health and illness include a number of factors, such as exposure to 
chemicals and noise, muscular-skeletal strain, conditions for rest and restitution, working 
hours, and psychosocial work environment. Offshore workers are exposed to physically 
straining tasks, often in a harsh and noisy out-door environment; noise and bad whether 
accounted for the majority of exposures reported in the 2005 questionnaire (RNNS, 2005 
report). Overall, muscular-skeletal ailments appear as the single most important 
contributor to work-related health problems. A majority of offshore workers report that 
they occasionally or often perform heavy lifting and repetitive movements, and that they 
often work in strained positions; a large proportion report that they suffer from muscular-
skeletal pain. Some 30 and 40 percent report impaired hearing, headaches, and skin 
complaints, largely due to work-related factors. In the 2003 report, newly established 
indicators for noise exposure and management of chemical health risk showed that large 
groups of employees were subjected to exposures that exceeded permitted limits. Risks 
                                                 
58 For the period from 2001 to the first half of 2006 there were on average 1,05 cases of serious injury per 
million man-hours on the NCS, against 1,14 in the British sector. The average fatal accident rate on the 
NCS was 1,13 per 100 million man-hours, against 3,9 on the British shelf (amounting to a total of 2 
fatalities against 10 in absolute numbers). Joint reports are produced regularly (RNNS, 2006 report). 
59 This has been measured in terms of absence, disability, and work-related death. Costs of work-related 
illness has been estimated as the ranging somewhere between NOK 280-450 million. See Ministry of 
Labour and Social Inclusion  (2006) for a summary, based on studies carried out by The National Institute 
of Occupational Health, and ECON, a consultancy firm specialized in economic analysis. 
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related to chemical work environment have received considerable attention for some 
years. About 70 cases of illness related to chemical exposure are reported every year. 
Considerable effort has been made to improve industry performance in this area, such as 
through registration systems, reporting, substitution of dangerous chemicals, and medical 
monitoring.60  
 
Psycho-social working environment is largely monitored in terms of the degree of 
supervision, job demands, and support found in the job. The results pertaining to 
supervision are positive for most employees. Although many experience that they face 
great demands in their work concerning work tempo, concentration, knowledge, and 
skills, the majority reports that their work is often challenging in a positive way: they get 
good support, particularly from their closest colleagues, although there is a perceived 
potential for improvement in relation to feedback from line management. About ¼ report 
that they never or only rarely get any feedback. There are also 3 percent who report that 
they are bullied or harassed, amounting to more than 300 persons in absolute numbers 
(RNNS 2005 report). 
Politics and perceptions of risk 
The issue of risk levels in the offshore petroleum industry is certainly not only a matter of 
objective measurement and calculation. And even the more balanced and well-reasoned 
evaluations enter the public domains of risk politics, with contested perceptions 
concerning both the risks and the strategies chosen to regulate and manage them. At the 
time of writing, legal claims for compensation from a number of former divers from the 
pioneer-era are subject to court proceedings, where the government itself is on trial 
regarding their responsibility for regulatory negligence during this period. After years of 
controversy over facts and responsibilities, the government has taken “moral and political 
responsibility” for the acknowledged fate of the pioneer divers, and has established 
several compensatory schemes. Legal responsibility in accordance with statutory 
                                                 
60 The robustness of indicators related to these risk factors is clearly variable, and there are differences 
between companies in the understanding of criteria for reporting risk exposures. 
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compensation law has not been acknowledged, however, due to the claim that the 
government as such had no direct role as an operator or employer in the activities.61  
 
Although this case is extraordinary, it serves as a strong reminder that risk issues are 
often value laden and controversial, regularly mobilizing the affected stakeholders, and in 
this case also challenging the governmental role as regulatory authority. On the whole, 
however, the regulators appear to have had a relatively strong and legitimate position in 
the public, and have regularly positioned themselves in the role as authoritative and 
reliable in the politics and evaluation of risk. The introduction of the large scale RNNS 
project was an important contribution in this ongoing process, in particular as the 
relationship between ‘measured’ and ‘perceived’ risk levels was subject to continuous 
concern and debate among the involved parties and stakeholders. Although the industry 
would generally be seen as ‘under-estimating’ and the unions as ‘overestimating’ the 
‘real’ risk level, the RNNS reports could alternate in ‘supporting’ either side, and could 
regularly also measure workers’ risk perceptions’ against changes in risk trends.62 
Risk controversies and climate changes 
Towards the end of the 1990s there was a mounting conflict between the parties about the 
development of risk levels. Some industry representatives stated that risk levels had 
shown a steady decline and that HSE conditions had “never been better” (Ryggvik, 
2000). The largest unions, however, claimed that conditions had gradually deteriorated, 
largely due to extensive cost savings, downsizing, industrial negligence, and self-
complacency. Industry representatives countered that the unions had hidden agendas and 
were basically serving their own interests, such as attracting membership interest. These 
conflicts were voiced in a number of contexts and arenas, and were most clearly 
                                                 
61 The government has only very restricted legal responsibilities for inappropriate or absent regulations and 
control schemes, and the Supreme Court has been very restrictive in making the regulatory authorities 
liable for damages and compensation. The ongoing proceedings are therefore of great societal and legal 
importance, and attract a considerable amount of public attention. 
62 It may be noted that in the RNNS- questionnaire, respondents evaluated the risk potential in connection 
with the different accident scenarios as higher in 2005 than in 2003, despite the fact that no increase was 
registered. The impact of some conspicuous incidents in 2004 may partly account for that. The risks of gas 
leaks, fire, blow-out, spills, collision, and sabotage/terror were considered by all groups of respondents as 
higher in 2005 than in 2003. With the exception of collisions, no increase was registered in neither the 
number nor the scope of accidents in these categories. Only the perceived risk of helicopter accidents was 
lower in 2005 than in 2003 (RNNS 2005 report). 
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documented in the first RNNS pilot report, which included extensive interviews with 
some of the key actors (NPD, 2001).  
 
Largely, the concerns of the unions were confirmed in the risk evaluations, and were also 
supported by research that pointed to the effects of the NORSOK-process, and that the 
strong focus on cost reductions in the face of falling oil-prices had endangered safety 
robustness (Ryggvik, 2000; Hovden, 2002; Vinnem, 1998). A study of serious accidents 
and near misses demonstrated failing safety systems, partly due to reductions in resources 
and the removal of positions and functions designated for health and safety issues, such 
as safety officers. Part of the new and ‘lean’ organizational designs was that HSE-issues 
should be a ‘management-responsibility’, and not delegated to staff functions. Not 
objecting to the idea of ‘management responsibility’, critics still pointed to the need for 
specialized expertise and designated watch dog positions (Ryggvik, 2000). The 
conflicting perspectives were sharpened also when key industry representatives 
questioned the research, largely based on the observation that there had been no clear 
increases in the total frequency of injuries. This in turn also caused discussions about the 
validity of these figures as adequate indicators of the overall risk level, in particular with 
respect to health and major accidents.  
 
All in all, the NPD shared the concerns of the unions. Although the changes did not 
manifest themselves clearly in the NPD registration systems (such as injury frequencies), 
the agency still warned that falling oil prices should not lead to rash measures that would 
reduce safety levels. They also resisted pressure from the industry to soften regulatory 
standards. In 1999, the NPD director wrote in the annual report that: “Several 
independent observations and evaluations indicate that the total level of risk is increasing 
and that the negative trend will continue in the next decade”. The first observations from 
the RNNS pilot project supported their conclusions, and in September 2000 the NPD 
Director General sent clear message in a letter to all licensees: 
 
The last couple of years a new critical focus has been directed towards the safety on the 
Norwegian shelf. The unions have been very active, both toward the media and the 
authorities, in communicating that the situation develops in the wrong direction. Studies 
conducted by risk analysis expertise at universities and in the industry provide well 
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substantiated claims that the risk is increasing. By and large, the NPD shares this view…. 
In this situation we regret to say that the actors in the industry do not seem to fully realize 
these problems. The companies have the same access to data from the industry as we 
have, but in the media some company representatives have claimed that safety has never 
been better. 
 
This was seen as a strong message, both in form and content. It was intended to ‘settle 
things straight’, to teach the industry a lesson, and to resume (or confirm) authority. The 
concern also reached the political level, and a decision was made to issue a separate 
White paper on health and safety in the petroleum industry at more regular intervals. 
Also, voices from the companies gradually appeared, confirming the NPD view, and 
calling for a more humble and self-critical approach from the industry.  
 
On Christmas Eve 2000, there was a fatal accident on a platform at the Oseberg field, 
operated by Hydro. Both the timing and the seriousness caused much public attention. As 
noted, fatalities were rare occurrences, and Hydro had been particularly criticized for 
jeopardizing safety; only two weeks before the accident the NPD had issued a report 
about the negative safety effects caused by efficiency measures in the Oseberg field, and 
the subsequent accident investigation revealed serious flaws in how Hydro operated the 
field. Even closure of the field was considered in the aftermath. Extensive media 
coverage exposed the conflicts in public and included broad brush characterizations of 
increasing offshore risks, and deteriorating ‘safety cultures’, ‘management cultures’, and 
‘company cultures’. ‘Culture’ thus entered the public domain as a general label for both 
surface symptoms and underlying forces in how the industry was run. 
 
A more cooperative climate emerged, however, and several joint projects were started. 
The mounting conflicts between the parties were largely approached by trying to rebuild 
trust. In 2001, the so-called Safety Forum was established as a joint tripartite arena for 
dealing with HSE issues. The Forum was to be led by the NPD, and included all key 
players, notably the industry associations and the unions. The ministry was given the 
status of observer. According to the mandate, the purpose of Safety Forum was “to 
contribute to increased knowledge and understanding of why and how the Norwegian oil 
and gas industry should be a pioneer industry as regards HSE, both on a national and 
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international level.” The forum has since its establishment served as a reference group 
and consultation body for a number of key projects, such as RNNS, and has participated 
in the preparation of the governmental White papers on HSE. As part of this ‘joint effort’, 
a project was established by OLF in order to promote a more harmonized and sustained 
attention to HSE issues, called Working Together for Safety ( WTfS). A number of 
working groups were established and several joint recommendations and practical safety 
tools have been developed, such as common systems for work permits and for so-called 
‘safe-job-analysis’. This was a response to complaints about disparate systems and 
practices between platforms and companies, which caused confusion and also a perceived 
threat to safety; in particular, contractor employees, were confronted with many such 
divergent systems.63 WTfS has regularly reported to the Safety Forum. Also, an extensive 
educational program in ‘regulatory competence’ was developed for the industry in order 
to enhance knowledge about the new regulatory framework.  
 
In the forth RNNS report (for the year 2003) interviews with key informants indicated 
increased confidence and a better climate of cooperation. The newly established arenas 
such as the Safety Forum and Working Together for Safety were reported as having 
contributed significantly to this. The RNNS project in itself also served as a major 
contribution in settling some of the disputes by providing a coherent and largely agreed 
upon overview of trends in risk levels and a systematic account of key risk indicators. 
The increase in several key risk indicators could not be disputed, such as hydrocarbon 
leaks, well-kicks, and collisions between platforms and supply vessels. Also, isolating 
serious injuries from the general injury frequencies, showed a considerable increase in 
the former. The later improvements in injury rates have largely been attributed to the 
‘new deal’ efforts starting after the turn of the millennium. 
Penetrating the risk indicators: human, social, and cultural factors 
Changes were also evident in studies of HSE perceptions among offshore workers. As 
noted, the RNNS project included a battery of questions related to what gradually 
                                                 
63 This issue has generally received low scores in the RNNS questionnaires (se Appendix 3). More than 70 
percent of contractor employees have reported that different procedures and routines in different 
installations were perceived as a threat to safety (RNNS 2003 report).  
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appeared under the heading ‘safety climate’. The climate part of the questionnaire 
received considerable attention, since it directly addressed the offshore workers’ 
experiences of the human and organizational aspects of HSE and how these were handled 
at the work place. It covered a number of critical factors, notably perceptions about 
leadership and company behaviour, rules and regulations, competence and training, items 
related to work processes and behaviour, and some more general items about HSE issues 
such as reporting practices and safety meetings.  The results of the pilot study in 2000 
revealed a mixed picture. Several items in the questionnaire had low scores, specifically 
related to issues such as the quality of hierarchical communication, cooperation between 
operators and contractors, the influence of manning levels, and the general priority of 
HSE-concerns. Two years later, most scores had improved, some of them considerably 
so. For example, the percentage that agreed (wholly/partially) with the statement "I am 
occasionally pressured to work in a manner that threatens safety" was reduced from 39 
percent to 18 percent. The 2005 study also showed significant improvements on several 
scores. For some questions, however, improvements have been less clear, such as the 
scores relating to industry's ‘paramount priorities’ and whether ‘production takes 
precedence over HSE’. Some concerns, appear as relatively constant, such as the extent 
of "doctoring" of incident reports, and the lack of cooperation between operators and 
contractors. Some items generally have had low scores, such as the quality and 
accessibility of regulations, procedures and safety systems, thus confirming the 
impression that ‘bureaucratization’ was perceived as a significant problem for the 
offshore workers (see Appendix 3).   
 
The questionnaires were important additional sources for penetrating organizational and 
cultural conditions that would influence risk levels. The risk indicators would mostly 
provide intermediary figures between antecedent factors and ultimate outcomes. 
Immediate causes would be indicated from the categories used, but the complex webs of 
underlying causes are only revealed by more comprehensive analyses and in-depth 
investigations. It appeared as a major challenge in the RNNS project to be able to link the 
risk indicators to underlying organizational and human conditions in a more transparent 
manner. In the sixth phase of the RNNS project (2005 report), a series of seminars were 
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conducted in order to identify causes and remedies for some of the most critical risk 
indicators related to serious occupational accidents and major accident. Participants in the 
seminars were handpicked on the basis of their specific expertise and background in the 
relevant areas, and were invited to discuss the relative and combined impact of 
technological, human, and organizational factors. We present here a condensed summary 
of the results, partly because these seminars highlighted a series of critical and recurring 
themes related to organizational encounters with the industrial risks, and partly because 
they convey how these were experienced and articulated by people with first-hand 
experience. But also, it should be noted how the seminar design contributed to the 
categorization and conceptual organization of these observed conditions. Five dimensions 
were used for structuring the discussions and sorting out factors thought to be critical for 
safe operations: Organization, rules and regulations; values, attitudes and competence; 
work processes; relations and networks; technology and operations.64  
 
Discussions on organization rules and regulations, centered on several topics; the 
transition from prescriptive to a function-oriented regulations was reported to have 
resulted in different sets of company-specific rules and procedures. Sometimes, these 
would be contradictory and cause uncertainty, particularly for contractor workers 
commissioned by different operators. Furthermore, procedures generally appeared as too 
complex, poorly-designed from the user’s point of view and difficult to follow in 
practice. Also, organizational changes, rationalization and cost-cutting had resulted in 
lower core manning, causing greater dependence on contractors. Frequent changes of 
contractor would in turn cause discontinuity and loss of competence and thus affect task 
performance, planning and safety management.  
 
Discussions on values, attitudes and competence, addressed factors related to training, the 
need for “facility-specific competence”, risk and safety awareness, and the use of 
reporting systems. Declining competence and limited access to experienced personnel 
with “hands on” experience were observed (such as drilling/well operations and 
                                                 
64 The model was referred to as the ‘Pentagon model’, and has been employed in various parts of the 
industry. A fuller discussion is provided in chapter 7.  
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shipping), and largely explained by low priority to recruitment and training programs. 
The gradual disappearance of facility-specific competence was explained as the result of 
maintenance work being increasingly performed by contractors, sometimes on short-
terms, and involving many levels of subcontractors. Also, a general need was identified 
for improved understanding of risk and safety at all levels of the different organizations, 
and a greater awareness of the systemic consequences of individual decisions and actions. 
Several problems were identified in relation to reporting and reporting practices. 
Underreporting could occur as a result of possible penalties or accusations of “whistle-
blowing”. On the other hand, the practice of ‘rewarding reporting’ could result in 
reporting for reporting’s sake. In both cases, reporting problems could be related to the 
fact that HSE results had become an important inter-company competitive factor, in 
particular for contractor companies afraid of losing contracts. This may also have 
affected experience transfer between companies and caused event-directed rather than 
preventive risk management strategies.  
 
Discussions on work processes addressed issues related to “visible management”, 
conflicting pressures of safety and efficiency, increased complexity and integration of 
activities, and “multi-disciplining” and fragmentation of tasks. Offshore managers, it was 
reported, had been charged with more administrative tasks and given less time to be out 
and about on the installation. This lack of visible management had negatively influenced 
their function as role-models and the perceived correspondence between “words and 
deeds” in management behaviour. Various examples were given of managers saying that 
personnel should ”take the time to work safely” but that this no longer applied when it 
was a “rush job”. In the context of widely varying offshore operations, work processes 
have critical phases in which speed of action is decisive for production results and the 
avoidance of potentially lengthy delays. Such situations gave both workers and managers 
a sense of pressure, subconscious or self-imposed, to prioritize efficiency at the cost of 
safety. The different activities performed during work operations have become more 
closely integrated and dependent on different people and work processes. This integration 
has entailed greater complexity in work processes, where individual activities have 
become more critical in terms of potential delays. This can bring extra pressure to get the 
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job done, with less concern for safety. Moreover, increased complexity in itself could 
represent a greater risk of unplanned events generated by systemic connectivity between 
tasks. Participants from various occupational categories and disciplines also reported that 
they were being charged with more roles and tasks, that specialist competence thus could 
be sacrificed due to “the insistence on multi-disciplining”, ultimately representing a 
danger to safety. 
 
Discussions on relational aspects and networks centered on interfaces between different 
organizational units, between contractors and operators, and on the importance of 
informal relations for the execution of tasks. The key players in the logistics chain must 
deal with such interfaces, sometimes simultaneous and sometimes postponed, such as 
between drilling and day-to-day operations. Actions and decisions taken by one unit (e.g. 
a project organization) may have significant safety-related consequences for another unit 
(e.g. the operating organization). The different activities must be sufficiently coordinated 
with regard to safety, underlining the importance of such factors as flow of information, 
experience transfer, mutual trust, and clear lines of responsibility. The interface between 
operator and contractor is particularly important since contractors have increasingly been 
involved in operators’ own work processes (such as maintenance and logistics). Limited 
informal contact can lead to limited understanding of each other’s work and areas of 
responsibility. More generally, faulty communication between different units can 
contribute to varying perceptions of the risk potential in work operations and prevent the 
transfer of useful experience and critical information. The widespread use of contractual 
personnel on short-term contracts makes the formation of informal networks with 
permanent crew members more difficult. This may cause few opportunities to discuss 
work-related questions with other key players. It also makes it more difficult to know 
whether or not procedures are being followed and the job properly done. 
 
Topics relating to technology and operation included more complex technologies and 
increased use of expert systems, modification of equipment and absence of 
standardization, replacement of computer systems, and choice of maintenance 
philosophy. In many areas, technological development has led to a combination of more 
 88
complex technology and increased automation. This imposes demands for more, and 
different, competence and skills. Lack of technological competence may be observed in a 
number of areas, among both managers and co-workers. The increasing use of expert 
systems mean that many activities are performed by personnel who do not necessarily 
have sufficient understanding of the consequences of their actions. Modification of 
installations has resulted in limited standardization, giving a high degree of installation-
specific technology. At the same time, increasing portions of maintenance work is being 
performed by contractor firms which sometimes lack the requisite installation-specific 
competence. The constant upgrading of computer systems and problems with data 
conversion mean that important historical system documentation is not readily accessible. 
On some older installations, historical knowledge is largely linked to individual 
experience and competence. The choice of maintenance philosophy was also put forward 
as an important safety factor. It was pointed out that there are frequent discussions 
between different discipline areas about the lifetime of production equipment versus 
maintenance. The focus on cost-saving, low core manning levels, and limited local 
knowledge of the different installations may lead to reduced availability of appropriate 
parameters in maintenance planning. 
 
The RNNS rapport summarized the results of these seminars in 4 critical themes: (1) 
communication and experience transfer between different organizational interfaces, (2) 
the formulation and use of procedures, (3) the establishment of reporting systems that 
contribute to learning, (4) adequate competence in relation to particular areas of 
discipline, specific installations, new technology, and work processes. 
Risk management: issues and controversies 
Addressing underlying causes and conditions affecting risk would be followed by 
questions about appropriate interventions and strategies, reflecting different and partly 
contradictory approaches to the understanding and management of organizational risk. In 
these matters, accommodating attempts appeared as less successful. Some of these 
controversies were clearly reflected in the seminars (and indicated in the ‘climate’- 
surveys), such as conflicts between safety and operational efficiency, use of local 
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knowledge vs expert knowledge, manning and continuity in the platform organizations, 
etc.  
 
Bureaucratization of risk management systems was a recurring concern, and generations 
of such systems had replaced each other successively during the years. Issues related to 
‘rules and regulations’ generally received low scores in the climate surveys, and only 
minor improvements could be observed. ‘Culture’ often appeared as the alternative; what 
could not be achieved through formal systems was to be achieved through culture. And 
the two could also be seen as contradictory, that safety was not reducible to ‘systems’, 
and in fact could be endangered by these. These were clearly not novel issues, as was 
clearly expressed by one of the old timers from the pioneer-era: 
 
Talking about culture – perhaps the best story is the safety meeting that I remember most 
…. it was lead by an American, at Albushell-Ekofisk in 1978. It was a start-up meeting in 
the afternoon just after dinner, with some Norwegians and Britons, half asleep. They were 
tired after work and a full dinner. On a table in front of him he had piled up stacks of paper, 
all the internal documentation from Phillips and all the Norwegian regulations. He gazed at 
his audience and said quite calmly: “Just continue sleeping. This, all these regulations and 
rules will take care of you. This meeting is just formality and routine.” He then slammed the 
table, the piles of paper falling onto the floor. Everyone in the room woke up. Then he said: 
“That’s just what this is good for. Every single one of you can kill all the people on this 
platform, by doing something stupid, by not asking questions, by challenging fate, by 
turning a valve without knowing what runs through the pipes, by cutting, by welding ….”. 
He had the audience listening intensely for 45 minutes .… His message was: “You don’t do 
anything out here without being absolutely certain that you’ve double- and triple-checked 
that you’re doing the right thing and that you know what’s going on” .… Today, in our 
culture, with outsourcing and all that, people are lumped together; some have never been on 
the platform and they hardly know each other. On the old platforms, the same gang worked 
together shift after shift, whether they were drilling contractors, catering contractors – we 
knew every single one of them …. You don’t kill people you know. On the Norwegian 
platforms it’s the “rule book”. Look at all the paper we have! That’s what takes care of us! 
Paper doesn’t take care of anyone. It sinks, or burns…. 
(former company director) 
 
These ‘conflicts’ between formal systems and actual conduct (sometimes labelled 
‘culture’) were however not accentuated as ‘political’ conflicts with camps and parties, 
although the practical and ‘operational’ (offshore) perspective would often be contrasted 
with the theoretical and ‘academic’ (onshore) perspective. ‘In theory’, however, all 
appeared to agree that formal systems should be minimized and optimally adapted to the 
practical context. The issue appeared more as a common grievance than as a conflict.  
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 Several discourses and controversies of risk management can be related to the ‘opposing 
doctrines’ briefly summarized in Chapter 1, all though the intensity of the debates varied 
according to both topics and discussants. Some issues were more or less inherently 
politicized, such as that between blamism and no-blamism, and between trade-offism and 
complementarism. The latter issue was, however, ‘politically resolved’ on repeated 
occasions, as one minister after the other proclaimed that there was no contradiction 
between economic goals and HSE goals. In this, they appeared in the ambiguous twin 
role of risk management experts and politicians. There was certainly also another 
politicized twist to the issue, as the industrial opponents would variably agree about 
trade-offism, but invariably disagree about how the trade-offs in fact served either goal 
(safety or economy). Not only union representatives lamented how these goal conflicts 
permeated the industry, as was evident also from the RNNS questionnaires. The 
precedence of operational and economic goals was often seen as related to the use of so-
called ‘key performance indicators’ (KPIs). A former deputy director of one pioneering 
oil-companies on the NCS, expressed this view most forcefully, and recalled their 
introduction thus:   
 
I remember when they introduced KPIs, with payment criteria, setting production targets 
and targets for up-time and down-time; then you can forget the whole talk of HSE. What 
happens? As soon as you come close to these limits, people start up without being sure it’s 
safe, they’ve been down too long already. They start production when they shouldn’t. .… 
Which are your KPIs? And how is the bonus-system? Operating time and production counts 
more. I remember the various consulting firms …. adopted these ideas from American 
business schools in the late 70ties. As soon as they were able to sell these concepts, KPI’s 
and all that, HSE and that culture went right out of the window. There is a direct link. At the 
very same moment you get a total disconnection between policy statements about HSE, and 
the realities you are measured against, or let yourself be measured against. In fact, you 
promise your investors production-levels to the effect that you move along the edge at the 
risk of human lives. What kind of system is that? It’s madness. You get the production 
you’re supposed to, given the framework conditions.  
 
Two other opposing doctrines had a mixed status in this politicized context, but were also 
subject to more than only ‘professional’ disagreements. In the case of quantificationism 
vs qualitivism, the issue was largely what numbers to trust, and their relative significance 
as inputs to risk management strategies. The introduction of risk indicators to the KPI 
systems had in fact contributed to transforming the priority problems to a risk 
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management controversy, as the risks related to the KPIs and other forms of industrial 
monitoring largely had relied on a rather simplistic use of such indicators. There had been 
a long tradition within the industry for statistical monitoring of risk, which relied heavily 
on registration of incidents, from larger accidents and near misses to minor injuries, like 
superficial cuts and bruises (Haukelid, 1998; 1999; Hovden, 2002). Apart from the need 
for reducing risk assessments to simple and easily measurable indicators, this approach 
has largely been justified by a widespread belief in the so-called ‘Iceberg Theory’ of 
industrial accidents. In a simplified version, it implies that there is a law-like proportional 
relationship between all kinds of incidents, i.e. that serious accidents occur at some more 
or less specified interval measured against the number of minor incidents and near 
misses, thus the ‘iceberg’.65 One implication of this idea was that of causal convergence 
between very different types of events (such as between a gas blow-out and a personal 
injury). In particular, the use of so-called Lost Time Incident figures (LTIs), often stood 
out as the most important risk indicator, and therefore as the knowledge-base from which 
risk management policies and priorities were designed.66 An important assumption 
included within this dominant iceberg philosophy has been the attribution of causes to 
‘human error’, the ‘estimated’ proportion varying from around 80 percent up to 95 
percent. Influential safety evangelists, such as the DuPont safety experts, contributed to 
                                                 
65 The intervals was originally set at 1:29:300. The theory is attributed to the American insurance official 
H.W. Heinrich, who in fact had a much more nuanced view on the relationship between different risk 
indicators  (Heinrich, 1931; Heinrich et al., 1980). 
66 As it happened, in my first encounter with the petroleum industry, I was invited to participate in a 
‘morning-meeting’, a telephone-conference between the operator’s land organization and the offshore 
production facility (contracted from another business-unit of the same company). As usual (as if ritually 
underscoring the safety-first policy) the meeting started with a review of all ‘unplanned incidents’ that had 
been reported during the last 24-hour period,. The installation manager regretfully started his report with a 
fairly detailed outline of how one of the workers had woken up in the morning with “something in his eye”. 
They could not figure out what had happened (perhaps something in his cabin?) since he certainly had used 
proper eye protection on the previous day shift. I first thought the whole story was some internal gag, only 
to be understood as essentially a message about the good safety record since the last morning-meeting. That 
was definitely not the correct interpretation. As the ‘incident’ was elaborated further, it turned out that he’d 
been sent to the nurse (‘the medic’) for treatment, which included the use of some anaesthetic ointment, 
further causing the event to be counted as an “incident involving medical treatment” (generally referred to 
as “H2-injuries”). This was such a high ranking event in their risk record system that only two such 
incidents were allowed for in their annual ‘injury budget’. This was late January, and now they had already 
used half the budget (!). The episode stole some ten minutes of the meeting (which gradually turned to the 
amounts of oil that had been produced, etc.). However, at a dinner in the afternoon, the field director of the 
company (one of the old-timer engineers with some 30 years of experience from the petroleum industry), 
lamented the exaggerated concern with all the ‘minor cuts and bruises’, compared to the ‘real dangers’ 
associated with major accident risks.  
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the spread of these ideas and to accompanying safety programs that extensively addressed 
the importance of reducing the number of ‘human errors’ (Haukelid, 1999; Ryggvik, 
2008). Much critique has been generated against this simplified view, and it has even 
been considered a dangerous smoke screen that attracts attention away from far more 
safety-critical conditions.67 Critique was also voiced from within the ranks of the 
industry, and certainly from the agency officials in the NPD and the PSA. The point was 
forcefully made by one of the old-timers in the agency, referring specifically to the use of 
injury rates as the primary risk indicator, ignoring maintenance problems and safety 
consequences following from bad platform designs: 
  
Forget the statistics and look at the realities. What’s the major accident potential, where is 
it, could you have designed it away? .… The statistics people, who’ll never say anything 
unless some calculation can be done based on historical records. They don’t recognize the 
potential for major accidents .… The industry is full of people obsessed with describing the 
leaf, the structure of the leaf or the sprig on the bough. They forget the trees and the forests. 
 
Not surprisingly, the conflicts regarding risk levels towards the end of the 1990s were 
partly related to the industrial reliance on simplistically interpreted injury figures. From 
the NPD/PSA point of view, the RNNS project was seen as a major contribution towards 
a more comprehensive evaluation of risk factors and their relative impact. Risks related to 
major accidents and to work related illness was to occupy a far more prominent position 
in the annual reports than injury statistics. Still, the trust in numbers was ambiguous, 
since the professional risk evaluators in the agency clearly believed that the far more 
sophisticated approaches in the RNNS project were designed to avoid reductionist 
presumptions, such as those of the Iceberg Theory. The risk evaluations included a 
number of technical factors, such as the presence and performance of technological 
defences and barriers, and organizational factors, such as communication, stress, and the 
general working environment conditions. And although the reliance on historical data 
was important, much attention was also devoted to the impact of framework conditions 
and structural changes not yet apparent in the indicator records. Such factors included the 
aging of platforms, aging of the work force, old and ‘rotten’ wells, increasing reliance on 
                                                 
67 The investigation reports after the BP Texas Refinery explosion (see chapter 2) both pointed to the 
preoccupation with operational error as a contributing factor to the negligence of the more dangerous and 
complex processual risks (Baker et al., 2007; CSB, 2007) See also Hale (2001) and Hopkins (2000). We 
return to this discussion in chapter 8. 
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computer based operations, rapid organizational changes, and increasingly amorphous 
work processes and organizational forms. 
 
The analysis and evaluation of risks and their ‘causes’ had implications for management 
and strategies of prevention. According to the ‘Iceberg view’, focus would be on the 
attitudes and alertness of the ‘morally committed worker’ and a close monitoring of 
behaviour at the sharp end of production. Alternatively, priority should be given to 
investments in ‘forgiving technologies’ and redundant designs, making room for human 
failure, flexibility, autonomy, and absence of continuous control.  
 
These divergent positions have often been framed in a politicized language reflecting 
oppositions between workers interests and industry interests. In their ‘doctrinal’ form, the 
positions were mutually rephrased as adversarial stereotypes. Worker’s representatives 
would accuse companies of using behaviour-based safety approaches (referred to with the 
acronym BBS) as a way of putting responsibility and blame on workers, provokingly 
phrasing their techniques as ‘concern for workers’ while avoiding expensive investments. 
Company representatives would accuse workers (or their representatives) of escaping 
their share of responsibility, putting all blame on management and ‘external’ factors. This 
polemic thus involved mutual attributions of ‘motive’ and a search for ‘hidden agendas’ 
of adversary parties. The industry was seen as choosing a cheap way out, hiding 
economic interests behind a veil of expressed concern for everyone’s safety and explicit 
statements about ‘safety first’, regularly contrasted with the (low) priority given to health 
issues. Behaviour based approaches were generally ‘safety-oriented’, focussing on salient 
and ‘event-based’ injuries and incidents, giving undue attention to long term health risks, 
typically not so high on the agenda from a company perspective. Union activists on the 
other hand were seen as being politically motivated, without due regard for the 
‘scientifically proven’ significance of safe behaviour. 
 
Like the opposed and competing ‘risk management doctrines’, these were stereotyped 
extremes, albeit also to be found in the real world. The practice of risk management 
would include various mixtures of assessment methods, redundant designs, models of 
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participation, investment policies, causal and moral attributions, degrees of resilience, 
etc. But the question of priorities and emphasis would still surface when different 
strategies and means were to be chosen; and the choices would reflect certain epistemic 
preferences as well as normative ones, variably affecting the interests of the parties 
involved.  
 
These were the amorphous contexts, in which the regulatory philosophies and strategies 
were to make a difference, 
Concluding summary 
The development of the Norwegian petroleum industry has gone through several phases, 
and has almost reached its peak in terms of production levels. The risks associated with 
this industry cover a range of technologies, organizational structures, work processes, and 
human resources. Risk management strategies are employed on a societal level through 
government regulatory institutions, down to the management of the single offshore work 
operations. The basic regulatory strategy has been to mobilize regulatory resources on all 
levels, and to promote prophylactic, prudent, and self-corrective mechanisms within all 
managerial and operational facets of the industry. At the same time, strong unions have 
developed, able and willing to voice their interests and to exploit statutory warrants as 
they were produced.  
 
We should note here also some more general societal features, regularly (but somewhat 
interchangeably) referred to as the Nordic, Scandinavian, and also the Norwegian model. 
We need not elaborate here on the nuances between these ‘models’, and in the following 
we will occasionally refer only to what can roughly be characterized as the ‘Norwegian-
Nordic context’. We find within this context a relatively high level of societal trust, 
egalitarian values, relatively low differences in income and economic resources, generous 
and universal welfare systems, a high level of state intervention, such as through 
relatively centralized systems of bargaining and extensive collaboration between the state 
and the actors in the labour market, and a correspondingly low level of industrial and 
societal conflict. Industrial democracy has been high on the agenda and democratic 
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leadership styles has been valued. Even industrial managers have been expected to 
represent democratic society and not only their commercial interests, and  markets have 
been pragmatically viewed servants to the people, not the other way around.68  
 
The petroleum regime is firmly placed within this context, in particular through the ‘holy’ 
tripartite system comprising the industry, the unions and the authorities, the latter 
burdened with the task of balancing opposing social and economic interests, but still 
benefiting from the active contribution of the industrial parties in making the regulatory 
system work. Regulatory ambitions have been high, and in the 2002 White paper, the 
Government proclaimed that the petroleum industry should have leading role in Norway 
with respect to health, safety and environment. In the 2006 White paper, ambitions were 
even bolder; Norway was to lead the world in this area. 
 
Seen in a long term perspective, working conditions have improved considerably, and 
some key risk indicators are dramatically reduced. The driving forces in this change 
process are varied and complexly configured. Some authors hold that powerful external 
forces account for most of the safety improvements, and that the industrial actors 
primarily responded to pressures from the outside, such as empowered regulators, 
workers, and unions. Risk levels are seen to fluctuate according to the power balance 
between the industrial actors and these outside pressures, a power balance which in turn 
is influenced by the fluctuating markets for labour and petroleum (Ryggvik, 2000). Most 
industrial actors would point to intrinsic changes in attitudes, moral commitment, and 
‘corporate social responsibility’; they would also subscribe to complementarism as far as 
possible, but allow for trade-offism, and be firm that the trade-offs benefited safety 
(exempting occasional and unplanned irregularities in the system).  
 
                                                 
68 The term ‘model’ refers here generally to the societal policies and institutional designs, whereas the use 
of the term ‘context’ indicates also the cultural context of trust and egalitarianism. There has been much 
discussion, however, about both the virtues, the empirical ‘accuracy’, recent ‘pressures’ and development 
trends, varieties between countries, etc., regarding both the model(s) and the general context. We need not 
elaborate on these issues here. For general references and discussions, see Barth et al. (2003), Bjornson 
(1993), Byrkjeflot (2001), Dølvik (2007), Svendsen and Svendsen (2006). 
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We should note again that the issues about risk levels and management strategies 
provided the contexts in which the cultural turn entered the industry. We will see, 
however, that the local enactments of the risk management doctrines had their specific 
configurations which often made it difficult to ‘locate’ the divergent positions and to 
‘organize’ debates in a straightforward and constructive manner.  
 
Another important context for the introduction of ‘culture’ was the number of competing, 
overlapping, and increasingly elaborate and comprehensive risk management systems. 
These  have appeared and disappeared since they were first introduced, accompanied by 
continuous discussions about their appropriateness, both in terms of managerial 
prejudices and lack of worker participation, but also of their ability to cope with the risks 
in a transparent and efficient manner. Reliance on intricate systems (registration, 
documentation, rules and procedures, monitoring, internal audits, etc.) could in itself 
become a major obstacle to efficient risk management. The risks of risk management 
systems was ultimately that they appeared as smoke screens, detached from the 
operational tasks-solving contexts, increasingly academic, too complex to understand and 
impossible to follow. Accident investigations showed repeatedly that they were not 
complied with, and that procedures were inappropriate or unknown. The systems were 
often devised by external consultants and experts and not properly adapted to local 
knowledges and operational demands (Haukelid, 1998; 1999). The cultural turn was in 
part an attempt to ‘connect’ the risk management systems to the operational and socio-
cultural realities of the petroleum industry (Haukelid, 2001; 2006). 
 
This outline of the industrial, institutional, and socio-cultural developments provides a 
necessary background for understanding the present institutional and regulatory setting, 
to which we now turn.  
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4. Cultures of regulation – regulation of culture 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the present regulatory framework and national 
regulatory context, including a brief outline of the more general administrative system 
and policies of regulation. The main focus, however, is on the content of the regulations 
and the regulatory context of the culture provision. 
 
It’s probably fair to say that risk regime in the petroleum sector have been in the forefront 
nationally, partly serving as a model and benchmark for regulatory reforms on a broader 
scale. In terms of regulatory philosophy, prescriptive regulations have gradually been 
replaced by goal-setting regulations, and inspections have been replaced by systems-
oriented audits. The general discussions about the generality or specificity of regulations 
have been salient in recent Norwegian legislative history (Sand, 1996). The replacement 
of technically detailed with functionally open regulations, due to the inadequacy of 
detailed specifications in the face of highly dynamic and rapidly changing societal and 
technological developments, have been most forcefully accomplished within this sector. 
The old prescriptive regime was largely viewed as time-consuming and inappropriate. 
Regulatory development was seen as following a ‘fire-fighting’ method in a never ending 
attempt to keep up with new technologies and work processes, thus also making the 
regulatory system inconsistent and patchy. In addition to this, there was the problem of 
responsibility. Prescriptive regulations tended to put too much responsibility in the hands of 
the regulators if compliance didn’t prevent accidents or harm. Through less prescriptive 
requirements, the responsibility for managing risks would more explicitly be in the hands of 
the regulatee. It has been generally acknowledged, however, that this would also imply a 
more co-operative and trust-based interaction with the industry. Thus, the regulatory 
processes have to an increasing extent involved the industrial actors, including the unions. In 
terms of political and democratic investment, the regulatory reforms have, within the overall 
legal mandate, been just as much participative and bottom up as top-down. The agency 
enjoys a considerable amount of professional autonomy and uses this to mobilize the 
professional involvement of the industrial actors and expert groups.  
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The national context 
The Norwegian model of public administration is marked by firmly placing constitutional 
responsibility with the ministers of government, and ultimately with the “King in 
Council”. In principle, all decisions and activities within the state administration are 
executed on delegated authority, and each minister is accountable toward the parliament 
for everything that goes on at the lower levels, including any failures committed. But in 
the practical everyday life of policy administration, a great deal of autonomy and 
discretion is certainly exercised, depending of course on a number of factors, such as the 
public salience of the policy areas, the amount of professional expertise involved in 
administering the policy area, the degree of professional overlap at the ministerial level, 
the degree of rule-bound triviality of decision-making, and sometimes also, on the 
personal authority of those occupying leading administrative or political positions. The 
establishment of separate public bodies outside the ministries of government has been a 
marked trend in the post-war period, reflecting the increasing complexity and 
specialization in society and public administration alike (Christensen and Lægreid, 2004; 
Egeberg, 1989; Sand, 1996). The general policy has been that ministries should 
concentrate upon its ‘policy-making responsibilities’ while ‘technical decision making’ 
could be decentralized to more independent non-departmental agencies. This was 
intended to prompt greater efficiency and clearer demarcations between political and 
administrative tasks. In this system, the courts also play only a minor role, when 
compared with other countries, as many legal roles and tasks are administered within the 
state bureaucracy (OECD, 2003a; 2003b). The Norwegian system, despite the formal 
hierarchy of offices, has thus been considered as highly decentralized compared with 
other countries, “reflecting the Nordic approach in trust-based decision-making” (OECD, 
2003b: 7).  
 
The agencies are lead by Director Generals, appointed by the government based on 
proposals from the administration. Terms of office have traditionally been indefinite, but 
arrangements with limited but renewable four or six year periods have gradually become 
more dominant. The agencies are governed according to principles and regulations based 
on ‘management by objectives and results’ (or ‘performance management’). They 
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respond and report to their ministries according (often relatively flexible) targets and 
performance-based criteria, and are also occasionally subject to external evaluations 
commissioned by the ministries, and to audits from the Auditor General. In the area of 
risk regulation, parliamentary statute laws often provide ample opportunities for the 
ministries to issue secondary regulations under the authority of the statutory laws. This 
hierarchical structure provides extensive bodies of statutory regulations with equal legal 
force. Increasing societal complexity combined with increasingly ambitious welfare 
politics have caused a considerable degree of regulatory interventionism and a large 
number of such secondary regulations are warranted in statutory law (Sand 1996; 
Statskonsult, 1999).  
 
Regulatory bodies and agencies have been established and expanded, and given multiple 
and variably composed roles in producing and enforcing rules, giving professional advise 
to the ministries and the regulated parties, and generally for overseeing the developments 
and policy challenges within their turf. These regulatory systems have historically been 
developed in a rather piecemeal manner, responding to sector-specific concerns as these 
have appeared in the wake of societal and technological developments, covering a large 
amount of laws, regulations, and administrative bodies with few internal or external 
pressures towards coordination or administrative reorganizations (Statskonsult, 1999). 
From the early 1990s, this changed gradually, partly as a result of pressure from 
corporate interest groups. Arguments where launched and lobbies activated in order to 
reduce the burdens of red tape, regulatory requirements, square-minded law enforcers, 
and uncoordinated inspectorates. In 1999, the Directorate of Public Management issued a 
report, counting some 20 agencies and inspectorates, 60 laws, and more than one 
thousand regulations within the area of health, safety and environment (Statskonsult, 
1999). The report recommended that better organizational conditions be provided for 
coordinating regulatory tasks and for harmonizing policy instruments and legal measures 
in the area. Two years later, partly based on the same documentation and line of 
argument, a government commission reviewing ‘Societal safety and emergency 
preparedness’ suggested that all or most of these regulatory regimes be reorganized under 
one single ministry in order to make societal safety (broadly defined), more ‘visible’ in 
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the political landscape, to provide a more transparent allocation of responsibilities, and to 
coordinate the various regimes (NOU, 2000).  
 
The NPD was an important exception to this fragmentation, and was used as a benchmark 
in the arguments provided for more integrated systems. The ‘NPD-model’ became a point 
of reference in the discussions that followed. Not only did the NPD cover an 
exceptionally broad range of health and safety issues (working environment and 
technical/operational safety), it was also authorized to coordinate all public supervisory 
activities directed towards the operators, including environmental issues and health 
services.69 That is, the NPD-system was unitary and integrated in terms of regulatory 
purpose in one specific industrial sector, with a defined and delimited target group; 
following the traditional categories of organizational specialization (Egeberg, 2003) it 
appeared as relatively specialized in the former sense and very specialized in the latter 
(Statskonsult, 2002). At the same time this arrangement deviated from the more general 
model of having sector-independent regimes with more specified and narrowly defined 
regulatory purposes. It thus separated (below the ministerial level) occupational health 
and safety regulations in onshore and offshore industries. 
 
A shift in government after the 2001 elections, won by the centre-right parties, brought 
renewed attention to regulatory policies. Headed by a high-profiled economy professor 
representing the conservative party, the Ministry of Labour and Administration drew 
comprehensive and ambitious scenarios for the importance and future role of regulation, 
supported by a peculiar mixture of theoretical, political, and ideological rationales. The 
reform proposals were presented to the Norwegian Parliament (the Storting) in a White 
paper in 2003, and covered virtually all areas of economic and social regulation, 
including some 40 regulatory agencies (Ministry of Labour and Government 
Administration, 2003). The report argued for the importance of regulation as a condition 
for efficient markets, fair competition, the provision of public goods, and the protection 
                                                 
69 The arrangement includes the use of expert assistance from other administrative agencies with particular 
expertise within relevant areas, notably the Maritime Directorate, the Directorate for Civil Protection and 
Emergency Planning, the Coast Directorate, the Civil Aviation Administration, the Meteorological 
Institute, and the Radiation Protection Authority.  
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of public and private interests, including health and safety issues. It called for greater 
independence for the agencies, greater transparency, removal of  conflicting goals 
(following the principle of ‘single purpose’), and increased focus on their competence 
and professionalism. It proposed a comprehensive reform in the regulatory mandates of 
the agencies, with increased autonomy and discretionary powers. This was partly to be 
achieved by restricting the possibility of ‘ministerial instruction’ and by setting up 
independent appellate bodies for handling complaints. These arguments and 
recommendations corresponded neatly to the current OECD views about economic and 
social regulation, and coincided in time and substance with an OECD land report on 
Norwegian regulatory policies (OECD, 2003a; 2003b). As it happened, the White paper 
included a proposal to de-centralize a large number of the agencies, relocating them in 
various regional centres all over the country. Initially, the justifications given for this was 
primarily related to assumptions about a correspondence between geographical distance 
and discretionary autonomy. As the parliamentary decision-making process drew closer, 
however, general regional policies became more salient. As could be expected, this 
attracted almost the entire portion of public and political attention in the following 
process, and in sum the reform largely ended up as regional policy more than regulatory 
policy.70  
The establishment of the PSA 
However, the reform had two important consequences for the petroleum regime. First, it 
was decided to transfer the responsibility for a number of petroleum related land facilities 
to the NPD. Second, it was decided to split the NPD in two. Safety and working 
environment issues were to be transferred to a new regulatory body, the Petroleum Safety 
Authority Norway (PSA), with the resource management administration left in the old 
organization. It was admitted that the potential goal conflicts within the agency had not 
                                                 
70 The reform left few other traces in terms of more general or comprehensive policies of regulation. As 
could be expected, the discussions in the Storting were almost exclusively related to questions about 
localization. The idea of setting up independent appellate bodies was rather bluntly dismissed, and other 
proposals implying a departure from the basic hierarchical principles of government were not accompanied 
by any reflections on the discretionary powers of the agencies following from the extensive use of open-
ended functional regulations. Whether the re-localization  of the agencies provided them with more 
discretionary autonomy is still an open question. The Competition Authority, which was moved to Bergen, 
has later been overruled by the ministry in several major cases. 
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yet “resulted in problems in relation to individual cases”, and the argument for a division 
was thus given a more principled twist, referring to the need for assuring “indisputable 
legitimacy and authority in issues relating to safety” (Ministry of Labour and 
Government Administration, 2003, Chapter 5.2.1). What this reform in fact effectuated, 
was simply to ‘de-centralize’ the already existing division of responsibility at the 
ministerial level, making it penetrate all hierarchical levels down to the front line 
bureaucracy. As noted in Chapter 2, working environment and safety issues had in the 
late 1970s been transferred from the ministry responsible for managing the petroleum 
resources (the former Ministry of Oil and Energy). Since that time, the regulations have 
been located in various (and/or renamed) ministries, normally in conjunction with general 
labour market policies. Currently it is the responsibility of the Ministry or Labour and 
Social Inclusion. The reorganization was still significant, as the responsibility for 
‘balancing’ the trade-offs had now been formally removed from the agency level.   
 
The NPD was divided from the first of January 2004, and the core activities within 
resource and safety administration were placed in two separate bodies, however still 
located in the same building. Goals that had been formerly integrated as ‘equal’ in 
importance were now reformulated by according ‘linguistic primacy’ to either. Thus the 
goal of the NPD was to  
 
contribute to creating the greatest possible values for society from the oil and gas 
activities by means of prudent resource management based on safety, emergency 
preparedness, and safeguarding of external environment. 
 
The goal of the newly established PSA was to: 
 
stipulate premises and follow up to ensure that the players in the petroleum activities 
maintain high standards of health, environment, safety and emergency preparedness and 
thereby also contribute to creating the greatest possible values for society. 
 
The division was not supported by the General Director of the NPD, and opinions 
diverged internally (Lindøe and Olsen, 2007). Goal conflicts had certainly surfaced from 
time to time, involving some strife between the safety division and the resource division; 
but the established checks and balances appeared as relatively well functioning. At the 
time of the reform however, roles were blurred in a manner that stirred some uneasiness. 
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In 2000, a process had started in the resource division in the NPD, reorganizing the whole 
division according to a ‘team-model’, comprising a large number of partly autonomous 
and loosely connected teams, with a ‘management collective’ on top. The years 2001-03 
were quite turbulent, as the new model had been extended to cover also the safety 
division. The former separation between the resource division and the safety division was 
to some extent perforated, and part of the rationale was in fact to integrate the 
organizations in order to fully exploit resources and competence across borders and to 
facilitate a more ‘holistic’ approach toward the industry. This clearly caused some 
challenges in terms of handling potentially conflicting roles and goals. Administratively, 
the division of goals and responsibilities was explicit only at the ministerial level. The 
experiments also caused some organizational discontinuity, as several key officials in the 
ongoing regulatory reform project left the agency before the process was completed. 
Among them were the project leader of the reform and the originators of the culture 
provision.  
 
The reform thus reversed the integrative attempts, and the separation was institutionalized 
more firmly than ever before (Lindøe and Olsen, 2007). When I first entered the PSA in 
2005, the new organization was fairly well established, and the new regulations were the 
frame of reference. As noted, the increased agency autonomy announced in the White 
paper did not materialize instantaneously, as these would under any circumstance have to 
be endorsed through sector-specific legislation. The impact on the petroleum regime was 
primarily the setup of a separate regulatory body. But although the PSA is an ‘ordinary’ 
regulatory agency in legal and constitutional terms, it enjoys considerable professional 
autonomy, and as noted, this clearly contrasts with the much more politically and 
administratively governed resource management regime. Almost all discretionary 
authority is delegated from the ministry. Also, there are relatively few instances of formal 
complaints on agency decisions (see below), thus making this opportunity for ministerial 
interference minimal. Generally, the ministry expresses great trust in the professionalism 
and vocation of the agency. The role of the ministry is basically that of administrative 
control and overall governmental management according to administrative and budgetary 
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rules and processes.71 Regulatory reform proposals and amendments are coordinated and 
discussed with the ministry, prior to the ordinary formal public hearings and reviews. 
Within the overall legislative framework and mandate, participation from below appears 
as equally important in shaping the content of the regulations. These participatory 
processes are largely organized through the so-called ‘Regulatory Forum’, which is lead 
by the agency and with representatives from the companies and the unions, thus allowing 
for extensive tripartite collaboration in amending and developing regulations.  
The acts 
The central acts regulating safety and working environment in the offshore petroleum 
industry are the Petroleum Act and the Working Environment Act. The Petroleum Act 
deals primarily with the management of the petroleum resources, outlining the system 
through which the petroleum activities are carried out in a long-term perspective “for the 
benefit of the Norwegian society as a whole”. Section I states that “The Norwegian State 
has the proprietary right to subsea petroleum deposits and the exclusive right to resource 
management.” The Act further specifies the license system for exploration and 
production, the administration of the financial interests of the state, responsibilities, 
liabilities of the duty holders, etc. All petroleum activities associated with subsea 
petroleum deposits (such as exploration, exploration drilling, production, transportation, 
utilisation, and decommissioning) requires permits or licenses (consent/approval) from 
the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.  Production licenses are typically announced 
through so-called licensing rounds, and the awarded licenses grant ownership to the 
                                                 
71 This trust could be more bluntly expressed by a former Director General of the Department of Working 
Environment and Safety (1990-1997): “Generally, we had a deep-seated confidence in the safety 
department in the NPD; they were leading experts in this field and Magne Ognedal [General Director] was 
really an international capacity. The information asymmetry was obvious; if they said it’s safe to drill a 
5000 meter hole, we could not but trust them. We did not, and could not challenge them on their 
professional competence. We had lawyers, and economists and social scientists, whose basic expertise was 
that of manoeuvring within the administrative and political interface”. In terms of regulatory process, the 
basic role of the ministry was largely described in terms of benevolent inquisition: ascertaining that due 
processes had been followed, relevant parties involved, expert judgements requested, etc. As to the 
substantive issues of establishing a ‘prudent’ level of safety, the agency appeared as relatively self-
governed. Some critical issues could surface, however, but largely in a case-by-case manner, depending on 
activism from below or political attention from above (or both). The basic division of responsibilities has 
not changed significantly in the last decade; in a survey conducted by The Directorate of Public 
Management in 2002 the ministry even suggested that the delegation of powers to the agency had reached a 
level where additional delegations would remove their governing capacity altogether (Statskonsult, 2002). 
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petroleum resources. Licensees form groups, either through joint applications or through 
ministerial decisions, and an operating company is appointed on behalf of the group. A 
joint operating agreement regulating the relations (such as the allocation of revenues and 
voting rules) between the parties must be concluded in a ‘licence document’, and a 
management committee must be established as their decision-making body (normally 
referred to as the license committee). The state participates in these groups to varying 
degrees through the SDFI-arrangement (see Chapter 3).  
 
The license document regulates the rights and duties of the licensees, with the prime 
purpose of optimally utilizing the available petroleum resources. Impact assessments 
shall be provided as input to the decision making process at several stages. Prior to the 
development of petroleum deposits, the licensees are required to submit a plan that 
contain an account of economic,  commercial, technical, environmental, and resource 
related aspects. This plan shall also provide a general account of HSE-related aspects 
with regard to the chosen production strategy and development concept, including HSE-
objectives, the acceptance criteria for risk, organization and management systems, 
operation and maintenance requirements, and the handling of the organizational 
interfaces and coordination between the participants. Special requirements to safety are 
laid down in Chapter 9 of the Act, the purpose of which is that the petroleum activities 
“shall be conducted in such manner as to enable a high level of safety to be maintained 
and further developed in accordance with the technological development” (section 9.1). 
The chapter only briefly covers target provisions relating to emergency preparedness, 
safety zones, etc., and general demands on documentation and qualifications of the 
licensee. The statutory framework for safety is thus primarily elaborated in the 
regulations.  
 
From the HSE-perspective, the Working Environment Act (WEA) is naturally far more 
elaborate and comprehensive, being specifically dedicated to the protection of workers’ 
health and safety. As briefly recounted earlier, the framework for the present legislation 
was laid down by an extensive regulatory reform in 1977. The reform grew out of 
extensive collaboration within what we in the previous chapter referred to as the 
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‘Norwegian-Nordic context’. It was preceded by an increased attention toward working 
conditions during the 1960s and 1970s. The traditional model of regulation from above, 
through specified command and control rules, was challenged in several ways. This 
strategy had caused increased regulatory complexity, but it was still difficult to keep up 
with the corresponding complexity of hazards and their causes. Risks related to long term 
exposures, combined effects of several hazards, psycho-social strain, etc, were not 
sufficiently addressed in the traditional regulations. Consequently, and as noted in 
Chapter 1, the new regulatory philosophy reflected ideas about a dynamic ‘bottom-up’ 
approach, taking account of changing technologies and risk exposures, and relying 
heavily on local workplace mobilization and the establishment of mechanisms and arenas 
for participative problem-solving (Gustavsen, 1984; 1990; Gustavsen and Hunnius, 
1981). The 1977 Act thus had a general form, with the purpose to secure a “working 
environment that provides a basis for a healthy and meaningful working situation”, and 
requiring “full safety from harmful physical and mental influences and which has safety, 
occupational health and welfare standards at any time consistent with the level of 
technological and social development of society” (section 1). 
 
Provisions are purpose oriented, specifying that the various aspects of the work 
environment should be “fully satisfactory” (with respect to the work place, technical 
equipment, substances, planning systems, work arrangements, emergency situations, 
etc.). Employers are obliged to continually monitor working conditions, provide risk 
information and proper training for employees, and to take appropriate action to ensure 
compliance with the act. An extensive system for worker participation and arenas for 
problem solving and decision making are outlined. Primarily, this involves the 
appointment of safety representatives and the formation of working environment 
committees (mandatory for enterprises with more than 50 employees). As noted in 
Chapter 3, safety representatives are given the right to stop dangerous work, and several 
provisions specifies their right to proper training and time to fulfil their tasks. Designated 
safety and health personnel (medical officer, company nurse, etc.) are required for certain 
specified categories of enterprises. The regulatory authorities are granted wide warrants 
to issue secondary regulations, and a large number of such regulations have been issued. 
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The implication of this is that even though the act has a general and purpose oriented 
form, the total body of statutory obligations are quite specific in a number of areas. As 
noted in Chapter 3, the WEA was applied to the offshore petroleum industry after some 
contestation, only with some exemptions, primarily regarding working hours. The act has 
been amended a number of times and a more comprehensive revision took place in 2005. 
The main principles, purposes and provisions have remained, however. The 2005 revision 
was largely a restructuring of the content and a linguistic simplification, but involves also 
a shifting of emphasis toward organizational and psycho-social working conditions, in 
accordance with changes in occupational and enterprise structure, and reflecting the 
diminishing role of traditional industrial hazards.72 
 
The employer is the central obligated party according to the WEA, although employees 
also have specified duties to “cooperate” and to “take part” in the systematic HSE 
activities, including also preventive actions in situations of danger (interference, 
notification, etc). The hierarchical principle is contained in the act through the 
coordinating duties levied on the “principal undertaking” when several employers are 
involved in a specific work site (such as construction work). The principal undertaking 
shall cooperate with other employers and shall be responsible for coordinating the HSE 
work of each undertaking.  
 
All sectors of society are covered by General Civil Penal Code, and since 1989, this act 
has included a section on the criminal liability of enterprises. Such provisions had until 
then been scattered around in several special laws, including the WEA.  According to the 
new amendment, an enterprise may be liable to a penalty “when a penal provision is 
contravened by a person who has acted on behalf of an enterprise” (section 48a). The 
penalty will normally be issued as a fine, but the enterprise may also be deprived of the 
right to carry on business, wholly or partly. Several considerations are stated as grounds 
                                                 
72 The revision also reflected an increasing attention to individual adaptations of working conditions in 
order to promote ‘inclusiveness’ for all categories of employees, regardless of personal capabilities and 
circumstances. The role of management systems is more explicitly regulated in the new Act, thus 
incorporating the internal control principles formulated as “systematic health, environment and safety 
work”. These provisions, and the associated regulation are quite rudimentary, however, compared to the 
elaborate regulation of management systems in the petroleum regulations. 
 108
for imposing a penalty (and for determining its size and form), such as its preventive 
effect, the seriousness of the offence, whether it could have been prevented by guidelines, 
instructions, training, control, etc., or whether the offence was motivated by or resulted in 
the promotion of company interests or advantages. The size and severity of the penalty 
shall reflect the economic capacity of the offender. In the case of individual liability, 
penal law distinguish between negligence and gross negligence (wilfulness or 
premeditation are hardly ever relevant in these cases). Negligence may be ‘conscious’ or 
‘unconscious’, but the offender would under both circumstances be expected to have 
considered the possible outcomes, and thus be subject to penal action. The likelihood of 
harmful consequences in these cases is expected to approximate the ‘general societal risk 
acceptance level in daily life’ (Eskeland, 2000: 272). As will be evident, penal action in 
the petroleum sector is almost exclusively taken against companies, not individuals.73  
The HSE regulations  
The regulatory reform starting from the late 1980s had been pioneering as a collaborative 
process; a number of informal working groups had been established, allowing all parties 
to air viewpoints, make suggestions, and discuss feely. They were thus sheltered from the 
‘positioning’ mechanisms that would normally follow from more formal processes. The 
same basic philosophy was evident up to the 2002 reform, which started in the second 
half of the 1990s. The initial purpose was partly to integrate the NPD-regulations with the 
regulations of the environmental authorities and the health authorities. Partly, the NPD 
also wanted the industry to take a greater responsibility for the operational guidelines and 
thus to continue the standardization process. Several parallel processes were started, 
including collaborative working groups which involved the key industrial associations, 
the major unions, experts, and NPD officials. An overarching purpose was also to 
strengthen the regulation of organizational designs and risk management. 
 
There is no reason to believe that this process involved the NPD in a unitary collective 
endeavour, and hindsight reconstructions vary somewhat between the participants in the 
process. We have no interest here in ascertaining this historiography, the latter part of 
                                                 
73 The role of tort law (and industrial insurance) is not considered in this thesis. 
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which coincided with the turbulent organizational period of team experiments (see 
above). Clearly, however, partnership in the regulatory process was unequally distributed 
and there seems to have been a loosely coupled network of around 10-15 people, with a 
handful of 3-4 key persons acting as initiators and coordinators, including the leader of 
the regulatory project. The network included professionals with a non-technical 
background (political science, economy), largely located in the supervisory department in 
the safety division. The professional departments were seen as somewhat traditional and 
‘technical’ in the regulatory approach, and recent developments called for more 
comprehensive regulatory mandates. As noted in Chapter 3, the effects of decreasing oil-
prices, the NORSOK-process, cost-cutting, and restructuring, revealed apparent 
shortcomings in the existing regulations. As was explained by one of the participants in 
the regulatory process:  
 
Companies were downsizing, getting really ‘lean and mean’; they nearly got anorectic. 
Cheap, simple, and sub-standard technical solutions were chosen. This was a great 
challenge. The regulations weren’t really appropriate for facing this situation. (former NPD 
official) 
 
There were no requirements addressing critical safety issues such as maintenance, and no 
clear warrants for interfering directly with the amount of resources invested in safety. The 
only solution was to use high-level, purpose-oriented requirements in the Petroleum Act. 
The NPD officials had a watch dog position in the license-committees, but it wasn’t easy 
to speak up without clear legal warrants. As part of the regulatory process, an analysis 
was made of a large number of internal company incident-investigations. According to 
this analysis, the investigations revealed a narrow, single-loop strategy of correction and 
repair; the potentials for learning and improvement were correspondingly restricted. Also, 
cross-disciplinary audits were conducted that covered several organizational layers, thus 
contributing to a better understanding of overall organizational processes. The results 
were not all encouraging and internal reports on incidents exposed sloppy attitudes and 
grave conditions.  
 
New regulatory ideas were explored in the risk management literature and in the 
experiences from other sectors, such as the nuclear power and aircraft industries. The 
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idea of addressing ‘culture’ appears to have grown out of these processes; as was noted 
by one participant in the regulatory project. “We had to go to the core; indications were 
that something was missing in their organizational culture”. There is no need to 
determine the relative impact of this informal network on the resulting regulatory reform; 
but as we shall discuss later, the idea of introducing ‘safety culture’ (the term ‘HSE 
culture’ appeared later) as part of the regulatory strategy clearly originated within this 
group.  
 
First and foremost the new regulations were to include reinforced and more elaborate 
designs for risk management, including methods for risk analysis, management of change 
processes, designs for decision-making, traceability, outcome-evaluations, maintenance 
management, and a more comprehensive and organizationally oriented employment of 
barriers and ‘defences’. The new regulatory structure contained overall Framework 
Regulations, issued by Royal Decree in 2001, and four more detailed regulations: the 
Management Regulations, the Information Duty Regulations, the Facilities Regulations, 
and the Activities Regulations.74 These regulations replaced the internal control 
regulations and 14 more specific and disciplinary oriented regulations (including risk 
analysis, working conditions, emergency preparedness, drilling and well activities, load 
bearing structures, etc.). The prescriptive requirements within these areas were largely 
reformulated in industrial standards, and the regulatory provisions were replaced by goal-
oriented (functional) rules. Most provisions are briefly formulated target statements, 
supplied with non-statutory guidelines that refer to the relevant standards. However, 
some important deterministic requirements were reinforced regarding safety barriers, 
redundancies, and ‘defence-in-depth’ principles. More loosely defined criteria for risk 
management were also reformulated, in particular by specifying that the ALARP 
principle (‘As low as reasonably practicable’, see below) required the duty holders to 
improve and implement safety measures beyond simple risk-cost-benefit considerations, 
                                                 
74 The full title of these regulations are: Regulations relating to Management in the Petroleum Activities 
(the Management Regulations); Regulations relating to Material and Information in the Petroleum 
Activities (the Information Duty Regulations); Regulations relating to the Design and Outfitting of 
Facilities etc. in the Petroleum Activities (the Facilities Regulations); Regulations relating to Conduct of 
Activities in the Petroleum Activities (the Activities Regulations). 
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thus shifting the burden of proof in favour of safety.75 Thus, both the number and the 
nature of statutory regulations changed. From 1985 to 1995 there were 22 technical 
regulations and four non-statutory guidelines. From 1995 to 2002 there were 14 technical 
regulations and 33 guidelines. From 2002 there have been only 5 general and purpose 
oriented regulations, with one guideline supplementing each, but with a large number of 
associated national and international standards.76 On the whole, however, it was argued 
that the reform primarily restructured and elucidated the regulations, rather than 
substantially changing the material requirements.  
 
The HSE regulations thus encompass all the risk areas related to safety and the working 
environment, and include also health services, the external environment, and financial 
assets (including production and transport regularity and operational availability).77 As 
noted, the provisions are largely formulated as ‘functional’ requirements regarding the 
various aspects, characteristics, qualities, and outcomes of the product or process in 
question. The provisions thus combines purpose orientation with relatively open-ended 
target requirements, but still specifying a number of elements and conditions to be taken 
care of, using phrases such as ‘necessary’, ‘sufficient’, ‘shall establish’, ‘follow-up’, 
‘prudent’ etc. Typically, the ‘responsible party’ is required to continually monitor, 
analyze, audit, revise, improve, etc., thus pin-pointing that the responsibility for safe 
operations is not limited to compliance with some prescriptive norm. The non-statutory 
guidelines recommend a number of standards as a means of complying with the 
requirements. If a recommended solution is opted for, it will constitute a key basis for 
documenting fulfilment of the statutory requirements. When other solutions are used, 
documentation must be provided that the chosen solution fulfils the regulatory 
requirements. 
  
                                                 
75 According to Hovden (2002), these proposals met some opposition in the industry, as they no longer 
allowed for justifying cost-cutting purely based on (controversial) risk-cost-benefit analysis. 
76 The PSA participate extensively in the preparation of standards (primarily national) through working 
groups, reference committees, and review processes. 
77 The regulations are also warranted in the environmental legislation and the general health act, and are thus 
issued jointly by the PSA, the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) and the Norwegian Board of 
Health (NBH). 
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The responsible party is primarily the operator, but the individual provisions also specify 
the obligations of other parties participating in the petroleum activities. Employees are 
required to participate in complying with the regulations. The hierarchy of 
responsibilities is specified in that the operator “shall see to it” that everyone carrying out 
work for him complies with statutory requirements (employees, contractors, sub-
contractors). Likewise, the licensees are responsible “to see to it” that the operator 
complies with statutory requirements. These formulations are furnished according to the 
hierarchical principle, thus covering all actors down to commissioned contractors and 
suppliers.   
 
Chapter 3 in the framework regulations establishes the “principles relating to health, 
safety and environment”, which is also where the HSE culture provision is located. The 
introductory section clearly states that the principles shall be complied with and that they 
shall serve as basis for the enforcement by the authorities, and in particular that the 
“exercise of authority according to the regulations and according to the individual 
provisions as a whole is in accordance with this chapter.” The principles are thus given a 
key role as a general point of reference for regulatory compliance. The term “Prudent 
petroleum activities” expresses the overall regulatory target, implying that the regulatee 
conducts “individual and an overall consideration of all the factors of importance to 
planning and implementation of petroleum activities” taking account of the “distinctive 
character of the individual enterprises together with local and operational conditions” 
(section 8). Section 9, “Principles for risk reduction” formulates the ALARP principle as 
moving beyond the more fixed and static use of acceptance criteria (the key principle in 
the former regulations), and in principle also moving beyond the minimum statutory 
requirements (“Over and above this level the risk shall be further reduced to the extent 
possible”). The guidelines also specify that this minimum level “must be complied with 
without regard to costs and that the party responsible cannot set aside specific 
requirements of the health, environment, and safety legislation with reference to 
calculation of risk.” This section also introduces the associated principles of 
“substitution” and “best available technology” (the BAT principle), requiring the 
regulatee to “choose the technical, operational, or organizational solutions which 
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according to an individual as well as an overall evaluation of the potential harm and 
present and future use offer the best results, provided the associated costs are not 
significantly disproportionate to the risk reduction achieved.” Section 10 specifies that 
“the operator shall have an organization in Norway which on an independent basis is 
capable of ensuring that petroleum activities are carried out according to rules and 
regulations. The party responsible shall ensure that everyone carrying out work for him in 
petroleum activities, have the competence required to carry out such work in a safe and 
prudent manner”.  
 
The culture provision appears as section 11 among these principles. Under the heading 
“Sound health, environment and safety culture” it specifies that:  
 
The party responsible shall encourage and promote a sound health, environment and safety 
culture comprising all activity areas and which contributes to achieving that everyone who 
takes part in petroleum activities takes on responsibility in relation to health, environment 
and safety, including also systematic development and improvement of health, environment 
and safety. 
 
The subsequent chapters cover the establishment and follow-up of management systems, 
requirements on the provision of information and documentation, working hours, 
application of maritime legislation, and some administrative provisions regarding the 
rights of the authorities, such as access to facilities.  
 
The four supplementary regulations provide elaborations of the Framework Regulations. 
The Management Regulations specify key elements of the management system, requiring 
regulatees to set objectives, norms, acceptance criteria, indicators, and to establish 
systems of internal monitoring, supervision, and “continuous improvement”. All 
decisions shall be based on a comprehensive and adequate consideration of their 
implications for HSE. Sufficient resources shall be provided and planning and work 
processes shall be adequately specified and documented. Comprehensive requirements 
are given for the analysis of risk, specifically referring to major accidents, emergency 
preparedness, and working conditions, including the use of quantitative risk analysis. 
Risk reduction shall be achieved both through reduction of probability and by limiting the 
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extent of harmful consequences. The concept of barriers (defences in depth) reflects key 
principles of risk reduction, and refers to technical, operational, and organizational 
measures intended to prevent or interrupt the course of undesirable incidents. Sufficient 
independence between them is required when several are needed. Collective protective 
measures shall be preferred over protective measures aimed at individuals. The functions 
and performance of barriers shall be known and defined, referring to both technical, 
operational, and organizational elements which are necessary for the individual barrier to 
be effective.  
 
The Information Duty Regulations specifies comprehensive requirements regarding 
material and information to be submitted or made available for the authorities. They 
contain requirements on applications for consent, alerts, notification, and reporting. Thus, 
the operator shall notify the PSA of situations of hazard and accident which have led to or 
could have led to severe and acute injury, acute life-threatening illness, severe 
impairment or loss of safety functions, or other barriers that endanger the integrity of the 
facility. The Facilities Regulations deals primarily with the physical and technical design 
and outfitting of facilities, including safety functions and loads, materials, work areas and 
accommodation areas, physical barriers and emergency preparedness. The Activities 
Regulations contains requirements on the conduct of various activities, including 
requirements regarding working conditions, maintenance, emergency preparedness, etc.  
 
A large number of industrial standards are tied up to the regulations through the 
supplementary guidelines. This includes ISO standards for management, NORSOK 
standards for risk analysis and management, and a number of more technical industrial 
standards, most of which are tied up with the facilities and activities regulations. Also, 
several regulations pursuant to the WEA act are listed as reference documents to the 
regulations.  
Emerging philosophies of regulation 
The present regulatory system is a continuation of a long regulatory development, as 
briefly outlined in Chapter 3. As noted, some argued that the new regulations only 
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partially represented any substantial changes in the material requirements put on the 
industry, and that the regulatory process largely consisted in transforming the 
requirements into more purpose oriented and functional provisions, with the more 
prescriptive norms reappearing as industrial standards.78 This was in large parts only a 
continuation of a long process, responding to some of the major difficulties associated 
with standard setting, as noted in Chapter 2 (such as those related to informational 
demands and technological change).  These arguments and considerations have been 
present in the regulatory discourse since the 1970s, thus responding to the need for 
generalized rules applicable to the specific technologies, and environments in which they 
shall have their intended effect (Dahle, 1994).  
 
Regulatory interventions can be directed at different stages in a process that may lead to 
harm, distinguishing between preventive intervention, act-based intervention, and harm-
based intervention (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). Although it may be difficult to distinguish 
clearly between preventive and act based regulations, all these ‘staged’ intervention 
strategies are reflected in the regulatory standards. Preventive interventions are generally 
considered extremely important, for obvious reasons. The risks associated with sub-
standard technologies and facilities are great, and post-construction amendments would 
generate high costs, as would other adaptive measures to compensate for awkward and 
unsafe technical solutions. Preventive interventions may also include approvals or 
consents that must be obtained before an activity can start (regarding technical 
installations, equipment, organizational resources, etc.). As was noted, however, the 
petroleum authorities have been reluctant to intervene in early stages in a manner that 
would give the impression that approvals were granted and that would somehow make 
them responsible for the chosen solutions. For instance, consents are only given as a 
‘clearance’ that some activity (such as certain drilling operations) may commence 
according to a plan, not as any approval of the activity as it is later conducted. They have 
generally been careful not to intervene in any manner that would make them partly 
accountable if anything happened. Rather, all interventions address the self-regulatory 
                                                 
78 Functional requirements are sometimes associated with both output demand (as contrasted with input 
demands) and a fairly open and purpose oriented standard.  
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systems wherein the regulatee must produce and document pre-activity risk assessments 
(preventive), compliance with internal procedures (act-based), and accident investigations 
(harm-based). The safety of installations (and other equipment) is to be the sole 
responsibility of the companies.  
 
From the beginning, this strategy had caused discussion, and criticism, about the 
regulatory role in standard setting. Some considered functional rules to be a 
circumvention of responsibility by the authorities, that they didn’t take a stand by 
providing explicit standards. But the process of involving the self-regulatory capacities of 
the industry was seen as critical, in terms of both necessity and rationality. The industry 
had to make judgments themselves, and instead of reversing the development, it was 
extended. As was noted by the regulatory director:  
 
We had to develop the methodology a step further, and consider all regulations in terms of 
their functionality. That is, if you start a process where you introduce risk management and 
a supervisory regime based on the principle of internal control or self-regulation, 
regulations must be adapted to the same philosophy. To enforce predominantly prescriptive 
regulations in such a regime would work against the objective we had. (director of 
regulatory development) 
 
Defensiveness and blame-avoidance may have been elements in this strategy, but the 
justifications were obvious. Partly it was considered a simple matter of necessity. As one 
of the agency veterans explained, they received “piles of paper from the industry”, and 
had no chances of making expert based reviews of all the technical documentation. But 
there were also more positive justifications. It would not only ‘empower’ the industry, 
but also engage them actively in the risk assessments and make them accountable for the 
solutions adopted. But the authorities were of course confronted with the need to know 
what were ‘good enough’, and the accompanying need for standard solutions in order to 
avoid unnecessary documentation processes. The first response was to provide 
guidelines. The idea was that the functional requirements could be optionally met by 
adhering to such guidelines, but that other options were possible if an equally satisfying 
effect could be documented. Much industrial discipline and knowledge were required in 
order to make this work. The increasingly functional rules clearly pinned the companies 
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in accounting for the solutions adopted. As was explained and exemplified by one agency 
official:  
 
Take the large renewal of lifting equipment on [one of the large offshore fields]. All the 
cranes had to be replaced. Eleven huge cranes at about [NOK] 45 million each. So we’re 
talking about large amounts of money. Then, the new cranes were of substandard quality .... 
they were badly designed and produced, and …. it was really bad craftwork. This coincided 
with the introduction of new functional regulations, saying that the operator have to decide 
what function the cranes were supposed to fulfil, for example that they can lift 50 tons, with 
wave heights up to 4-5 meters, summer and winter. Then you get cranes with several 
deficiencies. With the old detailed regulations we could have pinpointed all these technical 
deficiencies. But with these new requirements, we have to ask: what does this entail for 
your operations? What kind of restrictions do you face? Then they started to list up: the 
heating up of the hydraulic system under strain restricting usage to 1 ½ hours each time, 
problems with the breaks so that personnel cannot be lifted, and so on. So all these things 
summed up one would expect the agency to proscribe the cranes altogether. But given the 
regulations, we didn’t say that. Rather, we said: You now have a number of cranes out here 
with a functional capacity restricted to the lifting of empty 20” containers under perfect 
weather conditions. And if that’s what you need, it’s fair enough, just run those cranes. But 
if you need to lift a 32 ton coiled tubing unit, with 3 meter waves in winter, then you need 
another crane. This forced through a substitution of the cranes. I don’t think they saw this so 
clearly themselves. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
The next step in this process was the substitution of guidelines with industrial standards. 
The maintenance of guidelines, standards and manuals generally has high costs, and the 
technology advance ahead of them. As noted, with the new 2002 regulations, much of the 
content in the guidelines were replaced by references to industrial standards, and the role 
of the authorities was then largely to participate in standardization groups on a 
professional basis. But to the extent that these standards are referred to in the guidelines, 
compliance with the standard would normally equal compliance with the regulation it is 
linked to. And if an incident occurs despite compliance with a recommended standard, 
this could have a bearing on the subsequent legal assessment.79 Still, it’s of some 
importance that a distance is upheld between the authorities and the standards. 
References to standards are always made in guidelines, not in the regulations. If standards 
                                                 
79 The Supreme Court has in fact recently acquitted a company in one case of pollution, where an incident 
occurred despite adherence to a standard. In this case a tank that was build according to EPA standards had 
a leakage (US Environmental Protection Agency). The Norwegian pollution authority claimed they had 
stricter requirements than the standard specified, but since the standard was considered to be widely 
accepted, the court sided with the company. This is still a grey zone, however, and just recently there has 
been a controversy between the PSA and the industry regarding life-boats. The guidelines originally had a 
reference to the general marine regulations for such boats, but the agency found these to be insufficient for 
the offshore facilities, removed the reference, and reinforced the requirements. 
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are referred to in supervisory reports, as exemplifying conformity or non-conformity, it 
must be formulated so that the standard does not appear as the only path to compliance. 
The responsibility for compliance must rest with the company. As was explained by the 
regulatory director:  
 
R: We must in a sense be clearer on roles, where the regulatory agency issues regulations 
containing mainly purpose-based requirements and the industry develop supplementary and 
detailed or prescriptive norms or standards. Much the same principles are now being used in 
part of EU-legislation. At the same time all involved parties have to be aware of the formal 
difference between the regulations and industry standards. 
I: Are you passing the buck then? 
R: No, definitely not …. We’ve stated that the regulations facilitate the use of alternative 
but in terms of safety, documented equivalent solutions on a detailed level. This principle 
should be both the right and the responsibility of the parties, and we shouldn’t unduly 
intervene in their decision processes at this level. 
I: These are complicated regulations to enforce, then? 
R: That’s true in a sense because we have to a larger extent have opened for discussions 
about alternatives. But just think how the situation would be if we returned to a regime with 
prescriptive regulations; regulations that specifies solutions in advance .… that would as we 
see it hamper, or stop, the technological development; unless we enforced regulations based 
on an extensive use of exemptions. This would in turn be time consuming and undermine 
the status of regulations. We must make the decision-makers accountable and make them 
understand their responsibility. We cannot always be ahead of the technological 
development. We’re not the ones driving forward the technological development. We don’t 
know all the answers for the questions of tomorrow. Rules that specify which of these 
future decisions were acceptable or not acceptable in advance would be impossible to 
develop. Gradually, everyone realizes this. Let me clarify however that we still have 
prescriptive requirements; when solutions shall be identical, where rights and obligations 
are defined, etc. (director of regulatory development) 
 
 
This system where statutory regulations only provide a bedrock for industrial self-
regulation, has thus been a long term process, But self-regulation does not relieve the 
authorities of establishing what in a given case should be considered ‘good enough’. 
Deviation from a standard that may lead to increased risk must be compensated for by 
other measures, as will any change in circumstances that may make the ‘standard’ 
inappropriate. All operations must at any time be ‘prudent’ in terms of risk and safety as 
judged by the authorities, and enforcement practice cannot always rely on pre-specified 
norms, as will be discussed later.   
 
But self-regulation is the key principle, and within the firmly established tripartite 
system, this presupposes close cooperation with the industry and a dialogue with the 
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involved parties largely based on consensus and mutual trust. These presuppositions were 
emphasized in both the 2002 and the 2006 White papers. If union and employee 
representatives grew more critical of the industrial practices, the system was vulnerable.80 
As was noted by the regulatory director:  
 
Obviously, when you operate a regime where the involved parties use the ‘freedom’ of the 
regulations to proactively improve HSE-standards, that’s an ideal situation. But if that 
‘freedom’ is used to look for minimum solutions it creates a different and more problematic 
situation. There is of course some flexibility. The employee side may observe, in their view, 
a reduction in standards, which we may still judge to be in accordance with justifiable 
interpretations of the regulations. This regulatory policy is clearly founded on participation 
from the industry and all the parties. One thing is participation in the regulatory process. 
But the regime also presupposes participation in the ‘in-house’ self-regulatory process. And 
this is a critical and sensitive issue. In the old prescriptive regime with detailed rules, if the 
industry wanted to adopt a different solution or approach, they would have to apply for 
exemptions from the regulations. This decision could then be subject to appeals from the 
employees. This provided a formal access to the decision process. In the case of self-
regulation, the parties must participate. We transfer decisional powers to the industry on the 
condition that they have a dialogue with the employees when choosing specific solutions. If 
the employees or their representatives then say “we are not sufficiently included in the 
decision processes”, we would be in conflict with an important premise for the development 
of the regulations.  This is an important principle for us.  But thus far, the parties have 
generally been satisfied with this regulatory policy and the access to the regulatory process, 
and we’re really happy with that. (director of regulatory development) 
 
 
But the exploration of interpretive ‘freedoms’ also gave the agency much power in terms 
of determining what was ‘good enough’. Although the regulatory process was highly 
participative and consensus seeking, one requirement appeared to have unexpected 
consequences for the industry. Section 31 in the Activity Regulation regarding the 
“arrangement of work” stated that “the work shall be planned so that as much work as 
possible is done daytime, and so that the employees are assured necessary restitution and 
rest.” The general and goal oriented wording was however further detailed in the 
guidelines, endorsed in the 2002 White paper, implying strong restrictions on night work 
and so-called ‘joint sleeping’ (sharing cabins). These restrictions had potentially far-
                                                 
80 Indeed, it was argued, in particular by the OFS, that the ‘functionality’ of loosely defined targets 
increasingly served as a smoke screen for reduced HSE standards, and that it made it difficult for safety 
representatives and union representatives to object to measures or to demand improvements, if no standard 
was available as threshold or norm. An evaluation of the regulations conducted in 2004 revealed highly 
disparate opinions among the parties, however, including also among different unions. The industry was 
moderately satisfied with the target orientation and the flexibility of the regulations, but more critical in 
terms of adequate cost-benefit assessments and predictable enforcement practices. 
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reaching implication with respect to night work during special operations, manning levels 
in critical phases, the availability of cabins, etc.81 These interpretations and the following 
enforcement practices caused much discussion and controversy, and was seen by some 
industrial actors as unduly disproportionate. Costs were estimated at possibly several 
billion (NOK), and the Oil Industry Association (OLF) later published a report which 
addressed costs and benefits of the new requirements (OLF, 2006).82 It was also 
considered a breach with the established ‘goal orientation’ in the regulations, and 
generally, this method was more difficult to apply in cases where the relationship 
between means and ends was dubious or contested, as it of course was, in the case of 
determining the impact of working hours and sleeping conditions in relation to health and 
operational safety. The NPD/PSA appeared firm in their responses, and produced their 
own counter-report, contesting what they saw as highly exaggerated cost estimates and 
defending the importance of the work arrangements, both in terms of health and of 
safety.83 On the whole, this issue appeared to have caused some disturbance in terms of 
conficence and mutual trust; but it also revealed the powers of the authorities in 
establishing thresholds for acceptable levels of risk, not by simple and straightforward 
                                                 
81 The wording of the guideline reads as follows: “The requirement to do as much work as possible daytime 
.… implies, inter alia, that night work should be limited to tasks and functions that are necessary in order to 
maintain prudent activities. The requirement to necessary restitution and rest .… implies, inter alia, that all 
personnel are allowed to sleep undisturbed and normally alone”. 
82 This report was issued in March 2006, just prior to the finalization of the 2006 White paper, and was 
submitted to the agency and the ministry. It addressed a number of concerns related to the cost-benefit 
balance, and argued that authority interventions in several cases jeopardized the purpose orientation in the 
regulations by requiring specific solutions that was not sufficiently justified from a cost-benefit perspective. 
The interpretation and enforcement of the provision regarding working hours, rest and restitution appeared 
as prominent examples. Furthermore, a general argument was made for a stronger reliance on internal risk-
cost-benefit analyses, based on ‘realistic and operational demands’, and considering also the need for a 
broader perspective on ‘societal value creation’. Reference was also made to the internal regulations for the 
public administration about assessment of economic and administrative consequences and impacts of 
reforms and proposals (“Instructions for Official Studies and Reports”). These are laid down by Royal 
Decree and concern consequence assessment, submission and review procedures in connection with official 
studies, regulations, propositions and reports to the Storting. Although quite elaborate and ambitious in 
substance and intent, these regulations are not very strongly followed up and variably practiced. No control 
system exists for enforcing the regulations. 
83 The justifications related to safety were based on the risk for reduced alertness in the execution of safety 
critical tasks. Although research was referred to, documenting such effects (like the higher proportion 
accidents on night shifts), the results were contested in terms of scope, strength, and criticality. But in 
referring to the potential consequences of having ‘tired workers’, a strong argumentative rhetoric could still 
be mobilized.  
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enforcement of explicit rules, but by the execution of discretionary powers.84 We return 
to the issue of law enforcement in the next chapter. 
Regulating culture 
Evidently, the regulatory context in which the HSE culture provision was introduced was 
complex and comprehensive, apparently pervading all aspects of industrial behaviour. 
The search into the history of the culture provision started with a few simple and partly 
contradictory hypothetical leads, ranging from the slightly patronizing suspicion that this 
was just another import of fashionable organizational design, to a more optimistic 
expectation of finding HSE culture to be thoroughly integrated in a comprehensive and 
cognizant regulatory strategy. No definite answer appeared, partly because the different 
traces that could be followed revealed no single narrative. There was no unitary 
exposition of the rationale behind or any clear conception of the course of events in the 
regulatory process. Still, the extremes could be ruled out; a lot of strategic thinking was 
evident at different stages in the process, despite the lack of any overall idea of how the 
concept of culture was to be integrated in regulatory frameworks and practices.  
The origins 
During the initial phases of the fieldwork, everyone seemed to point to someone else 
when asked about the origins of the culture provision. A lot of work had been done in 
order to explore the substance and practical implications of HSE culture, and to 
communicate this internally and externally; but the originating rationales and processes 
were not clearly elaborated. The rationales were admittedly responded to with some 
degree of coherence, but not quite in terms of its organizational origins or any exposition 
of the ‘legislative intent’ as it was developed in the regulatory process. How was this 
provision to be understood as part of the broader regulatory framework and was there an 
understanding of something ‘missing’ and a need to add a ‘new dimension’? Responses 
were certainly given, but they didn’t seem to relate directly to the course of the regulatory 
process, and appeared at times as hindsight reconstructions. It gradually became evident 
                                                 
84 The interpretations were as noted endorsed by the ministry and possibly also originating from political 
interference. Rumours had it that the ministry (led by a Labour Party minister) had yielded to strong union 
pressure. 
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that crucial leads had to be traced outside the NPD/PSA, to the group of former 
employees who had left the organization during the turbulent period of organizational 
experimentation (see above). 
 
It’s certainly not possible to locate the introduction of the culture-concept to any specific 
moment of revelation or to any clearly identifiable process resulting in a ‘cultural turn’. 
Most of the ‘cultural’ aspects of organizational reality that participate in shaping how 
they deal with risk had been present in the risk management discourses for many years, 
dating at least as far back as the Bravo blow out (see Chapter 3). During the 1990ties, 
however, there was an increasing awareness of how the more deep-seated organizational 
properties and processes did or did not contribute to the proper management of risks. The 
concept of culture emerged in this ‘sensitizing’ process, as part of a broader attempt at 
rethinking how regulatory efforts should be designed. However, this was not simply a 
‘mental’ process of maturing insights into the deeper causes of organizational behaviour. 
As noted above, external influences were apparent, both through changing economic 
conditions within the industry and developments in the scholarly understanding of the 
organizational management of risk (such as from the nuclear industry). The main 
elements in this new regulatory approach were integrated into the reform process. The 
first person to bluntly take responsibility for introducing culture into this regulatory 
context, now employed as an HSE manager in the industry, was also the first project 
manager for the risk management regulation and later for the whole regulatory reform 




Yes, I was the one who introduced the concept. I adopted it largely from the Chernobyl 
investigation report. That’s were it originates. What interested me was how it demonstrated 
the total breakdown of formal systems, despite the fact that you have such systems, that 
you have a relatively robust technology, that you have competent personnel, and so on. In 
spite of all this you do something so operationally outrageous …. This was not a 
technological failure; they tested the plant far beyond its limits, and didn’t respect the 
technology. In short, they ran an experiment that they should never have run. And this they 
did in spite of all these factors, expertise, systems, and so on …. still it all collapsed, and 
the fact that it’s possible in this situation to collapse quite comprehensive formal systems, 
that was a phenomenon they referred to as safety culture. And this phenomenon, that you 
can in fact bypass and surpass comprehensive formal systems, has also occurred in the 
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Norwegian petroleum industry. So that was the first professional source of inspiration. The 
other source was the High Reliability approach from Stanford. The third source came from 
aviation. We got access to investigation reports from the FAA [The US Federal Aviation 
Administration] and others – that showed the same – that you have strong formal systems, 
but under certain conditions they can collapse. These were the three professional or 
scholarly roots .… So, I was the one to introduce the concept, based on what I saw in 
operation internationally. So that was the reason; and then I saw that this phenomenon …. 
that it addresses something that we also experience here .... The rest of the regulations are 
very much about formalities and formal systems, and a host of criss-crossing coordination 
requirements .… And still, formal systems may collapse. Written rules and procedures are 
like a specialty in the petroleum industry. We have loads of rules and procedures that no 
one comply with, and no one even believe that they should comply with them. If you look 
at aviation this would be totally outrageous. You won’t find a captain who does not follow 
procedures. But that’s because the captain knows he’s not going to fly on his 20 years of 
experience, he shall fly on the total thousand years of experience of his company. But then, 
their procedures look a lot better; they’re actually possible to comply with. The nuclear and 
aviation industries consider procedures as a means of experience transfer, that’s where we 
gather our best experiences and our best practice. And that’s where the experience of the 
company and the whole industry is to be collected. So it’s not like some say in the 
petroleum industry, that “now I’ve been out her for 20 years and several stormy nights, so 
now I’ll do as I please.” A flight captain would never think of saying that. That’s a kind of 
discipline in those industries that you’ll never find here. But then we don’t systematize 
experience like they do either, or collect data. Then I’m talking about the whole industry, 
including the authorities. (former NPD-official and ‘originator’) 
 
 
The common theme in this initial account of inspirational sources appeared to be the 
fragility of formal risk management systems. Experiences from both the aviation and the 
nuclear industries were studied extensively, as was the safety literature inspired by the 
High Reliability tradition (see Chapter 2), thus reflecting the ‘cultural turn’ within the 
research on organizational risk. What was sought after, was a greater respect for risky 
technologies, a more sophisticated ability to learn from experience, and a more ‘mindful’ 
and dynamic application of formal systems and rules of conduct. These influences were 
further elaborated by pointing to the dangers of organizational self-complacency in the 
face of large scale risk potentials. Self-complacency in the face of ‘good records’ could 
lead to bad safety culture, indicated by deterioration of internal information processing 
and loss of sensitivity to risk.85 The dangers of unchecked reliance on formal systems and 
                                                 
85 A rather elaborate story about a Canadian nuclear power plant was reconstructed for making this point: 
Very briefly, the plant had been closed down by the authorities after having been ranked by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  as one of the world’s ten best nuclear plants only three years 
earlier. Organizational self-complacency appeared as a major explanation. They started to ignore or distrust 
warning signals from unions, department managers, internal audits, safety officials, etc., and internal 
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organizational self-complacency, both ideas largely inspired by the High Reliability 
school, were thus initially the two prime components of the culture concept. But the 
culture provision was also seen as a clear continuation of the already established 
principles of enforced self-regulation: “It’s perfectly in line with the tradition that focuses 
on the ability in the industry to pull oneself up by one’s bootstraps, to work 
autonomously. In that sense it’s a typical PSA provision. It’s very representative for that 
kind of regulation.“ (former NPD official and originator). But there was also a clearly 
stated intention to catch up with recent developments in risk management and safety 
philosophy: to be ‘part of the trend’. The first drafts of the provision leaned heavily on 
ideas and formulations used in the nuclear industry (such as IAEA, 1999). In the 
regulatory process an external review group, including the cooperating research 
communities, commented on drafts and suggestions, and the response to the culture 
provision was perceived as positive; there was a “good professional dialogue about 
alternative approaches and formulations” (‘originator’). These were academic institutions 
heavily influenced by the same High Reliability tradition.  
 
The culture provision was primarily supposed to reflect an intention. Several options 
were discussed. One was to have it formulated in the preface to the regulations. Another 
was to put it in the purpose section. Both options were considered as too weak. In order 
to emphasize its independent weight, it was thus placed in a single section, as part of the 
principles. The phrase ”encourage and promote” (see above) reflected several 
considerations: that it was supposed to generate processes, that it should involve 
everyone, and that it should promote participation and contribution from the employees. 
As was explained by another participant in the regulatory process: 
 
The culture provision was supposed to express the holistic perspective; it was the sum of all 
the elements, particularly in the management-regulation. But the authorities were not 
supposed to ‘diagnose’ the culture. Rather, they should challenge the companies. It was 
supposed to be a common project, a starting point for engaging in a dialogue with the 
companies. (former NPD official) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
communication deteriorated. Resources declined since they believed they performed so excellent that they 
would be able to manage with less. Bad news would appear as contrary to their self-image. 
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The network dissolved rapidly, however, during the brief period of organizational 
experimentation, and the new regulatory framework was barely completed before the 
great majority had left the NPD. The process of writing out the text of the provision, 
including the guidelines, was taken over by others, and was thus no longer in the hands of 
the group. The provision was quite consciously intended to be written in a speech-like, 
rhetorical manner, but the guidelines were supposed to be more specific. The group was 
not altogether happy with the result. Too few clues were given as to how it was to be 
followed up, and no references were given to the existing regulatory documents, such as 
those from the nuclear industry. The final wording of the guideline was rather short, 
abstract, and general, pointing to the purpose and scope of the provision, rather than to its 
content: 
 
This provision is new, but expresses principles embodied in the health, environment and 
safety legislation. To ensure the success of the systematic effort needed to prevent faults 
and dangerous situations or undesired conditions arising or developing, and to limit 
pollution and injury to persons and damage to equipment, a favourable health, environment 
and safety culture must pervade all levels of the individual activity/establishment. A 
favourable health, environment and safety culture is also needed to ensure continual 
development and improvement of health, environment and safety. In order to make it clear 
that this section applies across the entire scope of application of the regulations, the 
expression “health, environment and safety culture” is used instead of the more established 
term “safety culture”. 
 
 
Neither did the originators appear happy with how the regulations were followed up more 
generally. The new requirements were formulated in terms of functionality and purpose, 
some quite abstract, and the intention was initially to produce guidelines and develop 
common understandings for their enforcement.86 This lack of clarity was all the more 
critical since the regulatory process was largely informal, undocumented, and thus sparse 
in terms of legal sources. At the same time this style of regulation involved a substantial 
amount of discretionary judgment in order to ‘enforce compliance’ in a productive 
manner, and required in fact very competent and demanding supervisions. The pitfalls 
                                                 
86 This applied not only to the culture provision: “They require consequence rapports in the most 
unthinkable way. Some have fallen in love with that provision. The requirement that decisions shall 
“sufficiently informed”, can be used and abused in all kinds of situations…” (former NPD official). A 
certain amount of disillusionment was apparent in the interviews with these former NPD-officials. 
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would include both misplaced concreteness and nebulous abstractness. As for the culture 
provision, this was particularly true:  
 
One must consider how requirements and orders are interpreted and put to use in the  
companies. “You must do something about your HSE culture” – how should such a 
message be followed up? It would be like saying, “you must focus more on attitudes and 
behaviour”… Some may feel that the word is like a lever providing a momentum, like 
“follow up” and “impact assessments”, similar concepts attempting to drive forth change 
through some magic force. (former NDP official) 
 
The organizational response 
It would be a mistake to portray the introduction of HSE culture as the intellectual 
property of this network only, with no resonance or independent reflection from the rest 
of the organization. It seems, however, that the provision and the originating ideas lost 
some of its momentum in the process. No one in the ‘new’ organization was able to 
clearly account for the rationale as it was originally conceived. Even those who were 
quite deeply involved in the regulatory reform project had mostly vague ideas and 
memories about just how and why it was introduced, and referred recurringly to the 
former leader of the project. But the hindsight reconstructions of the cultural turn also 
displayed some commonalities, largely framed within the familiar language of systemic 
and enforced self-regulation. In fact, an outline of the whole regulatory history, from the 
introduction of the first internal control provisions, was the immediate response from the 
General Director on the ‘how-and-why’ question, providing also an eloquent version of 
the continuities embedded in the regulatory philosophies, with HSE culture almost as its 
final fulfilment:  
 
If we look back at developments in the industry, in the regulation of the industry, the NPD 
starts where it starts, that is in a situation with no trust between the industry and the 
authorities. It was largely a state of confrontation. This lack of trust had the implication that 
the authorities had to tell the industry exactly what to do. So in the beginning, rules were 
produced that specified almost everything. It was highly technical; much of the technology 
in use was age old, it was stone age technology, mud pumps from the war, etc. So there was 
a strong focus on technological improvements, and to have safety built into the installations. 
This continued over some years. Then we had to ask ourselves: what are we really up to 
here? We had specifications for rail heights, the number of toilet rolls, and so on. But what 
is this really about? It’s about risk, that’s what it is - management of risk. So we started a 
discussion: who is really responsible for what in this industry-authority picture? That was in 
fact quite unclear. We observed our colleagues in the Maritime Directorate saying that 
“we’re responsible for safety at sea”. But how could they be responsible sitting at the office 
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in Oslo? …. We realized that we could not be responsible for offshore safety. We didn’t run 
any business. So the discussion started about self-control. They had to have systems in 
place to ensure that they complied with government regulations, and also with their own 
regulations. This had to be organized. So we wrote the first guidelines for self-control in 
1978. And just as with the concept of HSE culture, we didn’t quite know what it was. What 
does it ‘look like’ - and how are we as a public authority going to approach it? So 
something had to be sorted out, something about responsibility and how to handle that 
responsibility organizationally. That much was clear. But how should we inspect this? We 
realized that technically detailed regulations were an impediment both to us and to the 
industry. Regulations were constantly behind the industrial development, and there was a 
huge maintenance job – we tried to keep up with the development. But gradually we got a 
grasp of it, and the industry started to understand what we were after. One example: A 
manager in an oil company thought that the concept of self-control implied that we 
entrusted public authority to the company to the effect that they themselves could decide to 
deviate from regulations. Such problems came up. But we got it sorted out, and the 
development continued, and we saw that in addition to technological requirements we had 
to have management systems included in the regulations.  
 
Then came the idea of internal control, and we revised our guidelines and introduced this 
new concept.87 Internal control was used in some regulatory regimes, as some larger 
companies had mandatory safety officers for electricity systems. These officers were 
independent and were supposed to act on behalf of the authorities, but were at the same 
time employed and paid by the companies. Some inspiration was gained from this system. 
Also, there was a parallel development of quality systems and the standardization of such 
systems. This development was followed closely by the NPD. Definitions of management 
systems for HSE had much in common with definitions of management systems for quality, 
such as “systematic measures to ensure compliance with rules and regulations” …. So, the 
first improvement measure was technology, the next was on organizational management of 
HSE, without forgetting the technology. And we saw significant improvements. Then 
discussions started, in the industry, in research communities, about ‘human factors’ and all 
that… We were searching for new approaches. Improvements were levelling out; we didn’t 
get further down, as with the number of injuries. So what should the next area of focus be, 
in addition to the two, in principle, already in place? Then we landed on …. that it’s very 
much a matter of attitudes, of conditions and frameworks around people enabling them to 
do a proper job, and so on. These issues surfaced more and more as a result of cost 
reductions and somewhat tougher attitudes from the operating companies. So we said we 
had to announce this as an additional topic, and we called it HSE culture. And when we 
made the decision and wrote it into the regulation, it was more policy than anything else, 
formulated as a duty to develop a HSE culture .… 
 
There was an understanding that this had to be digested in order to grasp what it was we 
were talking about. When we said “develop a HSE culture”, then we start a process, we 
don’t have a product requirement. This was very deliberate .… Certain considerations were 
already in place in the regulations. You could have explicated these considerations more 
clearly, but in that way you wouldn’t bring them all together under one umbrella so to 
                                                 
87 The concept of internal control seems to have emerged in the process that followed, without any obvious 
external influences. Inspiration from accounting was clearly rejected. One immediate reason for the change 




speak. For instance, you could have specified with more detail worker participation, worker 
responsibilities, management responsibilities, etc. But we wanted to pull it together within 
one ‘umbrella concept’ .... these things hang together, so it was natural for us construct this 
umbrella, and say that all the elements included shall be taken care of. Then the question 
comes up: what are all these elements? We didn’t have the answer to that when the 
regulations were put in force, which meant that we had to start a development process to 
find out what the NPD intended to accomplish. And the industry had to do the same. And 
then we need to have good discussions together in order to promote that development. To 
some extent that’s what we’ve had. We’ve prepared information products …. without 
claiming in any way to have the final formula. The intention is to try to clarify the content 
of this concept and to assist in the development process. And correctly, the process is not 
finished in any way. (PSA General Director) 
 
 
We may note that the experimental nature of these regulatory developments were 
unwaveringly admitted, as were the necessity of creative engagements with the industry 
in fulfilling regulatory intentions and devising organizational designs and processes for 
that purpose. The ideas about a ‘natural continuation’ were perhaps the most widely 
shared outline and justification of the ‘cultural turn’; it was clearly evident also in the 
account provided by the director for regulatory development: 
 
R: This paragraph on HSE culture can also be seen as the result of a long process, which 
may be traced back to the introduction of internal control when we started to focus on 
organization and decision processes, in the late 1970ties. That’s when we introduced the 
first guidelines on risk evaluation as well as guidelines for what we then called “self-
control”, and later “internal control”. The process started with the realization that the 
offshore structures, and the organizations needed to design and operate these, were so 
complicated that our traditional approach, using prescriptive regulation and detailed control, 
was no longer suitable. We had to find alternative ways of approaching this, and thus we 
came to the conclusion, in our supervision, to focus more on how projects and organizations 
were organized, how decisions were made and the considerations they were based on; rather 
than descriptive rules, specifying solutions. So this was how it started. …. Since then, 
we’ve been through a process of developing more goal based regulations and supplement 
these by references to acceptable industry standards in the guidelines, and focussing also on 
management systems, etc. Then, at one stage the health, safety, and environmental 
authorities – with regulatory responsibilities on the shelf – decided jointly to develop a 
holistic HSE-regime for the shelf, including safety, environmental, and health legislation. 
The concept of safety culture was not new. Using HSE was a consequence of this broader 
regulatory approach and perspective. It addressed how the operators complied with the 
regulations, not provision by provision, but as a whole. There were discussions on the issue 
of making HSE culture into a provision. Could you formally regulate this? Can companies 
be sanctioned for not adhering? And how could you define what was acceptable? There was 
a discussion whether it should be a purpose-like provision, similar to the intention of the 
WEA. The discussions ended up in a decision to regulate this area, in order to apply some 
‘pressure’ on the industry. But in my view the difference in arguments weren’t that 
significant, since it would be a difficult provision to enforce strictly anyway. There is so 
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much discretion involved in the enforcement. But we thought that a dedicated provision 
would add strength to its implementation. 
I: Did you think it was needed, that it provided something new, something that was 
missing...? 
R: We believed so, we felt that. It was natural to develop the internal control concept and 
get a step further from procedure; to incorporate the internal control regime into an overall 
culture regime. That’s how we saw it. Also internationally there was a process toward 
looking at more integrated approaches; not specifically dedicated to safety, quality etc., but 
to more holistic approaches. (director of regulatory development) 
 
 
In addition to the ‘natural process’ argument, the idea of culture as the necessary ‘next 
step’ for further improvement, should also be noted. This was a widely shared notion, 
graphically displayed in a figure that recurrently appeared in presentations of regulatory 
developments, indicating the ‘cultural level’ to be the ‘final stage’ in a tripartite process, 
‘technology’ and ‘management systems’ being the first two. Time appeared as the 
horizontal axis and HSE level appeared as the vertical axis and the ‘arrow’ ascended 
towards the age of culture. What was partly camouflaged in this visualization, and subject 
to some confusion, was how culture should be considered a ‘novelty’, only ambiguously 
contained in the preceding stages; or conversely, if technology or management systems 
had no role in the cultural phase. 
 
It’s difficult, but not necessarily critical, to determine the amount of hindsight 
rationalization in these expositions. Judging from the first responses, as perceived (and 
remembered) by the initiators, a long process of digestion must have taken place. In their 
view, the initial reception in the agency was not one of enthusiasm, and acceptance for 
the idea came only after much argument and persuasion. It was even argued that part of 
the justification for introducing culture was a perceived need for the agency to ‘wake up’ 
from their own ‘self-complacency’, and that the observed deterioration in the industry 
was reflected in the agency; but with the difference that the authorities didn’t have 
equally strong incentives for change: “The difference is that authorities are normally less 
self-reflecting. Their self-complacence is more resistant. The industry has to change; 
they’ll face sanctions, like loss of insurance, etc. But the authorities can defend 
themselves, point to the industry, point in all directions, except themselves” (former NPD 
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official). This ancient old Qui custodient ipsos custodies? question was to reappear 
occasionally, both outside and inside the agency.88 
 
 
However, the process of digestion did not seem to leave any clear idea of how culture 
was to be addressed in future encounters with the industry. What was to be the outcome 
of the ‘developmental process’ in terms of confirming, fulfilling, or moving beyond 
established ideals of risk management, such as ‘leadership engagement’ and ‘continuous 
learning’? With all the originators gone, ‘HSE culture’ somehow had to be reinvented, 
and the process of sorting out the regulatory implications and practical applications was 
taken over by others. We return to this follow-up process later. 
Concluding remarks 
The HSE regulations provide a comprehensive framework for the petroleum sector, 
virtually carpet bombing the industry with comprehensive statutory provisions and a 
large number of loosely associated industrial standards. They cover all aspects and actors 
in an intricate network, relying heavily on the active operation of self-regulating 
mechanisms to be installed within the hierarchies of industrial actors. The strategy is 
firmly based on the belief that regulatory capacities are more rationally employed by 
addressing the higher levels of risk management in the companies. Self-regulation is also 
a supplementary meta-regulation, not just a substitute for or a replacement of command 
and control systems. Thus it has also been termed self-administered command and 
control (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). But in the more elaborated forms of self-
regulation, this labelling is not sufficiently precise. The self-administration must be 
enlightened, requiring extensive knowledge and self-reflection about how internal risk 
management processes in fact contribute to the fulfilment of the regulatory purposes. And 
these processes must attune the organization to continuous learning and improvement, not 
searching for the minimal standard of what’s ‘good enough”. These were the ambitions of 
the new regulatory move, within which the cultural project was to play a significant part. 
Although there were some critical discontinuities in this reform process, the cultural turn 
can also be seen as a continuation, and was largely understood as such, of the long 
                                                 
88 Taken to originate from Roman times, and translates normally as: “Who rules the rulers”. 
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tradition of mobilizing self-regulatory resources in the industry. Although there were 
ambiguities as to what this new move would substantially add to the regulatory 
repertoire, there was still a strongly held belief that something was needed for penetrating 
beyond formal risk management systems.    
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5. Bureaucracy in action 
 
The good inspector exemplifies the ideal of ”flexible” regulation – neither uniformly legalistic nor 
overly accommodative, neither uniformly distrustful of regulated enterprises nor overly 
accommodative, neither uniformly distrustful of regulated enterprises nor overly trustful. The good 
inspector is willing and able to use the coercive tools of the law when necessary, but willing and 
intellectually able to make sensible compromises that avoid regulatory unreasonableness and elicit 
cooperation.  
 
Bardach and Kagan (2002: xi) 
 
 
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway is located in the so-called ‘knowledge park’ in 
Ullandhaug, Stavanger, in walking distance from The University of Stavanger (UiS) and 
the International Research Institute of Stavanger (IRIS). Both these institutions have 
petroleum technology and risk management as two of their most prominent discipline 
areas, and contribute significantly to the development of knowledge relevant for both the 
PSA and the NPD. The Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim 
(NTNU), and some highly specialised consultancy firms also belong to this cluster of 
know-how related to the petroleum industry. There is extensive collaboration between 
these institutions and also some migration of people between them.  
 
In this chapter, we look at how the agency uses their available resources in order to 
promote the regulatory goals.89 Although ‘behaviour modification’ against the ‘standards 
set’ appears as critical criteria for the success of control systems, regulatory strategies 
involves a lot more than just ‘compliance with rules’, as should be evident from the 
foregoing. The ultimate goal appeared to be the promotion of enlightened risk 
management, entailing a number of difficult trade-offs, sensitivity to warning signals, 
responsiveness to internal and external regulations, adjustment to changes, and ability to 
continuously learn and improve. One of the newly employed PSA-officials, with some 25 
years offshore experience as a safety manager, told me with some enthusiasm that the 
General Director had passed through the hallway one day, inviting anyone who’d 
                                                 
89 This outline is written with the year 2006 as the ‘ethnographic present tense’, not implying any 
‘ahistorical bias’, but rather as a convenient manner of representation. Policy statements and quotes 
referred in the text are found on the official PSA web-site that same year, and such references are not 
further specified.  
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encountered a “truly learning organization” to please come to his office and tell him 
immediately. Encounters with the industry largely took the form of confronting them 
with information gathered in order to make them act upon it in a purposeful and 
enlightened manner. Enlightenment was not the privilege of the regulator only. Although 
well resourced, they faced a well resourced industry, and expected them to know 
themselves better than occasional intruders form the outside. The cooperative context was 
essential, but not taken for granted. And if the trust was shaken, the enforcement 
measures were available and exploited.  
Organization and resources 
The PSA currently has some 165 employees and an annual budget of some 160 mill 
(NOK). The agency is headed by General Director Magne Ognedal. Originally trained as 
an engineer, he started his career in the NPD in 1974, and became director of the safety 
division in 1979. He has thus had a key role in building up the regulatory regime, and has 
been an active promoter of the ‘regulated risk management’ philosophies, both in 
Norway and abroad.90 The senior management team furthermore comprises two directors 
of ‘supervisory activities’, a director for ‘professional competence’, a director for 
regulatory development, a director for ‘operational support’ (heading the administration 
and human resource unit) and a ‘strategic communication advisor’ (heading the 
information/public relations unit). Regulatory development covers all regulatory issues, 
including the follow up of international regulations, coordination of relations with other 
national and international authorities, and support to the ministry in the preparation of 
White papers, reform proposals, etc. A number of more and less permanent teams and 
project groups are formed that use personnel resources from all these four departmental 
areas.  
 
                                                 
90 He was a key member of the so-called internal control commission in the late 1980s, preceding the 
internal control reforms on a wider national scale (NOU, 1987a; NOU, 1987b), and he was also an 
influential advisor to the Cullen commission after the Piper Alpha accident (1990), resulting in the 
development of the new risk management regime in the British sector. In fact, the Cullen report was 
occasionally referred to as the ‘Ognedal report’, although this influence was normally acknowledged only 
in informal contexts (see Beck, et al.; Ryggvik, 2000). His position within the offshore petroleum industry 
may be indicated by the occasionally employed nickname, ‘Mr. Safety’. 
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The organizational model was developed just after the establishment of the PSA in 2004. 
Although the team organization (see Chapter 4) by many was seen to have improved 
information-flows and perforated some disciplinary boundaries, the new management 
wanted more fixed structures, but still retaining some of the flexibility of the team model.  
The new organization should be task oriented; teams should be composed and work 
processes organized according to the nature of the tasks and problems faced. This 
organizational design is most clearly evident in how they solve the organizationally 
disparate concerns related to target group specialization on the one hand and disciplinary 
specialization on the other. In the present organization, 6 discipline areas constitute the 
basic structure, reflecting the complex variety of HSE-related issues. These are headed by 
discipline leaders, reporting to the ‘professional competence’ director, and with 
administrative responsibility for personnel resources. Six supervisory teams, headed by 
supervisory coordinators, reporting to the supervisory directors, constitute a secondary 
structure, dividing the regulated companies into designated target groups, notably oil 
companies, rig companies, and other contractor companies. This particular construction 
thus combines the disciplinary and the target group dimensions in a relatively ordered 
organizational matrix.91  
 
The basic disciplinary units cover working environment, process integrity, drilling and 
well technology, structural integrity, logistics and emergency preparedness, and HSE-
management and legal affairs. The number of employees in each unit range from 10 to 
25. The supervisory units comprise a ‘Statoil/Gassco team’, which is the largest, a 
‘Hydro/Shell team’, a team for the rest of the oil companies (ConocoPhillips British 
Petroleum, ExxonMobile, TotalElf etc), a team for all rig companies, one for the 
contractor companies, and one for the land facilities. Again, the number of employees in 
each team range from 10 to 25; administratively, however, they belong in the disciplinary 
units. The system thus implies that disciplinary and supervisory leaders act as leaders in 
one context and as ordinary group member in another; their latter role however limited by 
the burden of their leadership tasks. This structure facilitates both cross-disciplinary 
                                                 
91 Resolving the inherent tensions between these basic organizational dimensions has been a major 
headache in several other regulatory regimes (Statskonsult, 1999; 2002). 
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approaches in encounters with the industry and transfer of experience across the 
landscape of industrial actors.  
 
Although a number of professions are represented in the PSA, they are clearly dominated 
by engineers, roughly corresponding to the not uncommon ‘80/20 ratio’ of technical/non-
technical personnel in such regulatory agencies (Reason, 1997).92 These cover a range of 
engineering disciplines, such as material science, construction, process-engineering, 
electro-engineering, etc., and include of course the more specialized disciplines within 
the industry, such as petroleum engineering, drilling and well technology. The working 
environment unit appears as the most multi-disciplinary, comprising chemists, biologists, 
physiologists, social scientists (anthropology, psychology), as well as engineers.93  
 
Wage-levels are well above the average for public servants due to strong competition 
from the wealthy petroleum industry, ready to recruit attractive expertise from the labour 
market. Some also leave for consulting firms or R&D institutions. Generally the labour 
market is still able to offer considerably higher wages in particular areas. Depending on 
the level of activity and the economic fluctuations, certain disciplinary areas are 
particularly exposed to shortage problems, such as drilling and well technology, material 
science (corrosion, pipelines, etc.), and process-technology.  
 
In national terms, at least within the traditional risk regimes related to health and safety, 
the PSA must be considered quite resourceful, measured against the ‘size’ of the 
regulatory space. Although they cover an extensive range of risk factors, the amount of 
regulated firms is limited. The number of operators has traditionally been low (10-20), 
and the principle of making the operating companies control actors further down the 
hierarchical levels has enabled the agency to concentrate their supervisory resources 
towards a rather limited number of actors. This broad picture is changing somewhat, 
however, both due to the increasing number of smaller operators and the fact that the 
                                                 
92 Due to mixed educational backgrounds and organizational positions, exact figures can hardly be 
produced, But the 80/20 ratio appears as fairly accurate if internal/administrative staff is excluded, and 
would include also some 6-7 lawyers among the non-technical staff. 
93 Five of whom hold PhDs within their disciplines. 
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agency now approach the contractor industry to a greater extent. They also face a wealthy 
and resourceful industry with considerable administrative and professional capacities that 
can be mobilized in responding to the risk management requirements and assume 
responsibility for self-regulation. Such aspects of the ‘controller-controlled ratio’ are 
important for understanding the regulatory and supervisory options and strategies. The 
PSA is thus able to engage in quite diversified and comprehensive encounters with the 
actors, and the supervisory teams will be able to acquire substantial insights into the 
management systems, practices, and cultures of the companies.94  
Priorities, plans and interventions 
Although strategic priorities cover the whole spectre of agency activities, such as 
regulatory development, information, professional advice, and collaborative projects, we 
concentrate here on the supervisory tasks. Supervision is used as a comprehensive term 
for most encounters with the industry. These constitute the principal context for enacting 
the public role towards the companies and occupies roughly one third of the agency 
resources. We provide here only a rough outline of how overall philosophies, goals, 
resources, and informational sources are transformed into practical action.  
‘Risk based supervision’ 
Disposing available resources in a purposeful manner is in itself a priority, and much 
energy is devoted to developing and ‘enacting’ models and criteria for prioritization. The 
principal policy is that supervision shall be risk based and systems oriented. Risk based 
supervision has developed like a mantra in all Norwegian HSE agencies during the last 
two decades, and is generally formulated through the doctrine of giving priority to the 
‘greatest risks with the highest improvement potentials’. The principle of risk based 
supervision should not be interpreted as being restricted to any narrowly defined set of 
supervisory encounters with the industry. Rather, it is part of a more general public 
                                                 
94 A contrast here with the onshore Labour Inspection is illustrative: It comprises some 500 employees 
regulating and supervising some 240 000 employers, spanning a highly diversified regulatory space of 
sectors and risk profiles, and generally facing much less resourceful and motivated regulatees. The 
Statoil/Gassco team , by comparison, alone include more than 20 agency officials for supervising two 
companies. And a meeting with the CEO of Statoil, holding 60 percent of all the operatorships on the shelf, 
must be considered a ‘deep impact’ encounter (compared to, say, a labour inspector supervising a grocery 
store). 
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management orientation toward efficiency, performance, and outcome-based result. Risk-
based regulation and supervision are the logical extensions of this orientation in a risk 
regime, and implies neither more nor less than ‘optimal risk reduction’ as the ultimate 
outcome benchmark, to the effect of identifying the intervention strategies best suited for 
that purpose. The challenge is even greater in the PSA, as no other agency in Norway 
covers such a broad spectrum of risks, all of which would be subject to forces only 
variably within the sphere of agency influence. The allocation of internal resources is not 
only supposed to reflect the ‘risk picture’, but also the expected impact of any specific 
intervention. Self-reflective acknowledgement of the limits of organizational rationality 
in the face of these conundrums would occasionally surface. Indeed, after first lamenting 
the industrial failure to assess the effects of the measures and remedial actions required 
by the PSA, the General Director allowed himself to reflect a bit more modestly on the 
difficulties involved in making such assessments, comparing them to the difficulties 
involved in meeting similar requirements from their own principals:  
 
R: It’s really what the Ministry asks us to do. What’s your contribution? So we try. We’re 
starting a project now to establish indicators in order to measure the effects of what we do. 
That’s really a challenge .… A few years ago we initiated a project together with the 
industry in order to reduce the number of gas leaks with 50 percent within 2005.95 So we 
instigated an industry project, and we followed it closely .… Now it looks like we’ll reach 
that goal. That looks very good. But then there’s the question: what’s our contribution in 
this? What we’ve done is that we’ve put it on the agenda, demanded action, suggested 
means, suggested a goal, and we’ve got acceptance from the industry. So, that we as an 
authority focus on certain issues and put pressure on the industry - that will produce results 
and that is now confirmed. .… So through follow-up meetings, through supervisions that 
focus on HC-leaks [hydrocarbon-leaks], through such measures, we can keep up the 
pressure and produce results.  
I: But you could proceed like this, area by area, and try to measure the net effects of your 
contribution, to take account of all external factors, and so on…? 
R: Sure, it’s really a challenge. (General Director) 
 
The last remark was an understatement. It may come as no surprise that the ‘indicator 
project’ referred to, proved difficult to complete in a satisfactory manner. As noted, the 
RNNS project had in itself required lots of energy, resources, and computational skill; but 
justified agreement about the development of the various risk indicators and their relative 
contribution to the larger risk landscape, would constitute only a first step, a necessary 
                                                 
95 See reference to the gas-leak project, chapter 3, pp. 76-77. 
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condition, for identifying the expected relative impact of any particular agency 
intervention. As was admitted with some resignation by one of the supervisory directors: 
“it proved very difficult”. Ambitions had to be tempered considerably, in particular with 
respect to quantifiable indicators, and much self-reflective and discretionary judgment 
was required in order to link output measures to overall strategic choices and the more 
specific forms of intervention.96 Relating developments in risk levels to regulatory and 
supervisory efforts also raised some ‘auxiliary’ questions of a rather different order; that 
is, about praise for ‘successes’ and blame for ‘failures’. In the former case, it could run 
counter to the tripartite collaborative ethos to claim too much credit for improvements; 
and conversely, it could of course strike back on the authorities in the case of negative 
events or trends.97  
 
Still, some critical, but not mutually exclusive, dimensions may be identified, along 
which the priorities had to be selected. They include such factors as the types of risk to be 
addressed (major accidents, injuries, or occupational illness), the stages or points of 
intervention (preventive, harm-based, or act based), the various causal antecedents of 
harm (technological, human, organizational, - or ‘cultural’), the performance records of 
the companies (however measured and ranked), the organizational points of intervention 
within the industrial hierarchies (from licensees to sub-contractors), and the intervention 
methods to be employed in encounters with the industry (from collaborative projects to 
supervisory audits). Not surprisingly, very rough estimates and evaluative judgements 
provided the background for how priorities were made, and the outcomes would be 
produced in quite complex organizational processes, ranging from the ministerial level 
down to the single agency official.98  
 
                                                 
96 Quantified ministerial targets is thus typically related to input factors, such as hours spent on supervisory 
activity, currently amounting to some 60 000, which approximately represents 1/3 of their total resources. 
In 2005, this amounted to some 125 audits and supervisory activities. It may be noted that a recent 
evaluation report commissioned by the ministry omitted outcome effects altogether.  
97 Certainly, the opposite mechanism could also be observed: blaming the industry for failures and claiming 
credit for improvements.  
98 A certain reluctance could be observed in ‘pushing’ these overall risk-cost-benefit-analysis issues too far, 
reflecting a certain distaste for measuring the economic value of outcomes (such as the value of a lost life). 
But the issue was recurrently voiced and addressed, such as in both the 2002 and 2006 White papers (see 
chapter 3), and certainly also dating back to the pioneer era.  
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Some priorities are ‘fixed’ in the sense that they are more or less permanently embedded 
in the regulatory framework and in the composition of professional resources. Other 
priorities are more ‘variable’, partly because they are subject to longer term planning 
processes, and partly because they are adapted to dynamic and changing circumstances. 
In responding to a question about overall priorities, the disciplinary director in fact drew 
attention to the ‘fixed’ priorities in terms of the current distribution of professional 
resources:  
 
R: Traditionally, major accidents have had a lot of attention, because everyone understands 
the potential. But to damage your hearing after long term exposure, it’s not that easy to get 
the attention .… It takes such a long time. And then there are often so many other factors 
that have an impact, like from your private life.  
I: But you make priorities? 
R: Yes, but given that we’re also measured against result, it’s easier for us also to focus on 
issues where these results are visible within a range of say one or five years, rather than 
twenty. We must be firm in our long term perspective… 
I: You could think of a radically different distribution of resources .. like 50 percent on 
working environment? 
R: Well, that’s partly what we’ve done. Look at Statoil; they have like 600 drilling 
engineers, we have ten, but within working environment they don’t have more than we do. 
So we’ve done a prioritization, we’ve upgraded working environment considerably, 
compared to the normal distribution within the companies. … just to provide a rough 
picture. Half of the drilling engineers work with safety related issues, like well integrity and 
well control. Most of the disciplines have interfaces toward working environment. But there 
must be a balance; the technology must work, there must be stability on the floating 
installations, the structures must not yield, pipelines cannot crack or burst, and so on .... 
(disciplinary director) 
 
The presence of high risk technologies and the prospect of large scale accidents, against 
the ‘softer’ area of working environment, thus appeared as a major priority issue. 
Traditionally, the former has been favoured, and in that respect, clearly reflecting also the 
priorities of the industry. It could be justified by drawing up worst case scenarios of the 
potentially devastating effects on the whole industry and its role in the Norwegian 
economy. But health and working environment had gradually gained a more prominent 
position and were increasingly also seen as critical for the safety levels on a broader 
scale. Indeed, an ‘integrated perspective’ on HSE and the interrelation between the 
constituent parts appeared as a major perspective in agency policy. 
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In short, the priorities were the result, not of precise indicators and calculations, but of 
much discretionary judgement about the relative ‘size’ of the broad spectre of ‘residual 
risks’, and of how interventions could contribute to reducing both the size of the risk and 
the size of the ‘residual’. As noted, the concept of residual risk denotes the size of risks 
not handled by other regulatory systems. However, as intervention in the corporate 
regulatory systems was at the heart of the ‘higher order’ regulatory philosophy, ‘reducing 
the residual’ appeared as a primary purpose of intervention. Indeed, the assessment and 
evaluation of ‘primary’ risks were key elements in the corporate obligations.99  
Addressing the industrial hierarchy 
The policy of addressing, not only the intra-company but also the inter-company systems 
of control was justified as an optimalization of the regulatory resources. As evident from 
the regulatory system (see Chapter 4), a crucial idea has been to exploit the contractual 
hierarchies within the industry, by making the upper level actors control lower level 
actors. Operators have had an overall responsibility for all activities within their sphere, 
including all other firms directly or indirectly involved in the operations. Thus, they were 
responsible for the surveillance of contractors, sub-contractors, and the supply industry; 
contractors were also responsible for the surveillance of sub-contractors, and sub-
contractors for sub-sub-contractors, etc. In this manner an intricate system of hierarchical 
controls has been devised, sometimes covering up to six or seven contractual levels. At 
its best this has been an ingenious way of incorporating checks and balances and 
establishing self-regulatory mechanisms at an overall systems level. The system 
strategically localizes the point of intervention but also relieves the agency of some 
supervisory burdens, as it has been possible to substantially delimit the number of 
companies in the target group, concentrating and directing most resources at the top level 
of the contractual hierarchy. All actors have had their specific responsibilities according 
to the regulations. As was noted by one of the supervisory directors: “One of the most 
important strategic choices made within supervision has been to approach the 
                                                 
99 Such as the application of the ALARP principle. Indeed, the complexities involved in following up this 
requirement could be indicated by the fact that one of the leading risk experts in the R&D network (a 
professor at the UiS) had been commissioned to make a ‘preliminary’ evaluation of corporate ‘compliance’. 
Not surprisingly, great variations were disclosed, including also variations in the interpretation of the 
‘principle’ as such (Vinnem, 2006).  
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responsibilities of the various actors within the pyramid”. Up to the late 1990s only the 
operators were subject to agency supervision.  
 
However, this has also been a vulnerable and complicated system. Gradually, there was a 
growing need to approach lower level actors directly. First the ship-owners (rig-owners) 
and then other large contractors were included as target groups for supervision. Although 
transparency in accountability was one purpose of the system, the opposite effect could 
also emerge. As was explained by one of the supervisory directors: 
 
We saw a development where the operators didn’t fully have hands-on control of all the 
suppliers. They were also submitted to severe rationalization processes. We also received 
information from contractors/suppliers that there was a very long distance from them to the 
authorities; that they’d always have to go through the operators. So you had the questions of 
cost-generating regulation, and of who were the real conveyors of requirements: the 
operators or the authorities. Do the operators hide behind the authorities when they specify 
their requirements? Which were really operator requirements of a commercial kind, and 
which were authority requirements related to safety? (supervisory director) 
 
Also, in 2000, audits were for the first time targeted directly towards licensees. Departing 
from the hierarchical principle has not been only a smooth and uncontroversial path to 
follow. The exclusive focus on operators provided a possibility for supervisory 
concentration and uniformity. But the issue was not simply one of relieving supervisory 
burdens, but of optimally exploiting available resources and of being firm on the matter 
of hierarchical responsibilities. By subverting the system, operators could start feeling 
relieved from their own control tasks. One such critical issue arose with regard to the 
drilling rigs. In order to facilitate the transfer of mobile rigs from various jurisdictions, 
there was a need for a joint system of ‘minimal certification’. This lead to the 
development of the so-called AoC system (Acknowledgement of Compliance), defined as 
“a decision made by the PSA to the effect that the technical condition of a mobile facility 
and the applicant's organization and management system are considered to be in 
compliance with relevant requirements in Norwegian shelf legislation.”.100 The AoC 
system is now being extended to comprise other mobile units as well, such as flotels and 
mobile production-ships.  
                                                 
100 http://www.ptil.no/English/Helse+miljo+og+sikkerhet/Tilsyn+og+raadgivning/SUT_hovedsiden.htm 
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Supervisory plans and strategies 
The supervisory policies encompass a broad range of interventions, from meetings with 
top company managers to spot checks on a facility. The bulk of supervisory activity is 
carried out through audits, with the purpose of providing an overall evaluation of 
compliance with regulatory and management system requirements.101  A fairly detailed 
supervision plan is prepared each year, based on the general priorities and the more 
detailed knowledge provided by the supervisory teams.  
 
The yearly priorities are formally based on the ministerial letter of award. In practice, of 
course, the agency has considerable influence on the final outcome.102 The planning 
process starts in the spring, as priorities are fed into the government budgetary process. 
These inputs are primarily based on the observed trends in risk levels (such as reported 
incidents), and on societal, technological, and organizational conditions and changes 
thought to affect future risk levels. Such overall topics may include organizational 
interfaces, integrated work processes, management of change-processes, aging platforms, 
aging work force, etc.103 There is a considerable amount of interaction between the 
agency and the ministry in this process, as inputs to the letter of award are produced 
during the fall and a draft is then sent to the ministry. It is formally sent to the agency in 
                                                 
101 The Norwegian term, translated here as ‘supervision’, is “tilsyn”. “Tilsyn” har gradually appeared as a 
common denominator for all agencies with supervisory tasks, but refers more specifically to those 
particular sets of activities with the purpose of actively assessing and sanctioning regulatory compliance. 
The actual inspection practices follow the standard guidelines for quality audit/assessment, adapted of 
course to the specific area of control.  
102 A practice of letting the agency draft the letter of award was in fact introduced in the early 1990s. As 
was explained by a former Director General (1990-1997) of the ministerial Department of Working 
Environment and Safety: “They produced drafts which were much better than what we could have 
accomplished on our own. And the priorities in terms of supervisory activities were to a large extent 
‘stable’, with recurring issues related to the regulated activities. They could from their position make more 
enlightened judgements about the exact composition and priority of tasks”. But clearly, this was an 
interactive process; as was explained by one senior official that had been heavily involved in these 
processes in the 1990s, the letter of award appeared as a way of ‘seeing oneself in the mirror’. The phrase 
expressed both the impact the agency had on the outcome, but also the self-reflective process of having to 
account for and justify the strategic choices in the face of a critical and ardent principal.   
103 See also chapter 3. Examples of such overall priorities in 2007 are: aging installation, subsea facilities, 
onshore facilities, onshore-offshore integration, environmental vulnerability, e-operation, value creation, 
and internationalization. Integrated operations (e-operations) has become a major issue over the last years, 
as increasing portions of the actual offshore operations are carried out from quite advanced multi-media 
and computer-based onshore control-rooms. These may in fact be located anywhere in the world, and 
involve several cooperating companies responsible for different parts of the operations.  
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January, and the chances it’s returned without major modifications are considered to be 
fairly good.104  
 
The overall priorities are to be further elaborated and operationalized by the supervisory 
and disciplinary groups, however, and a so-called priority memo is produced for all 
groups of actors, including proposals for activities and measures related to every single 
actor. The teams also prepare a so-called ‘actor-image’ each year, based on meetings with 
the companies, audit experiences, consents and exemptions given, specific projects, 
reported incidents/accidents, willingness and ability to comply with regulations, etc. 
These summaries both serve as input to the upcoming plans and as more ‘holistic 
diagnoses’ that are communicated to the companies in so-called ‘status-meeting’ that are 
convened each spring. Considerations beyond ‘past experiences’ with the individual 
companies must also be made, such as upcoming change-processes, internal projects, or 
audit-plans. The more detailed activity plans must reflect the whole spectre of risk issues 
and perceived needs for intervention. The distribution of regulatory burdens must also be 
considered; as was noted by one supervisory coordinator: “We cannot keep up a constant 
heavy pressure on a company. We also have to give them time to follow up our 
requirements and orders, and then come back to assess the results when they’ve had time 
to implement measures”. The concrete planning of supervisory activities is fed into a 
supervision database. Caution, logistic ability, and planning systems are needed in order 
to avoid colliding activities, and it is the responsibility of the coordinator to make 
decisions about how the various measures are composed and utilized. This includes how 
supervisory interventions  are distributed across the companies, both in a short term and 
long term perspective, and how formal means are employed, with due consideration of 
varieties in company performance.  
 
The supervisory plan does not distinguish clearly between audits focussing on 
management and control systems, and verifications more concerned with measurements, 
testing, inspection, etc. One single audit may contain elements of both, although the 
                                                 
104 Political agendas are still evident in some cases, such as issues related to social inclusion and social 
dumping. The PSA also respond to input from the Pollution Control Authority, the Board of Health and the 
other agencies that they cooperate with. 
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theme of the audit will imply a bias towards either. Such themes cover the whole range of 
possible interventions, varying in resources invested, scope, generality, and the choice of 
HSE-elements to be covered. Supervisions can be directed towards ‘generic’ issues, such 
as ‘HSE-management’, ‘follow-up of incidents’, or ‘management of change and re-
organization’. Some supervisions have an explicit focus on the internal hierarchy of self-
regulatory mechanisms, and may trace the management of a defined area of risk from the 
overall systems perspective to the operational levels on some selected sites. They require 
a lot of resources however, but they also facilitate a more comprehensive evaluation of 
organizational performance on a broader scale. A large group of supervisory activities is 
specifically directed toward defined and delimited risk areas, such as lifting operations, 
well control, working hours, automation, electricity systems, etc. Some supervisory 
activities are also more ad hoc based, being conducted to follow up specific incidents or 
accidents (see below).  
The audit process 
The actual audit process involves, first, a notification to the involved parties some three 
weeks in advance about purpose, scope, time-schedule, agency participants, documents to 
be prepared (some of which are sent to the PSA in advance), notification of the safety 
representative, etc. Questions and clarifications are made in the interim period. In 
preparing for the audit, the team must assess the nature of the relevant statutory 
requirements, in particular their level of detail and specification, and to what extent the 
auditee is expected to have formulated internal requirements, which may include 
decisions about the amount and nature of company documentation to be studied before 
the actual audit, and what can be done on the spot. The audit itself starts with an opening 
meeting, with the agency explaining the purpose and scope of the audit, methods to be 
used, schedule, and practicalities. Normally, everyone from the company expected to take 
part in the audit is invited to the opening meeting. In particular, the safety representatives 
are expected to be present, and are also specifically informed about the right to a separate 
meeting with the team and the possibility to participate in physical inspections on the 
facility. Normally, a separate interview is conducted with the safety representative as part 
of the audit plan.  
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 The audit is then conducted, with documentary analyses, interviews, and site 
observations; the latter may include improvised talks with employees encountered during 
the inspection. A closing meeting concludes the audit, where the team summarizes their 
main impressions, and the auditee is invited to give comments or supplementary 
information. No conclusions are presented at this stage regarding the specific 
observations or their legal status. The report shall be sent (with a copy to other involved 
parties) within three weeks, and list all findings and comments along with the ‘supporting 
evidence’. Any formal measure (order) shall be notified in the accompanying letter. A 
summary of the report is posted on the PSA web-sites. The auditee is allowed a four 
week deadline for responding to the rapport, including how non-conformities have been 
or will be followed up. In the (rare) case of notified orders, the response shall comment 
on each specific item in a satisfactory way for the order to be dropped (i.e. by providing 
new information, specific measurements planned or taken, etc.). In the majority of cases 
some disagreements surface about the appropriateness or sufficiency of company 
performance, about the ‘facts’, or about the interpretation of observations as ‘non-
conformities’. Most of these disagreements are resolved through ‘dialogue’ or ‘clarifying 
meetings’. If agreement is not reached, the PSA will normally order the company to 
implement the required measures. The audit is ‘closed’ when the companies have 
provided a satisfactory response, including a report about the measures taken or planned. 
Normally, the PSA will not physically seek to verify these implementations as part of a 
general follow up. Spot checks may however be taken in subsequent audits. 
Points of interventions 
Using the conventional distinction between preventive, act-based, and harm-based 
interventions (Baldwin and Cave, 1999), the former two clearly absorb the majority of 
resources. Given the heavy reliance on enforced risk management strategies, it is not easy 
to distinguish preventive from act-based interventions, however. Authority intervention, 
in terms of checking that the self-regulatory mechanisms are properly enacted (like 
conducting risk assessments), addresses both the preventive effects of the assessment and 
the act of conducting them. Likewise, adherence to internal procedures is (in ‘theory’) 
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preventive, but sanctioning non-compliance is act-based. Conventional preventive 
interventions, would be difficult due to information problems, and would sometimes run 
counter to the strong ‘no-approval’ ethos. The agency needs a charte blanche in pointing 
to and assigning responsibility for whatever non-conformity that might be discovered.   
 
This point can be illustrated by an example quite some time back, where an operator was 
going to develop an oilfield offshore. There were challenges related to the seabed, and they 
had to be confident about the foundations. They commissioned two consultancy firms to 
conduct studies and as could be expected, they come up with two different solutions. So the 
company sent these to us, asking which one to go for. Our response was to inform the 
company that this was a decision they should make and then present their decision to us. 
With this regime you put the responsibility in the hands of the company in the first instance; 
and if they have one or two sleepless nights, that’s quite all right. At least, they’ll check 
once and twice before they commence. (director of regulatory development) 
 
Generally, the agency has been extremely cautious in not undermining the responsibilities 
of the regulatees. No approvals, decisions, or ‘signals’ that could be interpreted as 
approvals should be given. The agency would just point to the non-conformities 
discovered during supervisions. They would never give anything resembling a stamp of 
approval or a “clean bill of health”.105 The consent system, whereby the operators have 
been required to apply specifically for consent from the agency prior to the start up of 
activities (such as at certain pre-defined milestones or phases in a project), has been 
carefully designed in order to avoid such ‘misunderstandings’. The consents are given on 
the basis of a self-declaration from the companies (including possible deviations from 
plans or regulations) where they must confirm that activities can commence in a 
‘satisfactory manner’.  
 
Harm-based interventions were largely conducted as investigations of incidents and 
accidents, including the sanctions that would normally follow. The PSA investigate some 
10-15 incidents/accidents each year, selected according to their seriousness, and a much 
larger number is investigated by the companies themselves. A limited number of the most 
serious cases are also investigated by the police. Compared to the onshore risk regimes, 
these investigations were given high priority, in terms of both resources spent and the 
                                                 
105 The phrase is used by Perrow (1999: 359), referring to the practice of the US Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, and indicates, implicitly at least, the regulatory risks involved in ‘awarding’ such 
approvals. 
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internal and public attention they received. It would be a mistake, however, to assess this 
priority against the ordinary arguments given for harm-based interventions, such as 
preventive deterrence. Partly, harm-based interventions were in all respects 
supplementary strategies, not substitutional ones; and partly they were indeed seen as 
preventive, not primarily with the purpose of deterrence, but rather with the purpose of 
‘learning-from-failure’.  
 
Even though enforcement costs sometimes justify harm-based intervention (it’s cheaper 
to sanction the relatively few instances of actual harm than the much larger number of 
potentially dangerous causes/acts), such considerations were not important. First, 
investigations were in fact quite costly and time consuming; second, the reports primarily 
identified, post hoc, the violations of regulations and procedures and were thus more like 
an ‘after the (f)act’ kind of act-based intervention, sometimes also conducted in the 
absence of actual harm (the gravity of harm-potential being an important criterion). 
Although the findings would always support subsequent action, including orders in grave 
cases, the justifications were not primarily based on deterrence arguments. Still, 
investigations could be seen as a kind of ‘punishment’. Investigation reports were 
published on the web-sites, and there was a certain ‘bad boy’ stigma attached to having 
behaved in such a manner that the agency had to investigate the matter; and the 
production of subsequent sanctions could also be done with more evidential scrutiny and 
support. But an important justification was also that of information-gathering on a ‘supra-
case’ level. Investigations were thought to provide unique insights into the causal 
antecedents of incidents and thus a contribution to the body of learning and knowledge 
necessary for preventing new ones. This applied to the company itself as well as to the 
agency. But also, they wanted the reports to be read by other companies in order to fully 
appreciate the ‘lessons learned’.  
Policy instruments and enforcement practice 
The law enforcement philosophy of the PSA could perhaps audaciously be said to follow 
The law of the Phantom: “tough towards the evil and kind towards the good”. But 
whereas the Phantom leaves his signatures (the Good Mark or the Evil Mark) as 
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permanent imprints, no such enduring and encapsulating signs of approval or disapproval 
would normally appear in the diagnostic practices of the PSA. To the contrary, they 
would take care to accommodate their policy instruments in order to avoid just that. As is 
evident from their basic regulatory philosophy, all signs of authorized approvals would 
be avoided. The agency would take care always to be free, after the fact/event, to make 
the company fully accountable. But neither would they treat their subjects as proven or 
potential villains. As will be apparent later, the early attempts to apply the culture 
provision in formal encounters with the industry stirred uneasy sensations of having used 
the Evil Mark (‘bad HSE culture’).  
 
Working theories of regulatory compliance were more in line with the ‘political citizen’ 
model or the ‘organizational failure’ model, than with the ‘amoral calculator’ model (see 
Chapter 2). But, taking account of the possibility of the latter, the enforcement options 
and practices reflected rather what has been referred to as a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy (Ayers 
and Braithwaite, 1992). That is, measures taken would be highly contingent, containing a 
diversity of informal and formal measures, and employed according to a broad range of 
circumstances, the gravity of the observed transgressions being seen as the most 
important. The availability of instruments within the enforcement pyramid allowed great 
flexibility and reliance on accommodative modes. Having ultimately the power to 
influence the chances of being granted access to the attractive markets, they were able to 
“speak softly with big sticks”. As observed by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 19): 
“Paradoxically, the bigger and more various are the sticks, the greater the success 
regulators will achieve by speaking softly”. Accommodating these instruments to the 
highly complex and versatile contexts of application required much discretion and 
professional judgement, confirming the claim that “There is … as much art as science in 
enforcement since trade-offs have to be made on a number of fronts” (Baldwin and Cave, 
1999:117). 
The doctrine and context of ‘dialogue’ 
Dialogue and cooperation thus appear as key words in most accounts of relations with the 
industry. And as noted, agreement is normally reached between the PSA and the 
 149
companies before formal enforcement measures need to be used. Seen against the 
availability of variously sized ‘sticks’, there is some understatement contained in the 
more laconic formulation of official policy, where the PSA follow-up after a supervisory 
activity is described as “generally based on dialogue and cooperation with the players on 
the Norwegian shelf”, and that, as a rule, “agreement is reached between the PSA and the 
audited companies concerning our findings and impressions from the audit.” 
 
 
On the whole, the industry is regarded as compliant, disciplined, and well-behaving. 
Although the reasons for this cannot be reduced to instrumental calculation only, 
industrial responses to regulation could variably be attributed to their affluence, to the 
reputational risks, and in the last instance to reduced chances of being granted future 
licenses. There was also a general observation that the readiness to comply would change 
if the companies were no longer interested in new licences; or at least that the interest in 
taking active part in the ‘beauty contest’ would diminish (Ryggvik, 2000). As long as the 
contest counted, even quite cost-generating measures were gradually accepted, like the 
remote drilling technologies which were introduced from the late 1980s. The Oil Industry 
Association and the Rig Owners Association could partly take the role of giving voice if 
regulatory interventions were seen as disproportionate or unreasonable. But generally, a 
certain amount of ‘self-restraint’ was apparent from industrial actors in terms of actively 
and openly voicing any critique of enforcement practices. 
 
The industrial timidity would occasionally be subject to self-reflecting comments from 
agency officials, including also on the implicit powers of agency officials in their, 
sometimes unheeded, encounters with the industry. Enforcing compliance by ‘raising 
eyebrows’, would not bring any disagreements to the surface. In informal terms, the point 
was made more explicit. Although the risks related to market access are difficult to 
assess, the scenario of damage to reputation was seen as sufficiently efficient. As was 
noted by one of the disciplinary leaders, the companies made the connection themselves, 
whether it was justified or not:  
 
I: How do you notice this mechanism? 
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R: I guess we notice in our use of measures … we don’t need to use such severe measures 
in order to get things through; it’s enough to hint at something to make the companies act. 
I: So it’s enough to just raise eyebrows…? 
R: Sometimes, yes. (disciplinary leader) 
 
Such mechanisms were seen to influence the company even if orders or complaints on 
orders in themselves had little impact on the company evaluations which where produced 
as background documentation for the awarding of licences. Rather it was the assessment 
of the HSE-standards as such, over time that mattered. But, generally, a certain self-
restraint from the companies in objecting to enforcement practices or using their right to 
appeal or complain was observed from PSA officials as well as from the companies 
themselves. As was noted by a senior legal advisor: “The companies know that we make 
these evaluations and recommendations for the ministries. So they know HSE is part of 
the picture”.   
Enforcement measures 
Law enforcement is no trivial pursuit in the petroleum sector. As noted in Chapter 3, an 
order to the industry may have huge economic impacts, and the petroleum authorities are 
arguably among the most powerful within the state administration. In one conspicuous 
case, an order was notified that the whole Ekofisk field be closed down unless extensive 
technological modifications and improvements were implemented. The total costs were 
estimated at some 20 billion (NOK).106 This may only indicate the extreme end of the 
spectrum, and most cases were of less dramatic kinds; but regulatory intervention would 
potentially generate large costs, such as those requiring temporary production stops.  
 
The enforcement measures are often displayed as steps on a staircase, the uses of which 
ascend according to the severity of the regulatory transgressions. It starts with ‘dialogue’, 
and is followed by orders, coercive fines, stopping activity, legal prosecution, and finally, 
expulsion. The enforcement strategy is displayed as a downward arrow to show that the 
accommodative alternatives are the preferred policy instruments. The term ‘dialogue’ 
                                                 
106 This was in the early 1990s, and involved extensive negotiations and lobbying from the involved 
companies. The ministry was of course notified (a governmental memo was also produced), but voiced no 
clear position besides confirming the right of the NPD to notify the order; in the case of appeal, they could 
not commit themselves to any predetermined opinion. The case was finally resolved and the company 
(Phillips) conducted the upgrading of the field. 
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thus covers a broad spectrum of encounters with the industry. In terms of enforcement 
measures, dialogue subsumes a number of informal strategies, such as ‘requests’, 
informal warnings, identical letters to groups of actors about trends or general 
observations, copy of letters/reports to superiors within a company, safety messages, 
summoning meetings with company management, etc.; in short, all non-statutory 
initiatives taken to influence company behaviour. Even the posting of report summaries 
on the web-site may be considered as part of an enforcement strategy.107  
 
A so-called ‘Handbook of enforcement measures’ provides rough guidelines for how the 
various instruments are to be applied in various circumstances. “Requests” are the most 
common response used in the follow up of audits. Requests are used as a first response 
even when non-conformities can be categorized as regulatory violations if these do not 
justify the use of orders. They might also be the response to observations that cannot be 
strictly categorized as non-conformities (referred to as “potentials for improvement”). 
Such responses may also be based on the more evaluative and discretionary judgments 
not specifically related to single observations but to overall ‘impressions’ that are not (or 
cannot be) easily substantiated by ‘evidence’.  
 
An order is a formal and legally binding enforcement measure. It is considered a 
“powerful preventive policy instrument” that clearly signals that the violation is of a 
serious kind with a considerable potential for causing harm. It may also be used when the 
actual violation (in isolation) is of a less serious kind but when the company in question 
has a bad record of responding adequately to the milder requests. Orders shall always be 
preceded by a notification, in itself seen as a strong signal to the company. Occasionally, 
the notified orders are not issued, or they may be modified or altered, due to faulty 
assumptions from the supervisors or corrective action taken by the company. But as a 
rule, notifications result in orders, indicating that there has been a preceding process of 
                                                 
107 This risk of sanctions was indeed phrased in conjunction with the doctrine of dialogue, making dialogue 
conditional to the ‘cooperativeness’ of the firm, as evident from the following statement “there is a 
continuous dialogue between the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway and the players on the Norwegian 
shelf. For us, this dialogue is a means of influencing decisions/actions, and it is a central element in our 
supervision strategy. If the dialogue is unsuccessful, we can give notice of orders, and then orders. In 
serious cases where safety is endangered, we can demand that an activity be temporarily stopped. The 
authorities can also file charges with the police and impose fines” (http://www.ptil.no/English). 
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trying to come to an agreement. Normally, requests (and orders) do not specify changes 
or solutions to be implemented. This follows from the regulatory philosophy and the 
nature of the regulations, and the regulatee is rather prompted to ‘do something’, that is, 
to analyze causes, identify alternatives, and take ‘appropriate action’. The message of 
self-diagnosis and self-treatment is as integral to the enforcement philosophy as self-
regulation is to the regulatory philosophy. Responsibility must be firmly placed on the 
regulatee and auditee, not on the regulator and auditor.   
 
The frequency of enforcement measures decrease with their strength. In fact, the strength 
of formal instruments may be indicated by their infrequent use. Only some 10-15 orders 
are issued each year; some of them are also related to the same incidents, but issued to 
several companies involved.108 Orders are thus ‘unusual events’, as are the legal 
instruments further up the ‘enforcement staircase’.109 Legal prosecution will normally 
follow only very serious incidents or accidents, and will regularly result in a ticket fine 
(see below). All formal PSA decisions (like orders) can be appealed to the ministry. This 
occurs very seldom, perhaps once or twice each year, and if it does, the PSA decisions 
are confirmed in some 50 percent of the cases.110 
 
The enforcement handbook, internal training programs, and the administrative quality 
systems, clearly provided clues as to how due processes were to be achieved; but to 
develop a uniform practice and culture of law enforcement were a constant and ongoing 
challenge, involving the comparison of quite diverse cases, dealing with complex socio-
technical situations and contested risk contexts. As was explained by one senior legal 
advisor: 
                                                 
108 Ten orders where given in 2003, three in 2004, fifteen in 2005, and 10 in 2006.  
109 Coercive fines are extremely rare, and are used when orders are not complied with within the deadline. 
Stopping activity is also rare, and shall only be done when there is an immediate danger. As explained by 
the agency: “Normally, the company will stop such activity themselves”, referring also to the rights of the 
safety representative to stop dangerous work according to the WEA. Expulsion in terms of withdrawal of 
license or change of operator is the ultimate enforcement measure, but has never been used.  
110 It was suggested by the OLF, however, that many companies often saw the agency and the ministry as 
‘externally voicing the same views’, possibly causing a reluctance to appeal. The relatively high proportion 
of appeals supported by the ministry (some 50 percent) was suggested as an indication that complaints were 
often justified, and the OLF argued more generally that the right to appeal should be used more actively by 
the industry (OLF, 2006).  
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R: Like, we have this stair-case, indicating degrees of seriousness. The steps are meant to 
specify how measures should reflect this. But how do you define what is “very serious”? 
What criteria characterize a minor incident? And so on. It turned out to be very difficult. 
We tried to formulate criteria, but we simply had to give it up. It was too difficult. Like, you 
cannot link it to specific requirements, that transgressions of this or that provision were less 
serious or very serious. Even if some requirements are more critical.  
I: So is it more like intuition, then? 
R: What we would say is that …. as an administrative authority you’re obliged to treat 
similar instances uniformly. But what is “similar”? So it’s more like …. the various 
disciplines need to agree within their field, as a minimum. And then there must be a 
correspondence across disciplines. It takes a lot of coordination.  
I: But do they manage within disciplines? 
R: I really don’t know .… It’s not really law in that sense. It requires very good processes. 
You need to compare instances. Complications arise if you have a case, and you have some 
previous case, and then you must compare .… And no one knows what the future will 
bring. .… You need good processes to assure yourself that you find the right level. That 
people talk together ....  
I: Do you get rapports from the industry that you’re not harmonized? 
R: Well, from time to time we’re told that it’s not uniform. (senior legal advisor) 
 
 
I certainly had neither the competence nor the intention to press the questions further. 
There was some uneasiness related to these issues, however, and it was not altogether 
clear how the internal work processes contributed to transparent and harmonized 
enforcement practices. Certainly, there were rumours and some complaints from 
consultants and other external observers about ‘hidden orders’ and lack of 
accountability.111 The important point, however, is the general lack of close legal scrutiny 
and pressure from the industry to test out the legal limits; one legal observer and 
specialist described the regime as an “almost empty legal space”, referring to the fact that 
there was hardly any case law and that the legal standards were never tested in courts or 
challenged by the industry. Lack of transparency and unclear legal warrants for agency 
decisions were clearly of some concern to the industry, evident from the issues voiced in 
the 2006 report from the OLF on the use of cost-benefit evaluations (see Chapter 4, OLF, 
2006).112 
                                                 
111 Accountability in law enforcement was one of the apparently few critical issues in the evaluation report 
commissioned by the ministry in 2006. 
112 The report argued that comparable cases were not always treated equally, depending on both 
professional area and individual factors. The issues related to work hours, rest, and restitution were 
specifically mentioned as unduly warranted. As the regulations generally required much discretionary 
judgement in order to establish whether ‘compliance’ was achieved or not, the process and method of 
making such judgements were all the more critical. Some thus voiced the opinion that authority judgements 
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 There is obviously a considerable amount of discretionary judgement involved in 
deciding upon the right use enforcement measures and thus also the interpretations that 
can be made from simply ‘counting’ them as indications of the ‘enforcement policy’ of 
the PSA. Several mechanisms were at work that contributed to keeping enforcement and 
compliance questions out of the legalistic flashlights; one was the ‘problem-solving’ 
approach of peers meeting peers. As was observed by one senior legal advisor in the 
PSA:  
 
I: Do you have many disagreements on facts and legal interpretations in your enforcement 
practice? 
R: Not often. Not necessarily because there is no reason to. There may be formal flaws and 
so on. But often they come to an agreement. They are received by engineers and written by 
engineers. And normally they come to an agreement. At least if no large costs are involved. 
But also when costs are involved, they may accept. I believe it’s largely due to professional 
and practical agreements between engineers. There may have been, previously, a somewhat 
mistaken belief that if they protest it may influence the allocation of licenses or other things. 
Even if it didn’t have any real impact, they created this conception of reality. That may have 
been one reason why they didn’t protest, even if they had some justification for doing so.  
I: So the reason for compliance then? 
R: You have engineers on both sides. Lawyers and economists in the companies tend not to 
be involved. So they just consider the technical aspects, if it seems all right. So they don’t 
pick on our foundation for requiring .… if they find our requirements reasonable. This may 
be combined with an exaggerated respect for what we require. They might have objected, 
but they may fear a negative effect if they do. But mistakenly so.  It’s quite legitimate to 
disagree with the agency …. It’s not without reason that they talk about ‘Supreme Court 
engineers’ .… A lot of the engineers feel they can manage this themselves. Companies and 
other places, they say the engineers are a ‘breed’, in their training or whatever, they want to 
solve problems, and they want to do it themselves. Engineers tend to be problem-solvers, 
you know. They’re world champions in most matters, so they handle the legal aspect too.  
I: How many ‘Supreme Court engineers’ do you have here? 
R: (Laughing). I really don’t know. It varies over time. Some periods .… there is a constant 
improvement, though. I remember when I started here .… like administrative principles .… 
when you issue an order you must always give a notice in advance. But even a simple thing 
like that, it was almost impossible to make them do it. It was considered bureaucratic 
nonsense …. That’s partly why we produced the handbook. To provide an overview of 
measures, with examples of how to write it out in order to get it correct according to proper 
administrative practice. The background was that to many things went out that wasn’t good 
enough. (senior legal advisor)  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
had to follow approximately the same methodology for risk evaluation as that which was established in the 
NORSOK standard for risk analysis (Z-013, see http://www.standard.no/imaker.exe?id=244). 
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Local problem-solving, based on highly contextual judgements about the case-specific 
conditions and about the probable results of legal instruments as compared to informal 
accommodations thus appear as important factors in the enforcement practices; 
facilitated, of course, by the contents of the regulatory tool-box. 
 
Although there is a clear division of legal and non-legal measures, there is thus no direct 
or transparent relationship between a legal transgression (non-conformity) and the use of 
legal measures. The supervisory report is largely an account of the observations made. 
Based on that, the measures are decided upon. Normally, as noted, only a request is made 
to the companies for taking action in terms of analyzing causes and finding remedies. The 
idea is to differentiate, and to use legal measures only when these appear justified by the 
severity of the transgressions. But these overall considerations were also tempered by 
additional concerns and factors. As was noted by one of the supervisory coordinators: 
 
When we issue an order, we know they will concentrate on that and it will allocate their 
attention and resources. So we don’t issue orders on less important issues. That would result 
in unbalanced focus, and they may forget what is most important .… you cannot use the 
sledgehammer always, it’s a trade-off. .… Basically, I think an order is a poor measure. It’s 
always a bit uncomfortable when we use an order. It may set off a period of suspicion about 
what kind of justification is provided, if there is some kind of retribution involved, and so 
on. But we have the handbook, saying what is the threshold for the various measures. So at 
least it’s important that we bring into line the usage …. so the companies feel they’re 
treated equally. That’s what’s most important. .… Then we know – that in some operators’ 
organizations – an order in those companies really hurts bad. And at the other pole, you 
have, operators that hardly care. They have more of the ‘latino attitude’: “don’t worry, this 
will turn out fine”. So when our instruments and measures are received so differently, we 
have to take that into account when we consider using them. So there’s not only one issue to 
consider. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
The restrictive use of legal enforcement instruments can thus be explained in cultural as 
well as in instrumental terms. First, there is the highly technical professional dominance 
in the agency. While the regulatory processes and frameworks are strategically crucial 
and generally awarded high priority, the legalistic outlook is not dominant in the actual 
enforcement policy. The PSA is dominated by engineers with a practical problem-solving 
agenda. Even the director of regulatory development and the disciplinary leader for of 
unit for HSE management and legal affairs (comprising most of the lawyers) are both 
engineers. Lawyers are not the sideline, but are more quality controllers in the decision 
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making process in order to guarantee legal prudence. This confirms the impression that 
legal criteria and boundaries are not severely tested. 
 
Legal measures appeared thus not primarily as instruments for getting things done, but 
rather as occasional ‘signals’ to the industry about the behavioural record. ‘Dialogue’, 
implicitly within the context of the basically asymmetrical relation, was the favoured 
approach. As noted by one of the supervisory directors: 
 
We’ve had a discussion over many years about the strategic use of means. You have, not a 
collision, but a balance between a legal approach or culture where you think of means 
strictly in relation to addressing regulatory requirements, deviations from these, and orders, 
and a more strategic approach to the use of means, especially when addressing safety-
critical issues. These must be applied in a proper manner …. As an example: Strategic use 
of meetings with the top management in the companies .… one purpose of these meetings 
can be to address issues that we regard as safety-critical and which we think is important 
that the management must address in their management team and organization. Such 
meetings may be preceded by a letter addressing safety-critical issues as summarized from 
supervisions, investigations, etc. Simply to carry out an audit, or the decision to do so, will 
mobilize a lot of resources in the companies, and is of course also an instrument. 
(supervisory director) 
 
The existence, and potential application, of formal enforcement instruments still serves as 
a basic framing condition against which these dialogical encounters took place. And 
some degree of ‘existential uncertainty’ on the part of the industry provided a convenient 
and perhaps also necessary condition for enacting the regulatory role with a 
corresponding degree of ‘existential certainty’. After all, they faced the most powerful 
companies, in both international and national terms; to have some golden shares in their 
reputational assets was twofold ‘safety-critical’. The ‘empty legal space’ may thus also 
have served some higher purpose, given that the regulatory powers were used with self-
discipline and much enlightened ‘dialogue’. The idea of ‘filling it’ with precise legal 
criteria, and quantified and comparable risk-cost-benefit estimates, could ultimately carry 
the dialogue to unforeseen voids.  
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The biggest sticks 
The (second) biggest sticks utilized would be the activation of criminal charges through 
the police and the public prosecutor.113 But, both instructions regarding their size and the 
user manuals seemed largely to have been provided by the risk management philosophies 
of the agency. Both parties generally described cooperation between the PSA and the 
police as ‘close’. The collaborative culture was partly facilitated by the establishment of 
the so-called “Shelf Police”, consisting of a network of Police Departments along the 
west cost, with the Rogaland Police Department in Stavanger in the leading role.114 The 
NPD/PSA has worked closely with these departments since the 1990s, in particular with 
the ‘local’ department in Stavanger, which has a dedicated unit specialized in offshore 
issues (NSE).115 On average, there has been +/-5 police-cases each year. The police are 
always involved and conduct investigations in the case serious incidents, such as fatal 
accidents. However, partly due to variable resources, there is no definite threshold for 
what shall become a ‘police-case’. Resources may be wanting in critical situations, 
affecting priorities and uneven efforts over time.116  
 
Police investigations are always initiated and conducted in cooperation with the PSA, and 
the police follows closely the information and professional advice they get from the PSA 
                                                 
113 The prosecuting authority is organized in three levels: the Director of the Prosecuting Authority, the 
public prosecutors at the regional level and the prosecuting authority in the police districts. The latter two 
are organizationally separate bodies.  
114 As I was allowed to attend a two-day joint seminar with all the actors involved, these ‘collaborative 
attitudes, were confirmed. The police officials clearly stated their acknowledgement of, and dependence on, 
the professional expertise of agency officials, and the PSA officials faced an attentive audience as they 
lectured on accidents, near, misses, investigations, trends, and future risk scenarios.  
115 “The North Sea and Environmental Unit” (NSE) was established in 1991. The unit is headed by a police 
superintendent, and includes 4 investigators and a legal specialist. The Rogaland district is by far the most 
experienced and largest in terms of resources and area of responsibility, and has advisory functions toward 
the other districts, including training and investigation assistance. It also draws on other resources in the 
district, but must assist other units if demand is high. The Public Prosecutor in Rogaland has responsibility 
for all prosecutions on the NCS. The system is regulated in a Royal Decree dating from 1990, and 
guidelines from the Ministry of Justice. Police responsibilities cover emergency preparedness related to 
major accidents, bomb threats, terror or sabotage, and investigations. The legal warrants are provided in the 
Penal Process Law §224-2, allowing for investigation of causes of accidents, even without any suspicion of 
illegal acts. Further regulations in fact oblige such investigations in cases of fire and accidents involving 
serious harm to people or considerable damage of property. 
116 Thus, after 2004, efforts devoted to shelf-issues were reduced due to extraordinary heavy work loads in 
the district after a major bank robbery in the city of Stavanger. Professional, armed robbers got away with 
more than NOK 70 mill in a spectacular and dramatic break-in, including the killing of a police officer. The 
investigation occupied vast resources in the police force. The threshold does thus not seem clear-cut, and is 
influenced by current capacities.  
 158
officials. Due to the close and frequent contacts, the PSA would normally not need to 
submit any formal report; as was noted by one PSA legal advisers: “The exchanges with 
the police are so regular that we need not use formal reports. They start the investigation 
when we want them to anyway”.117  
 
Normal procedure in the police-cases is that the police request an opinion from the PSA 
about liability. In assessing penal liabilities, negligent behaviour from the company or 
from individuals is the primary concern. Individual negligence is ordinarily referred to as 
‘human error’ (slips, lapses, trips, fumbles, etc.) or more seriously as ‘carelessness’. The 
strictly legal considerations about what can be regarded as ‘negligence’ (of not having 
taken ‘proper care’) may be highly variable, however. The organizational context will be 
given weight, although with differences in emphasis and thoroughness of analysis. Such 
factors as missing training, inadequate procedures, bad planning, etc., may to different 
degrees count, or not count (see Bjordal, 1997).118 
 
In the petroleum sector, penal action towards individuals is seldom considered, however, 
and individual penalties are extremely rare. Penalties are almost exclusively levelled 
                                                 
117 Formally, incidents are to be reported to the police through two channels. According to the Working 
Environment Act, companies are obliged to report all incidents involving fatalities and serious personal 
injuries to the police directly. Furthermore, administrative bodies report incidents and accidents according 
to instructions issued by the national Director of the Prosecuting Authority. Supplementing these 
instructions, the relations between the PSA and the police are regulated in a formal agreement. If the police 
have direct information, they start their own investigation, but they also open a dialogue with the PSA to 
have their judgement. All police investigations are thus undertaken in agreement with the PSA, and include 
the assistance of PSA-investigators. Police officers are always in charge, but the PSA personnel can supply 
questions after the interrogations. The PSA provides the closing summary/statement. All administrative 
decisions are left to the PSA, on the basis of their own parallel investigation. The police have in some cases 
prosecuting authority, but normally in these cases, they make a proposition to the public prosecutor who 
makes an independent decision about charges. The close relations between the administrative body and the 
police stands in some contrast to the Labour Inspectorate, who send formal reports to the Police, but often 
experience a lack of capacity and readiness to follow up the cases closely; this reflects the difference in 
contact frequency and professional dialogue.  
118 In legal terms negligence is regularly determined on the basis of terms like accidental accident, 
inattention, misplaced attention, faulty reaction or assessment of the situation, or slips of mind (Skjønhals 
and Jersin, 2004: 211). Although none of these forms of ‘error’ are in themselves sufficient for determining 
negligence (although accidental accident is generally out-ruled), there is clearly no definite threshold or 
criteria available. The experience and position of the offender, and other contextual factors would be 
considered in each individual case, although with some reference to case law in comparable cases. Partly, 
individual considerations are established as an institutional norm, but also, some less justifiable 
inconsistencies have been observed in relation to prosecutions and court decisions (Bjordal, 1997; Bjordal 
and Graver, 1996). 
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against the company. As noted in Chapter 4, an enterprise may be liable to penalty when 
a penal provision is contravened by a person who has acted on its behalf, even if no 
individual person may be punished for the contravention. The enactment of penal law in 
the petroleum sector must be considered an interesting departure from traditional legal 
theory and practice, where the main rule has been to look for individual culpability. 
Culpability of enterprises was primarily introduced as supplementary, to be applied when 
individual culpability was difficult to determine, but where the act or event should still be 
considered in terms of unlawful negligence. However, the preventive effect of making 
enterprises culpable was also given weight (NOU, 1989). The legal argumentation has 
been twofold. First, accidents and near misses may be the result of acts by several 
individuals, neither of which would, in isolation, be considered negligent; only the 
outcome, considered as the sum of these acts, constituted unlawful negligence. This is 
commonly referred to as cumulative faults. Second, when it is not possible to identify 
who has committed the negligent acts, this is legally referred to as anonymous faults. 
These categorizations are warranted by current interpretations of penal law, with parallels 
to the concept of ‘objective responsibility’, but were originally introduced only as 
“pedagogical” terms in the legal nomenclature (Andenæs, 1997). Within the context of 
received risk management philosophies established in the petroleum regime, they 
provided a welcome opportunity for making organizational failure a legally legitimate 
diagnosis and they appeared in almost all the NPD/PSA recommendations provided to the 
police.  
 
The last instance of individual penalty was in fact the fatal accident on the Oseberg field 
on Christmas Eve 2000 (see Chapter 3). A brief review will provide some impression of 
the threshold for going to such ‘extremes’. The accident occurred when a man was killed 
during a crane lifting operation. A pipe bundle was to be removed from a basket; there 
was no tag -line on the pipe bundle, men were working under a load, and the load was 
lowered into an area out of the sight of the crane operator. As it was lowered, the load hit 
an operator in the area. The lift was thus carried out in a so-called ‘blind zone’, but no 
flagman was present to control the lift, and warning signals were not used. The crane 
operator, who was also a supervisor, was finally sentenced with a fine of NOK  15 000. 
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In this case, the gravity of the transgressions was considered so serious that personal guilt 
was determined by the public prosecutor, and even gross negligence was later judged by 
the court.119 Negligence on the part of the companies involved was also established, but 
not to the effect of acquitting the operator. Hydro, as the operating company, received a 
ticket fine of NOK 15 mill, and the employer and contractor company (Prosafe) 
responsible for the operation, received a ticket fine of NOK 75 000. The negligence of 
Hydro and the contractor company was related to the follow up of training and 
procedures, and for tacitly accepting non-compliant behaviour. Also, the deck was 
packed and orderliness and tidiness were seen as a contributory precursor to the accident. 
The contractor company was also criticized for not taking proper action towards the crane 
operator; he was known as a skilled operator, but also as a headstrong and influential 
personality. The fine was seen as severe, however, and Hydro, although they finally 
decided to accept it, expressed “surprise” by its size, compared to other cases.120  
 
The conviction of the operator was unique, but whether or not this only reflected the 
severity of his acts, is not easy to determine, since there were no systematic analyses of  
‘comparative culpability’ in these judgements. To some degree, one would expect that a 
certain amount of ‘arbitrary circumstantiality’ would influence both the process and the 
final outcome. What is most interesting from our point of view, however, is the 
observation that individual negligence is largely constricted through the strong 
professional influence of the petroleum authorities. The more blame seeking judiciary 
                                                 
119 In fact, he was not taken to court in the first round, but was still charged guilty of negligence. According 
to the Criminal Procedure Act, even though guilt is legally proved, “a prosecution may be waived provided 
that such special circumstances exist that the prosecuting authority on an overall evaluation finds that there 
are weighty reasons for not prosecuting the act”. However, guilt was still established, and this could in 
itself be considered an unusually severe sanction, given the general reluctance from the authorities to blame 
individuals. Even if no penalty was issued, he felt the establishment of guilt was unfair; also, he was fired 
from the company. Generally, if the person charged maintains that he is not guilty of the offence for which 
prosecution has been waived, he may require the prosecuting authority to bring the case before the court if 
the charge is not withdrawn. This he did, and the fine was sentenced. The court even reinforced the charge, 
from ‘negligence’ to ‘gross negligence’. He later appeared publicly, together with the mother of the 
deceased, claiming, with her support, that he’d been unjustly treated.  
120 Fines were certainly also determined according to the wealth of the offender, which of course, was great. 
As noted above, the accident occurred in an atmosphere of growing conflicts about the development of 
safety conditions, and it provided an opportunity for the authorities to teach the industry a lesson, in 
particular in the face of what they saw as an unjustified self-complacency on their part. As noted, the 
accident also contributed to the gradual shift in the ‘risk-discourse’; for Hydro, it triggered the launch of a 
large scale safety program (to be commented later). 
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system is kept on a distance and the ‘systemic’ and organizational approach attributes 
‘causation’ and responsibility to the company as such rather than to the individual. The 
somewhat ritualistic uses of ‘cumulative and anonymous fault’, would possibly not have 
survived the discretionary judgements of more critical legal specialists not socialized into 
the prevailing risk management philosophies.121 We return to this issue below. 
Trust, calculation, and compliance 
As noted in Chapter 2, a purely calculative regulatee would try to measure net costs of 
compliance against the risk of authority sanctions. Theoretically, this would involve 
rather complex assessments of expected costs (including, for instance, predictions about 
disclosure and subsequent authority behaviour). Ultimately, such calculative behaviour 
might appear more as a theoretical construct, as an ‘ideal type’, to be contrasted with the 
fully committed and socially responsible actor at the other end of the scale. The 
intermediaries were more interesting, and various mixtures of profit-seeking calculation 
and prudent risk management would appear in all companies in the course of time, 
sometimes reconcilable and sometimes not. Although the potential conflicts were 
recognized and accentuated, the ‘prudence’ of risk management practices was the main 
target of attention, organizational failure was a dominant explanatory scheme, and the 
industry could be approached within the context of ‘dialogue’. However, as noted above, 
this dialogical context should also be understood against the industrial concern for 
reputational risks, and ultimately also their considerations about market access. To the 
extent that such ‘framing conditions’ kept potential conflicts off the agenda, the 
exceptional or ‘threshold-testing’ cases would appear all the more interesting. 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the new requirements regarding rest and restitution 
occupied much attention as a ‘compliance issue’. In order to meet the requirement of 
‘normally sleeping alone’, a number of measures had to be considered: rebuilding cabins, 
hiring flotels, accommodating schedules according to capacities, etc., all of which would 
potentially generate large compliance costs. And as indicated, the issue initiated a call 
                                                 
121 This observation may be substantiated by a comparison with legal action in onshore accidents (industrial 
and transport sectors), where much lower thresholds for attributing individual blame have been evident 
(Bjordal, 1997).  
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from the industry for a more systematic use of cost-benefit analyses in the regulatory 
processes, including enforcement policies. Although some actors interpreted the 
industrial responses as acts of active ‘non-compliance’,  the official arguments was rather 
that the interpretation provided in the guidelines and in the enforcement policy did not 
have the proper legal mandate, as these had not been explicitly presented in the formal 
regulatory process.122 But the companies didn’t respond uniformly to the requirement; 
some adopted a more pragmatic and timid stance. Partly, this variety would reflect very 
different compliance costs, but that would hardly be a sufficient explanation. Some even 
took some pride in making these investments, both as a (possible) contribution to risk 
reductions and as a ‘gesture’ to the welfare of the workers.123 The PSA defended their 
position, and referred to the risk involved if people didn’t sleep properly. Obviously there 
was a double pressure, however, as the unions also protested against what was seen as 
more lenient enforcement practices in terms of interpreting the legal force and 
significance of the clearly ambiguous phrase, ‘normally alone’. The amount of discretion 
involved in these cases was considerable, and apparently, some practical compromises 
and accommodations were made in the process.  
 
Most important from our point of view, however, is how this case challenged the 
‘conditionality’ of the trust balance and exposed potential fragilities when critical issues 
about the socio-economic distribution of risk were at stake. The cost-benefit 
considerations that were thus introduced, involved rather complex questions: What was 
really the magnitude of the risks involved? How much risk reduction would be achieved 
by complying with the norm? What were the compliance costs, and did they justify the 
                                                 
122 The OLF had commissioned a report from a law professor, supporting this view, ‘technically’ based on 
the argument that the regulatory process had not provided proper information about the consequences, 
which in this case, of course, were considerable in terms of economic costs. Since the parties had not been 
properly involved in the formal hearing process, the requirement was to be considered legally invalid. An 
explicit reference to this report was made in the “OLF guidelines for rest and restitution” (see: 
http://www.olf.no/hms/retningslinjer/?26481). Technically, the ‘non-compliance’ implied that the 
companies were expected only to consider the relevant solutions with reference to the general wording of 
the provision, and that no application for ‘exemption’ from the regulation would be considered necessary if 
this requirement was met.  
123 That was certainly the case for the small oil company I visited, including a six day stay at one of their 
production ships, were I, as it happened, slept in a cabin that had just recently been rebuilt into a single 
room. They proudly presented these investments as a sign of their general generosity and positive attitude 
in all welfare and HSE matters. In another company, it was also suggested that a too lenient compliance 
policy could be taken as a lack ‘solidarity’ with their industrial fellows.  
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(contested) risk reduction compared to alternative allocations of risk reducing efforts? 
And certainly: what was really the impact of ‘welfare-concerns’ for the workers in these 
requirements?124 The strategy and response from the OLF could however be seen 
primarily as a case of ‘principled disagreement’, more than one of calculative non-
compliance (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). These controversies were enacted in a fairly 
open landscape, with clear positions, and without seriously endangering the conditional 
trust that companies did not (openly) defy regulations once the authorities where out of 
sight. The nature of this conditional trust was explained by one of the supervisory 
directors as follows:  
 
I: What’s the underlying incentive: Is there a shared interest as a common platform, 
implying that you only have to “remind them”, or is it the underlying fear of sanctions, of 
loosing future licenses, of damage to reputation? 
R: There might be an underlying fear … the economic forces are strong and damage to 
reputation can be experienced as painful. And this again can have managerial implications. 
So the significance of addressing this at an earlier stage, and be very clear about the issues, 
is important.  For example; we had this meeting recently with a company. We presented our 
experiences from one installation: “you’ve had a number of incidents, we’ve identified 
deviations in several of our audits that are not satisfactory. We observe that you as an 
operator do not take on the responsibility that you have according to the regulations, so 
what’s your opinion about all this… ?” That’s how we can approach it. (…) And the 
sanction then is that if they don’t take on the responsibility as required, we will address this 
formally, in an order. 
I: But they could ignore other sanctions and be very cynical, tolerate a notice, pay fines, and 
so on? 
R: Yes, yes .... but the baseline .… we have this trust, this mutual trust as a foundation, and 
the mutual understanding of roles, that the companies assume responsibility. We must build 
on that. (supervisory director) 
 
                                                 
124 The latter issue was even extended to the societal level, as the costs generated were juxtaposed with the 
amount of welfare that could be produced in other sectors (say elderly care) dependent on public funding, 
the availability of which ultimately depended on revenues and taxes from the petroleum industry. Industry 
representatives would occasionally suspect the welfare aspects of the, in practical terms, ‘single room’ 
requirement to be the ‘real’ motivation, and consequently to regard the risk arguments as a smoke screen. 
This was really a luxury demand, forced through the decision making process at the political level, 
disregarding due processes, formal hearings, and, if not disrupting, at least it had unduly bypassed the 
legitimate tri-partite collaboration processes that had preceded the regulatory reform. Incidentally, one of 
the leading union representatives occupied a position in the political staff in the ministry at the time. 
Besides those arguing substantially for the factual and risk based justifications, proponents within the 
unions, at the shop floor level, etc., would occasionally support the welfare argument, but would also refer 
to the great revenues generated in the industry and that this was something they really could afford with the 
current level of oil prices. And indeed,  the company managers would themselves not hesitate to sleep in 
luxury hotels on their business trips. Such arguments were of course also applied more generally in relation 
to HSE- costs, welfare costs, wage-levels, working hours, etc. 
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‘Conditionally’ trust-based and high-level dialogue that address the learning and 
improvement capacities of the company, thus appears as the most concentrated ‘high-
impact’ encounter with the industry.125 Seen from the agency perspective, the regulatory 
strategies then reflect assumptions about company rationalities. From a purely calculative 
point of view, the enforcement level would be determined by the estimated deterrence 
effect on potential offenders, taking account of the assumed calculations of the latter. But, 
as noted above, the establishment of enforcement ‘levels’ was not so much determined by 
any assumed calculative rationality on the part of the companies as it was by the 
perceived severity of the transgressions in each case, although longer term company 
behaviour would also influence the choice of sanctions. But also, the longer term 
compliance record was also decisive in determining intervention strategies and priorities. 
Assumptions about mere cynicism were exceptions. Sub-standard performance was 
generally attributed to organizational abilities and capabilities rather than to bad motives; 
lack of ‘engagement’, priority, and expertise could be observed though, in particular in 
some rig companies. But trust, or conditional trust, appeared as the base-line in relations 
with the operators. And if required reports about rectified non-conformities after agency 
supervisions turned out to be mere lip-service, the agency reactions would be all the more 
rigorous; undermining the trust, appeared almost as adultery.126 Within the context of 
‘dialogue’, games of hide and seek were for the most part marginal phenomena.  
 
Regulatory encounters involved adaptive flexibility, taking account of the multiple selves 
of the regulatee, but also of how these ‘selves’ would be influenced by internal and  
external circumstances, such as the internal rewarding systems or the current profitability 
in the industry. As was explained by one of the supervisory coordinators: 
 
I: So you’re role is to come out with HSE-glasses and look them in the …? 
                                                 
125 The meetings referred to are the yearly ‘status-meetings’ where the PSA managers meet with company 
managers in order to ‘summarize experiences’ over the past year. The supervisory teams prepare overall 
assessments of company performance as input to these meetings, and they are considered as being of great 
importance, as they allow for a discussion of company behaviour and future challenges in a face-to-face 
encounter with the top-management. 
126 In one referred case, it was discovered on a later audit that a company had erroneously reported 
‘closure’ of non-conformities that had in fact not been effectuated. The agency reaction was described as 
close to ‘astonished disbelief’, and the response was accordingly severe.  
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R: I think so. Even if they say that HSE is a management responsibility, we often ask the 
question, is HSE still  priority number one? .… I believe there are other KPI’s [Key 
Performance Indicators] that the managers are more explicitly measured against. There 
surely are conflicting targets and interests. And there’s a great difference now, with oil 
prices over $ 50, from the time when it was $ 9. It wasn’t very easy to get things done back 
then. They also ran the downsizing projects, cutting costs wherever possible. Maintenance, 
manning, store-parts, everything.  
I: So the deterioration towards the late 1990s was a consequence of this? 
R: It was a contribution .… And many of these fields were dimensioned in the 1970s, in an 
affluent period with high prices. There was no limit. You could pour in lots of people. They 
had huge organizations, crowded with managers and multilayered hierarchies. Now you 
normally have only two levels with top and middle managers. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
 
The efficiency and adequacy of enforcement measures would thus depend on the stakes 
at hand. Assumptions made regarding the doctrines of complementarism, that safety and 
other (economic) goals go hand in hand, or the opposite doctrine of trade-offism, that 
safety had to be traded off against these other goals, were in practical terms themselves 
expressing trade-offs. The applicability of these doctrines was contextual and contingent. 
A report commissioned from the local R&D network about conditions for preventing 
major accidents, produced in collaboration with PSA officials in 2005, made a 
provisional list of safety interventions that could, respectively, be said to support either 
‘doctrine’ (Aven et al., 2005). Savings regarding modifications, maintenance, and 
production processes, would clearly be in line with the doctrine of complementarism, as 
would increased regularity, longer facility lifecycles, and improved company reputation. 
Other interventions would support the doctrine of trade-offism, such as investments, 
down-time, revision-stops, etc. These were indeed hotly debated issues, and the 
intervention strategy and the force of legal instruments had to be adapted to the concrete 
context. The considerations involved were aptly illustrated by one of the supervisory 
coordinators, with specific reference to the introduction of remote drilling systems: 
 
Does it require actions that both safeguard HSE and at the same time contribute to increased 
income, then there’s no problem. Or a dialogue could be required for them to realize that 
connection. But when we said, now, there have been too many accidents on the drilling 
floor. We want people removed from the drilling floor. So an order was given to establish 
systems for remote operation of pipes and work strings. They reacted with astonished 
disbelief and wonder. If you could have increased the drilling speed at the same time, it 
would have been easier to have this implemented. But drilling speed was reduced. A well 
trained crew could drill almost twice as fast with manual operations. But had it been the 
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other way around, if you had increased drilling capacity using less people, it would have 
been easier to use arguments and persuasion, and we wouldn’t have had to issue any order. 
(supervisory coordinator) 
 
In sum, the conditions and conditionalities of regulatory trust and compliance reveals a 
complex picture, and although some operating mechanisms may be sketched, the outline 
provided here may perhaps reflect rather than inform the observation that compliance 
theory is still considered ‘underdeveloped’ (Hutter, 2001: 231). 
Roles and accountability 
Petty kings or captured auditors? 
Part of the justification for the present organizational model in the PSA was that the 
broad and cross-disciplinary composition of the supervisory teams, with each member 
organizationally bound to their disciplinary units, would ensure appropriate distance and 
professional integrity. In fact, the organizational model prior to the brief period of team-
experiments had been abandoned partly due to the capture risks. In this model, six 
supervisory managers had the responsibility for organizing all encounters with the 
companies. But capture was not the only risk. The ‘company-man’ model could also have 
the reverse effect, making them ‘too powerful’. Due to this relative absence of 
organizational checks and balances, accountability could be compromised either way. 
The matrix model was seen as a fair trade-off between closeness and distance:  
 
R: …. some of what goes on is not so accountable .… this may get a bit out of control .… 
some may act as petty kings out there without substantiating or documenting what they do, 
or providing legal warrants. There’s not much of that now, but I believe it has occurred 
from time to time in the past. And you had people here with very close relations with some 
companies, over longer periods of time. Parts of this culture is not so good…  
I: But close relations could also work the other way, that you’d develop a loyalty .…? 
R: Well, yes .… I’ve seen some out there, informing how things should be and be done, and 
who’ve had a somewhat limited understanding of administrative formalities and principles. 
But we also had a period with supervisory managers with long-term tenures .… and I 
sometimes had the impression that some did more to protect the company than to execute 
the necessary supervision. You have that side of it too. This regime was stable for a long 
time; for some 15 years you had this system with supervisory managers; none of them had 
the same position for that long, there was some rotation; but there’s a problem when one 
person, without any corrective mechanisms, had that kind of relation toward these big and 
powerful companies.  
I: But you started out from the different perspective …. that they were powerful..? 
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R: Both these aspects are present. The first aspect is mostly history. And the supervisory 
manager role ended with the team-model. (disciplinary leader) 
 
Typically, the power and impact of the front line bureaucrats were, from the agency point 
of view, seen as somehow a legacy of the past. From the industry perspective, traces of 
this legacy were still apparent, however, as was evident also from the publicly voiced 
concerns from the OLF. An even more blunt report was provided by one HSE manager:  
 
R: I believe they should think more about the enormous power of single officials. Officials 
generally are very powerful and have a great impact throughout the industry. So it’s 
important that, not only the agency management reflect on their supervisory activities and 
how strategies and are carried out; it’s important for the PSA as such to have a strategy that 
everyone understands and the majority complies with. There will always be some who don’t 
get it right but they will gradually be marginalized and isolated in the industry. But it would 
be a good thing if more officials realized and acted in accordance with a common strategy 
…. It’s the officials who govern the industry, not the PSA-management. 
I: So you believe there’s too little control of the output, against some standard? 
R: Yes. And it’s a challenge for the PSA that the industry is governed by the officials, not 
the management. Sometimes that may be wise, but sometimes it’s not all that wise. But .... 
we’re very happy with our team .… (HSE manager) 
 
Being more critical to the agency as such, than to ‘one’s team’, was not untypical for the 
HSE managers and regulatory advisors. We return to company responses to regulation 
below, noting however, the conditional and often context-dependent nature of such 
responses. 
United in knowledge, divided in roles? 
Encounters with the industry were also encounters between professional peers. Some 
might have been school mates at the technical university, some would belong to the same 
professional associations, they would meet in seminars, etc. Well engineers would meet 
with well engineers, electro-engineers with electro-engineers, drilling engineers with 
drilling engineers, etc. (including even more ‘specialized’ encounters, such as between 
‘alarm-specialists’ or ‘emergency specialists’). The impact that these affiliations had in 
the encounters they had - as representing the position of regulator and regulated - is not 
easy to evaluate. Some encounters were also of a more ‘hybrid’ kind. Given the extensive 
level of interaction (partly allowed by the favourable ‘controller-controlled-ratio’), these 
professionals would meet in a number of contexts (seminars, educational programs, 
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collaborative projects, standardization groups, etc.) where they would act partly in their 
professional role and partly in their ‘positional’ role.  
 
To outsiders, these professional networks could be seen as compromising accountability 
and undermining the unbiased execution of the authority role. To insiders, they could 
appear as necessary for developing joint understandings, facilitating knowledge transfer, 
and also for making deeper impacts on the self-regulatory processes by ‘greasing the 
wheels’ and improving the total regulatory machinery, upon which the success of the 
regime ultimately depended. This is of course the rough picture; not all networks were 
frictionless and participants could be consciously aware of the roles they had. But the 
insider-outsider perspective was still evident. Thus, the lawyers, themselves sometimes 
alert to the non-transparent collaborations between ‘problem-solving’ engineers, had 
extensive professional interaction across actor/interest-group borders. Lawyers on both 
sides described this cooperative network as ‘professionally grounded’, oriented towards 
substantial legal issues regardless of the specific interests of the participants. These 
interchanges were reported to take place in a ‘scholarly’ atmosphere with participants 
sharing the same concern for informed and well-founded legal reasoning; in short: as 
arenas for dispassionate discussions of common disciplinary problems. Positional roles 
could allegedly still be retained in the ordinary encounters.127 
 
In short, relations between the authorities and the industry would involve a mixed 
combination of both ‘positional’ and ‘professional’ encounters, and within the shared 
space of HSE-related matters, agency officials, company staff, safety-delegates, external 
specialists, etc., would often appear as united in terms of both professional interest and 
goal orientation. In these discourses, regulatory compliance and prudent risk management 
could be synonymous and undisputed concerns. 
                                                 
127 All lawyers are gathered on a regular basis, referred to as the ‘Petroleum-legal seminar’, comprising 
lawyers from the relevant ministries, the agencies, the industry, the police, the public prosecutors, and also 
the courts (even the supreme court). However, HSE-issues amounts to only a minor (although increasing) 
portion of issues addressed (estimated to some 5-10 percent), the more time-consuming areas being 
resource-issues, contracts, taxation, and general administrative law.  
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Crossover experiences 
One group of interviewees were particularly interesting in terms of roles; or rather, that 
one aspect of their professional career when tables had been turned. A number of agency 
officials came from the industry; generally a highly regarded experiential background in 
dealing with the companies from the agency perspective. And conversely, agency 
officials left for the industry, often as attractive candidates for positions as regulatory 
advisors or other HSE related jobs. How did this change of roles appear to the crossovers 
and to their environments? 
 
Generally, these crossovers were seen as unproblematic and were even welcomed. As 
was noted by one supervisory coordinator (himself a ‘crossover’) referring to encounters 
with former agency colleagues, now occupying key HSE-positions in the industry: 
 
R: Basically they know the system here very well 
I: It would be in safe hands then? 
R: You could say that. But they’d also know very well our weak spots, both formally and 
practically. But I also feel more confident, like when we get an AoC, we don’t have to go 
the whole round of explaining what is meant by this or that, what kind of information we 
require in order to carry out our assessment of HSE. But the role may be tricky …. 
I: Is it primarily a professional dialogue? What’s the greatest difference in sitting on either 
side of the table? 
R: The difference is not all that great, I believe. We like to say in many contexts that we 
have common interests …. that operations shall be carried out without accidents or 
incidents, that no lives or assets are lost. In that sense we have the same starting point. But 
then we have different roles in this, and I’d think that may be the greatest difference …. If 
you take former PSA employees, they often end up as regulatory advisors or HSE-advisors, 
and I believe that, in addition to their knowledge of the regulations, they also know their 
intended purpose. Internally we talk about “our expectation”. We never use that externally. 
Either it’s a requirement or it’s not. But a requirement is founded on an expectation as to 
some activity, what must be done in order to meet that requirement. Access to that kind of 
knowledge is precious for an operator .… I believe that’s extremely useful; in fact, there 
should have been a system for circulating people in and out of the agency, both to get 
operational experience into the agency, and to get regulatory experience out to the industry. 
I guess many operators have realized this since we often meet former colleagues out there. 
I: So it’s not motivated by a desire to delude or deceive the authorities in a more 
sophisticated manner, by knowing them ‘from the inside’? 
R: I don’t believe that. It’s the knowledge they possess that’s sought after, in particular the 





Seen from the other side, the ‘converts’ tended to point to the triviality of administrative 
procedure, the organizational complexities involved in making things work, getting 
things done, and mobilizing sufficient resources. As was noted by one regulatory advisor 
and former NPD-official:  
 
When I worked in the NDP I must admit I wondered why the companies didn’t have 
systematic accounts of regulatory deficits; and if they have such accounts, why don’t they 
take remedial action, what’s the status, have they followed up, closed non-conformities, 
verified that the measures taken have caused improvements, do they have good systems for 
this? And so on. So when you come into the company you see that it’s not exactly a lack of 
willingness, people want to do their best, it’s more a question of time and capacity, and 
what kind of management focus is afforded. In our company there has been an increasing 
awareness that we’ve been good at making plans – this must be done and that must be done 
– so you get plans for all kinds of things, and you end up with so many plans that you’ve no 
chance of following it all up, or make an opinion about what is really worth doing .… you 
must be rather critical and selective when you decide on what shall be followed up, and 
when you do follow up, you must do it the whole way through. (regulatory advisor) 
 
Several agency officials with long industrial experience as HSE-managers or officials 
confirmed these general observations, and argued strongly for the agency to pay more 
attention to the organizational conditions of compliance, partly by being more supportive 
towards the HSE-staffs and safety representatives, but partly also by being more sensitive 
to their own choice of intervention. Impractical demands or generally formulated requests 
to ‘do something’, to assess this or assess that and to take ‘appropriate action’, could 
leave the internal HSE-employees in bewilderment and frustration. The conventional but 
unqualified appeals to self-diagnosis and self-treatment, were convenient for the agency, 
and were ‘politically correct’ in terms of allocating full responsibility to the companies. 
But these requests could also be an easy way out, perhaps hiding incompetence and be 
unproductive in not providing any clues about the expected follow up. As was explained 
by another former agency official:  
 
R: The first thing that strikes you is how much effort is hidden behind a formulation in a 
letter. There’s a lot more effort put into things than reach the eyes of the authorities, like all 
the implications of measures, studies, investigations which are expected from the 
authorities. 
I: If you look back - then you were the supervisor, now you’re responsible - how did you 
experience the transfer? 
R: When you think back, the change wasn’t all that great. The professional challenges are 
the same. Some things are easier, some things are more interesting and some things are less 
interesting. In some issues, I have revised my point of view. The agency tends to be very 
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much occupied with overall judgements, assessing systems, etc., using very general 
formulations. But it’s virtually impossible to have the faintest idea of when such a 
requirement is satisfied and when it’s not. Such generic orders that they tend to enjoy, 
they’re terribly difficult to comply with internally. And also, it’s hard to understand what is 
referred to. Even if I’m a more qualified guesser than most others in the industry, 
sometimes these bureaucratic and general formulations that are perfectly meaningful for the 
official who writes it, they’re virtually impossible for us to interpret .… We may agree on a 
general level, but what do they expect us to do? .… We cannot respond, like: “we’ve 
registered your request and now we’ve speculated for two weeks, and we’re really stuck”. 
There’s something about the level of precision, about being concrete and straightforward, 
that I appreciate …. sometimes when you summarize and generalize too much, the message 
doesn’t get through. (HSE-manager) 
 
This latter comment, point clearly to the inherent double edged nature of systems oriented 
interventions, and partly also to the limits of the audit context in providing precise 
diagnoses at the organizational level, towards which the supervisory philosophy 
essentially directed its attention. Flaws and non-conformities could be discovered, but the 
question of how these were related to the ‘underlying causes’ to be found in the systems 
and practices of risk management (or even worse, as shall be evident: in their ‘culture’), 
was not easily answered after two or thee days of audit. Unable to provide a ‘solution’ in 
a form that would commit the agency to the success or failure of ‘its’ outcome, they 
would rather provide timid diagnoses related to observed transgressions and generalized 
requests for remedial action. We thus turn to the issue of how self-regulation was 
promoted. 
Enforcing self-regulation and promoting learning 
The enforcement strategy is clearly not based on a philosophy of self-regulating firms as 
single loop feed-back systems, responding to pre-set standards and controls. The basic 
enforcement policy was to install the regulatory purpose as part of the self-regulatory 
cycles, seen to have been undermined by the traditional inspection-like controls: 
 
In the old days, long lists of violations were produced, and the company made action plans 
for corrections. The follow up consisted mostly in checking out that every single item on 
the list was taken care of. It was more like an inspectorate, and became almost a ‘cushion’, 
as an external controller department within the company. But that’s a long time ago. 
(supervisory coordinator) 
 
The traditional inspections were thus doubly flawed; they indirectly releived the company 
from their responsibility and they did not promote self-regulation as dynamic 
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mechanisms for learning and improvement. The expected response from the companies 
would be restricted to correcting the already identified failures. But even when adhering 
strictly to functional demands, there was a question of addressing failures in a manner 
that promoted a deeper kind of organizational response. As was exemplified by one of the 
supervisory coordinators:  
 
R: If you as an example of a physical problem find that a sprinkler head is packed you 
might address that specific issue, as it would imply that the functional requirement of 
having a working sprinkler system is not met. But we need to go beyond the observation 
that the sprinkler is plugged. If that’s your only observation, the operator might change the 
sprinkler heads and make some corrections in the maintenance program. But the reasons 
behind a failing maintenance program may not be addressed. I believe we still have a way 
to go in order to challenge them on such questions.  
I: But there would be a danger in probing too deep into these causal mechanisms, that 
wouldn’t be directly available for observations through the audit? 
R: Yes. But we might ask them to examine causes more closely. We don’t do that so often. 
The furthest we would normally go would be to state that the sprinkler heads are packed 
and that we take that to be an indication of some weakness in their maintenance program. 
So what we get out of that is that they examine the program. We’ve gone a step further than 
just observing that the sprinkler heads are packed .… 
I: Do you discuss these issues, how to approach the organizations in order to get the desired 
response?  
R: Well .… we have discussions, but I believe it’s mostly afterwards, in hindsight .... We 
need to improve our awareness before the tasks are prepared and carried out, before you go 
out there looking for those packed sprinkler heads. We need to think of these things in 
advance; when you’re out there, and you’ve found those four sprinkler heads, your 
opportunities are more limited … 
I: But there’s a danger in going too far? 
R: Yes. You get a lot more blurry. There might be other causes and it’s risky to make 
indulgent interpretations. It’s easier to dig in the wrong place. No one can argue against the 
sprinkler heads being packed. .… In the traditional engineering environments you’re 
reluctant to say more than you can positively account for. You should be able to 
substantiate your observation properly, and two packed sprinkler heads there are .… I think 
we achieve the best results when we combine the supervision of management and steering, 
and the traditional disciplines, and in most audits, this is what we try to achieve. 
(supervisory coordinator)  
 
Self restraint and diagnostic abilities were thus key virtues of the auditor, given also the 
limitations of the audit context in producing ‘speculations’ about organizational causes. 
This dilemma between being stuck in the fault-finding tradition and promoting proactive 
responses from the regulatee, was partly to be solved within the limits of the audit 
context, and the way out would be restricted by the reluctance to indulge in interpretive 
speculations about underlying causes. Although we will return later to the issue of how 
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‘culture’ could be evoked as part of this diagnostic repertoire, we may at this point note 
that culture appeared as a somewhat ambiguous way out of the dilemma:  
 
R: Some look for rust, without asking how it’s built and designed .… If the non-conformity 
is seen as how the valve is mounted, the solution is to turn it right, not to ask why it was 
erroneously installed in the first place. So I think there’s a potential for improvement in how 
[culture] is applied and used in our supervisions. I don’t think this is representative of our 
supervisions generally, but in some areas we’re still a bit in that vein. But it’s not done 
overnight. We work towards having a more conscious approach in all our supervisions .… 
to dig deeper in some areas and look at how activities are managed. And then we’ll have the 
cultural perspective in the back of the head.  
I: Meaning that you’re careful in using the word…? 
R: Basically, yes. I guess we look more for the effects .… I carry out audits within a 
technical discipline. Traditionally we also include management and steering issues, that also 
contains cultural elements, like if people report errors they encounter, if they get 
appropriate training, if they speak out when they don’t, if they’re heard when they do 
[speak out], if errors are corrected, and so on. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
 
There is thus a very present and substantial dilemma involved in deciding how much the 
supervisory team should probe into all the possible organizational antecedents of error. 
The ‘symptoms’ can be evidentially substantiated, but the ‘diseases’ cannot, or, there 
may be too many ways of relating the former to the latter. The typical and functionally 
appropriate orthodoxy is to leave the diagnosis to the patient. The emergent convention in 
framing orders has thus become self-diagnosis: Conduct investigations, assess the risks, 
find the root causes, use external expertise, etc. The reflections related to the dilemma do 
not, it can be argued, express a strategy of avoidance or of passing the buck. Rather, they 
are deeply embedded within the context of the supervisory challenge, almost as respectful 
prudence: 
 
Out on the installations we see that the operators are not always able, fully, to learn from 
the incidents. We observe that some focus very much on each incident, in isolation. This 
screwdriver fell down. Watch out everyone that they don’t. What’s really required, 
according to our regulations, is that they look into the underlying causes of each incident, 
and also that they analyze a number of incidents and look for trends in such root causes. It 
varies how good they are in doing that, not only on a specific installation, but also at a 
company level, and across companies and abroad. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
 
Agency interviewees were clearly aware of the limitations of the supervisory context. 
Great skills, preferably developed from industrial experience, were considered vital for 
 174
the sensitivity and diagnostic abilities of the auditors. Not only inexperienced newcomers 
could be fooled by detailed documentation and ‘official’ presentations. Some of the 
former NPD/PSA officials could afford an even more critical tone.  
 
I’m surprised how naïve and credulous the agency can be sometimes. Systems and 
formalities may be all in place. But when you know how things really work, how things 
may be twisted and manipulated …. There is too much reliance on formalities, written 
procedures, written reports. People in the agency without industry experience believe they 
can ‘read’ deficient HSE conditions from reports, from incidents, from internal audits, from 
statistics. That’s a naïve belief. They go wrong from the start. (former NPD official) 
 
 
In a sense, the higher order of self-regulation would make external controls redundant. 
What then was their distinctive role and contribution in relation to the industry, in 
particular in the course of an audit process? How did they think they would make a 
difference, seen within the context of resourceful, powerful, and self-managed firms?  
 
I: In principle this system is supposed to be self-correcting, almost making agency 
supervision superfluous…? 
R: That’s true. We have two roles, to provide the regulatory framework and to enforce its 
realization. If they’re outside of this framework they get a little ‘stroke of the whip’ .… In 
principle these ‘strokes of the whip’ should not be necessary; that would be a good indicator 
that the system works. We carry out our supervisions, but we don’t find anything. They take 
care of this themselves, and there are no incidents. In the ideal world they take 
responsibility and have their own supervisions and self-correcting mechanisms. That’s why 
we never give approvals. We only give consents. That’s a main principle. Very often it’s 
tempting to provide solutions. Most of us are professionals, and we may see solutions, but 
then you always run the risk of meeting yourself …. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
Pointing to the responsibility of the firm, but taking the ‘child raising’ position, was in 
accordance with the regulatory philosophy. But the flip side was certainly also 
recognized. The role of the agency in circulating information and transferring knowledge 
could be sacrificed by the ‘laid back’ requests to always make the industry solve the 
problems. This could sometimes be hinted at by agency officials, referring to the 
necessity of expert contribution and the importance of using operational knowledge in 
‘solving problems’. Such reflections would of course challenge the timidity of requests 
and orders, leaving the solutions to the industry. But to a former official, now in a 
position of really having to do the job, the position of ‘laid back child raiser’ could be 
reflected upon more bluntly: 
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I remember one episode, I was really ashamed. We’d summoned Statoil for a meeting; 
they’d had a lot of falling objects, and we were to scold them; and how we scolded! Statoil 
told how they’d done this and done that. But we didn’t have any sensible response to what 
they’d done. They listed all the actions taken and all their precautionary attempts, but we 
had nothing to say, no professional response, other than “shame on you!”. We could have 
saved the effort. That’s not good enough! If you don’t have any professional response, no 
fresh approach to suggest, no advice to offer, no idea of what else could be done – just 
summon an operator just to say: shame on you!. I thought it was incompetent and hopeless 
then, and I think it’s even more so now. It doesn’t help. And if the authorities cannot 
contribute anything but reprimands, they just follow along the road without doing anything 
important. The primary task of the authorities is to prevent accidents. And then they must 
find out how to proceed in order to fulfill that role. (former NPD official) 
 
Company responses to regulation 
We have occasionally referred to industrial responses to regulation, notably from the 
OLF and ‘converts’ from the agency. These industrial responses were more 
systematically addressed in a number of interviews with HSE-managers and regulatory 
advisors, however, in order to get a general impression of their relations with the 
authorities.128 No attempt is made here to estimate a precise statistical distribution of 
these company responses, and much less so to systematically relate such distributions to 
other variables that might have any impact on them. Rather, the modest ambition is to 
portray the kinds and varieties of responses in more impressionistic terms, but sensitive to 
their inherently contextual and potentially biased nature. As may be evident, encounters 
between the authorities and the industry would thus be influenced by a number of factors 
related to various encounters with the authorities and also on their more overall views on 
the regulatory regime. ‘Opinions’ would thus appear, sometimes as digested reflections 
on years of experience in one company, sometimes flavoured by recent controversies, 
usually dependent on the relationship with members of the PSA supervisory team, 
possibly ‘furnished’ in the interview context in case the opinions voiced would reach the 
agency (despite reassurances to the contrary), and in some cases also formed by their 
experiences as agency employees sometime in the past.129 
                                                 
128 After all, I only talked to some 15 company officials from 8 companies, most of whom represented the 
HSE-departments (including regulatory advisors). No comprehensive analysis was made of formal 
responses in relation to regulatory changes, agency policies, or supervisory interventions.  
129 Apparently, some international companies had, at least in the past, fairly restrictive rules for external 
communication with the authorities.  
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 On the whole, the meetings with the companies largely confirmed the expectations 
generated from talks with the agency officials, in particular when supplied with 
interviews with the former officials. Perhaps the most striking impression from these 
talks was the diversity of responses. On the one hand, and in the majority of cases, 
professional trust and respect, sometimes even ‘reverence’, characterized their attitudes 
towards the agency and its officials. Agency officials were described as professional, 
knowledgeable, accommodative, helpful, pleasant, and understanding. Contacts were 
regular and frequent. One regulatory advisor had a picture of all the members of ‘their’ 
supervisory team on a board, including necessary contact information. There were 
weekly contacts, and the professional support of the team was considered “vital for the 
continuous improvement of HSE-conditions”. Sometimes these approvals were 
somewhat conditional, and phrased in terms like: “at least the people we’re dealing with”, 
but adding: “but we know there are differences”. In fact, the interviews could oscillate 
between such generalized views and concrete experiences. After first reproaching the 
agency in general terms, one HSE-manager then praised the supervisory team: 
 
To take the team I experience from my position, I believe they do an excellent job; the 
supervisory team we’re exposed to is really first-rate. We’ve only had positive experiences 
with that group. So as a company we cannot say anything negative .… They’re 
professional, they’re flexible, and they’re lucid. (HSE manager) 
 
But there were also exceptions. Sometimes, the overall risk priorities would be 
questioned, if the agency was seen to approach minor risks rather than the major ones. 
Sometimes, in cases of published criticism, the ‘bad boy’ stigma was objected to, as if the 
overall safety commitment of the company was questioned. Rather than criticizing the 
company and its managers for not taking HSE seriously enough, more attention should be 
given to the rather ordinary organizational tasks and challenges of dealing with complex 
technologies, operational behaviour, and managerial processes; organizational failure, not 
poor management attitudes, was the issue. Some critical voices thus lamented that the 
agency officials didn’t always fully understand the management systems, the 
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organizational make up, or the way things were supposed to work in practical terms.130 
Addressing such organizational issues based on relatively brief supervisory encounters 
could occasionally appear capricious and ill-founded to the ‘insiders’.  
 
In one particular instance, it was even questioned whether the agency supervisions really 
contributed to improving HSE conditions in the company, beyond the simple fact that 
external reviews more generally made them ‘aware of’ and ‘alert to’ the possibility of 
such reviews: “We know that we will be measured and evaluated, and that in itself is a 
motivation for improvement; but the supervisory reports are not always very useful in 
themselves. They scratch the surface, but the real diagnosis and the appropriate solutions 
come from within” (regulatory advisor). Also, a more profound understanding of the 
‘particular and local challenges’ was called for, such as the trade-offs that often had to be 
made when dealing with risks in practical and day-to-day contexts. Although 
supervisions could have the effect of drawing attention to organizational failures and sub-
standard performance, the actual framing of ‘non-conformities’ could also be experienced 
as unduly restricting the scope of possible remedies. Even if ‘self-diagnosis’ and ‘self-
treatment’ was part of the overall philosophy of making the companies ‘solve their own 
problems’, any given non-conformity could implicitly entail expected ‘conformity’, and 
thus also restrict the scope of possible solutions; but, as noted, the relationship between 
‘problems’ (non-conformities) and ‘solutions’ was not always clear cut. In line with the 
self-regulatory principles, an intermediary option would be to set minimal requirements 
to the use of qualified or competent personnel in the analysis of risk. In one case, a 
company had deliberately avoided to specify any competence requirements related to the 
analysis of incidents, as they wanted to use a broad spectrum of people with different 
backgrounds and perspectives in order to extend the interpretive scope of the evaluation; 
the subsequent controversies were finally resolved, but revealed the inherent problems 
related to just how the process of attaching solutions to problems was to be resolved. In 
another case, competence requirements related to the analysis of chemical risks was 
                                                 
130 Occasionally, it was also reported that agency officials could admit these shortcomings themselves. In 
one case, an official, who had been temporarily engaged in the company as part of a ‘knowledge transfer 
scheme’, had apparently acknowledged, after two weeks, that he’d finally realized ‘how the system was 
supposed to work’.  
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considered unduly restrictive and uniform, due to a perceived discrepancy between the 
‘size’ of the risk and the capacity of the organization. But the accommodative and 
‘respectful’ response was evident also in these cases; one HSE manager told proudly that 
they regularly hired a prominent expert of risk analysis to conduct evaluations (a 
professor at the university, who was regularly also used as an advisor by the agency).   
 
The PSA clearly had to balance the collaborative and accommodative style against the 
regulatory role. This is of course difficult, and may explain why they (sometimes) had to 
‘assume’ authority against a (sometimes) equally knowledgeable and self confident 
industry: 
 
R: And no one in the whole industry is more touchy or sensitive than the PSA; but it’s a bit 
fun to tease them …. Sometimes you feel that it’s them against the rest of the industry. You 
sometimes notice at conferences etc., if you criticize them – they don’t like that. 
I: Why is that? 
R: I don’t know, but I think maybe it’s important for them to be, you know, a little 
unassailable, beyond criticism .... 
I: Like, it’s part or the order of things, that they’re the authorities and all that? 
R: Yes, right. Then I really think they’re clever and I really appreciate Magne Ognedal and 
the way he’s been running things, before and now. But I think sometimes they’re too rash, 
like if you have some minor slip or deviation, they get at you just like that .… I should 
really have liked to run over the PSA with some of my buddies, you know, really probing 
into their own compliance with procedures and regulations, together with some experienced 
auditors. (HSE manager) 
 
Just as the image of companies balance and oscillate between the ‘distrustful money-
machine’ and the ‘committed risk manager’, themselves normally asserting the 
possibility of being trustful in both roles, the image of the authorities also balance 
between bureaucratic invincibility and prudent professionalism, although for the most 
part approximating the latter. 
Attribution of causes (and responsibilities) 
Providing explanations and attributing causes are part and parcel of risk management. 
Hazards may range from ‘unexpected’ accidents to slowly emerging health impairments, 
and the causal models applied would be correspondingly versatile. In the received risk 
management approach, preventive measures shall be applied somewhere along the 
intersecting causal chains and targeted against the antecedent triggers and conditions in a 
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manner that provides the greatest chances of avoiding harm. Beyond this, due to 
unpredictability or uncontrollability, risk management measures address the capacity for 
organizational resilience, the ability to cope and recover when barriers are absent or fail. 
Generally, the accidents and near misses have been the dominant preoccupation and 
concern. A number of models, tools and theories are applied in these endeavours by the 
authorities; influencing and influenced by parallel models in the industry and in the 
research and consulting networks. Typically, the use of technical causes has gradually 
been supplemented with human and organizational causes, largely promoted by the 
authorities. The application of causal models thus also reflects the development of the 
regulatory framework, locating both causes and related remedies to the overall risk 
management philosophies. That which may cause harm, is that which must be controlled; 
if the breaking of barriers cause accidents, prevention is restored by establishing and 
maintaining efficient barriers. Risk management is thus achieved by influencing the 
alleged causal antecedent, trailing them from immediate triggers to ever more distant 
‘root causes’ of ‘contributory factors’. As noted in Chapter 3, a plethora of 
methodological approaches are employed for understanding and explaining risks and 
their sometimes unhappy outcomes, with case narratives and statistical records as perhaps 
the extreme poles. Causal categories would accordingly be contextualized within the 
trajectories of the narrative, or they would be predefined and counted as frequencies in a 
sample. In between, there were digestions of accumulated experience, sensitive to 
individual varieties, but also generalized beyond these. As one of the experienced 
supervisory coordinators reflected on causal antecedents from the point of view of a 
‘generalized narrative’:  
 
Often it’s related to violation of procedures. That again may have three causes. First, the 
procedure may be inadequate. Second, it may not be known, people are unaware of its 
existence. Third, it’s adequate, people know it, but they don’t care. They take short cuts, 
they deliberately contravene, etc. Most people who violate procedures have a good reason 
why .… Often, these reasons are related to safety concerns. Perhaps most salient, is that 
procedures are inadequate and ambiguous .… One of the things we have observed several 
times is that, over time, a way of doing things develop. A serious breach is not a one-time 
incident; rather you stretch and bend the rules gradually, and then the front line work 
management is not always present where operations are carried out; this has been observed 
in several investigations. Managers responsible for work operations are often overloaded 
with administrative work, so they have to spend most of their time in an office. In the new 
regulations we address procedures specifically, saying that one shall ensure that procedures 
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are understood and used as intended. This formulation is not unpremeditated. The usual 
way of checking out that the procedure is understood is to supply the operator with a list of 
procedures relevant for the job at hand, and then you’re supposed to mark out when the 
procedure is read. Then you read 20 procedures in your leisure time, mark them out, hand 
the form to your supervisor who signs and puts it in the archives. The only thing you say, 
really, is that you’ve read the procedure. Eight out of ten don’t understand what they’ve 
read; they read the procedure, but they don’t appreciate the implications of what they’ve 
read. To read a procedure and to understand its content and the intention behind, that’s two 
different things. Some companies have follow up questions to ensure that the procedure is 
fully understood. That’s the proper way of doing it, and that’s what’s intended in the 
regulation. Very often the procedures are misunderstood .… they may be badly written. 
They’re often written by academics, but it’s not always academics who are the users. We 
have our own style of writing. This also applies to regulations. To me it’s crystal clear. I 
don’t see why people don’t understand. But when you’re out speaking to people, to 
outsiders .… even here in the PSA, we have our own manner of speaking; use concepts in 
the most obvious way. Like when we use “should” in a regulation, it’s quite clear to us what 
that means. But it’s not necessarily understood the same way by most people. We have to 
be aware of that. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
The narratives of causal antecedents and ‘sequences’, contrasted starkly with the 
statistically processed records of counted numbers and fixed categories. The gathering 
and processing of statistical information occurred through a number of sources and 
methods; and as noted in the previous chapter, a number of requirements oblige the 
industry to submit information to the authorities regarding plans, consents, incidents, 
accidents, etc. On the average, some 500 incidents/accidents are reported to the agency 
each year, ranging from fairly minor injuries to serious accidents and near-misses. These 
data-bases serve as sources for prioritizing the supervisory activities. Linking the 
statistical records to underlying organizational causes had in fact been an important 
methodological challenge in the RNNS project, and no apparent solution was yet 
apparent. The seminars recounted in Chapter 3 represented in fact one such attempt near 
the qualitative end of the scale. Although statistical data was important in prioritizing and 
planning supervisions, it was mostly through the supervisory experience itself that the 
organizational dynamics could be uncovered. Exclusive reliance on statistics was not 
uncontested, and triggered also more profound critiques of the information gathering 
policies and of the kinds of analyses that were employed in the diagnostic process: 
 
Some in the agency are really obsessed with ‘incidents’; ‘learning from incidents’ is like a 
mantra; we must learn and avoid the same thing from happening again”. Sometimes I think 
that it would have been better if incidents and accidents had been forgotten altogether. One 
should rather focus on conditions on an organizational level, on knowledge, maintenance, 
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stress, external pressure, etc. We need to learn about root causes, underlying conditions. 
Incidents are analyzed in isolated groups, like cranes, leaks, drilling etc., and don’t provide 
that kind of organizational insight. It’s no use to only employ the right terms, the new 
language, if we don’t understand the mechanisms operating. You must realize that everyone 
speaks the “right” language; deviance, silent deviance, violations …. There’s no guarantee 
that people mean the same. (former NPD official)  
 
Also the industry uses similar registration systems, and causes are applied to incidents 
and registered in databases. There are several such tools in use, but the dominating 
system is “Synergy”, which was developed jointly by Statoil, Hydro, Aker, and several 
other companies during the 1980s. The system has largely been quite standardised, with 
some instances of specific tailoring. Causal models are also used in investigation reports, 
and techniques vary across companies.131 There were thus a number of available 
classification systems for ‘causes’, and several options for how these could be fitted 
together in more comprehensive models for understanding why risks developed and how 
they could be managed.  There was also a high degree of overlap, with recurring and 
favoured ‘causes’, and ambiguous and diversified categorizations made it difficult to 
make any one of them commonly accepted. As was aptly noted by one HSE-manager:  
 
So when you want to draw conclusions on an organizational level and a management level, 
you need additional tools .… Then you have all these causal categories widely employed in 
the industry. That’s a problem. I don’t believe we benefit from having all this mess .... you 
know, Synergy, Tripod etc. And none of them are really good enough. I believe that, here, 
the PSA has a job to do, in order to arrive at some common causal categories that everyone 
in the industry can agree on and use, as a minimum …. And they must be logical, at a level 
that facilitates statistical analyses without ending up with 200 percent …. There’s too much 
overlap, too much confusion, too much ambiguity.  Then every single company may add 
their own categories. (HSE manager)  
 
As noted, industry systems, the RNNS-reports or the PSA registration system do not 
penetrate deeply into background causes, only referring briefly to very generalized 
causes, as exemplified in the 2005 RNNS-report, where ‘operational error’ was said to 
represents the largest category of reasons for hydrocarbon leaks, involving a combination 
                                                 
131 This includes the so-called MTO-analysis used by the PSA (man/technology/organization), TRIPOD, 
MORT, SMORT, etc., the latter often popularized through the so-called ‘Loss-Cause Model’. Causal 
categories typically include operational error, working conditions, maintenance, procedures, etc, variously 
organized and including large numbers of subcategories, down to quite detailed precursors (like ‘slippery 
surfaces’, ‘deficient/absent protection’, etc.). The day-to-day registration systems are often criticized for 
being overly time consuming, bureaucratic, and costly. The average cost of processing an incident through 
the Synergy systems was said to amount to some NOK 3000. 
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of ‘human, organizational and technical factors’; and furthermore, that leaks from 
equipment, valves, connections or broken piping, often could be attributed to unfortunate 
design, inappropriate purchasing, and inadequate and faulty maintenance. Statistical 
monitoring of these predefined causal categories is conducted at all levels. The PSA 
employs causal categories both in the registration of incidents in the internal databases, 
and in their investigation reports.  
The PSA-investigations and the MTO-model 
Investigation reports detail and penetrate far more extensively the processes leading up to 
an event. The so-called MTO-analysis has been the prominent investigation method since 
the late 1990s, and was imported from the nuclear industry. The method is based on the 
idea that both human, organizational, and technical factors should be considered in the 
explanatory accounts (hence MTO: Man, Technology, Organization). The MTO-analysis 
involves the use of an ‘event- and cause-diagram’, a ‘change analysis’ and a ‘barrier 
analysis’. The event-cause diagram provides a linear account of the event sequence in a 
block diagram, and includes the attribution of ‘technical and human’ causes in the 
sequence. The change analysis describes how the series of events have deviated from 
earlier events, a normal situation, or from common practice. The barrier analysis 
identifies human, technological, or organizational barriers that have failed or are missing 
in the course of events. Figure 5.1 below illustrates the MTO-analysis worksheet. The 
main purpose of the analysis is to identify how the flow of events could have been 
broken, and what the organization have done in the past in order to prevent the accident. 
The MTO-analysis also includes technical, human, or organizational recommendations 
(which should be as “realistic and specific as possible”). Generally the terminology 
covers barriers, barrier functions, barrier elements, and influencing factors. In 
investigations, the term, ‘barrier’ is generally given a wide definition, as "all systematic, 
physical, and administrative forms of protection found in the organization and in the 
individual workplace intended to prevent, or limit the consequences of, faults and 
erroneous actions".132 Examples of barriers within this interpretation are rules and safety 
                                                 
132 See also the use of the barrier concept in the management regulation (p. 115). In the 2006 White paper, 
barriers are defined as “technical, operational and organizational measures which, either individually or 
together, shall prevent or interrupt the course of specific undesirable incidents. Barriers can reduce both 
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systems, procedures, guidelines, and traditional technical barriers like fire walls, blow out 
preventors, valves, etc.  
 
During an investigation, the PSA-team (normally 3-5 participants) will interview relevant 
personnel both offshore and onshore, evaluate submitted documents and conduct an 
inspection on the facility. An MTO diagram mapping the immediate and underlying 





Figure 5.1.  MTO-analysis worksheet 
 
The attribution of causes follows a set of 11 predefined categories of ‘underlying causes’, 
including a number of sub-categories that indicate faults related to each category (some 
important sub-categories are listed in parenthesis):  
 
A. Working environment (light, sight, cleanliness, temperature, wind, waves, noise, stress) 
B. Work organization (time pressure, manning, competence, planning and preparation of 
tasks, division of labour and responsibilities). 
C. Routines in change-processes (verifications, information, consequence analysis). 
                                                                                                                                                 
likelihood and consequences”.  Nuances between definitions and specifications of ‘components’ and 
attributes of barriers were subject to some discussion, such as distinctions between functionality, 
independence, efficiency, testability, etc.  
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D. Management and platform-organization (policy and purpose, safety culture, quality 
programs, experience transfer, training programs, maintenance programs, division of 
responsibilities, risk analysis, emergency preparedness). 
E. Ergonomics – poor technique (technical design, functionality and availability of 
information). 
F. Working hours/time (overtime, stress, restitution and rest). 
G. Communication (common understanding of risk, tasks and messages, tasks and risks, 
technicalities of media). 
H. Written instructions/procedures (availability, content, format, readability, updating). 
I. Supervision (delegation, follow-up, task overload/distribution, expectations, time 
pressure, work-mate contact, experience transfer) 
J. Individual behaviour (use of procedures, preparation, self discipline, use of equipment, 
tiredness, motivation) 
K. Training/competence (formal, practical, updating of competence, training material).  
 
 
The actual use of these categories followed more elaborate definitions and criteria, and 
proficiency in the use of investigation techniques was generally followed up through 
special training programs and user manuals. At this point, disregarding the conceptual 
taxonomy employed, we may note how “safety culture” appears as a sub-category and an 
indication of “management and platform-organization” in consort with items such as 
quality programs and maintenance programs (but apparently dissociated from 
communication, supervision, work organization, etc.). The criteria for employing ‘safety 
culture’ in the causal analysis were specifically related to two conditions. First, whether 
the violations observed had a ‘collective’ nature, that is, if they appeared as commonly 
conducted and accepted within a work team. Second, whether the violations appeared to 
permeate hierarchical levels so that the operational failures could be taken as ‘symptoms’ 
of bad management (such as missing follow-up of plans, training requirements, risk 
analyses, corrective actions, etc.).  
 
An internal analysis of 37 incidents/accidents in drilling and well operations in the period 
from 1998 to 2004, provides a picture of how these causal categories are distributed and 
attributed (see table 5.1. below). As each incident is investigated according to the MTO 
scheme, the method used was simply to count the frequency of causal categories in the 
material. Some categories appeared in almost all the events; category D 
(management/platform organization), in fact appeared in all of them. Other recurring 
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causes and categories were related to supervision, individual behaviour, and work 
organization; in fact, most categories appeared in the majority of the reports. 
 
 
A. Working environment  56% 
B. Work organization  86% 
C. Routines in change-processes  45% 
D. Management and platform-organization  100% 
E. Ergonomics  – poor technique 78% 
F. Working hours/time  27% 
G. Communication  75% 
H. Instructions/procedures  67% 
I. Supervision  97% 
J. Individual behaviour  94% 
K. Training/competence  45% 
 
Table 5.1. Incident causes in drilling and well operations, 1998-2004 
 
Within the most popular category (D), ‘bad’ safety culture appeared as the second most 
used sub-category, after failing quality assurance. It also appeared as the third most used 
sub category when counting all violations, and was used in almost 30 reports. However, 
operational error or lack of ‘self-control’ (the sub-category “individual behaviour”) also 
appeared in almost all the incidents. This is not to be taken as expressing a bias towards 
identifying ‘human error’, in isolation, as an ‘important’ cause. The basic rationale in the 
investigation process was to uncover how the sum of MTO-factors had contributed in the 
course of the event. Operational error would normally be one piece in this puzzle. 
We will return to these causal models later, noting for the moment how they, although 
pragmatically adopted, still served as important clues for framing the understanding of 
causal sequences and relations, and implicitly also contained (partly un-stated) theoretical 
approaches. 
Causation and blame 
‘Operational error’ was seldom highlighted by the agency. Given the long and strong 
tradition to address the systemic aspects of risk management, there was an accompanying 
reluctance to blame individuals; and ‘operational error’, although normally registered in 
the ‘causal chain’, came close to making that link. The related concept of “human 
factors” was not associated with ‘individual error’ as such, but rather with complex 
interactions between the individual and the environment. ‘Human factors’, as this concept 
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was employed within the agency, was primarily concerned with the understanding of 
socio-technical systems and interactions among humans in their work-related 
environments. Originally derived from the discipline of ergonomics, it had gradually 
become an important approach, in particular within the working environment group.133 
Through initiatives from this group, it was applied in audits and in other more 
collaborative encounters with the industry.  
 
The associations between ‘operational error’ and individual blame was of course easy to 
make, and undue attention to both had the potential of constricting information flows and 
undermine the reporting cultures necessary for maintaining a viable risk management 
regime. Also, there were moral objections. The issue of causation, as translated to blame, 
made little sense in complex systems were the ‘trigger cause’ (like ‘human error’) would 
only be one element in the complex trajectories and configurations of facts and events. 
As noted, this no-blame philosophy was strong enough to resist the encounters with the 
more blame-seeking legal cultures and institutions. The in-house lawyers were socialized 
into the no-blame culture, but the NPD had also managed, with the aid of these lawyers, 
to ‘cultivate’ the police and the prosecuting authorities. As was explained by one senior 
legal advisor:  
 
R: Offshore, there hasn’t been much focus on the work force. Focus has been on the 
company or firm-level. You’ll have difficulty finding evidence for that [use of individual 
blame] in the petroleum sector. 
I: Does that mean that you’ve trained or influenced the police…? 
R: I believe it’s related to the recognition that the offshore industry is so huge and complex, 
with huge and complex systems and organizational structures. So it’s been largely realized 
that it would be difficult to find that one person has made a mistake .… You recognize that 
so many factors play a part, influencing the conduct of that person …. so you see that it 
would be fatal to single out one person as blameworthy for things that go wrong. Therefore, 
focus is put on the companies as such, that there is something wrong with how activities are 
run. But cooperation with the police has been close all along, as long as I can remember. 
There’s also been unwillingness on our part to focus on persons. And our recommendations 
to the police have reflected that. And the police have followed our recommendation very 
closely all along …. there’s been no counter-pressure from the police. Those working with 
these issues have understood that these issues are difficult and complex, and that it’d be 
                                                 
133 In this tradition, data and methods and designs are employed to “optimize human well-being and overall 
system performance” Although the concept of ‘human error’ plays a part in these approaches, the main 
focus is to  “contribute to the design and evaluation of tasks, jobs, products, environments, and systems in 
order to make them compatible with the needs, abilities, and limitations of people”  (see the International 
Ergonomics Association; http://www.iea.cc/). 
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hard to single out particular individuals. There has been very exceptional cases were you 
find someone who’s been taking independent decisions, who hasn’t been listening to others, 
and clearly behaved in a blameworthy manner, then you may have gone after the 
individual.... 
I: Some say that the police in their investigations are content when they identify the 
immediate causes, that they don’t trace the causal chains very far…? 
R: I really don’t agree with that. As we have increasingly focused on a more holistic 
perspective on causal connections, the police have been keeping up, and they’ve been just 
as interested in searching for root causes. .… We always join them in their investigations 
precisely in order to convey a broader understanding of how the systems work, give them 
inputs in their examinations. .… We may have been in the forefront, but they’ve never been 
slow in catching up. (senior legal advisor) 
 
Even the police investigations adopted a standard systemic accident investigation model.  
All members of the NSE-unit have been trained in the PSA investigation methods, 
although they used a slightly different technique themselves, more attuned to establishing 
‘facts’ that could serve as evidence in identifying individual and organizational 
responsibilities. Terminology is also slightly different and more police-like, such as 
interrogation instead of interview, witness instead of informant, etc.; and of course, 
regulatory violations are identified as a basis for making decisions about legal 
prosecution. But the overall approach seemed well harmonized. The head of NSE unit 
was himself trained both as a police officer and as an engineer, and had some ten years of 
experience as an offshore petroleum engineer and HSE officer, and was thus familiar 
with the risk management philosophies and the accompanying methods and 
nomenclatures.134  
 
But there were certainly debates about these issues. The director of regulatory 
development referred to this as an ideological debate, but seemed self-confident that the 
established regime would survive. Somehow, the systems based regime and the purpose 
oriented regulations had pinned the company as the prime mover in all matters of 
responsibility and causation:  
 
We’ve had a dialogue with the police authorities on these issues. They have underlined the 
fact that it’s more complicated to start legal proceedings against companies, or individuals, 
                                                 
134 He described the investigation process very much as a double effort: to uncover the course of events and 
at the same time to ‘protect’ those involved, emphasizing the establishment of trust when they were on the 
site; questions about ‘external’ conditions, such as sufficient training, if working conditions were well 
arranged, if work practices were normally accepted, etc.  
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based on goal setting regulations, because there are fewer ‘definites’ to pin a case onto; thus 
you have to use more discretionary judgments about what’s required. It is however our 
main focus to develop the best regulations as a tool for improving safety and thus 
preventing accidents or near misses from happening. So we have not, in our regulatory 
thinking changed our regulatory approach, but focus constantly on describing as best as 
possible the intention of the individual requirements. So we’re not quite attuned, 
ideologically. We’ve often had discussions with the police on these issues. (director of 
regulatory development) 
 
There has been some focus on this, as some consider judgments of individual 
responsibility to be too evasive. Even if clearly established procedures, such as 
conducting safe job analysis, were not carried out, no one was to be blamed. Companies 
have occasionally claimed that individual penalties are too rare, and unions have 
regularly claimed that responsible managers too easily escape public prosecution. Even 
some employees in the PSA were of the opinion that they had moved too far in order to 
protect the individual, although the legal approach was not necessarily seen as a desirable 
remedy. But the absolutionist ethos was strongly internalized. The preventive effect of 
targeting individuals would be rather small compared to that of targeting the company as 
such. And although the conflicts were apparent, the prophylactic no-blame attitude was 
also advocated within the industry:  
 
I: Is there a conflict between the legal outlook and system and the risk management 
perspective? 
R: Yes, for many reasons. To me the safety perspective is the principal issue. The prime 
task of the regulatory authority is to prevent accidents to recur, not to expose or punish. But 
then, sometimes it’s really grave, and you’ll have to take the sanctioning approach. So 
there’s a question of when you use sanctions, which sanctions, and how you use them. 
Punishment is one .…You have the trade-off between sanction and information, and it’s 
very difficult for any authority. In fact, I believe the NPD/PSA largely has administered that 
trade-off in a quite reasonable manner. But there have been strong tensions between 
ordinary officials and the lawyers .… It’s been handled through internal discussions 
.…You’ll always live with this .… The Rogaland Police Department has learned a lot and 
been constructive. I believe these issues have been reasonably handled. You have the 
unions who want more people hanged in the higher echelons, and the companies want more 
people hanged in the lower echelons, and the authorities stand in between and has to 




The petroleum regime thus seems to have efficiently countered the more blame seeking 
approaches that is normally found in legal systems and cultures. This is not necessarily 
reflecting any national pattern. An analysis from the mid 1990s on the role of the 
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judiciary system (the prosecuting authorities and the courts) in relation to accidents 
(primarily in the industry, construction and transport sectors) concluded that this conflict 
was indeed a more pervasive phenomenon. It was argued that the legal system had not 
adapted sufficiently to the modern risk management philosophies that were reflected in 
the regulatory reforms and that investigations and legal proceedings often concentrated 
on the ‘triggering causes’ (typically at the operational level), thus missing the complex 
mix of antecedent causes and conditions preceding the accidents (Bjordal, 1997; Bjordal 
and Graver, 1996). The petroleum regime then appears as pioneering also in how the 
regulatory authorities have managed to ‘educate and enlighten’ the other legal actors, 
notably the police, and thus to avoid the blame-seeking, and often inconsistent, 
involvement of the public prosecutors and the courts. A ‘double barrier’ has thus been 
erected, favouring absolutionism rather than blamism. The justifications for this were 
both moral and instrumental; the former possibly also reflecting pressure from unions, 
and the latter reflecting the belief that information processing would be compromised in a 
blame seeking system and that event analyses had to reflect the causal complexities in 
order to promote learning and improvement. Still, the methods applied in investigations 
would be adequate for establishing individual negligence. The sequential ordering of 
events, in each step measured against relevant requirements, could, if served in the hands 
of a judiciary system untrained in ‘modern risk management’, easily have triggered 
verdicts based on individual negligence. As noted above, the justification for not doing 
so, even if faults were not ‘anonymous’, was that they were ‘cumulative’. Although the 
threshold for applying that term was not clearly established, the ‘causal impact’ of the act 
in question was generally considered to be too insignificant for the outcome. Apparently, 
this legal pigeonhole was spacious enough for absorbing the overwhelming majority of 
‘errors’ committed on the shelf. 135  
                                                 
135 It should be noted that no systematic analysis has been conducted here of the available investigation 
rapports in order to assess the uses of causal techniques. The general impression, however, is that various 
discretionary judgements about ‘proximity’ and ‘adequacy’ are summed up to outline the combined effect 
of several contributory conditions, and then linked directly to the abundantly available legal provisions in 
order to establish ‘non-conformity’. These analyses did not (need to) approximate the kind of sophistication 
necessary for teasing out the more ‘precise’ causal impact of individual acts through various tests that may 
be employed through so-called causal minimalism for specifying ‘causally relevant conditions’ (‘cause-in-
fact’). Such tests of causation may be rather unrestrictive, such as the ‘but-for’ test implying only a 
requirement of necessity (the condition, without which, the outcome would not have occurred). Problems of 
over-determination or ‘joint determination’ have caused some to introduce stronger claims, such as 
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The mismatch between legalistic and organizational or systemic conceptions of risk and 
hazard is approached within the context of risk management politics, regulatory 
enforcement, and penal law. The potential conflicts between these systems are largely 
solved by keeping the legal system on arm-length distance. But issues about the 
attribution of cause (and blame), and the appropriate individual and organizational targets 
of such attributions, are still intensely debated and contested through the application of 
apparently competing models of risk management and organizational approaches to 
working environment and safety. Incidentally, the concept of culture served as a trigger 
in raising these issues and conflicts on a broader level, with the legal boundaries receding 
more into the background. And clearly, cultural values and ideas about reasonable and 
just ways of distributing the relevant risks will affect both legal and extra-legal judgments 
about causality, responsibility, and culpability. It has been argued that causation in law 
should to a greater extent reflect ordinary causal judgements outside the legal context 
(Hart and Honore, 1969; Honore, 2005). In the petroleum regime, the risk management 
philosophies served as templates for such ‘ordinary’ judgements. And in the end, it can 
be argued, there are no theory-free, context-free, or value-free criteria available for 
making judgments about these issues (Shaver, 1985).  
Reviewing some salient regime properties 
Before turning more specifically to the experiences of the cultural approach to risk 
management in the next chapter, we may at this point review some of the most salient 
aspects of the regulatory context within which these experiences took place. And, as we 
shall return to a more general discussion about the understanding of regulatory regimes in 
the final chapter, this review should also serve as a preparation for that discussion.  
 
As would be evident, the practical task of managing risk from the position of the 
regulator, involves a complex mix of regulations, resources, priorities, organizational 
designs, supervisory techniques, analytical methods, conceptual schemes, causal models, 
enforcement measures, interaction patterns, and communicative styles. These 
                                                                                                                                                 
conditions that are considered as necessary elements of a set of conditions jointly sufficient for the 
outcome, also referred to as the NESS test (see Hart and Honoré, 1969; Honoré, 1999; Honore, 2005). 
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components of regulation, in all their various modalities, reflect also some assumptions, 
ideas, and philosophies about the regulatory role, as well as structural conditions for 
fulfilling this. Encounters with the industry take a number of forms, and embody 
assumptions about motivational structures and conditions of compliance which inform 
the choice of appropriate enforcement instruments. Sources of power may variably 
depend on available sanctions, or on the professional knowledge and legitimacy as an 
authority (many would, humbly, refer to the importance of the latter). Anticipatory 
mechanisms are clearly present, as the regulatee knows that the authority has the means 
to strike hard if trust is broken. Although their role is formally founded on the legislative 
mandate provided by the law, the dominant rationale in enforcing regulation is based on 
dialogical and enlightened problem-solving in the promotion of regulatory goals, with 
arm-length distance to ministerial and political principals, as well as to the judiciary 
system. Partly we’re dealing here with disparate systems of the societal order that 
converge in using the one, the legal system, to achieve the goals of the other; that is, the 
public policies of reducing risk and promoting the values of health and safety. The front 
line bureaucracy has the challenging task of navigating within these spheres.  
 
Seen from a historical perspective, this regime has it own specific genealogy, developed 
within a national context largely characterized by predominantly egalitarian values, a 
relatively high level of trust, and a correspondingly low level of industrial and societal 
conflict. The regime is firmly integrated in a tripartite system of industrial relations, 
burdened with the task of balancing opposing social and economic interests, but still 
benefiting from the active contribution of the industrial parties in making the regulatory 
system work. We have previously referred to these broader societal features as the 
‘Norwegian-Nordic context’ (see Chapter 3).  
 
The philosophy of self-regulation, gradually emerging from the late 1970s, relies not only 
on the implantation of formal management systems, but also, on the proactive and 
dynamic involvement of regulatees, interest groups, experts, etc. Despite the genetic 
idiosyncrasies, some generic modalities of the regime may be highlighted by briefly 
considering some of its properties in relation to the ‘anatomy’ developed by Hood et al. 
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(2001), briefly outlined in Chapter 2. This also provides an occasion to critically examine 
some of the formative constraints contained in that model, in particular in terms of how 
specific configurations of dimensions and variables match requirements for conceptual 
clarity, the logic of categories, and how these capture the empirical varieties of actual 
regimes, to be understood both as ‘cases’ within larger regimes and between such 
composite regimes.  
 
Starting with the tripartite control system (standard setting, information gathering and 
behaviour modification), this clearly cannot be conceived of as a static ‘single loop 
thermostat’. Regulatory processes are dynamic and the regulatory purposes are pursued in 
a number of integrated approaches, each of which is not easily identifiable as isolated 
components of the control system. Regulatory activities, such as audits and 
investigations, contain elements of all three, as they simultaneously set standards, gather 
information and modify behaviour. Likewise, the RNNS project not only gather and 
process a comprehensive body of information and knowledge about risk, but serves also 
as a ‘mirror’ for the ‘modification’ of industrial behaviour. The three elements are still 
separable within these integrated practices, but we consider them jointly below, as they 
apply to each component along the ‘instrumental-institutional’ dimension. It should be 
noted at the outset, however, that the composite versatility of this regime makes it 
difficult to unequivocally attach values to these variables.  
 
The first element, type of risk, makes that point particularly clear, for two reasons. First, 
as this component primarily addresses the magnitude of risk we may recall the 
comprehensive efforts devoted to evaluating risk levels in the petroleum industry. We 
recall also the great variety of risk factors, from health impairments to major accidents, 
and the problems, despite prolonged efforts, related to estimating the relative magnitude 
of each. As this component specifically address the residual risk, the impact of societal 
controls other than strict market controls must also be noted, such as the local systems of 
participation and voice (like safety representatives), although these controls of course 
belong to the ‘content’ of regulation. Again, the most striking feature of such controls is 
their embeddedness in socio-political context of the tri-partite system. Market failure 
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appears as a feeble benchmark for considering residual risk in this context. The second 
and third components, public attitudes and organized interests, are probably best viewed 
in consort. The former have certainly had an impact, and the tightening of regulations 
during the 1980s can be explained as largely a consequence of the Bravo blow-out in 
1977 and the catastrophic capsize of the Alexander Kielland platform in 1980. The local 
media have extensive coverage of offshore incidents and accidents, but the impact on 
regulations is probably insignificant. The ‘public’ in this case is largely represented by 
the organized interests. Although the unions are dispersed in several separate 
organizations, they are all represented in critical arenas and mobilize much argumentative 
force and energy, as will be evident also in the pages to come. The industry also appear to 
further their interests primarily through argumentative mobilization. On the whole, 
interest groups are efficiently organized, with a number of available channels for voicing 
their interests. As it appears, the industry demonstrates a certain reluctance in openly 
objecting to requirements and enforcement practices, unless these appear severely 
unjustified; and the voices are predominantly channelled through the industry 
associations. The unions allow themselves a far more militant and outspoken role. On the 
whole, however, the organized interests are allowed to participate extensively in crucial 
phases of the regulatory processes.  
 
Turning to regulatory content, the size component appears as intriguingly difficult to 
estimate, partly as regulations for the most part are risk-based and goal oriented. The 
severity of the regulations are also subject some (unsettled) controversy. No less than a 
Laplacian Demon would be required in order to measure the net risk reducing effect of 
interventions against some of these essentially un-predictable scenarios (such as the 
effect of, say, a sleepless night in a double cabin), as against the ‘comparative’ risk 
reducing effects of interventions against impairments of worker’s health conditions (such 
as the effect of, say, a good nights sleep in a single cabin).136 Still, it may be modestly 
                                                 
136As may be recalled, the Demon of Laplace (the French mathematician and astronomer, 1749-1827), was 
a theoretical construct based on the belief in causal determinism, typical of the strong belief in the progress 
of science during the Age of Enlightenment. It was launched in his essay on probabilities, regarding the 
present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future: “Given for one instant an 
intelligence which could comprehend all forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of 
the beings who compose it - an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis - it would 
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summarized, the overall investment in regulation appears relatively comprehensive in 
terms of resources, scope, and coverage. No province of risk easily escapes this 
regulatory framework. Regulatory structure is complex and composite, primarily in terms 
of the extensive role of industrial self-regulation. Standards, internal procedures, 
monitoring schemes, etc., vastly exceeds the amount of statutory regulation. The structure 
of the state bureaucracy, on the other hand, is tailor-made to fit the industrial sector, with 
extensive organizational integration of risk factors and elaborate coordination 
mechanisms towards other agencies. Regulatory style has been described here as typically 
accommodative; this must however be seen against the availability of the variously sized 
‘sticks’. The degree of ‘rule-orientation’ is somewhat dubious, since rules and procedures 
are abundantly present and strongly advocated but at the same time seen as intrinsically 
dependent on practical efficacy, knowledgable agents, and a ‘good HSE culture’.  
 
Given this very provisional summary, we should note however the overlaps and grey 
zones between variables. Thus, for instance, regulatory size and style would in many 
cases provide a combined indication of what is referred to as ‘policy aggression’, which 
in the model is referred to as only an aspect of size. As noted above, although ‘style’ 
appears as accommodative, it is clearly backed by the implicit possibility of severe 
sanctions, even if these seldom surface. Also the aggregate dimensions appear as overly 
composite; at other times they seem too restrictive in scope. In both cases this has 
explanatory implications. Categories like ‘structure’ and ‘organized interests’ are both 
very composite dimensions. The former combines two quite distinct institutional 
dimensions. The first, referring to the non-state share of regulatory resources, alone 
covers two separate sub-dimensions, that is the amount of third party contributions and 
the level of compliance cost. Both of these, in particular the latter, must also be seen as 
indications of ‘size’, in terms of the regulatory burdens and costs apportioned to the 
regulatees, including systems of self-regulation. The other aspect of structure opens the 
landscape of institutional arrangements within the state system, thus covering both the 
vertical and horizontal dimensions of organization. In itself, this complex constitutes a 
                                                                                                                                                 
embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest 
atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past would be present to its eyes." (see 
Hacking, 1990: 11-12). 
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critical and dynamic dimension in the formation of regimes. Likewise, ‘organized 
interests’ joins very different groups of actors, with very different interests: business 
interests and union interests may be subdivided only on the third level of disaggregation. 
Within an industrial relations perspective, these are of course highly relevant. In sum, 
many levels of disaggregation are necessary in order to capture important mechanisms in 
the formation of regulatory content. More important in this context, is that the regulatory 
interest, or more specifically, the interests of the policy makers, the regulators, and the 
bureaucrats are not clearly separated, and in the aggregate analysis they are joined 
indiscriminately with the interests of all non-public interest groups. I shall argue below 
that ‘the public interest’ deserves a more unique and distinctive position in the 
explanatory and interpretive scheme. I shall further argue that this is also due to the more 
restricted delineation of ‘type of risk’. Although this dimension opens for a wide 
interpretation of ‘residual risk’, taking account of possible disagreements and 
uncertainties, it may also serve as a more narrowly defined benchmark in the explanatory 
analysis, restricting the scope of public interest explanations. We will return to this issue 
in Chapter 11. 
 
This general account of regulatory world views and practices provides a necessary 
background for understanding the contexts in which ‘HSE culture’ was supposed to make 
a difference. Although only occasionally having touched upon the subject so far, we have 
still seen how ‘culture’ appeared in various configurations, sometimes ascending to 
comprehensive roles, sometimes descending to more modest roles; and as noted, the 
originators had all left the agency before these navigational processes commenced. We 
thus turn to how the heritage was ‘managed’. 
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6. Reinventing HSE culture 
 
As noted, the originators of the HSE culture provision left the NPD during the initial 
phases of the ‘team-period’ around 2001. The follow up process was to be organized as a 
project (starting some time late in 2001), reporting directly to one of the supervisory 
directors. Some of the key members of the group, including the leader, were recently 
recruited, partly on the basis of training and competencies considered important for the 
follow up of the culture provision.137 Neither the loss of the originators nor the 
composition of the project did contribute to any continuity or strong anchoring of the 
project within the agency. They clearly felt they had to start from scratch. No clues were 
given apart from the text in the provision, the very brief guideline, and some passages 
from the 2002 White paper that were being drafted. The lawyers and many of the 
engineers were somewhat bewildered; some were sceptically waiting for measuring 
criteria to be developed in case the provision was to be used as a yardstick for defining 
non-conformities, or worse still, as a warrant for issuing orders. The management 
provided in practice a more or less open mandate; as noted, the ‘developmental’ and 
‘experimental’ nature of the provision had been formulated as a point of departure. In 
short, the regulatory implications of HSE culture had to be reinvented.  
                                                 
137 The leader was a skilled HSE professional with some 25 years experience from the industry. He was 
also a petroleum engineer, and had practical experience as a well supervisor. He had participated as project 
manager for one of the most successful HSE-projects ever conducted in Statoil, contributing to the 
reduction of accidents in Statoil operated drilling operations with some 90 percent in the period from 1986 
to 1991 (from a frequency of nearly 60 to 3,7 injuries per million work hours; in actual numbers from 72 to 
3). The project enjoyed strong managerial support and utilized a number of organizational intervention 
strategies, such as training programs, continuous monitoring, and task analyses (see Haukelid, 1996). The 
other was an anthropologist specialized in organizational studies and with occupational experience from 
quality management in the hotel business. She admitted, as an anthropologist well familiar with the evident 
complexities and potential confusions related to “culture”, that she was skeptical from the start: “I didn’t 
really like the idea in the beginning; it was too complex and comprehensive .… Only gradually, it started to 
make sense, by discovering how cultural factors actually was very significant in all kinds of contexts”. 
Partly, this development reflected increasing familiarization with the industry (with which she had no prior 
experience). Due to maternity leave, she was later to be replaced by another anthropologist (recruited from 
the local research institution, IRIS). Also, a newly appointed organizational psychologist participated 
heavily in the project.  
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Conceptualizing ‘culture’ 
The work commenced largely as a venture into the literature on safety culture and risk 
management, in collaboration with the ‘R&D network’. No contact was made with the 
originators. Not surprisingly, however, many of the original sources of inspiration were 
utilized in the reinvention process. Notably, these were largely to be found in the High 
Reliability-literature, in particular through the popularized exposition provided by James 
Reason in his book on organizational accidents (Reason, 1997). The first major 
achievement of the group was the production of a small booklet or brochure called “HSE 
and culture”.138  It outlined a broad perspective on culture that drew together these High 
Reliability perspectives, supplied with some anthropological perspectives and more 
general organizational perspectives on management and leadership. The holistic HSE-
perspective was underlined, emphasizing in particular the importance of health and the 
working environment. This was quite deliberate, and in line with the priorities of the 
White paper; in both cases attempting to lift these issues out from the ‘shadow of safety’. 
 
Culture was defined as “the knowledge, values, norms, ideas and attitudes which 
characterize a group of people”, subsequently complicated, however, by adding that 
culture “is also about technology, economics, law and regulations, and other conditions 
which influence daily life”. In fact, it was of some importance to forward the message 
that culture was not to be understood as the sum of privately held attitudes mysteriously 
adding up to a strong collective commitment to HSE-values and “safe behaviour”. 
Rather, HSE culture was seen as evolving from ongoing processes of interaction between 
people, groups, and framework conditions, not clearly delineated into unitary ‘cultures’. 
Improving HSE culture would, in the short version, entail the application of appropriate 
                                                 
138 For the latest and slightly updated version, see:  
http://www.ptil.no/English/Produkter+og+tjenester/Publikasjoner/4_temahefte_hms_kultur_relansert.htm. 
Several internal work-shops were also conducted within the agency in order to generate a reasonably 
comprehensive understanding and agreement (2001-2). In particular, it appeared vital to counter or at least 
supplement widespread ideas among some of the engineers, seen to be highly influenced by American-
inspired philosophies associating safety culture primarily with ‘attitudes and behaviour’ at the low 
operational level (the ‘sharp end’ of production). These workshops were also largely exploratory in nature, 
conducted in parallel with the production of the booklet and the consolidation process of the culture group. 
External advisors, primarily form the R&D network contributed to and facilitated in the process. The 
process was completed when I entered the agency.  
 198
means to sensible goals and then to act on that, thus providing truthful agreement 
between words and deeds.  
 
The dangers of self-complacency were particularly underscored, quoting from Reason’s 
book: “If you are convinced that our organization has a sound safety culture, you are 
almost certainly mistaken”. Self-satisfied organizations would endanger critical judgment 
and the ability to spot signals of danger. A sound culture, on the other hand, would 
“facilitate continuous, critical and thorough efforts to improve health, safety, and the 
environment”. It was further pointed out that this required imagination, joint efforts, and 
a multi-disciplinary approach. The concept of HSE culture was then sketched out by 
adopting Reason’s notion of safety culture as an informed culture, the composition of 
which would include reporting, justice, flexibility, and learning (see Reason, 1997: 191-
222). 
 
Reporting culture addresses the dilemmas inherent in the so-called ‘zero-philosophy’ 
between seeing harms as caused and therefore (in principle) preventable, and the 
possibility of counter-productive pressures toward keeping figures low. Dangers of 
underreporting are addressed, in particular by warning against sanctioning ‘the 
messenger’ or the ‘wrongdoer’, but rather promoting a climate of trust and a willingness 
to learn from experience. It is further pointed to the possible double edged effect of bonus 
systems: rewarding low figures in contracts (worker, management, or company level) can 
promote unreliable and manipulated rapports rather than improved HSE-conditions. Just 
culture addresses primarily the relationship between personal responsibility and the 
systemic conditioning of behaviour. Human error is ‘human’, and organizational 
responses must take account of that and apply proportionate and productive responses. 
Personal responsibility and vigilance must be exercised in all phases of operations, 
including planning and design, but is affected by organization and staffing. No threshold 
is indicated for when, or which, individual sanctions should apply in different 
circumstances. However, a distinction is made between “intentional and unintentional 
behaviour”, but we are reminded on a very general level about the importance of 
perceived fairness, and the fact that both personal responsibility and framework 
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conditions matter.139 A flexible culture is furthered by creativity, imagination, free-
floating information, and the combination of multiple “mind-sets” in solving tasks. 
Redundancy is not mentioned specifically, although the industry is compared to High 
Reliability Organizations in having to balance between rule-following and swift 
adaptations to changing and unpredictable situations, not always able to afford the trial-
and-error approach. The intrinsic nature of this trade-off is not altogether apparent, and 
the text also contains some underscored, but rather general, checkpoints addressing the 
need for making sensible priorities and the active use of procedures based on “risk” and 
“best practice”. The last element, a learning culture, receives most attention.140 Learning 
cultures are open and facilitates unbiased knowledge-sharing across internal and external 
organizational borders, including also the established institutions of employee 
contribution (participation) and tree-party cooperation, referring to and quoting from the 
Framework Regulations to that effect. We are warned against in-group biases, inadequate 
communication along organizational interfaces, and other mechanisms for suppressing or 
ignoring important information. Included, however, is also the handling of conflicting 
objectives, pointing to the dangers of compromising HSE by making shortcuts in the face 
of production demands, tight scheduling, and time pressure. Other conflicts between HSE 
and economy are not mentioned here specifically, such as investments, resources, 
manning etc., although they are to appear later.  
 
The booklet also considers sources for understanding HSE culture, notably by discussing 
available methodologies. Methodological diversity is called for, pointing specifically to 
the need for supplementing the presently extensive and dominant quantitative measures 
with qualitative data. The industry is particularly advised to investigate how formal 
systems are actually complied with, and to identify causes of deviations as a starting 
point for revising systems, improving work processes, or both. HSE culture is treated in 
this section as a somewhat reified construct, as something out there that we can have 
‘access’ to through various techniques. The use of a singular tense contributes to this, 
                                                 
139 Reason (1997: 208-211) himself, it could be noted, in fact develops a fairly intricate model for 
managing this balancing act of determining the culpability of unsafe acts in his original presentation.  
140 This, contrary to the source text, where it is mostly seen as encompassing the former three, summarized 
as observation, reflection, and creation, only adding the most critical element of acting on these (Reason, 
1997: 218-19). 
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notably by the use of such terms as “the HSE culture”, “an HSE culture” or “one’s own 
HSE culture”.  
 
A more dynamic vision of culture is presented in considerations of “factors which can 
affect an HSE culture”, albeit the surviving singular tense. Culture is here described as 
continuously changing, through both external forces and internal dynamics. External 
factors cover national traditions, such as beliefs in the value of worker participation, 
multi-national influences due to the composition of the work force, differentiation of 
knowledge, professions, and tasks, etc. Also, structural framework conditions are seen as 
shapers of culture, ranging from state policies (regulations), economics (oil prices), 
technology, to natural resources. The forces shaping and changing culture may be clear, 
explicit, and apparent, or they may be implicit, hidden, and ‘unconscious’. No clear 
discussion is provided of how to see the difference, nor to distinguish external from 
internal forces, or ‘cultural’ from ‘non-cultural’ ones, leaving it to the intuitions of the 
reader to single out, at least, the extreme ends (like oil prices and reservoirs). Culture is 
thus permeating organizational realities in the guise of disagreements on priorities 
(culture conflicts), organizational differentiation (sub-cultures), decision-making powers 
(cultural powers), worker resistance (counter cultures), etc. Such cultural anomalies may 
be countered by unproductive problem-solving measures, such as: (1) tightening up 
bureaucratic systems and procedures leading to increased complexity, inappropriate work 
processes and alienated workers; (2) increasing worker discipline, leading to loss of trust 
and cooperation, again leading to muting and loss of information. Or they may be 
creatively approached by building a sound culture, in short, by avoiding the above. This 
leads to the final presentation of the role of management in the building of culture. 
Initially a distinction is made between ‘appreciated’ managers who are: open, honest, 
decisive, trusting, present, professionally able – and ‘unappreciated’ managers who are: 
closed, unfair, stressful, unpredictable, critical, absent and controlling. These 
management ideals are put to test, again, in the critical moments of choice between 
economy and HSE. And framework conditions, such as contractual arrangements 
specifying how performance is to be rewarded, strongly affect whether or not such tests 
are passed.  
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In short, the booklet summarizes an amalgam of researched and received wisdoms within 
risk management, and it both encapsulates and confirms some salient features of the 
regulatory philosophies, such as the no-blame approaches, promoting enlightened risk 
sensitivity and learning processes, warning against self-complacency, focussing on 
critical trade-offs, accentuating participation and tri-partite collaboration, and so on. 
Conceptually, however, culture appears almost as omnipresent, all pervasive, and 
unbounded within the various social, institutional, economic, and technical contexts. 
Culture is everywhere. It proposes a dynamic and open-ended perspective on culture, but 
does occasionally implicate ‘holistic’ ideas about singular and somewhat reified 
‘cultures’.  
 
The booklet was generally thought to be well-received, triggered much interest, and was 
widely distributed in the industry.141 It also constituted the most elaborated statement 
from the PSA about how HSE culture was to be understood; and as noted above, few 
such indications were given in the regulations or in the preliminary legal documents. 
Subsequent efforts to present and sell the HSE culture message were largely founded on 
the contents of the booklet, or at least, couched in the same terms and perspectives. The 
booklet was presented in a large two-day conference in November 2003, specifically 
dedicated to HSE culture.  A similar conference had been arranged in 2002. Both 
conferences were well attended (some 200 participants) and received good responses. 
The programs largely reflected the more general and organizational issues of risk 
management, and included presentations from researchers, unions, and companies (thus 
predictably provoking discussions about the vices and virtues of behavioural approaches 
to safety). Members of the culture group also participated in the R&D network, and had 
several external presentations responding to invitations from companies.142 Addressing 
HSE culture on public scenes thus took many forms, not always clearly distinguishable 
from other ‘non-technical’ meetings or seminars. Also, HSE culture would be addressed 
on occasions not specifically dedicated to the topic.  
                                                 
141 It has been printed in some 8000 Norwegian and 3500 English copies, in addition of course to 
uncountable downloads from the Internet.  
142 The R&D network included of course also the HSE culture project in the HSE research program, being 
responsible for several joint seminars on the topic.  
 202
Supervision and enforcement  
Greater challenges were to appear, however, in making HSE culture ‘auditable’ and 
‘enforceable’. It was, after all, a regulatory provision, in principle to be followed up like 
any other. In 2002, two pilot audits were conducted, furnished to address HSE culture in 
an exploratory manner, involving close and ‘deliberative’ cooperation with the ‘test-
companies’. These did not strongly involve the culture group, but were largely planned 
and arranged as an extension of the general supervisory training program. The 
experiences were mixed, however, clearly reflecting the difficulties involved in 
addressing, and even diagnosing, culture, within the bounded context of the audit.143 
Integrating HSE culture into the supervisory activities would gradually prove to be a 
challenging task. In the early phases of its conception as a statutory provision it was not 
quite clear how it was to be enforced. The ministry, dominated by lawyers, tended to 
prefer clear and enforceable provisions. In their dialogue with the PSA it was perceived 
to be regarded as an ‘ordinary requirement’ to be enforced as any other. The attitude of 
the ministry was that the legal codification had to imply a clear intention of its 
enforcement, thus enabling the possibility of assessing conformity against a more 
specified standard. They realized the difficulties involved, but indicated that it might 
apply to such instances as when regulations and procedures were “deliberately and 
continuously neglected”; if the managers clearly expressed or revealed “disregard for 
rules”, that was to be seen as a violation of the HSE culture provision (interview with 
ministry officials).   
 
In the NPD/PSA there were tendencies in both directions. But the main message that 
gradually came across was that this was to be considered as a more overarching 
provision, a goal to be reached for, and an opportunity for engaging with the industry in 
an open and creative dialogue about improving HSE conditions. Even the legal advisors, 
being socialized into the purpose oriented regulatory tradition in the NPD/PSA, saw it 
more as a provision of that same tradition. Enforceable rules had to be more specific: 
“you must know what counts as a violation, so there must be a standard to measure 
                                                 
143 Using open questions, promoting self-reflection and learning, appeared as important entries. Asking 
about HSE culture ‘directly’ proved too ‘comprehensive’.  
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against” (senior legal advisor). Evidently, no such standard was available in the case of 
HSE culture.  
 
As noted in Chapter 4, there had been discussions during the regulatory process about the 
legal status of the requirement. Some clearly thought it better be formulated as an integral 
part the general principles and purposes (that activities should be ‘safe and prudent’). 
When it finally ended in a separate section, this reflected most of all an intention of 
giving it force and attention. As was explained by the supervisory director responsible for 
the project: 
 
It’s more like an overall objective, integrated in HSE-activities. As for instance section 1 in 
the WEA, it covers the underlying rationale for the other regulations .… There is no 
specific definition of HSE culture. HSE culture must be addressed in relation to other 
regulatory requirements and HSE-activities in a way that supports and enhances the 
development of a good HSE culture in the companies. There was much discussion about 
having a dedicated provision. I feared that, being good auditors, we’d take that regulation 
and look for ‘the culture’, address this single-mindedly and based on checklists. But 
fortunately, thanks essentially to the culture group, we’ve been able to develop and acquire 
a broader understanding of the complexity of this kind of concept, and brought the 
discussion up to a more overall level where it belongs. (supervisory director) 
 
 
Although these were hindsight reflections, they also expressed initial concerns, 
uncertainties, and possibly also divergences regarding the enforcement issue. Even to the 
ministry, enforcement appeared ‘natural’ from a legal point of view; but the agency 
lawyers, more familiar with the substantial difficulties involved, were basically sceptical.  
The issue of enforcement was thus not clearly resolved. In fact, it was not possible to get 
a clear picture of how it was used in these initial phases. Clearly, no specified criteria 
were established for supervisors to measure conformities or non-conformities. But there 
were two conspicuous instances of at least ‘partial’ enforcement that received much 
attention. These were the two fatal accidents in 2002; HSE culture appeared in both 
investigation reports, and in one case even in the police report and finally also in a ticket 
fine issued by the Public Prosecutor. The fine included references to violations of a large 
number of provisions, the HSE culture provision being only one of these, and obviously 
not decisive for the penalty as such. We present these two cases below.  
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To my knowledge, culture didn’t appear in supervisory reports, at least not in the form of 
“non-conformities” or orders. There were certainly rumours to the contrary, both inside 
and outside the agency, implying sometimes that this had become a new magic formula 
and that all sub-standard HSE-conditions from now on was to be seen as symptoms of the 
most underlying of all underlying causes: a bad culture. But the supervisory directors 
were quite conscious about not indulging in this kind of practice. One of them also 
admitted that in the early period they had to restrain the enthusiasm of some by removing 
references to HSE culture in several audit reports before they were formally issued.  
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the expectations from the General Director were not so clearly 
stated, but pointed rather to the need for a ‘developmental approach’, and that HSE 
culture perhaps would be more approachable in overall meetings, based on a broader 
evaluation of company behaviour:  
 
R: To outline a picture of the culture as part of our supervisory activities …. I don’t know.  
I expect a picture of the culture in the company to be summarized once a year based on 
what we know. We do make assessments once a year and an image of their culture should 
be a part of this. And there is much that can be used, within all of these areas that we keep 
an eye on within the companies. Then that picture must be communicated …. That shall be 
done .... or is supposed to be done, in yearly meetings we have with the top management in 
all companies. To try to keep to the overall picture .… we tend to go into details .… as does 
operators. This year we also want a meeting with the largest license owner, the state owned 
Petoro. Try to put pressure on the licensees. What do they do in the license committees, 
where is their focus? So we will present a request that they, in addition to what they already 
do, will put HSE on the agenda …. how do they contribute? It’s apparent that a pressure is 
needed here, in budgets etc. It’s the license that provides the money for the operators. The 
license partners are the owners, or the board, and the operator is the executive. That’s our 
figure of speech. The operators run the fields on behalf of the license committee.  
I: So these meetings can be used to address HSE culture? 
R: I’d really like us to do that. We’re not good enough today .…  
I: Did you address HSE culture in last year’s round of meetings? 
R: I believe it was done, pointing to elements in what we have observed that illustrate the 
need for an improvement of the cultural element. Then this can be exemplified, such as 
absence of visible management, pointing to the question: “have you no concern for HSE?”, 
as an attitude, as part of a culture. We do this, but we’re not doing it well enough today. We 
must do it better.  
I: Have you considered how this shall be done in the upcoming meetings? 
R: I’d really like to do that  
I: Have the supervisory teams been instructed to ‘diagnose’ the HSE culture as part of the 
yearly evaluation?  
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R: Yes, well it’s not sufficiently explicit. .… In our expectations to the teams when HSE- 
conditions are summarized .… we’re not sufficiently explicit that they shall try to portray 
the culture, and accordingly, what they should look for. So we need a process here.  
I: So you’re not afraid of using ‘HSE culture’ [the term]? 
R: No, we must have the guts to say something about how we assess a company in terms of 
HSE culture.  
 
 
This account summarizes some of the important dilemmas involved in terms of enforcing 
the provision. On the one side, a willingness and interest in exploring and utilizing the 
powers felt to be contained in the concept, and on the other hand, a qualified respect for 
what it implied in practical terms. But, known as a fearless crusader, unwavering in 
critical situations, and outspoken in encounters with the industry, this respect seemed to 
make him less reluctant. Still, as far as I know, the intentions to put HSE culture on the 
agenda in the meetings mentioned, were not followed up.  
 
As noted, however, HSE culture appeared in the investigation reports subsequent to the 
two fatalities in 2002, the first one just a few months after the regulations had been in 
force. These cases thus stand out in terms of seriousness and attention, and a brief review 
will illuminate both how causal models are applied and related to the regulatory 
responses, and, in particular, how HSE culture appeared as part of these explanatory 
reconstructions. 
The Byford Dolphin accident 
This accident occurred on the mobile drilling unit Byford Dolphin on 17 April 2002 in 
connection with well completion operations on the Sigyn Field. Esso was operator of the 
field but Statoil was responsible for the operation on behalf of Esso. An engineer 
employed by the rig company Dolphin was struck on the back of the head by a so-called 
spool-piece (pipe) weighing 191 kg. The pipe-end had at that point fallen about 13 meters 
from the overlying drill deck through an opening in the deck (a so-called mouse-hole). 
The person was severely injured, and died later on the way to the hospital. The accident 
occurred during the installation of a so-called horizontal x-mas tree (HXT), a network of 
valves shaped as a X-mas tree to be placed above the well templates. During the 
operation, a piece of the drill string had temporarily been put in the so-called ‘catwalk’, a 
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carrier for transporting drilling equipment to the drill floor. The spool piece had been put 
in the catwalk a few days earlier. In the course of the HXT operation, the drill string had 
to be extended again, and the driller and the assistant driller decided to use the piece that 
had been put in the catwalk. A winch was used for that purpose, but in removing the 
string-piece, the spool-piece fell out of the catwalk, through the mouse hole and hit the 
engineer, who was working in the so-called moon-pool area on the cellar-deck below (an 
open area at the centre of the rig where equipment can be lowered down to sea level). 
They were working on improvements and adjustment of a landing skid in the area (that is, 
preparing an arrangement for temporary placement of equipment for the operation).  
 
A number of factors were identified by the NPD investigation team as precursors to the 
accident, each of which involved violation of company rules, statutory regulations, or 
both. Planning and preparation of the operations had been deficient. The spool-piece was 
deficient and should have been removed, as temporary placing of devices and equipment 
shall be avoided (referred to as “deficient orderliness and tidiness”). Also, the catwalk 
was not properly secured in order to avoid things from falling out, and the opening in the 
floor (the mouse-hole) was not sufficiently covered due to time saving and convenience 
(referred to as “deficient covering of openings in the deck between work areas”) .The 
winch operator (assistant driller) didn’t have a proper sight of the area, and should have 
used a flagman (referred to as a ‘blind lift’). The driller observed that people were 
working in the area below, and gave a radio message that they should move out. The 
message was not confirmed, but the driller (erroneously) assumed that it had been 
received as he later observed a person move out of the monitor from his position in the 
drill room. Not having the radio message confirmed properly was a deviation from 
procedure, but was not considered unusual, and thus in effect seen as revealing a more 
widespread attitude on the rig. In fact, none of the people in the underlying area had 
heard the warning, since they were tuned to another frequency, yet another violation of 
company rules. Deficient planning and preparation for the operation also included 
missing work permits and safe-job analysis, both related to the lifting operations and to 
the work in the moonpool-area. This indicated both deficient knowledge and breach of 
applicable procedures, and it reduced the general awareness of potential dangers related 
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to the operations. In this case, deficient communication and practice for conducting 
simultaneous operations on different levels, was particularly critical. Uncovering the need 
for coordination of activities is an important purpose of these procedures and systems.  
 
In sum, a number of causes and violations were listed in the NPD-report, where every 
relevant operation in the process were tied to the more generalized categories of analysis: 
insufficient planning and preparation of the task, including the use of safety assessments; 
insufficient knowledge and violation of procedures; deficient orderliness and tidiness; 
insufficient communication and coordination of simultaneous and parallel tasks; and, 
insufficient sheltering of openings between work areas (ie the mouse-hole). The overall 
evaluation in the report was that HSE considerations had not been properly addressed and 
implemented by the companies involved, evident both at the managerial and the 
operational level. Based on this, the NPD also notified a more extensive follow up of all 
the Dolphin rigs and all mobile rigs on Statoil contracts.144  
 
Both Statoil and Dolphin received orders after the investigation was completed. Dolphin 
was required to evaluate knowledge of and compliance with company procedures on all 
their rigs on the NCS. It was further required that measures be suggested, implemented, 
and independently verified. The Statoil order primarily addressed their responsibility to 
“see to it” or “ensure” (cf the wording of operator responsibilities in the Framework 
Regulation) that their contractors had prudent HSE-systems, and that contracts allowed 
safety concerns to be properly taken care of in practice (referring specifically to time and 
resources).  
 
Although safety culture was not addressed in the order, it appeared in the investigation 
report as a non-conformity following from an overall assessment of the large number of 
volitions of rules and procedures. More specifically, it was related to the failure of the 
                                                 
144 Barely two months after the report on the fatal accident on Byford Dolphin was presented, allegations 
had been made via the press of so-called "new information" that could cast doubt on the NPD-investigation. 
One of these allegations, which had also been reported (anonymously) to the NPD was that the engineer 
had been working for 36 hours without sleep. This caused an extensive follow-up, including the 
involvement of the ministry, but the assertions were rejected by the NPD.  
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company to follow up and react to these volitions, and to the general priority of saving 
time at the cost of safety. It was thus noted that several persons were involved in the 
process, and that neither those responsible for the operation, nor other persons involved, 
interfered in spite of these violations. Insufficient knowledge and negligent attitudes were 
cited as possible background conditions, referring specifically to the fact that managers 
and supervisors had been aware of and tacitly accepted the infringements on several 
occasions. In particular, the decision to lift the HXT to the cellar-deck without the 
presence of responsible and competent personnel from the supplier company, and the 
decision to exempt the personnel on the cellar-deck from participation in the emergency 
exercise, was seen as clearly implying that priority was given to speed and timesaving 
rather than to rules, procedures, and safety. Also, based on reviews of recent incidents 
and reports from the rig, revealing similar patterns of contraventions, the NPD found 
additional support for the conclusion that Byford Dolphin had a “bad safety culture” at 
the time of the accident. The accident was followed up through an independent police 
investigation, and Dolphin and Statoil were both fined (NOK 1,2 and NOK 1,0 million, 
respectively).  
 
In their report to the police, the NPD contended that neither the culture provision nor the 
guideline provided any criteria for how to judge whether or not a safety culture would be 
compliant with the regulation, and that no “standard” was established for making such 
judgments. But rather than letting this state of the matter ‘weaken’ their claim, they 
resumed and restated their position: “the NPD is of the opinion that, at least given the 
situation at Byford Dolphin at the time of the accident, and in the period prior to the 
accident, this would constitute a breach with good safety culture”. The claim was further 
supported by referring to the internal Statoil report which stated that “managers and 
employees don’t have a sufficiently good attitude towards HSE. The handling of HAZOP 
[Hazard and Operability Analysis], use of work permits, safe job analysis, insufficient 
hand-overs, orderliness and tidiness, exemplify this”. The report further stated that “HSE-
concerns often yield to economy and progress”. Pervasive attitudes of negligence 
indicated by repeated violations, in particular as these had been accepted and even 
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supported by the higher echelons, thus constituted the basic evidential support for 
allowing judgments about a ‘non-conforming’ safety culture.  
 
The diagnosis was thus primarily related to the situation at the time of the accident, more 
or less as a collective ‘state of mind’. In referring specifically to the follow up of the 
Dolphin management, onshore and offshore, the same evidential support was largely 
applied, again concluding that the pervasive negligence in relation to rules and 
procedures contributed to a “bad safety culture”. In this case, other provisions were 
referred to, such as the more general provisions about the duty to follow and to follow up 
all regulations, to persistently supervise, monitor, register, analyze, document, etc., and to 
continually improve HSE conditions. The same evidence was used in support of company 
negligence, but this time without the need for specific reference to the culture provision.  
 
It thus seemed, as was later also confirmed, that the existence of the provision, as a 
regulatory requirement, didn’t provide any ‘added value’ in legal terms; it was more like 
a ‘supportive’ claim in order to emphasize the gravity of the situation. Also, this was like 
a ‘test case’; the new regulations had been in force for only a few months, it was the first 
fatality to occur since the Oseberg accident, there was still a need to teach the industry a 
lesson, and the occasion was there to apply the provision for the first time. Based on the 
justifications given by the NPD, the culture provision thus also made its way to the ticket 
fine that was eventually issued by the public prosecutor (however, only towards the rig 
company, not Statoil).  
 
In line with the ‘absolutionist’ policy, no penal action towards individuals was taken, 
even though non-compliant behaviour was observed on a wide scale. The accident was 
seen as the result of acts by several individuals, to be considered as the sum of these acts, 
and thus as “cumulative faults”. And it was not possible to identify anyone who had 
committed legally negligent acts, and faults were accordingly designated as 
“anonymous”.145 
                                                 
145 Penal action against individuals was therefore not considered to an option, although doubts were in fact 
expressed regarding the drilling manager. 
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The Gyda accident 
This accident occurred on 1 November 2002 on the Gyda platform in the southern part of 
the North Sea in connection with a lifting operation. British Petroleum was the operator 
of the field and Smedvig was the drilling contractor. A deck-hand/welder employed by 
Smedvig died when he was crushed between two containers on the pipe deck. A chemical 
tank was stacked on top of another chemical tank. The upper tank was being lifted by the 
crane in an ‘unplanned operation’ when the crane hook or lug became wedged between 
the tank and the tank skid. The victim was working on top of the uppermost tank and was 
about to attach the crane hook when the tank was lifted and overturned and skidded into 
an adjacent container. 
 
Four days after the accident, the NPD, as result of the their ongoing investigation, 
ordered BP to stop crane and lifting operations on Gyda. The order was issued orally on 
the installation, and BP had to stop all crane and lifting operations on the platform until it 
was verified that the relevant personnel who supervised and carried out such work had 
received the necessary training in BP’s procedures for crane and lifting operations. BP 
was also ordered to confirm that similar training had been verified on the other BP  
installations. Within a week, BP replied that the required verifications were in place and 
that similar verifications had been carried out for supervisory and operative personnel on 
other BP operated facilities.146 Based on this verification, BP could resume the crane and 
lifting operations on Gyda. The NPD continued to investigate BP’s and Smedvig’s land 
organizations in cooperation with the police. 
 
18 transgressions were identified in the NPD-investigation related to both the stacking of 
containers, the performance of the lifting operation (sight, signalling, wires, etc.) and the 
work in heights. No one had interfered in the operation, and transgressions were partly 
due to lack of knowledge of procedures, but also that procedures were inadequate, 
unclear, and not sufficiently coordinated between the companies. The NPD concluded 
that many and collective violations of procedures caused the fatal accident, and that this 
would not have happened if the relevant procedural requirements had been observed. 
                                                 
146 Notably the Valhall and Ula platforms, and rigs hired by BP. 
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Serious defects in BP’s management system were uncovered in the report. The company 
itself had identified the dangers associated with insufficient knowledge of lifting 
procedures, and was aware that violations were a problem. Still, it had not been 
sufficiently addressed, and rectifying measures had not been implemented. The NPD had 
even conducted an audit on the same platform, aimed exactly at the same operations, just 
a few months before, pointing out several flaws that could be directly related to the 
accident, none of which had been rectified.   
 
The report stated that this was a violation of the HSE culture provision, based on the 
transgression of the procedures, or more specifically, the pervasive nature of these 
transgressions, and the fact that they appeared as ‘collective’, that is, collectively 
accepted. Added to this was the lack of follow up on identified risks, both offshore and 
from the land organization. These observations indicated a “bad HSE culture”. The 
comment about HSE culture was also highlighted in the subsequent press release: “The 
scope and gravity of observations made in connection with the investigation indicate a 
poor HSE culture in BP’s land organization and in BP’s and Smedvig’s offshore 
organization.” 
  
Both the operating company, BP, and the drilling contractor, Smedvig, received 
(additional) orders after the publications of the investigation report. They were required 
to identify the causes of the violations, to implement measures to prevent such breaches, 
and to verify that the measures functioned as intended. This process was to be quality-
assured by a third party. The order was aimed at the companies’ activities related to 
lifting operations on all their installations, including also an evaluation of the need to 
address other activities on the installations they operated. BP was specifically ordered to 
review the management system in terms of how identified risks were followed up and 
corrective actions implemented. They were also ordered to review systems for ensuring 
their contractors' compliance with procedures.  
 
The NPD may certainly have felt a need to expose their own efforts relating to this type 
of risk; in the press release, more than half the text was devoted to their general follow up 
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of lifting operations (and most of the remaining to the efforts of the NPD investigation 
team): 
 
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate has been working on issues related to the safety of 
crane operations for quite some time.  In August 2000, the NPD published a 
report regarding “Causal relations in lifting operations incidents”. The background for this 
was that the NPD has in recent years noted a marked increase in incidents in connection 
with lifting appliances and falling objects - on both permanent and mobile installations. In 
the NPD’s opinion, some of these incidents could have led to extremely serious accidents.  
 
 
There were several disagreements in the subsequent correspondence between BP and the 
NPD. Some of these were related to the specific causal effect of single violations on the 
outcome of the accident, and more generally to the (implicit) allegations that the NPD 
conclusions could be applicable to the company operations on a wider scale. The BP 
investigation report largely confirmed the course of events, however, but was criticized 
by the NPD for not considering the background conditions related to the organizational 
aspects and failures of the management system. BP also objected to the conclusion that 
there was a ‘bad HSE culture’ on the platform. The NPD reply restated their observations 
about the collective nature of the transgressions, the insufficient follow up of training and 
monitoring of crane- and lifting procedures, and the fact that measures to be implemented 
after the NPD audits just a few months prior to the accident had not been followed up.  
 
This time, the violation of the culture provision was not followed up in the police report, 
however, and the subsequent ticket fine (NOK 3 mill) primarily referred to the provisions 
relating to the specific violations and the general duty of the operator to follow up their 
contractors. The ticket fine was issued to the company, and individual negligence was not 
considered (again referring to ‘collective and anonymous faults’) 
Aftermath and reconsiderations  
These investigations served as critical landmarks, being the first ‘test cases’ for applying 
the provision directly. For some reason, however, the Gyda investigation appeared as a 
later point of reference, in spite of the fact that the formulations used in the Gyda report 
were more conditional, and that in the Byford Dolphin case, the provision was even 
directly applied by the prosecuting authority. Most probably, this was due to the reactions 
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from the company, objecting to having had their ‘culture’ stigmatized as ‘bad’. Rumours 
had it that the reference made to their ‘HSE culture’ had been a fierce blow to their self- 
image as a ‘prudent operator’. Despite the conditional and rather careful application of 
the diagnosis, fairly well substantiated by the serious and collective nature of the 
transgressions observed, the ‘Evil Mark’ was somehow attached to the company as such.  
 
There were numerous references to the investigation report in seminars, interviews, and 
meetings, etc., presented as part of reconstructed ‘narratives’ of how the provision had 
been applied and the response it had caused. Of course, these reconstructions were not all 
consistent, and not always factually accurate, to the extent that accuracy could be 
determined. On the whole, however, they indicate the perceived ‘dangers’ associated with 
using the provision, and contributed the general feeling that it had to be enforced and 
applied with great caution. The PSA official responsible for the order and for the follow 
up of the company thus noted that: “It’s a very powerful word to use, and it really upsets 
the industry when we do, since it addresses to such an extent their very integrity and 
inner lives; it’s a bit dangerous to touch upon, I believe.”  
 
One critical consideration that would justify references to HSE culture was whether the 
‘indications’ were really indicative, that is, if single acts and facts were exemplars of 
more comprehensive behavioural patterns (or ‘attitudes’). In the Gyda case, the diagnosis 
appeared justified on just those grounds. Still, the officials involved in the investigation 
felt a need to justify its application and to clarify more explicitly the actual wording of 
the report and the order:  
 
R: The Gyda incident is a fair example of how we interpreted HSE culture at that time. It’s 
not correct to say, as some do, that we issued an order warranted in that provision. In the 
rapport we said that our ‘main impression was that the HSE culture had deficiencies.’ The 
order wasn’t related to that. But it’s a good example of how we interpreted it .… Many of 
us are engineers, you know. So we need simple approaches. There was a focus on single 
elements in the HSE culture, like violations of procedures. And it wasn’t only one violation. 
There were several people involved, violating the same procedures, there was a tradition for 
doing it, and we considered that to be an indicator of a deficient HSE culture. It was a 
group-phenomenon. But it was also related to individual behaviour. What we’ve seen later 
on .… it’s fair enough to say that this is an indication that you have a deficient HSE culture, 
but what does it take to ‘remove’ such an observation, when do you have a good HSE 
culture? That’s what’s difficult. If you had related it to an order, when is it good enough? 
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And that was the comment from BP: “From this delimited part of our operations, it’s not 
enough to say that we have a poor HSE culture.” But that wasn’t what we said. We said it 
could be an indication .… so there were some discussions back and forth in the upshot. 
I: But you thought it was an accurate observation? 
R: Sure we did.  
I: And you still think so? 
R: Eh… well, that it’s an indication? I believe so. It is an indication.  
I: So, did it become a communication problem? You were quite specific that it was not BP 
as such, that it was only an indication, it was not tied up to the order, etc. But you wanted to 
comment on the … 
R: Yes. And since it was not only the operator – you could observe similar attitudes 
extending to the entrepreneur – we got even more confident that this … there had to be a 
culture at Gyda that contributed to this. So then we concluded that this had to be an HSE 
culture issue. I also believe we considered it an order some time during the process, but we 
realized we didn’t have enough objective evidence to use it as an order…. I guess we would 
have needed more evidence covering a broader area. That was the argument. So we landed 
on a more cautious and careful solution. But it stirred up much noise, more than the order 
itself I believe. I guess it hurt  more for the operator, internally .… that they had a culture 
problem. So many people knew. And they didn’t do anything. 
I: Wouldn’t it be enough to say that they violated the procedures? 
R: We did that too. And the order to BP was for them to uncover why they violated these 
procedures. We got various indications of why, and in this specific instance I think we 
uncovered the reasons for the violations. What we said, was that they had to look into the 
rest of their organization. If conditions were equally sloppy elsewhere, they’d have a 
serious problem. Like in the case of pre-pressurized systems, you’d run the risk of serious 
accidents. So they ran a project, using external consultants, looking into the reasons why 
people violate procedures. What’s the reason why you breach a procedure when you know 
it’s there to protect you? …. And the results [of that investigation] were related to well 
known reasons. Some do it knowingly, because they’re lazy or careless.  Some do it 
because they don’t know any better. Either, they don’t know the procedure at all, or they 
have misunderstood, in which case it may be a poor procedure .… At Gyda they were not 
easily accessible. They were both in the BP system, there were some bridging documents 
between the BP system and the Smedvig system, so there were ambiguities as to which 
system to comply with, and there were some inconsistencies also. So the way the 
procedures appeared was not satisfactory. (NPD/PSA official) 
 
The justifications were thus clearly in line with the kinds of arguments and criteria that 
still prevailed as indications for assessing HSE culture. But the lessons learned pointed 
towards a more restrictive policy in applying the provision, as was also argued by the 
NPD contact person for the company:  
 
There were so many collective violations of procedures, and so on and so forth, that we 
wanted to try the provision. .. When we issued the order we said that this could be 
indications of a bad HSE culture. And that caused an incredible amount of writing .… It 
was read as if the PSA said there was a bad HSE culture in Smedvig and BP. And the 
energy that was absorbed in this process that could have been used on something more 
positive, that was not a good use of resources and energy. So I guess we learned something 
from that. .… We must be very explicit about what we communicate; that we communicate 
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that this could be indications; right? Even if it says so in printed letters, we were not explicit 
enough. And the newspapers use it for what it’s worth, and so on. And again, it may cause a 
negative energy, but it can generate a positive energy if it’s used in the right way. I am a bit 
unsure; but then, I haven’t been working so intensively with this as the culture group, and 
they conclude otherwise, that we’d rather not use it. (NPD/PSA official) 
 
 
The culture group had at this point, three years later, clearly communicated their 
reservations on this point, endorsed by the supervisory director, although it had not 
clearly reached the level of official policy. They thus also accommodated some of the 
concerns voiced about the communicative risks of making cultural diagnoses. The 
company responses may be part of this emerging policy of restraint. First, tensions could 
be triggered by making contested connections between ‘indicators’ and that which was 
supposed to be indicated. And paradoxically, as an unintended consequence, the 
diagnosis appeared to have triggered a ‘cultural turn’ within the company of a kind that 
the PSA and the culture group would gradually consider to have become a problematic 
side-track, and sometimes a perverted industrial off-shot of the regulatory intention. The 
relevance of both these concerns was evident from the following comm.ent by the 
regulatory advisor in BP (who was also a former NPD official): 
 
I: Some say that the critique of the HSE culture was perceived as unfair by BP? 
R: It’s difficult to say; it’s not up to us to dictate others perception of our safety culture, 
that’s up to them to judge. There could be factual errors in the rapport that the management 
got hung up with, but …. What was special about the Gyda-incident was that Gyda was the 
perfect installation. There hadn’t been accidents for the last 2-3 years. It was the state of the 
art facility in the company, a model-facility. Everything was .… it was a small platform, 
with a good design, high-quality materials with little need for maintenance, good relations 
with unions and so on. We would rather have expected something like this to have 
happened at Valhall .… That’s what was special about the incident. But it’s often like that, 
when you think you’re good, that’s when these things happen .… People here do their best, 
they are committed and conscientious, so it’s not that easy to be told that the HSE culture 
isn’t good enough. So there’s been a process of self-examination, asking what we can 
change and improve …. and we’ve had campaigns focusing on safety-culture, that we must 
be accountable for our behaviour …. including campaigns for using the handrail …. People 
may have divided opinions about that, but what it means is that you should get used to 
follow the rules and take responsibility for what happens at your workplace. There’s an 
increasing focus on using the opportunity to stop colleagues offshore, asking: is this safe? 
Have you conducted a risk-analysis or a ‘Safe Job Analysis’? Previously, such interference 
would have been negatively perceived; such as commenting on wearing eye-protection or 




The ‘holding of rails’ had more than anything come to symbolize the behaviour based 
safety philosophy, and thus associated with all measures taken to make the workers adapt 
to the risks rather than the workplace to the worker. Certainly, no one appeared to object 
to the use of protective equipment; rather, the symbolism was related to the larger issues 
of proportionality and priority in the different risk management approaches.  
  
Anyhow, the policy of restraint followed these early instances of hybris. It was not 
clearly formulated, however, and for the General Director, the Gyda case didn’t appear as 
particularly discouraging in terms of using the ‘word’: 
 
I: But isn’t it a bit dangerous, to characterize the culture? 
R: No, why should it be? It’s a challenge. But really not dangerous, I don’t think that. 
I: But I know there has been a certain reluctance to use the concept …. the question has 
been: should the word culture be used? It confers many associations, are we sure they 
understand what is meant, and so on. So it seems that an un-stated policy of reluctance has 
developed …. Partly because comments about culture might be over-interpreted. Like in the 
Gyda-rapport, were it was taken to apply to the whole organization as such, and not 
localized to the incident …? 
R: Yes, but this is where we need to develop this process further. In the case of BP and 
Gyda, HSE culture was used. I believe it was a lifting accident. So they came back to us, 
having interpreted this as a characterization of BP Norway as a whole, of their total culture. 
I can understand that they could, given the formulations used. But what it was all about was 
HSE culture in the lifting operations in that case, not all the rest. We had no evidence 
beyond that. But it was quite obvious that the HSE culture in lifting operations was ready 
for improvement …. But when this was sorted out, they were happy. And they agreed it 
wasn’t good enough. Attitudes towards compliance with procedures etc., it was totally 
unacceptable. (General Director) 
  
 
The status and position of the culture provision within the larger regulatory system was 
still not sorted out clearly. The leader of the disciplinary unit responsible for HSE 
management and legal affairs (comprising most of the legal experts), largely formulated 
these ambiguities with elaborate reservations:  
 
You see the dilemmas that arise when we choose to regulate something like HSE culture, 
which in my view is more like a goal .… with the intention to initiate a necessary kind of 
dynamic drive among the various actors in order to achieve continuous improvement. For 
me, that’s what it’s about …. But …. I cannot come forward and say so since I’m not an 
HSE culture person. But that’s my understanding .… For me it’s an element that’s so huge, 
with a potential of being so overarching and just about all-inclusive, that it cannot be 
delimited to .… it will not approximate the kind of requirement or follow-up that would 
correspond to, say, the design of a gas-valve in a well. Such requirements could be specified 
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by stating some design criteria and functional criteria, etc. .… You cannot relate this to 
culture unless you have a book of this size …. maybe, telling us that this element should be 
so and so .… I cannot visualize this you know .… And we have several such requirements 
in our regulations which are .… on a philosophical level that have more like an overarching 
function in relation to an activity in terms of creating a momentum in the system. But such 
requirements are difficult to design and difficult to promote. In these cases it’s not possible 
to say that, “sorry, your culture isn’t good enough”, you know, “we’ll give you an order on 
your culture”. We had an analogous discussion regarding management systems .… I’ve 
never been a supporter of issuing orders, which on a general basis address the “management 
system”, that’s too comprehensive. You could certainly issue an order addressing some 
specific aspect of the management system, but to issue such an order on a general basis 
would amount to saying that you have a ‘general problem’ …. I could have understood, like 
if a report covered a number of conditions, grave conditions, revealing some basic problems 
in, say a department; they make some really bad decisions, they make serious mistakes, etc. 
…. there is something fundamentally wrong. And then, on this background you might 
conclude that there’s a need to focus on competencies, tools, attitudes, and it might look as 
if the HSE culture here is not in line with what we expect the HSE culture of a company to 
be like. I wouldn’t have any problem if such a line of reasoning was made visible. But to 
use the culture provision in an order or any other kind of formal measure, if it could be 




The reservations related to the culture provision were thus of a more general nature, 
pointing to how the relation between observed facts and overall diagnoses had to be 
specified within the regulatory context. In this context the appropriateness of HSE culture 
as an enforceable provision was fundamentally questioned. These concerns clearly had 
their parallels within the industry. As was noted by a HSE-manager from a contractor 
company: 
 
R: I’m a bit concerned now, that you have to be really prudent in these matters. HSE culture 
can be so many things, and so many ways to approach it. Just think, if you get an order: ‘the 
culture isn’t good enough’. I haven’t seen such orders yet, but you get, like, you know, 
‘there’s not enough leadership engagement’, ‘not enough campaigns’, ‘insufficient 
communication channels in relation to formal and informal meetings’, these kinds of things; 
you know, all the desirable activities, what shall be in place. Like you say it’s important 
that everyone who’s going out on a platform knows what’s going on there before they enter 
the helicopter. How far have you proceeded in the drilling process .. are you just 
commencing or are you about to finish .. or what the hell’s going on? Often when you come 
out, you’ll just have to enter the boiler suit and start working. So, if you don’t have that 
onshore pre-job meeting, is that a violation of the regulations – about the culture? And these 
are the kinds of things I believe the culture is very much about. Like, can you really talk big 
about having a good HSE culture when you’re seven months behind in your maintenance 
program? How concrete should this really be? 
I: So is it like almost anything that contributes to good HSE conditions is equated with 
promoting a good HSE culture? 
 218
R: Yes, right. And then you need conceptual tools that make people understand. And not 
everyone doing supervisions have that kind of understanding. And it’s really matured a lot 
since the provision appeared …. We have a large number of audits on any given facility 
during a year. They are from clients, authorities, and internal company audits .… If some 
say, we’re going to check out the atmosphere on board; is that to check the culture? If you 
read the reports from the working committee meetings, what do you check then? We, who 
are HSE-professionals within the industry, we see a whole lot of things in these 
supervisions, and sometimes there’s a bit too much capricious guesswork. It may be the 
auditors, that they’re not altogether explicit or consistent about something being a 
regulatory or contractual requirement, defined in this or that way, and that the non-
conformity is of this or that kind. And if you take the culture provision, what would qualify 
as an observation or a non-conformity? So you get back to the issue of how you measure 
these things …. And if you’re an administrative body, is this run fully satisfactory in 
relation to culture? What are you going to look for? What’s your action plan for culture 
activities? What do you do? And this is where we’ve experienced a lot of fanciful judgment 
…. from customers, from authorities, etc. (HSE manager) 
 
Restarting the cultural process 
This was the ambiguous and contested background against which the culture group was 
supposed to revitalize the cultural process. Producing the booklet was one thing. It had no 
legal status, it made no commitment to any particular diagnosis of industrial actors, and it 
could be written in ‘splendid isolation’, with fairly elaborate ‘scripts’ to rely on. Even 
cultural sceptics within the agency could endorse the content, as it confirmed received 
risk management approaches, and added some important but basically uncontroversial 
insights about learning processes being more comprehensive than just the single loop 
correction of operational failure. It did not, however, leave any clear idea of what was the 
value added by calling it all for ‘culture’, and of how this cultural approach 
‘communicated’ with the existing vocabularies and risk management concepts, as these 
had been codified in the remaining regulatory framework. Furthermore, few examples 
were provided that could have facilitated a better understanding of how the agency 
expected the industry to proceed.  
 
Internally, the HSE project (as a project-group) appeared as somewhat isolated in relation 
to the rest of the organization. It was primarily composed of members from the working 
environment unit; only the leader belonged to the drilling and well technology unit. The 
other important technical disciplines were not represented, such as structural integrity or 
process integrity. Despite the strong commitment to systemic (human, organizational and 
 219
technological) understandings of risk and risk management, the predominantly technical-
legal composition of the agency, made the task of ‘translation’ between culture and the 
discipline-specific contexts of experiential knowledge a critical and fragile endeavour.  
Nevertheless, it was this translatory task that was imposed on the group. HSE culture had 
to be made operational as part of the primary context for engaging with the industry, the 
supervisory context.  
 
There were explicitly stated plans for 2005 about furnishing the organization with more 
extensive knowledge and practical ‘tools’ to be employed in supervisory activities, in 
particular though the audits. First, this was to be achieved by a series of meetings where 
members of the group would make presentations and engage in discussions about how to 
integrate the cultural perspective in supervisory activities, starting with the extended 
management group and subsequently with all the disciplinary units and supervisory 
teams. The process was not fully completed, diffidently conducted, and ambiguously 
received. Most of all, it echoed a widespread sensation that HSE culture was still an airy 
concept. To be sure, the group leader was able to reflect quite concretely on how cultural 
properties and processes could be observed within and between miscellaneous 
compartments of industrial activity, such as in critical situations where human, 
technological, and organizational failures combined in the co-production of possibly fatal 
outcomes.147 Still, the audience seemed bewildered; some raised critical voices, taking 
‘culture’ to be just another buzz-word for the soft and intangible ‘human relations stuff’. 
Questions were raised about how culture could be seen as a ‘cause’ of accidents and 
incidents. There seemed to be an expectation of something at least minimally operational 
and tangible, not something elusive and pervasive.  
 
As one participant explained after one of the meetings: “You noticed the mood. People 
want answers. Time is ripe now for setting it right. Engineers and economists have their 
                                                 
147 The presentations were largely based on the HSE culture booklet, frequently referring to the statement 
that good HSE culture was to be observed if ‘continuous, critical, and thorough improvement’ of HSE was 
facilitated. Critical goal conflicts, tradeoffs and balancing acts were addressed, such as between economy 
and production, and between individual and managerial responsibility. HSE culture was observed all over, 
as present in or caused by: work-teams, safety meetings, procedures, time schedules, manning levels and 
resources, operational priorities, contracts, bonus systems, etc.  
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own mode of thinking – controlling efficient work. We must learn to use the tribal codes 
and terms; operationalize, and say: this is culture”. His own proposal, derived from the 
CEN ‘Value Management Standard’, suggested a safety culture to be defined through 
adequacy of attitude, awareness, and knowledge.148 He had himself been involved in the 
early phases of the regulatory process and recalled specifically the importance attached to 
the notion of organizational self-complacency. As the search for optimally productive 
regulatory interventions involved the identification of basic ‘root-causes’, it was of vital 
importance to address those components in the causal chains that could be identified as 
both essential and repetitious. Based on the historical record, self-complacency appeared 
as a particularly good candidate. But to address such organizational phenomena through 
brief supervisory encounters was of course not an easy task. He had also been deeply 
involved in the development of the supervisory function and in internal training 
programs, dating back to times long before ‘HSE culture’ was on the agenda. He 
explained as one of the principal tasks of the good auditor to be able to subtly provoke 
the learning capacities of the auditee; not primarily by identifying ‘non-conformities’ but 
by making them see these themselves, see warning signals, sort them out, and act 
appropriately. This was of course a demanding endeavour in a predominantly technical 
and problem-solving culture of engineers, to be found on both sides of the table in the 
context of the audit. Nevertheless, to promote this capacity for enlightened self-regulation 
was still a basic attribute of the regulatory philosophy, penetrating resistance of assorted 
kinds, from operational priorities to organizational mind-traps. This supervisory role had 
to be cultivated within just these action-based and problem-solving environments, 
transforming abstract ideas into productive and meaningful action. As he emphasised 
later: “Not simply talk about it, but expose, confront and reinforce – through action and 
learning”.149 The reference to the standard was of course not unprecedented. This was a 
world of standards, and an international standard could serve as a legitimate template for 
                                                 
148 The European Standard Committee (CEN) developed this standard in 1999 (CEN/TC 279: EN 12973). 
This reference was also mentioned in other interviews. 
149 In fact, we had engaged in several exploratory conversations about possible understandings and 
applications of HSE culture, both during and after the fieldwork period. As he was one of the real old-
timers (employed since 1975), these were indeed rewarding and enlightening conversations. He had been a 
former director of supervision, and later of strategy, and had served as a deputy for the safety director from 
the late 1980s to the late 1990s; he had thus been an influential participant in the development of the 
regulatory philosophies at different stages, He had, however, no specific role in the culture project.  
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elaborating some essential features of desired organizational behaviour. The response 
was hardly typical, but was still symptomatic for the ambiguous relations between ‘root 
causes’ and ‘manifested outcomes’, with culture as somehow embodying the former, 
almost as a ‘ghost’ in the organizational machinery – a ‘ghost’ claimed to be 
conditionable.  
 
No attempt was made to map out the full range of responses and associations to these 
presentations; most probably, as will be elaborated later, they were linked up with more 
general ideas about the management and mismanagement of risk, as these would be 
conceived and slightly adapted to personal or situational context (or to both). One 
supervisory coordinator had the following comment:  
 
R: We are quite a few simpleminded engineers …. it’s kind of complex …. at least the 
presentation they give …. how comprehensive the concept of HSE culture really is. It’s not 
readily accessible. You could see for yourself; confusion and blurred eyes spread in the 
room. People get a bit distant and ‘hooked off’. 
I: You asked yourself if culture could be considered a ‘cause’? 
R: Yes .… well, it’s been a recurrent issue in several investigations. Like on the Valhall 
Flanke North. It was very close to a fatal accident. For a period we reflected on possible 
cultural causes. But then, we landed on the issue of project management and how you 
manage changes in projects, so we found it was more related to the management of change 
– how you comply with internal requirements in processes of unexpected change …. It’s 
really quite typical for the investigation process. You see things very clear, the light goes 
up, then someone has a comment or an observation, tearing it all apart, and the argument 
dissolves. You test a lot of theories, and then they’re abandoned. We use the MTO model to 
map out the causal relationships. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
We shall further explore these ambiguous translation endeavours later, noting however, 
that the process of figuring out the trajectories of ‘unplanned events’ could follow 
unplanned patterns and that in the end, the more familiar models appeared to be the most 
rewarding. And we may recall, that in the MTO-model, ‘safety culture’ was reduced to a 
sub-category of ‘management and platform organization’, which in turn, was only one 
out of eleven major causal categories (see Chapter 5). 
 
The group also commenced on the production of a ‘culture guideline’ for use in audits. 
Several drafts were in circulation, but the venture finally terminated. They were initially 
written as a catalogue of interview questions, sorted in various themes, such as follow-up 
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of incidents, reporting-practices, HSE-meetings, Safe Job Analysis, HSE-management, 
contracts, etc. There was an emphasis on certain issues such as “deviance from 
standards”, “words corresponding to deeds”, “conflicting goals”, etc. The thematic 
outline of these drafts did not deviate much from the more general conceptual order of 
audit techniques, questionnaires, or guides. And the questions also seemed quite similar 
to what was used in the supervisory training programs, and thus already in circulation in 
the various supervisory teams. The group finally concluded that the whole project 
appeared very much like a general supervisory guideline, and there was a certain 
sensation that people would perceive it as a somewhat patronizing intrusion into well 
established supervisory practices. The group clearly didn’t quite feel authorized to 
assume that kind of position.  
 
One of the lessons learned, as a gradually developing belief, was that supervisions should 
not be specifically dedicated to HSE culture. The idea was even ridiculed as amounting to 
addressing questions like: ‘how is your culture today’. This reflected the belief that 
culture was “nothing in itself”, but was only “visible” in the ordinary HSE related 
activities (or non-activities). HSE culture should then be an integral part of ‘ordinary’ 
supervisions. The supervisory guideline was meant to serve this purpose. Discarding that 
idea, the question was how to proceed. The plan was initially to use the culture group as a 
‘knowledge- and resource-base’, were the supervisory teams could ‘commission’, on 
their own initiative, assistance from the group. Later, this was seen as somewhat too 
weak as an incentive for the follow up process to succeed. The plan for 2006 was then to 
pick out some supervisions were members from the culture group could participate in 
order to ‘integrate the cultural perspective’, thus providing an additional dimension to the 
supervisions. No specific number appeared, but indications were given that at least some 
5-10 supervisions should be explicitly dedicated to this project. Experiences were to be 
summarized as a basis for further strategies. As it turned out, no such supervisions were 
conducted.150 Nevertheless, the most dedicated and able members of the group felt they 
could profit from the insights of the project in ‘ordinary’ supervisions were they 
                                                 
150 Of course, I continued to ask, particularly as I was interested in joining the team; but the opportunity to 
make cultural audits an ethnographic experience was lost.  
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participated or had a leading role. But these were not explicitly singled out as ‘culture-
sensitive’ supervisions, or made subject to any extensive learning processes on an 
organization-wide basis.  
 
The supervisory director to whom the culture group reported clearly had reservations 
about too ardently diagnostic uses of the provision, pointing to both the limits of the audit 
context and the problems involved in legal enforcement. Although the following 
reflection was provided before the idea of ‘auditing HSE culture’ had been finally 
terminated, the outcome is foreshadowed.  
 
I: But people here would need to make it operational, know how to use it? 
R: Yes, and the purpose of the project is that they shall provide some guidelines for use in 
supervisions, so if HSE culture is an integrated theme in the supervision this could have a 
supportive function in helping our people to address those issues. But that would have to be 
related closely to the specific object of the audit. It’s very difficult to address these matters 
at general company level. I’d rather use the summary rapports at company level, where you 
consider all your information about the company over a period .... using data from 
supervisions, incidents, AoC’s, projects. This may reveal a number of systematic failures. 
I’d rather use HSE culture in that case, to summarize a broad range of findings .... and ask 
the company: “do you find this acceptable?” I’d say that that approach probably would have 
been more rewarding if you should address HSE culture in a company. Then you’d have 
one year or two years of experience, related to a series of areas, where you could challenge 
the companies and the top management: “is this good enough?”, and relate it to HSE 
culture. But to use this isolated in an order, I don’t think this is an appropriate measure.  
(supervisory director) 
 
The idea thus appeared of using larger samples of indicators than could be extracted from 
single supervisions (including investigations) in order to facilitate a more extensive 
dialogue and to activate the self reflective capacities of the companies themselves, 
preferably at the higher echelons. It seems, however, that these more comprehensive 
company evaluations also avoided assessments of their ‘HSE cultures’. These were 
devised by other people and the meetings in which they were presented, did not belong to 
the spectre of arenas in which the ‘culture experts’ were given any specific role.  
Concluding remark 
Reinventing HSE culture within the regulatory context was largely a piecemeal and 
incremental process; partly it involved the conceptualizing endeavours of the culture 
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project, partly some tentative diagnostic exercises, and partly it involved attempts to 
mobilize the agency through understandings and templates for practical application. 
 
But reluctance and reservations appeared gradually, and was stimulated by both internal 
and environmental factors. These seemed to work in consort to bring the cultural turn to a 
standstill. We shall return to the internal conundrums related to the conceptual and 
substantial ‘locations’ of the ‘culture-things’ later. In the following two chapters we turn 
to the environment, partly to explore how the industry localized ‘cultural factors’, and 
partly to provide some more ethnographic details about the context of risk management. 
This venture is largely case oriented, based on examples from Statoil, the largest 
operating company on the shelf; first to see how they failed to manage their risks, and 
then to see how they tried to educate their workforce into doing it. 
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7. The Snorre incident 
 
In theory, one could trace the various causal chains back to the Big Bang. What are the stop rules 
for the analysis of organizational accidents? 
 
James Reason (1997: 15) 
 
The Snorre incident may be considered as almost a watershed in the risk history of the  
Norwegian Shelf, and it had a potential for developing into one of the largest majors 
accidents ever in the North Sea. It occurred in the late fall of 2004, and was on 
everybody’s lips and a recurring point of reference during the field work period. It is 
recounted and discussed in this chapter for these and for two other obvious reasons. First, 
it demonstrates how a series of decisions and acts may develop into a potentially 
catastrophic near miss, and serves thus as a reminder of the kinds of consequences that 
may surface in the complex and risky offshore operations. Second, it demonstrates how 
the actors involved reconstruct and react to the event; the PSA through their regulatory 
powers and the ‘sinful’ companies through self-reflection and remorse. In particular it 
provides a case for demonstrating the applicability of ‘cultural causes’, as they were 
presented and represented in post-event interpretations. We shall provide a brief account 
of the case-specific trajectories below; but primarily we discuss the ways in which it 
could later be reconstructed, and how various explanatory models are applied for 
understanding the complex configurations of antecedent ‘causes’ and ‘conditions’. This 
discussion also offers a brief account of the post-accident reconstructions of the two most 
spectacular accidents in the NASA space-shuttle program. The comparison appears as 
particularly relevant, due to both similarities between the events themselves and the 
repertoire of hindsight understandings.  
Snorre A 
The Snorre A facility (SNA) is an integrated living quarters, drilling, and production 
facility in the Northern North Sea. It is permanently anchored to the seabed with tension 
legs and has a well template with 42 wells with risers and several export lines. Total 
production from SNA is around 200 000 barrels per day. The whole Snorre field is the 
third largest oil producing field on the NCS. Originally, it was operated by the Norwegian 
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oil company Saga Petroleum, who started production in 1992. Saga was bought by Hydro 
in 1999, who operated the field until 2003, when it was taken over by Statoil. Just a 
month before the incident, there was a change of drilling contractor from Prosafe to 
Odfjell. Although some 80 percent of the crew was taken over by Odfjell, several persons 
were replaced. This history of organizational discontinuities was later to appear as 
important background conditions in the explanation of the incident.  
 
The incident started on 28 November 2004. In preparing for drilling the sidetrack P-31B 
from the existing well path P-31A, pipes were being pulled out of the well. During the 
operation, the situation developed into an uncontrolled gas blow-out on the seabed, 
resulting in gas under the facility. The majority of the over 260 people on the platform 
were evacuated by helicopters; Thirty-five remained in order to rescue the facility. The 
PSA characterized the incident as “one of the most serious to occur on the Norwegian 
shelf.” In the press release after the publication of the PSA investigation-report, the 
Director General stated that: 
 
With only marginally different circumstances the gas blow-out at Snorre could have 
resulted in a major accident with the loss of many lives.  Our conclusion is that the incident 
was not due to accidental circumstances, but a consequence of a general failure in Statoil's 
planning, procedures, and assessments. 
 
The details of the process 
It is difficult to provide a brief account of this incident without omitting important and 
critical details about facts and events. At the same time, only the professional insider 
would be able to fully appreciate the significance of all these details. The following 
outline is a painful compromise adapted to the need for a minimally comprehensive and 
comprehensible narrative. Some basic features of wellbores and well operations must be 
noted initially. A wellbore consists of several hole sections that are mechanically 
supported by layers of tubes with varying, and decreasing, diameters further down the 
borehole. Concrete is injected around the tubes in order to anchor the well to the seafloor 
and the surrounding rock masses. The lowermost parts of the well are perforated in order 
to open up to and extract oil and gas from a reservoir. Producing oil or gas from the well 
also involves a system of barriers and controls. To avoid uncontrolled releases of oil and 
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gas under high pressure, the well shall always have two tested barriers in place, such as 
remote controlled valves, plugs, casings, mud, and a topside blow-out preventor (BOP) 
on the platform (see figure 7.1. below).  
 
The P-31A well was drilled in 1995 as a sidetrack to the observation well P-31. It was 
mainly used for injecting gas in order to improve the extraction of oil, until it was shut in 
in 2003. Various problems occurred during the completion of the well. At one point, the 
drill string got stuck, causing subsequent remedying operations that eventually resulted in 
the perforation of two to three holes in the 9 5/8” casing some 1500 metres below the 
platform.151 A so-called scab-liner, a ‘plaster’ tube measuring more than 2500 metres of 
length and with an  ‘unconventional’ ( or “non-standard”) diameter  of 7 5/8”, was thus 
installed inside this casing to cover the holes and reinforce the integrity of the well, which 
was then pressure tested, completed, and started up. The pressure integrity had however 
been reduced after the installation of the scab-liner (from 345 to 255 bar). The operation 
of the field was taken over by Hydro in 2000, who in 2001 measured extensive corrosion 
in and leakage from the innermost production tubing. A new liner-patch (a so-called 
“straddle”) was thus installed in the lowermost section of the production tubing. In 2003, 
the operation of Snorre was taken over by Statoil, and its management was reorganized 
into a cross-disciplinary unit for the whole field (called SNA RESU).152 In December 
2003, a new leakage was observed and a casing-burst was diagnosed in the 9 5/8” casing 
after pressure testing, but neither the causes nor the location of the damage were critically 
analyzed. The well was then shut in, with two barriers: a mechanical plug was inserted in 
the tail pipe (the lowermost part of the production tubing) directly above the reservoir 
section, and the well was filled with brine (tolerating pressure only below 94 bar). The 
well was now diagnosed as “complex” due to the problems that had been observed and 
the unconventional remedies that had been inserted (scab liner, straddle, etc.).  
 
                                                 
151 The holes were partly caused by flushing with powerful washing tools. 
152 The take-over made Statoil the sole operator in the whole Tampen area, and they could reorganize the 
running of the field; the so-called RESU unit integrated the formerly separate organization of production 
and drilling/well operations.  
 228
During the spring of 2004, however, a decision was made to conduct a “slot recovery”-
operation on the well, requiring that the lowermost part of the production tubing with 
straddle be cut and the 7 5/8” scab-liner be pulled out.153 A project team was established 
for this purpose. Apparently, all relevant historical data of the well were considered in the 
first plan for this operation, and according to the PSA investigation, the deficiencies 
related to the well had been considered, involving the participation of several contractors 
(except the drilling contractor). The primary barrier (the mechanical plug) was not to be 
removed, and an additional plug was to be installed above the planned cut of the 
production tubing that would serve as an additional barrier during the pulling of the scab-
liner. This plan, predominantly composed by drilling- and well engineers, was presented 
in September 2004. During the course of October, the plan was changed, however. In 
order to avoid contact or ‘communication’ with the planned sidetrack, the reservoir 
engineers in SNA RESU wanted to cement the reservoir section in the well.154 The 
drilling/well engineers opposed this as it would complicate the slot recovery, but a final 
decision to cement the reservoir section was taken by the end of October. The first of 
November, the drilling contract was transferred from Prosafe drilling to Odfjell drilling.  
 
The next day, a planning meeting was held where various alternatives adapted to the new 
decision were considered. They finally decided to perforate the tail pipe above the plug in 
order to pump cement past the plug, and into the reservoir section as planned. The scab 
liner was then to be pulled through the BOP in a single piece. The potential problems 
associated with the known two to three holes in the 9 5/8” casing were discussed, but not 
identified as a risk. The perforation of the tail pipe would expose the well to pressure 
from the reservoir, but the heavy mud pumped into the well was supposed to keep the 
pressure from the reservoir under control. At this point in the process, the plan for the 
operation contained two critical elements (that were directly in conflict with regulations). 
The perforation of the tail pipe could potentially expose the well to pressure and 
hydrocarbon fluids from the reservoir, and the plan to remove the scab liner would leave 
                                                 
153 A slot recovery is a preparatory operation to make ready for drilling a subsequent sidetrack for another 
well. The availability of well slots is limited, and the existing ones are used for these purposes. It requires 
however that the production tubing is cut and pulled below the kick-off point for the new sidetrack. This 
new sidetrack,  P31-B, was to be the used for resuming production from the reservoir. 
154 Such ‘communication’ could potentially ‘disturb’ the functioning of the new sidetrack, P31-B.  
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only one known barrier function operative, that is, the drilling mud, as the primary 
barrier. In addition, cutting and pulling the scab liner had two potential risks involved: 
First, because of the unconventional size of this liner, there was only very little clearance 
left between the inner diameter of the 9 5/8” casing and the outer diameter of the 7 5/8” 
liner. Because of this small clearance, pulling the liner acted like pulling a piston through 
another piece of pipe. Similar as in a bicycle pump, this upwards pulling of the piston can 
cause a swab pressure underneath the piston, i.e. a pressure that, depending on the 
circumstances, can be lower than the reservoir pressure. Such a pressure reduction can 
cause a flow from the reservoir into the well. The second risk was related to the ‘un-
conventional’ size of the scab-liner, which would block critical compensatory functions 
(such as holding and cutting functions) of the BOP.  
 
Just ‘how’ these critical elements were all included in the plan is still not clearly 
understood. Apparently, the well engineer responsible for detailing and setting up the 
procedure for the operation was a hired consultant, and may not have had enough 
experience and sufficient ‘authority’ for objecting effectively to safety critical elements. 
There was clearly a pressure for arriving at a workable plan that would not ‘unduly’ 
postpone the operation. Such ‘slot recovery’ operations were not normally considered as 
‘important’, but were more like routine jobs that would just prepare for the ‘real’ job of 
drilling the new hole. That this still was a ‘complex well’ appears somehow to have been 
‘suppressed’ or ‘forgotten’ during this planning process. The decision to cement the 
reservoir necessitated an opening of the well somewhere down-hole, and all alternatives 
that included an explicit and thorough consideration of the damages in the 9 5/8” casing 
would entail a very time consuming and complex operation. Roughly, three 
‘interpretations’ can be devised ‘post hoc’: (1) they fully understood the risks related to 
these old the damages, but took a chance; (2) they ‘knew’ about the risks, but did not 
fully understand the implications, and took a somewhat (in their view) lesser risk; (3) 
they misinterpreted the available documentation, did not consider the implications, and 
thought that the operation was safe.155 
                                                 
155 This interpretation is reconstructed from the investigation reports, interviews with PSA-experts, and 
other drilling and well experts. Apparently, the ‘content’ of the critical meeting where the plan was devised 
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Notwithstanding the ‘vulnerable’ premises, a final and formal meeting was held on 11 
November (including both supplier and SNA RESU personnel), going through both the 
history of the well and the details of the operation. A risk review, involving a critical and 
independent expert assessment from a ‘peer-review’ group, was planned the next day but 
was cancelled and postponed to 19 November due to collision of meeting times. The plan 
was still ‘verified’ by authorized personnel the next days, and finally recommended by 
the onshore drilling operations supervisor and approved by the onshore SNA RESU 
manager. The latter had the overall responsibility for the operations and was also 
responsible for summoning dedicated risk review meetings regarding “complex wells”.  
 
In the intermediate week things started to speed up, as the drilling rig had completed an 
ongoing operation earlier than expected. The rig was thus skidded on 16 November. The 
same day a meeting was held onshore with the offshore drilling management, including 
personnel from the new drilling contractor (Odfjell). The slot recovery operation started 
already on 19 November, the same day the postponed risk review was supposed to take 
place, and which now was cancelled once again. 
 
Several problems related to the presence of appropriate barriers during the operation had 
thus been discussed at various stages in the planning process, and were also to be 
discussed as the operation commenced; these appeared later to have been considered in a 
piece-mal and one-by-one manner, however. Although several ‘sub-operations’ were 
assessed during the course of events, the full significance of opening the well, given the 
original damages in the outer 9 5/8 casing, was never properly evaluated. 
Organizationally, a number of actors (decision-makers and professionals) had been 
involved in these processes; although fully responsible for the operation, the SNA RESU 
manager would have to rely on information and judgements from lower level managers 
and professionals, such as the drilling operations supervisor, and the (Statoil) offshore 
                                                                                                                                                 
was to some extent ‘black-boxed’; although the premises for the plan must also have developed gradually, 
with the involvement of various expert groups. It also appears that some ‘auxiliary’ hypotheses were 
forwarded from participants in the post event investigations, such as the belief that the mud that originally 
had been inserted in between the chasings and liners would be sufficient for preserving the integrity of the 
barrier. In fact, it was reported by participants in the PSA investigation team that the interviewees had been 
somewhat ‘evasive’ in terms of ‘localizing’ the most critical decisions, such as to perforate the tail pipe.   
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drilling supervisor (who in turn ‘relied’ on expert-assessments of others). Judgements and 
decisions were apparently subject to rather stressing and chaotic flows of information, 
where the ‘accountability’ of each actor at any point in time could be rather ambiguous, 
in particular in terms of continually taking account of ‘risk-relevant’ implications of 
changes and accommodations made during the planning process. 
 
Several problems occurred during the first days of operations, including some 
‘unexpected’ and gradually more critical flows of liquids from the well. The tail pipe was 
perforated on 21 November, thus opening the well for a (potential) pressure and flow 
from the hydrocarbon bearing strata in the reservoir. This pressure was to be controlled 
by the hydrostatic weight of the drilling mud that filled the well and acted as the primary 
barrier. Although there were ‘misunderstandings’ about the barrier situation related to the 
secondary barrier (casing, tubes, etc.), these were apparently ‘suppressed’ in the ongoing 
operation, not believing that the pulling of the scab liner would in fact be carried out with 
an ‘open hole’.156  
 
There were also other problems that required attention and caused further disturbances 
during the process: When the production tubing was pulled, an incomplete cut had caused 
the tubing to be pulled with the straddle inside. As it was not allowed to let two pipes 
pass through the BOP, a decision was taken to drop the lowermost part of the tubing 
(some 50-100 metres) into the well with the straddle inside.157  
 
The night shift drilling crew that arrived on 24 November comprised a drilling supervisor 
from Statoil who had not been on SNA since 1997, and one of the contractor’s drilling 
foremen (toolpushers) was on his first trip to SNA ever.  
 
                                                 
156  In connection with the pulling of the (unconventional) scab liner, the drilling supervisor  (day shift) did 
ask the program engineer (by e-mail) if the pulling of the scab liner through the BOP in the face of reduced 
functioning did not require a formal exemption. The reply, cited in the PSA investigation report, was that: 
“As I understand it, we do not have to do this as long as we pull a liner that is not out in an open hole.” In 
reality, the status of the barriers was now insufficient. The damaged casing had earlier been specified for 
pressure only below 94 bar. 
157 One important consideration related to this decision was that this ‘device’ would complicate the planned 
cementing operation. 
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It was then decided to perforate the scab liner before cutting and pulling in order to 
equalize a potential pressure build-up behind the liner that may have developed over the 
years when the well had been in use. A risk assessment related to pulling the scab liner 
through the BOP was removed from the plan, since, as noted, at the time of the 
assessment the well was not considered to be ‘open’. The pulling of the scab liner started 
on 27 November. Expected changes in pressure related to the pulling were not observed, 
but the operation continued.158 The punching and pulling of the scab liner had now 
caused a potential pressure contact between the reservoir and the holes in the 9 5/8” 
casing. Gas, if mobilized, could then pass from the reservoir, up the clearing between the 
scab liner and the 9 5/8” casing and through the holes into the annulus.  
 
At this point, the (potential) ‘piston-effect’ (see above) started to cause an inflow of gas 
into the well. The gas then slowly rised through the well under constantly changing 
pressure conditions. Due to the reduced hydrostatic pressure in the upper parts of the 
well, the gas also expanded; gas flow accelerated due to the expansion and at the end, 
came out of control. Later observations show that the breakthrough point in the outer 
casing (13 3/8”) was observed some 500 meters below the platform, and several blow-out 
craters in the seabed were verified, the largest measuring 8x3 metres.159  
 
Evidence for the piston effect, also called ‘swabbing’, was observed by the crew in the 
evening, and throughout the night of 28 November. Although this is a clear indication 
that gas is drawn into the well when there is communication to the reservoir, neither the 
causes nor the potential risks were considered as the phenomenon continued during the 
night. The response of the crew was to pull the scab-liner slowly and make regular 
observations.160 Loss of mud was now observed but compensated by injecting more mud. 
                                                 
158 It later turned out that these changes could not have been possible due to an absent or deficient seal in 
the casing spear that fastened the drill string to the scab liner.  
159 The outer casing was later referred to as having an unknown damage or weakness. 
160 Another reaction that most likely had an impact on how the situation developed was related to a heavy 
Calciumbromide brine that was placed behind the scab-liner in 1995 during the construction of the well. 
This brine mixed with the oil based mud in the well when the scab liner was pulled from its lower 
anchoring points. This probably caused the oil-based mud to thicken, that is, it created a viscous ‘gel’ that 
could have enhanced the piston effect. 
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It can only be speculated where this mud was lost, but there is a certain likelihood that 
fractures started to develop due to overburden.  
 
Figure 7.1 The P-31A well 161 
 
  
At 0500 hrs in the morning, the top of the scab-liner was pulled through the BOP, which 
was then blocked for several basic safety functions (e.g. cutting the work string that was 
inside the BOP and shutting in (closing) the hole efficiently). The operation continued, 
however, on the day shift, with regular flow-checks. Signs of instability were first 
observed throughout the afternoon and evening, with alternating losses of mud and 
increasing pressure. When loosing mud, additional mud volumes were inserted into the 
annulus, behind the scab-liner. Attempts were made to ‘circulate’ the well, but no mud 
was returned. Up until 1800 hours, the well was observed and additional losses were 
compensated for. At about 1800 hours, a critical backflow of well liquids was observed,  
                                                 
161 Note that the indicated path of the gas is speculative, and not fully known. 
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which developed in an undesirable manner.162 The annular preventor of the BOP stack 
had to be closed to stop this flow. This type of valve was the only one of three types of 
safety valves that could be utilized in the BOP.  Also, another safety valve inside the 
work string (Kelly cock) was installed. Available mud reserves were now estimated and 
initiatives were taken to prepare new mud volumes.  
 
This was the start of the well control situation. 
 
The platform manager summoned an emergency meeting at 1900 in order to mobilize the 
emergency response management. Gas was now detected for the first time, in the cooling 
water on one of the compressors. This would normally cause automatic shut down of the 
main power, but the cause was supposed to be local and the gas detectors were thus 
blocked. Production from all the neighbouring facilities was stopped and the standby 
vessel, helicopters, Statoil’s emergency centre, the public rescue coordination centre, and 
the PSA were all notified. The alarm was sounded and all personnel mustered to the 
lifeboats. Gas was detected in several locations, even on modules right below the flare, 
and from the annular preventor of the BOP. Due to the restrictions on the use of the BOP, 
the only solution left for killing the well was now to inject large amounts of mud at a high 
rate in order to force the hydrocarbons back into the reservoir (so-called bullheading). A 
decision to evacuate all unnecessary personnel by helicopter was made after an 
assessment of the movements of the gas. During and after evacuation, several gas alarms 
went off, and some reported that the sea was “boiling with gas”. The main power was 
shut down automatically due to gas alarms and the risk of ignition, and full evacuation 
was considered. The emergency power was not sufficient for continuing the killing of the 
well, as the mud pumps and the drill string could not be run with enough power. As a gas 
blow out from the seabed was now evident, the danger of loss of stability and buoyancy 
was also considered. Damage to tension legs and gas under the platform could both pose 
a risk to the integrity of the whole platform.  
 
                                                 
162 The details of these processes cannot be fully explicated here, but the ‘behaviour’ and measurement of 
liquid flows and pressures are critical in the course of these operations and have to be within certain critical 
thresholds in order to be continued in a safe manner. 
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At this critical juncture, the platform manager decided to continue the operation in order 
to save the platform. According to the emergency procedure, discretionary powers had 
now been transferred to him, although the decision to stay under the given circumstances 
was not in line with internal regulations. The scenarios were indeed dramatic, both in the 
case of leaving and in the case of staying.  
 
The main power was manually re-started just before midnight. Some time had passed 
since the last gas detection on the platform, but the decision was still critical. The process 
of bullheading mud into the well could now continue, however. Pressure from the well 
would rise and fall as they were able to keep up the process. New mixtures of mud had to 
be produced continually, which is a time-consuming process, and supplies were gradually 
reduced. For two periods, the crew could only monitor the well, awaiting new supplies of 
mixed mud. External supplies of mud were not available since gas in the sea did not 
allow the use of supply vessels. As they ran out of oil based mud, a decision was made to 
make a final attempt using an improvised mixture of water based mud. Elevated 
evacuation preparedness was requested, and at around 0900 hours, 160m3 were ready for 
use. The pressure in the well was at this point greater than it had been when the process 
started around midnight. One long hour later, zero bar was recorded from both sides of 
the scab liner; the mud stores were then virtually empty. Thirty-five people were left on 
the platform after the last evacuation.  
Post-event reconstructions 
Even though the actual consequences of the incident were serious (including substantial 
costs related to delayed production), the potential consequences could have been 
catastrophic. The probability of ignition would have increased significantly with more 
unfavourable weather conditions, or in the case of a blow out on the drill-floor.163 An 
extensive fire could have caused loss of human lives, and ultimately loss of the whole 
facility, including damage to the underlying well template, containing 42 well heads, 
                                                 
163 A cloud of gas could have formed, and proximity to the flare boom could have caused ignition. The 
flare was extinguished only at 0300 (due to various problems). 
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risers, and various subsea structures. The environmental impacts of this scenario were 
dramatic. The total costs could have been some NOK 30 billion. 
The PSA investigation 
The PSA investigation report identified twenty-eight non-conformities, summarized as 
(1) lack of compliance with and control in the use of internal company procedures and 
governing documentation, (2) inadequate understanding and implementation of risk 
assessments, (3) inadequate involvement of management, and (4) breach of well barrier 
requirements. The non-conformities were related to failures of both Statoil and the 
drilling contractor, involving several levels in the Snorre organization both onshore and 
on the facility. The report highlighted the pervasive nature of these failures, and pin-
pointed the fact that so many hazardous decisions had allowed the incident to develop. In 
summing up the investigation, they stated:  
 
Therefore, there is nothing to indicate that the incident was caused by chance 
circumstances. The non-conformities found in the investigation would all have been 
intercepted and corrected if the barriers had functioned. Individual barriers fail from time to 
time, but failure of so many barriers in different phases of an operation is extremely rare. 
The PSA is critical of the fact that such an extensive failure of the established systems was 
not uncovered. We question why this was not discovered and corrected at an earlier point in 
time (PSA, 2005: 4). 
 
Three critical events where identified as ‘triggers’. First, the perforation of the tail pipe, 
thus exposing the well to pressure from the reservoir without considering the secondary 
barriers; second, the perforation, cutting and pulling of the scab-liner, equally violating 
the barrier requirements; third, failure to respond to the ‘swabbing’ as the scab liner was 
pulled (this should have been taken as a sign that the effect of the primary barrier, the 
mud, was significantly reduced). As noted above, gas had been sucked into the well 
(through a vacuum effect), mixed with the mud, and thus also reducing its effect as a 
barrier. The other non-conformities were categorized as ‘underlying causes’, such as 
planning with insufficient barrier control, lack of risk assessments, etc.  
 
The report was careful in not making interpretations that went beyond any explicit 
evidential support. Thus, ‘insufficient leadership involvement’, which could otherwise be 
employed as a catch-all ‘root cause’, was specifically related to the failure of the 
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management to summit risk reviews, to approve deficient plans, etc. All ‘underlying 
causes’ were thus substantiated by reference to clearly verifiable observations only, 
reflecting the interpretive self-restraint appropriate for a regulatory agency. And each of 
the non-conformities were properly related to violations of internal company procedures 
and to the relevant standards and regulations. The violation of the requirements on well 
barriers (i.e. of having two independent barriers with known effects) recurred through the 
process from planning to the operation itself.164 
 
The PSA report provided a rather laconic and fact-based historiography of the 
organizational changes and discontinuities prior to the incident. A discussion of their 
possible impact on the events, was given in a highly conditional mode, as an “assessment 
and discussion of uncertainties”, and was introduced as issues where “contradictory 
information” was given, and where “the investigation has been unable to uncover an 
exact description of the incident, or where causal relations seem to be present, although 
this cannot be documented” (PSA 2005: 39). These ‘conjectures’ identified 
reorganizations, use of consultants, and change of drilling contractor as precursors that 
could have influenced the low priority and status given to the planning and preparation of 
the operation, in particular in the face of its criticality (i.e. the opening of a ‘complex’ 
well). Several indications were noted.  
 
Discontinuities during the transfer of drilling contractor could have led to loss of 
information; despite the fact that 80 percent of the personnel were taken over by the new 
contractor, some key supervisors and managers were replaced. Although much of the old 
Snorre organization had remained intact (the Snorre organization consisted largely of 
former Saga and some Hydro personnel), the integration into the Statoil system was far 
from completed, including working methods, procedures, and use of expertise. Several 
organizational changes were underway, however, including plans for rotation of well and 
drilling engineers/supervisors, and including also the replacement of the senior manager 
                                                 
164 The regulations specify that at least two tested barriers shall be present at all times between the 
reservoirs (or hydrocarbons in general, i.e. in processing systems) and the outside environment of people, 
things and ecosystems. The requirement is absolute and deterministic, and is further specified in the 
industry standard, NORSOK D-010 (http://www.standard.no/imaker.exe?id=1301).  
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for the whole Snorre field.165 Also, the program engineer who prepared the well program 
was a hired consultant, and largely left alone, “without much management, guidance, 
involvement, and prioritization from senior management” (PSA 2005: 40). As noted, 
some key drilling/well supervisors/managers were just recently assigned to their 
positions, such as Statoil’s drilling supervisor, who was on his first trip to the facility 
when the incident occurred. Finally, the accelerated start-up, due to the earlier availability 
of the drilling facilities, was noted as a possible contributor to stressing the situation. 
These were rather careful suggestions, in the face of what could easily be perceived as 
almost an argumentative overkill in terms of the organizational and operational stress that 
was created and imposed on the various steps of the process.  
SNA: cultural causes? 
As noted in the previous chapter, the policy of ‘cultural self-restraint’ had developed in 
the PSA before the SNA incident. This policy caused some discussion and concern, as it 
questioned the applicability of the provision as such. The discussion surfaced as the final 
preparations of the SNA report were being concluded. The investigation team had 
discovered twenty eight non-conformities, some grave and deeply systemic in nature, and 
the overall impression was that if this didn’t qualify as a violation of the culture 
provision, then, what would? Still, the reservations prevailed, partly based on the 
previous experiences (such as from the Gyda case) and partly also based on more 
principled arguments about the formal use of the provision as such. The idea advanced by 
the culture group was that HSE culture should rather be used in positive terms, as 
something that should be promoted and developed, rather than in negative terms, as 
something ‘missing’ that could count as a ‘deviation’ from a norm. The reservations 
reflected also the perceived ‘power’ inherent in the term HSE culture. Still, ‘culture’ was 
a recurring point of reference in the subsequent discourses surrounding this dramatic 
incident. The leader of the culture group, himself a specialist in drilling and well 
technology, referred extensively to this case as an illustration of how a series of critical 
decisions, judgements, and acts reflected and revealed indications about a culture failing 
to deal properly with risks. The failures were evident on all levels in the organizational 
                                                 
165 In fact, Snorre (RESU SNA) got a new manager on the very day of the incident.  
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hierarchy, and were all the more critical, as it was commonly known among well 
specialists that there were a number of such ‘old and rotten’ wells on the shelf. And the 
risks involved would not be properly approached if the risk monitoring policy only relied 
on the conventional use of historical data, such as the counting of ‘unplanned events’, 
like well kicks. These were risks that had to be managed through careful use of foresight 
analysis, imagining all the possible outcomes of well interventions based on in-depth 
knowledge that included also the case specific historical documentation, not just the 
‘signs of danger’ as they could be read from event-based statistical records. Proper risk 
management had to take account of all the human and organizational preconditions for 
safe operations. These were risk management perspectives he hoped that the culture 
group would be able to draw attention to. HSE culture was to serve as a sensitizing 
concept for understanding emergent and ‘unregistered’ risks as well as for dealing with 
them in a sensible manner through all the critical junctures of judgement and decision 
making. But to ‘formally’ attach the label ‘bad HSE culture’ to any one event, group, 
unit, facility, or even company, appeared too hazardous.  
 
Such self-restraint was not observed at the high-level encounters, however. The ministry 
prepared questions about the HSE culture of Statoil for meetings between the Minister of 
Labour and the CEO of Statoil. The CEO himself explained publicly that the safety 
culture of the Snorre organization had major flaws, but aptly adding to this observation 
that the main reason for the incident was that the organization hadn’t been ‘properly 
integrated into the larger Statoil system’, which of course, had a good and sound safety 
culture. The subsequent ticket fine, NOK 80 million, is the highest ever given in Norway. 
It was accepted by Statoil, apparently without protest, but in the subsequent public 
response, the claim was reiterated: the Snorre culture had not been properly integrated 
into the Statoil culture. 
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The Statoil report on the causes 
This self-restraint on the part of PSA, stands in contrast to the more sweeping analysis in 
the Statoil report to appear later (Statoil/Schiefloe et al., 2005).166 The order that was 
issued subsequent to the investigation report typically required Statoil to identify the 
causes of the incident and of the non-conformities, to implement appropriate remedies, 
and to measure and document their effect. An internal project was established in order to 
follow up the order, including also union representatives. The analysis of the causes 
appeared almost a year after the incident. The study was carried out by a research 
institute associated to the university in Trondheim (NTNU) and headed by a sociology 
professor. The final report was issued as an internal Statoil report, approved by the UPN 
director, and was in that sense also an expression of self-diagnosis and ‘confession’ on 
the part of the company. None of the observations in the PSA report were questioned; 
rather, they were penetrated and contextualized within the broader historical framework 
and a socio-cultural explanatory model.167 It starts with the premise that individual 
behaviour is to be understood largely as an outcome of the organizational and operational 
context of tasks solving, including such factors as work loads, time-pressure, resources, 
competence, and incentive systems. Critical operations within high risk systems cannot 
rely on the absence of erroneous judgements, only that such judgements are monitored 
and corrected in time. The main conclusion in the report was, briefly put, that this was 
not the case in the SNA organization. Error was allowed to happen, they didn’t really 
‘learn from experience’, and, although the phrase is not used, the implication is that this 
was an incident that was ‘waiting to happen’. The interplay between ‘systems-critical’ 
activities and weak organizational defences (barriers) caused ‘high operational risk’, with 
the implication that erroneous operations could lead to chain reactions with serious 
consequences, amplified by sub-standard technical conditions. Five dimensions organize 
the analysis, referred to as the “Pentagon model” (see also Chapter 3): (1) technology and 
operations; (2) organization and regulations; (3) values, attitudes and competence (also 
referred to as ‘culture’); (4) relations and networks; (5) work processes, including 
                                                 
166 A more technical investigation had been conducted just after the incident but did not penetrate very far 
into the organizational causes. 
167 It was based on extensive analysis of documentary evidence, a survey questionnaire and in-depth 
interviews with 152 informants, including virtually everyone involved in the incident.  
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cooperation, communication, and management.168 In short, the report identified 
weaknesses along all these dimensions.  
 
The technological condition of the platform had gradually deteriorated, mainly due to the 
priority given to short term production targets. In particular this was the case during the 
Saga and Hydro years. Statoil plans for improvements and modernization had not yet 
been implemented. Key informants stated that SNA largely had been managed on a day-
to-day basis with an ad hoc problem solving approach, including improvised repairs 
rather than more robust replacements. High pressure on performance goals and speed 
made more systematic and long term maintenance and operational policies difficult to 
pursue. Two critical examples were given: First, instead of replacing the damaged 9 5/8” 
casing in 1995, the unconventional and ‘awkward’ solution of inserting the scab liner was 
chosen, which was cheaper and faster. Second, in the critical decision to change plans 
and perforate the tail pipe before pulling the scab liner, considerations about time and 
convenience were decisive, since it would ease the process of cementing the reservoir.  
 
The organizational discontinuities and loose integration that was observed in the PSA 
report were confirmed and elaborated. Lack of integration into the Statoil system was 
partly explained as a response to expressed wishes from the Snorre organization, largely 
consisting of former Saga/Hydro employees, to be “left alone”. Despite formal 
integration (organization, safety systems, and operational procedures), the organization 
appeared as independent, and not “socially and culturally integrated in Statoil”. In 
addition to this, there were organizational changes still going on, as part of Statoil’s plans 
for a more integrated management of the whole Tampen area, where they now operated 
all the fields, implying also expanded areas of responsibility for key managers. Combined 
with a high level of activity, these changes lead to an overload on management resources. 
Furthermore, the change of drilling contractor also occupied management resources and 
attention, and greater responsibilities were put on the Statoil drilling managers due to 
                                                 
168 This analytical model is the same as was used in the workshops in RNNS project see chapter 3), which 
was organized by the same research institute (Studio Apertura), affiliated with the technical university in 
Trondheim, NTNU). The conceptual taxonomy suggested by this model has thus obviously contributed to 
shaping and framing analytical approaches and conceptual understanding on a wider scale, a topic for later 
discussion. 
 242
weaker follow up from Prosafe prior to the transfer. General adjustment and transfer 
problems were reported, and several informants experienced unrest and insecurity related 
to their jobs. These organizational disturbances in sum caused a “displacement of 
attention”. The pervasive and repetitive violations of rules and regulations noted in the 
PSA report were interpreted as ‘systems weaknesses’ in the sense that they could not be 
attributed to conscious individual volition. Rather, there was a general lack of knowledge 
about internal safety systems and procedures. Several explanations were provided, such 
as insufficient training and time pressure. Generally, the safety procedures were 
described as unavailable, complex, comprehensive, badly organized, and subject to 
frequent changes.  
 
Relations and networks were described partly in terms of internal cohesiveness in the 
Snorre organization, and partly in terms of its relative isolation in relation to the Statoil 
organization. These attributes, noted above, were evident also in the informal 
organization, pointing to the feeling of communion and good relations among Snorre 
employees, including also the contractor employees. SNA ranked high on mutual trust, 
general well being, and working environment. This confirmed also the observations of 
the PSA team, who, based on their experience from the investigation, characterized the 
working environment as “good”. These factors were seen as critical in contributing to the 
successful rescue operation, where the virtues of the action-oriented culture were fully 
exploited. The flip side was the loose connections to the Statoil system. This included 
lack of professional cooperation and little use of Statoil expertise and experience.  
 
The dimension most explicitly referred to as “culture”, included values, attitudes, and 
competence. A strong and distinct local culture was identified, reinforced by several 
strong and dominant managers throughout the SNA history. Partly, this cultural diagnosis 
reinforced the preceding analysis, such as the value of “keeping up production”, an ad 
hoc and short term perspective on operations, and an ‘insulated’ culture in relation to the 
organizational environment (the Statoil system). A high tolerance for risk and lack of 
systematic risk assessments could be related to these task oriented attitudes. To get things 
done without too much planning or thinking was important. Low tolerance for objections 
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and criticism was also observed, relating both to management decisions, expert 
judgement, and to external interference. Still, expertise in some areas seemed to have 
been weak, such as risk analysis and drilling- and well-operations. In sum, an image was 
drawn of a highly task oriented, self confident, and insulated organization, or ‘culture’.  
 
The last dimension, work processes, was then, partly, a repetition exercise. Planning of 
well operations had been an onshore issue, and communication with the platform had 
been insufficient. An argument was provided that hectic and shifting working conditions 
on the platform, together with low turnover and ‘cultural stability’, had developed a 
capacity for “micro-coordination”, referring to the ability to mobilize people and 
resources for solving tasks and problems in a swift and flexible manner. Again, these 
qualities of the organization were credited for the handling of the emergency crises. Risk 
awareness and safety concerns were clearly present, but were not sufficiently mobilized 
by the management in practical planning and work processes. Also, management 
resources were largely absorbed in administrative tasks, at the cost of ‘hands on’ 
involvement in planning and operations.  
 
The virtues of the analytical taxonomy of the ‘Pentagon model’ aside, the report deepens 
the historical and socio-cultural understanding of how the serious near-miss on Snorre 
developed, reminiscent of what Turner (1978) referred to as an incubation period; the 
disaster was halted only by the instant and extraordinary efforts of the platform manager 
and his crew. The ‘signs’ were evident also from other sources. Since 2003, four 
notifications had been reported to the PSA of serious incidents, two of which were well 
incidents (the other were a serious injury and a falling object). There was a general 
perception in the Snorre organization that SNA had among the worst HSE rankings in 
Statoil (Statoil/Schiefloe et al., 2005; PSA, 2005). The Statoil report also concluded that 
their informants themselves interpreted the causes of the repeated failures within a larger 
“historical and cultural context” related to work modes, communication, management, 
and strong leaders. The ‘Snorre culture’ appeared in a number of statements from the 
interviews. Mind-sets, behavioural modes, and norms had developed throughout the 
history of the field, where short term production targets overshadowed thorough planning 
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and assessment of risk. This was evident in the ambiguous interpretations of the status of 
the well. On the one hand, it was diagnosed as ‘complex’, and the operation was not 
considered ‘standard’; at one point, however, or gradually, the operation becomes 
‘straightforward and simple’.169 There were clearly factors that could support this mental 
twist, like the fact that this was ‘only’ an injection well or this was ‘only’ a slot recovery 
operation. As noted, such operations tended to be underestimated, and appeared as less 
‘prestigious’, compared to drilling in ‘virgin soil’. The underestimation of the well 
integration problems still appear as puzzling, in particular when considering the quite 
recent discoveries about the well problems and the decision to plug it.  
Local optimizations and external pressures 
The Statoil report analyzed the incident in terms of how organizational safety barriers 
were able to cope with complex and hazardous operations. Underlying causes were also 
identified in the history of the field and the well, implicitly blaming predecessors for 
leaving a muddled heritage, although the subsequent behaviour of the company was also 
critically analyzed. The relationship between historical and external contexts and the 
local processes of problem-solving shall be discussed below, partly by further exploring 
the Snorre-case, but also by briefly considering the post-accident investigations of the 
two NASA space shuttle accidents, Challenger and Columbia. We are interested here 
also in the more general questions of how causal complexities are analyzed and weighted, 
and in particular how ‘cultural causes’ may fit into these sequences and configurations. 
As will be recalled from Chapter 2, the explanatory and ‘managerial’ role of culture 
appears as one of the issues of controversy between the Normal Accident theorists and 
the High Reliability theorists, and a case-based discussion may facilitate an elucidation of 
the ‘positions’.  
                                                 
169 The possibility of gas entering through the outmost 13 3/8 casing was also part of this, as this possibility 
had not been seriously considered in the previous test that had indicated deviant pressures.  
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SNA: memory and adaptation 
The deterioration of memory observed in the Statoil report, was later addressed by 
Coeckelbergh and Wackers (2006) in a recent analysis (henceforth, C&W).170 Noting the 
problems related to retrieving formal documents of well history (travelling from office to 
office during the various takeovers), they still point to the fact that offshore personnel, 
that had been involved in the well operations as far back as 1995, didn’t ‘remember’ the 
hole in the 9 5/8” casing before they suddenly observed gas bubbles in the water. C&W 
also point to the fact that the former investigation reports didn’t fully account for what 
the onshore personnel involved in the planning ‘knew’ about well history, or explain why 
the operation of perforating the tail pipe and pulling the scab-liner was not considered 
critical. Which ‘local’ assumptions’ were the made during the various stages of the 
operation? C&W question the remarks in the investigation reports about ‘lack of 
competence’ related to barriers and ‘barrier thinking’, and the hindsight reconstructions 
of what went on in the critical contexts of decision making. Taking the perspective of the 
actors, situated in these specific contexts, and in trying to avoid the ‘implicit’ attribution 
of cause to ‘human error’,  it is argued that prior reorganizations put restrictions on the 
availability of expertise and that the allocation of resources to the project was not solely 
in the hands of the Snorre management. 
 
Widening the context further, and not restrained by ‘company perspectives’ in exploring 
explanatory options, C&W spans the whole development of the Snorre field, representing 
a strategic asset to Statoil in the sense that the take-over of the field would make them the 
sole operator in the Tampen area (including large fields such as Statfjord and 
Gullfaks).171  This gave opportunities for optimizing the use of resources and 
rationalizing the organization. The story is also traced back to the background for the end 
of Saga, the first operator of the field, the causes of its (hostile) takeover by Hydro, and 
later Statoil, and how the assets were shared and dealt with by the two companies in the 
                                                 
170 The analysis is based on the available documents and reports, and including a number of interviews with 
key participants and observers of the incident: investigation groups, the platform manager, and others from 
the remaining group of thirty-five (see also Wackers, 2006). 
171 Examples of ‘doctoring’ interpretations in line with company self image and reputation may be found in 
the Statoil report, such as the ‘blaming’ of the ‘Saga-culture’ and the ‘moneymaking’ Hydro period ; but 
overall, the report is painstakingly ‘self-critical’.  
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years to follow. Part of the deal was that Hydro would operate the Snorre field for some 
three and a half years, and that Statoil would then take over. Considerable cost reductions 
were implemented in the Hydro years, particularly in the onshore organization. Oil prizes 
in the period averaged around $10 /barrel, cost reductions were implemented in every 
conceivable way, and Snorre was operated as a money machine. The analysis then points 
to the very different contexts in which these strategic commercial decisions are taken, far 
removed from safety concerns. This context is  
 
… populated with different kinds of knowledge, skills, and sensitivities. It is a world of 
politicians, policymakers, bankers, lawyers. It is about the protection of national and private 
vested financial and industrial interests; requiring …. experience in business strategies and 
tactics that maximize share holder value. This is not a world in which reliability and safety 
consequences of deals are being explored. These concerns and consequences are relegated 
to the company that will take upon itself the responsibility of being operator for an offshore 
installation. The way in which Snorre A – the installation, the field – is framed as a business 
asset contributing to the value per share of the company on international stock markets – 
deletes from this world the sensitivity, vocabulary, and tools to assess the vulnerability 
inducing consequences of the deals being forged (p. 9).  
 
Market stress, partly caused by sliding oil prizes thus created corporate unrest and 
commercial pressure. Considerations of safety implications would not be a high priority 
in these business transactions. Rather, operational consequences related to organizational 
changes, shifts of personnel, discontinuity of operational knowledge, all the way down to 
the effect of interpersonal relationships in day to day planning and operation, would have 
to be handled post hoc. They had to be adapted to at the operational level. The context of 
such decisions, on a lower level, is exemplified in the change of drilling contractor just 
prior to the incident.   
 
The new drilling contractor was paid only for effective operational time (only for uptime, 
not for downtime), a type of contract not uncommon in the industry. In effect, time 
needed for maintenance, replacement of parts, etc., was not paid for, and accounting 
systems were devised to measure up- and downtime (to the quarter of an hour). The new 
contract effectuated a greater transfer of financial risks related to Odfjell personnel’s 
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errors or mistakes from the operator to the contractor.172 This squeeze and its 
consequences are summarized thus:  
 
The operator’s onshore organization wants to keep moving in order to maintain a detailed 
time schedule. The contractor’s onshore management also wants to avoid downtime, 
because this will a) interrupt cash flow and b) affect his operational effectiveness statistics 
that will come up in negotiations on contract renewals or effectuation of options. As a result 
there is a tendency for the contractor’s offshore personnel to trust the operator’s onshore 
expertise, rather than to rely on their own judgment. Relevant local and situated 
knowledges, experiences, and memories are suppressed; despite continuity of personnel, of 
bodies, knowledge and memories are in a sense deleted (p. 11). 
 
Whereas the PSA report noted the possible effects of organizational discontinuities, and 
the Statoil report explored their actual impact, the C&W analysis consider their causes, 
thus expanding the causal linkages in the complex developmental sequences. Both the 
Statoil report and the C&W report point to the importance of coupling and complexity in 
understanding these sequences. Implicitly resounding normal accident theory, the Statoil 
report describe petroleum production in general terms as being characterized by complex 
interactions and strong dependencies between operations, functions, and activities.  
Rather than embracing Normal Accident Theory, however, it ‘relies’ on the more 
optimistic High Reliability perspective (although not explicitly referred to). It thus points 
to the importance of vigilant attention in all the parts in the chain, and the role of human, 
organizational, and technological defences that must be present in order to compensate 
for individual or isolated failures, understood as parts of the system and as steps in the 
sequential order. The C&W analysis draws on the same vocabulary in describing the 
development (on the long term) as a process of decoupling and increasing 
vulnerability.173 
 
                                                 
172 Previous contracts required severe or gross negligence to establish the contractor’s liability for all costs 
resulting from such errors. The terms of the new contract required just (ordinary) negligence, and included 
also costs required to re-establish normal operations. In effect, this made it more difficult for their offshore 
personnel to voice safety and reliability concerns during operations if it could cause loss of income to the 
employer. Also, the contractors’ influence on the planning and execution of operations was not 
correspondingly increased, but were managed by Statoil’s onshore operational organization (SNA RESU). 
173 The latter understood as the systems ability to “anticipate, resist, cope with, respond to, or recover from 
undesired events that threaten the achievement or maintenance of performative closure”.  Performative 
closure refers here more specifically to the containment of hazards, that is, the system of barriers (pipes, 
valves, plugs, BOPs) that prevent the blow-out of high-pressured hydrocarbons.  
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At critical junctures, the human, organizational and technological barriers failed, and 
potential hazards were underestimated. The process of decoupling can be observed both 
in the high level decisions about business deals creating organizational ruptures, 
discontinuities and ‘loss’ of memory, and in the lower level decisions to change slot 
recovery plans without considering what new risks this could offset. These retrospective 
insights were not so clearly available in the context of “local optimization”, where 
practical and efficient solutions appeared to be ‘rational’ within the bounded context of 
single and isolated instances of problem-solving; they may even be saluted and mutually 
approved. This isolation of decision contexts was apparent in several stages leading up to 
the incident, such as the critical decision to perforate the tail pipe before pulling the scab 
liner, which was technically considered to be more ‘practical and convenient’ (i.e. faster 
and cheaper). At this point, the failure of the pressure test less than a year before was 
‘forgotten’, and no image of an ‘open hole’ was present. Later, when the pipe was pulled 
through the BOP, with basic stop functions unavailable, the uncoupling was (almost) 
irreversible. The challenge in this context, as noted by C&W, is to  
 
think not only how to get in and down and do the job, but also always to think how to 
retreat, pull out, while maintaining two barriers at all time. And the challenge is to think this 
in a flexible manner, that is, through the changes between types of partial operations, from 
running a tool on a wire to pumping down mud to pulling out a scab liner. Proper barrier 
thinking is a collective effort. It requires a diversity of input from all disciplines involved. 
And it takes time. Time should be a resource here (p. 16). 
 
 
Time finally also caused a forced upstart, as the drilling rig was ready two days ahead of 
schedule. It is an open question, however, whether things would have turned out 
otherwise if the postponed but cancelled risk review had been conducted as planned on 
19 November.  
 
However, as the situation developed and the signs of immanent danger could no longer 
be ignored or ‘reinterpreted’, the ability of the organization to ‘re-couple’ was evident. 
With gas intake from two parallel blow-outs (the seabed and the top side BOP), a number 
of critical decisions had to be taken. Although the first gas detection was interpreted as 
‘local’, it was soon clear that a crisis was underway. As the emergency situation was 
established, the discretionary power shifted to the platform manager. Curiously, not only 
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was the incident a result of serious violations of barrier requirements. The rescue 
operation itself operated on a regulatory edge. Company regulations supported full 
evacuation, as did the Statoil crises management groups that were assembled onshore. 
The platform manager, however, opted for a rescue operation.174 This included a number 
of precautionary decisions, such as turning vents, rearranging air intake, etc., but also 
high-risk (and non-compliant) decisions, such as rearranging electricity systems and re-
starting the main power. The scenarios of loosing the platform, including the possible 
destruction of underlying structures and massive blow-outs that could cause major 
environmental damage, seemed decisive. The remaining crew was assembled, and 
participation in the recovery was presented as voluntary; all key personnel decided to 
stay, however. In this process of innovative problem solving under high pressure, some of 
the virtues of the crew and perhaps of the ‘Snorre-culture’, reappeared in a paradoxical 
way. Not in the manner of a ‘reliability paradox’ (that is the loss of experience and 
problem solving skills due to the an ‘overburdened’ system reliability: i.e ‘full-proof’ 
socio-technical systems that need no ‘thinking’ on the part of their human ‘members’); 
rather, as was noted by C&W: 
 
In a paradoxical sense, operating Snorre A like a money machine maintained the 
improvisatory skills that saved the day in the recovery of the blow-out. Processes of 
improvisation and tuning do not only rely on existing knowledge but also themselves 
generate new knowledge, skills, and capacities. Furthermore, it is important to note that 
improvisation is not rule governed but coordinates actions in another way, that is, by using 
imagination. The reproduction of existing patterns goes hand in hand with innovative 
adaptations and exploration of new options (p. 23). 
 
 
In fact, in this changed state of heightened risk awareness, they took great risks, but they 
also ‘amplified’ some of the dangers, such as the loss of buoyancy due to the gas 
                                                 
174 The impact of this decision was critical, as explained by C&W: “If people would be killed in the attempt 
to regain control over the well, in the attempt to recover the developing crisis situation that was on a 
trajectory towards a major environmental, social and economic catastrophe, the platform manager would 
have to bear the brunt of criminal investigation and possibly criminal prosecution and punishment (….) The 
platform manager denies that any pressure was exerted on him by onshore management to stay on board 
and try to recover the situation. To the contrary, exerting pressure on him to stay would have been the most 
effective way of getting him to fully evacuate” (p. 17). 
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emissions; according to the PSA report, this scenario was less likely than the crew 
appeared to believe.175 
Normalization of deviance as culture 
The management of risk can thus be understood from different perspectives of variously 
situated actors, exposed to external pressures and constraints as well as shaping these, 
and also producing local strategies in complex processes of mental and social 
conditioning and optimization. The scope of such broad and highly contextual 
reconstructions of large accidents (and near misses), is evident in the post accident 
accounts of the two spectacular space-shuttle accidents, Challenger and Columbia. Both 
were analyzed by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (and their advisers), which 
was carried out with the intent, not only to find out what happened to the shuttle, but also 
to “determine the conditions that allowed the accident to occur” (Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board, 2003: 6). This insight does not in itself indicate how deep into the 
history of possible causal antecedents the search will penetrate; in this case the 
reconstructed narrative went beyond Challenger and to features and weaknesses that the 
Board found to be deeply rooted in the history of NASA and its broader political and 
economic environments. The report highlighted the organizational, social, and cultural 
background conditions that lead up to the accident, and their recommendations likewise 
pointed to how such conditions would be critical for the safety of future spaceflights.176 
What makes the analysis particularly relevant from our point of view is the crucial 
explanatory role given to NASA culture. Culture is here understood as “basic values, 
norms, beliefs, and practices”, defining assumptions made in way things are done, and 
which acts as a “powerful force that persists through reorganizations and the departure of 
key personnel” (p. 101). Culture is used both as interpretive biases, as models of the 
                                                 
175 But that kind of knowledge was derived from scientific experiments, and could not be considered 
necessary for the operation of the facility; it was thus neither a result of hindsight privilege nor of foresight 
expectation. 
176 Diane Vaughan more than suggests that this was due to her analysis of the Challenger accident 
(Vaughan, 1996), which the Board had read; she was called to testify and later invited to work with them 
and eventually to write the important chapter that summarizes the historical lessons from both accidents. 
According to Vaughan, the Boards report “is the first US accident investigation report to give equal weight 
to social causes and technical causes...”, thus departing from the “human factors model” or what she terms 
the “ritualistic post-accident investigation practice of placing blame on OE [operational error]” (2005:65). 
Consequently, the report is filled with references to the HRO-literature, and several prominent contributors 
to this tradition features on the list of “advisors and consultants”, such as Karlene Roberts and Karl Weick.  
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world, and as collective ‘scripts’, as models for acting in it. In its application, it is 
contrasted with features of organizational structure, with flows of communication and 
with external environmental factors. But it is simultaneously both influencing and 
influenced by these, in an integral co-producing force in the flow of events. Culture was 
thus not ‘localized’ at certain steps in a stringent causal chain, but still made observable 
as sometimes quite explicitly described mechanisms in the course of events. The most 
salient of such mechanisms is the process of “normalizing deviance”, echoing Vaughan’s 
(1996) well- known analysis of the Challenger launch, and in fact reapplying this label 
on what turned out to be a recurring behavioural pattern in NASA. 
 
The immediate cause in both accidents was technical failure. In the Challenger launch, 
the failure was caused by O-ring erosion; in Columbia it was caused by foam debris hits. 
Both weaknesses were well known, much discussed, and subjected to regular risk 
assessment processes. A number of flights had been successfully conducted, seemingly 
proving the weak spots to be well contained and within the limits of “acceptable risk”. 
However, additional strains to the system on the two occasions proved fatal. The cold 
night before the Challenger launch weakened the O-ring’s resistance to erosion; the foam 
debris hit a fragile tile and it was larger than the previous ones. On both occasions these 
facts were partly known and partly suppressed; in Challenger prior to the launch, and in 
Columbia just after the launch. The effects of the cold on the O-rings were voiced by 
engineers in the contractor company, but played down and suppressed by management, 
afraid of compromising business. The foam debris hits were a concern for a designated 
specialist task group, requesting additional scanning of the wing, but was incapacitated 
by the Project management. But the insufficient attention to warning signals was evident 
long before the actual events unfolded: “In both cases, engineers and managers who 
conducted risk assessments continually normalized the technical deviations they found” 
(p. 196). Both problems violated design specifications, but were transformed into a 
permanent maintenance issue following an initial engineering analysis, concluding that 
the design could tolerate the damage. According to the Board, these were turning points, 
as they “established a precedent for accepting, rather than eliminating, these technical 
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deviations”. The process of normalization was to become further institutionalized (or 
‘culturalized’):  
 
As a result of this new classification, subsequent incidents of O-ring erosion and foam 
debris strikes were not defined as signals of danger, but as evidence that the design was 
now acting as predicted. Engineers and managers incorporated worsening anomalies into 
the engineering experience base, which functioned as an elastic waistband, expanding to 
hold larger deviations from the original design. Anomalies that did not lead to catastrophic 
failure were treated as a source of valid engineering data that justified further flights. These 
anomalies were translated into a safety margin that was extremely influential, allowing 
managers and engineers to add incrementally to the amount of seriousness of damage that 
was acceptable (p. 196).  
 
Anomalies thus became “routine signals” rather than signals of danger, and ‘strong’ 
signals were reinterpreted as ‘weak’. The behavioural patterns in the critical phase 
leading up to the accidents were thus not surprising, but rather a long term consequence 
of problems that had become what Turner (1978) called “ill-structured”. The flight 
readiness process, intended to “transform known problems into acceptable flight risks”, 
was in both cases disabled, largely because the known problems were already defined as 
acceptable; they could not overrule previous expert judgment. In Turners analysis this 
“ill-structuring” was revealed only with hindsight bias. The detailed account, in particular 
of the Challenger launch, facilitates a closer reading of how this process evolved, seen 
from the perspective of the actors involved.  
 
The Board went further in their analysis, however. Common causes of both accidents led 
to identifying history as a cause, including a pervasive pressure on NASA to perform 
more like a business, with deadlines and efficiency demands, rather than as a research 
and development agency. The Shuttle was increasingly treated as an operational vehicle, 
with tight schedules and routine launches designated for operational tasks (servicing the 
ISS and Hubble). This was largely the result of compromises, as NASA was unwilling to 
reduce their ambitions in the face of budgetary cutbacks. What was originally designed to 
be an experimental project was increasingly treated as an operational one. In fact, the 
Board considered the schedule and shoestring budget to be as influential for the outcome 
as the actual risk decisions taken during the Flight Readiness process. Corners were cut 
and signals of danger were reinterpreted and dealt with in a manner that minimized the 
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likelihood of delays. Organizational accommodations following Challenger (as 
recommended by the accident commission), were reversed in the course of time; 
personnel cutbacks and outsourcing, simultaneously increased the reliance on contractors, 
and impeded oversight and communication flows. Reductions in safety personnel were 
justified on the (false) assumption that contractors would compensate with safety 
measures relative to their expanding commissions. Also, the independence of the safety 
organizations was compromised by role-conflicts and increasing reliance on the projects 
for budgeting; again contrary to recommendations of the Challenger accident 
commission. Structural changes were thus seen as “perpetuating dangerous aspects of 
pre-Challenger culture” (p. 199). Streamlining and downsizing conveyed a message of 
efficiency rather than safety. Furthermore, the Board pointed to the heritage from the 
Apollo era; the old vision of NASA as “the perfect place” where anything could be 
achieved, supported a strong “culture of invincibility”; this was visible also in the 
unwillingness to listen to outside experts.177 This old entrepreneur-like culture of 
research and development “with its prized deference to the technical expertise” was 
gradually overrun during the Space shuttle era by an “allegiance to hierarchy, proced
and following the chain of command” (p. 199). By implication, the assumptions of the 
‘can-do’ culture were transposed within this belief in “bureaucratic accountability”:
cultural belief that the seventeen years of successful launches could be attributed to the 
structures, rigorous procedures, and detailed system of rules. Continuing and deep-seated 
cultural properties (like easily produced confidence) were thus assigned a crucial role in 
explaining the missing impact of lessons from Challenger, however in close interaction 
with environmental and structural factors; the latter were however also occasionally 
referred to as ‘cultural’, at least in their consequence: “The NASA culture encouraged 
flying with flaws because the schedule could not be held up for routine problems that 
were not defined as a threat to mission safety” (p. 198). Production pressure and scarce 
resources influenced how risk issues were interpreted, and furthered rigid distinctions 
between serious and less serious problems, causing insufficient attention to the latter. 
Managerial behaviour was subject to conflicts between cost-efficiency and safety. The 
ure, 
 the 
                                                 
177 The Aerospace Safety and Advisory Panel told NASA in a 1985 report that they should stop treating the 
vehicle as if it was operational. The Board found that they continued to do so even after Challenger, despite 
repeated assessments reminding them that it was only experimental.  
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process of normalization allowed for selective and biased information processing, 
minimizing the risk of delay. Warnings were first rejected for want of “sufficient 
evidence”, but a subsequent clearance was accepted without question. Cultural 
mechanisms of framing are thus involved in the process of determining which concern is 
to carry the heaviest burden of proof.  
 
Cultural beliefs appear then as both ‘victims’ and ‘agents’ in the chain of events. The 
shaping of these beliefs includes a number of conditions, and their outcomes are visible 
throughout the critical junctures in the decision-making processes. There is, however, a 
delicate interaction between the process of shaping and of being shaped. The mental 
normalization processes appear as both models of and models for behaviour. The socio-
cultural mechanism of normalizing deviance was later to be described as “a social 
psychological product of institutional and organizational forces” (Vaughan, 2005: 34). 
The report specifically relates this double nature of local mechanisms and external 
pressure to the HRT-NAT controversies, trying in effect explicitly to reconcile them. 
Vaughan’s analysis of the Challenger accident, was addressed in the later edition of 
Normal Accidents, praised for its thoroughness, but also criticized for not accentuating 
the significance of external pressures and power mechanisms evident in some of the 
critical decision-making contexts, such as in the meeting the night before the launch (see 
Perrow, 1999: 380). Rather than seeing that context as a display of an engineering culture 
with twisted mind-sets and interpretive biases, Perrow point to the pervasive pressures 
that were put on the worried engineers, causing them to ‘fumble the ball’ and not able to 
mobilize the argumentative power that they in fact possessed. Cultural scripts existed, but 
the managerial ones prevailed, and the outcome was essentially an “exercise of 
organizational power” (Perrow 1999: 380). Perrow’s analysis may thus point, not only to 
the role of power, but also to the way in which competing  ‘scripts’ meet in asymmetric 
decisional battle-fields. Calling this the ‘powers of culture’ or just power and interests 
may be a matter of taste, but the basic line of reasoning is clearly resumed in the analysis 
of the Columbia accident and in the accompanying reinterpretation of the Challenger 
accident, with cultural mechanisms or ‘scripts’ appearing both as external cause 
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(‘production-pressure’) and as lower level mechanisms of ‘normalization’, but this time 
with the latter as being more susceptible to the forces of the former.  
Locating causes and remedies 
Some interesting parallels and contrasts appear in these cases, both as the events unfold 
and as they are later reconstructed, however far back into the history they are traced. The 
process of ‘normalizing deviance’ was apparent in the SNA-case. ‘Signs of danger’ were 
interpreted as ‘normal’, as long as possible. But the attenuation of the possible risks did 
not appear as ritualistic repetitions with the reassuring effect of having ‘followed the 
procedures’. Rather, the violations appeared as rather ‘conspicuous’, and even trivial; 
they were all the more outrageous from the point of view of the regulators. It could of 
course be reconstructed as an accident (incident) ‘waiting to happen’, but the more 
striking impression from the reconstructions was how it was ‘made to happen’; it 
appeared as ‘ill-structured’ only because apparently ‘obvious’ and elementary 
judgements and procedures were not followed. In fact, the PSA report almost ‘inverted’ 
the question, in pointing to the ‘ingenuity’ with which the incident developed into a 
unique series of broken barriers and regulations. As they concluded their report summary:  
 
The non-conformities found in the investigation report would all have been intercepted and 
corrected if the barriers had functioned. Individual barriers fail from time to time, but failure 
of so many barriers in different phases of an operation is extremely rare. The PSA is critical 
of the fact that such an extensive failure of the systems was not uncovered. We question why 
this was not discovered and corrected at an earlier point in time (PSA, 2005: 4). 
 
The argumentative overkill in the PSA report relied clearly on the most ‘decisive’ and 
fatal acts in the sequence. That is, they distinguished briefly three ‘triggering causes’: the 
perforation of the tail pipe, the perforation, cutting and pulling of the scab-liner, and the 
misinterpretation of the swabbing. Other causes were referred to as ‘latent’ or 
‘underlying’. In this scheme, rule violations (the non-conformities) and causes coincide. 
And the rules are embedded in theories of risk management that implicitly identify the 
‘stop-rules’ of tracing causes, such as pointing to failures of required barriers. Identifying 
such violations is then analogous to the identification of causes.178 The PSA would, at 
                                                 
178 We may notice a contrast to the ‘non-regulatory’ reconstructions, however. Whereas the ‘redemption’ in 
the PSA report lies in the combined effect of systemic failures, the C&W analysis point to the ‘local 
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least within the confines of their formal relations with the industry, hesitate to step 
beyond such identifiable and confirmable evidence.   
 
We introduced this chapter with a reference to the issue of explanatory ‘stop rules’. 
Reason responded to his own question by advocating the view that the search into 
antecedent conditions and causes should concentrate on that which is “changeable and 
controllable” (1997: 16 and 234-38). He thus links up the explanatory, predictive, and 
remedial value of different ‘stages’ or contexts within which to locate causes and 
accompanying remedies or ‘effective points’ of managerial intervention. These are 
displayed as a ‘hierarchy’, moving from individual failure via workplace conditions, 
organizational processes, organizational culture, regulation, and finally, society. He 
identifies the second, third, and fourth of these as the relatively most important ones, 
admittedly in a speculative manner, but asks thus if the ‘pendulum has swung too far’ in 
backtracking the origins of accidents. We may ask if these are questions that can be 
understood and ‘answered’ only in a ‘positivistic’ manner, ignoring some rather 
fundamental questions about human and systemic ‘responsibility’ within the range of 
explanatory candidates. We will touch upon these issues later, but note at this point that 
organizational culture and safety culture are given a relatively high ranking, both in terms 
of explanatory and remedial value. In fact, safety culture is explicitly treated as 
something that can be ‘engineered’ (Reason, 1997: 191-222; see also Chapter 6).  
 
Returning to the cases at hand, we see how a plethora of explanatory factors, differently 
configured, enter in various post-event reconstructions. One may trace the lines of 
historical developments, assess the impact of economic forces, output pressures, 
organizational myopias, and down to the operational errors and technical failures. The 
general mood of wanting to get the job done ‘quick and fast’ appeared as a driving 
rationale that contributed to keeping the risks in the background and to listen to the 
signals in a manner that allowed the process to continue. Also, the longer organizational 
and economic histories, the external economic pressures, the gradual tightening of 
                                                                                                                                                 
perspective’ in drawing attention to the way the situation appeared to the practitioners as the event 
unfolded. 
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schedules, etc., all had their impacts on the decisions taken. But how do we locate and 
identify the distinct impacts of these numerous factors in the chain of events? And are the 
cultural explanations a way of locating these causes in the narrow context of social-
psychological mechanisms operating in isolation from the environment? And what 
problems are solved by naming it all ‘socio-cultural-historical causes’, trying to bridge 
the ‘cultural HRT’ and the ‘structural NAT’? Which are the substantial differences of 
interpretation and which differences are only due to linguistic arbitrariness? In order to 
go beyond the matter of naming, we would have to consider which ‘parts’ of the causal 
complex this term culture should serve as the sum of. The role of culture in the 
explanatory account of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board appeared to be mixed, 
both as cause and as consequence; or rather: both cultural mechanisms and environmental 
conditions were present in the ‘co-production’ of the event. The role of ‘culture’ within 
the conceptual taxonomy of the ‘Pentagon model’ employed in the Statoil report, 
appeared as more dubious and reductive. Arbitrariness, overlap, and analytical fuzziness 
were apparent; for instance, “communication and cooperation” appeared as sub-
categories in all dimensions; ‘mind-sets’ or ‘behavioural styles’ likewise appeared under 
several headings; and ‘culture’ appeared under other headings than “culture”, which in 
turn, was reduced to a combination of ‘values, attitudes, and competence’. Cultural 
processes thus appeared both as disentangled from and embedded in the operational 
contexts within the MTO system.  
 
To locate specific and differentiating causal effects of the various background conditions, 
that is, to ‘isolate’ their relative or decisive impact, is not easy from any of the analyses 
that have been provided. Which were the necessary or sufficient causes, tracing the scales 
of causal proximity to the events? None of the analyses referred here classify the various 
candidates in any rigorous manner, and the longer we trace the ‘underlying conditions’ 
the more ambiguous are their explanatory impacts. Rather than providing specified 
accounts of which of these steps that really would be ‘a difference making a difference’, 
engaging in contra-factual reasoning, etc., there is an argumentative overkill amounting 
to a large assemblage of critical factors that ‘may’ have changed the course of events. 
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In reconstructing such events, we might identify the explanatory status of ‘deviance 
normalization’, ‘memory-loss’, ‘can-do cultures’, task-orientation, or problem-solving 
and operational cultures, and even try to identify the impact of economic forces in the 
formation of such organizational mechanisms and cultures. We would perhaps find 
possible ‘causal chains’, but at all junctures, the outcome of any ‘causal test’ would be 
ambiguous. Following the advice of Reason, safe operations could not ‘require’ the 
absence of can-do problem-solvers working for economic gain. And, it should be noted, 
as the Snorre incident evolved, it was just this ‘can-do’ culture that finally saved the day. 
Rather, we would arguably look for conditions under which the basic economic forces are 
tempered in such a way as to provide due allowance for managing risks to the extent 
necessary for safe and prudent operations.  
Culture as cause and as diagnosis 
This was the dubious context in which the label ‘HSE culture’, good or bad, was to be 
tested for its explanatory and diagnostic virtues. As noted, the culture provision appeared 
as ‘superfluous’ in the PSA response. There were enough provisions available under 
which the non-conformities could be subsumed. It could, however, serve as a more 
‘supplementary’ or ‘summarizing’ diagnosis, pointing to the pervasiveness of deviations, 
to the collective and tacit understandings evident in the operation, or to the underlying 
economic motivations that contributed to shaping these operational rationales. This is 
pretty much how the PSA General Director summarized the relevance of HSE culture in 
the SNA case, pointing also to its more general relevance:   
 
R: Then there is the question of how to follow up in terms of supervisory activity etc. You 
have several approaches. In particular, it’s important to uncover what kind of culture they 
really have in a company, taking a serious incident as the starting point. Investigations that 
we carry out provide very good assessment, very good …. a lot more efficient in many 
contexts than the traditional audits and verifications. If you take the Snorre-investigation 
and ask what it says about the HSE culture in the Snorre-organization, you’ll find that they 
didn’t have any HSE culture. They had a money-production-culture: keep production up at 
any cost. That was quite obvious .… I often use this case as an example …. here’s a 
thorough inquiry, it says a lot about a poor or missing HSE culture …. and it may provide 
much learning for others; study it, consider your own organization, look for things to 
improve. 
I: But HSE culture wasn’t referred to in the rapport? 
R: No. No, that wasn’t the question, you know. So therefore, the subsequent use of that 
rapport …. it’s an additional question …. what you can investigate, you find all the 
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deficiencies and rapport it to the company and demand that they correct and improve. 
That’s the traditional approach. But the order they were given, grounded in what was 
discovered at Snorre, required that they must review the whole organization in Statoil, to 
look for similar conditions elsewhere …. and we demanded an action-plan, not only a list of 
measures, but they also had to describe how they were going to estimate the effects.  
 
 
There was no apparent hesitation in this cultural diagnosis. This approach, challenging 
the company, calling for self-reflection, analysis, and improvement measures, and a 
somewhat open attitude as to what they would come up with, was as noted well founded 
in the supervisory strategy of the agency. The question about how the concept of culture 
would represent anything significantly novel in this context was not so clearly explicated. 
We recall, however, that culture later appeared in the self-evaluation required, but 
somewhat arbitrarily configured within the conceptual scheme of the ‘Pentagon model’.  
 
Although a reference to ‘failures’ related to HSE culture may have strengthened the 
conclusions in the investigation report, and served to attract more attention to 
organizational aspects beyond ‘rule-following’ or ‘regulatory compliance’, this option  
also triggered the ‘dangers’ involved in using the provision, as was noted above; and 
restraint was imposed in order to avoid ‘misunderstanding’. Although the culture group 
extensively used the SNA case to exemplify the significance of culture, they advocated 
reluctance in terms of using the term ‘negatively’ (see chapters 5 and 6) and argued 
instead for a ‘positive approach’: the building of good cultures as part of the remedying 
and preventive efforts. These dangers of labelling were also shared by the supervisory 
director responsible for the culture project:  
 
R: You don’t couple one incident in one area to the HSE culture of the company, since it’s 
so all-encompassing. That’s a sound development.  
I: Has it become a policy? Like in the SNA case? 
R: I agreed that they didn’t address the culture concept in that rapport. I’m probably among 
those who’re somewhat sceptical and careful in the use of that word, in investigations – or 
generally; it’s so easy to say that it has something to do with the culture, which again can be 
handled single-mindedly as a question of attitude and individual responsibility.  
I: Has there been a clear management policy as to the uses of the provision? 
R: What has been said is that if you address that provision, you cannot build on that in 
isolation; you need a broader basis; you need a solid foundation in other regulations 
I: But that’s been the case in these instances? 
R: Yes …. But the next step then would be to ask yourself: what does it take to say that the 
HSE culture is bad, since you didn’t use it at Snorre? We really haven’t had any clear 
 260
viewpoint on that matter, no clear guidelines, other than the activities of the culture-project, 
and the maturing process this has been in the organization, a raising of consciousness about 
the complexity of the concept of HSE culture and the necessity to have a holistic approach. 
It will loose some of its force if it is used constantly.  
 
 
The ‘pervasiveness’ of the culture concept was thus strongly felt among those who’d had 
the ambiguous privilege of probing into its potential meanings, as well as its potential 
force. These potentials also, as noted, involved a risk of culture being reduced to the 
sphere of individual attitudes and ‘operational’ behaviour. The question remained, 
however, of whether it would loose force if it was not used at all. Despite the willingness 
to talk about cultural aspects as significant in the promotion of desired HSE-performance, 
or the prevention of critical failure, and the understanding of both, the legal context also 
served as a restriction. What was the meaning of provisions that would not pass the 
‘enforcement test’? We will probe into these questions later, noting at this point how the 
culture provision gradually retreated from the regulatory context into which it had been 
incorporated. 
Concluding remark 
In sum, the Snorre incident can be described and interpreted from several perspectives, 
not mutually exclusive, but vastly different in terms of interpretive and explanatory 
scope. It ranges from the almost ‘barren’ but precise PSA investigation (that ‘no one 
could object to’), to more indulgent searches for background conditions and causal 
antecedents, going on almost ad infinitum. The role of human agency in such systems is 
not easily analyzed. The blending of explanatory conditions, moral responsibility, and 
wider contexts of understanding, is also to serve as inputs for principled and pragmatic 
approaches to the reduction and management of risk, seen both from the regulatory and 
industrial point of view. To the degree that human agency is assigned any contributory 
part in the development of organizational failures, moral issues will also be evoked, the 
more so if events have damaging potentials or outcomes. As has been noted several 
times, the human contribution was given an ambiguous and contested role in the 
industrial risk management strategies, and variously linked to local interpretations of 
HSE culture. In the next chapter we explore some of these risk management approaches. 
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8. Risk, culture, and ‘safe behaviour’ 
 
As noted, the cultural turn in the industry and its initial embracement by the regulators, 
didn’t enter into an ‘empty space’. It entered a space populated with a diversity of ideas, 
regimes, systems, professions, bodies of knowledge, in a word, ‘cultures’, that 
conceptualized and epitomized how risks where to be understood and dealt with. These 
included systems of statistical monitoring, comprehensive bodies of industrial regulations 
and procedures, investigation techniques, causal schemes and charts, etc., providing 
different frames of reference for the social construction of risk management. In this 
chapter, some selected glimpses into this space will be provided, concentrating on those 
slices that first and foremost became associated with the cultural discourses and 
controversies. The process of integrating cultural perspectives as part of the risk 
management regime was thus a process of ‘connecting’ culture to existing and ongoing 
themes and schemes, but it was also a process of ‘disconnecting’ it from the heretical 
ones among these.  
 
As noted, the cultural turn became entangled in basic controversies and opposing 
doctrines about risk management, about how risk was to be measured, about which risks 
should be given priority, and about the design of preventive measures. As was also noted, 
some dominant risk management strategies faced the critique of giving priority to injuries 
and fatalities related to ‘ordinary’ occupational accidents, rather than long term health 
impairments or major accidents; and furthermore, they did this in the wrong way, by 
trying to manage the workers rather than the hazards. Instead of respecting the autonomy 
of the individual, allowing for flexibility and ‘behavioural latitude’ at the operational 
level, personal attitudes and behavioural self-discipline appeared as targets for 
intervention. Was risk to be managed by pointing to the responsibility of the individual to 
safely manage oneself and nearby colleagues within the given framework of existing 
risks, or by addressing the managerial responsibility to minimize the risks embedded in 
these frameworks, with the aid and proper involvement of HSE specialists and employees 
(such as safety representatives and union representatives)? Such questions were 
epitomized in some of the large safety programs initiated within the industry. 
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The (cultural) safety programs 
A number of such safety programs have been launched in the industry during its long 
history (Haukelid, 1998; 1999; Lindøe and Engen, 2007; Ryggvik, 2008). Some of the 
later generations of these are comprehensive ‘behavioural’ programs involving large 
portions of employees, down to the lowest echelons. As HSE culture and safety culture 
emerged as the new risk management catchwords, they were often referred to as ‘culture 
programs’. Developing strong safety cultures, putting ‘safety first’, promoting good 
attitudes and safe behaviour, became common denominators, and appeared also as 
ingredients in the building of company reputation. The emergent industrial self-scrutiny 
around the turn of the millennium (see Chapter 3) was also part of the background for the 
programs, and some appeared to have been triggered by serious accidents in the 
companies (such as Hydro and Smedvig); the culture provision in itself was only 
occasionally referred to as decisive in this respect.179   
 
Many of these programs focused largely on individual attitudes and behaviour of workers 
at the ‘sharp end of production’, based partly on the preoccupation with avoiding injuries 
and keeping LTI-figures low. The ‘Iceberg Theory’ (see Chapter 3), translated into the 
idea that there was a proportionate relationship between minor errors and major accidents 
and that the total number of errors therefore had to be reduced, appeared as an important 
metaphor for understanding risk. But it was a contested metaphor, both in terms of its 
possible interpretations and in terms of practical implications. Undue attention to ‘human 
error’ at the lower echelons of the hierarchy, could draw attention away from the more 
important behaviours and decisions at the managerial level, which affected the ‘residual 
risks’ to be faced at the operational level, such as technical conditions or work-pressure 
due to tight deadlines. The programs were correspondingly contested and criticized by 
some as ‘symbol safety’ schemes, preoccupied with encouraging the employees to 
holding rails in stairs and back their cars properly. As noted, ‘the holding of rails’ when 
walking in stairs had become a recurring point of reference, a metaphor, for this 
particular risk management philosophy. And indeed, when you entered the head office of 
                                                 
179 It was, however, claimed by union representatives that some companies regarded BBS-programs as a 
way to comply with the culture provision.  
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some of the large companies, ‘holding rails’ would frequently appear on the  list of 
‘expected’ or ‘required’ behaviour that appeared on boards, in booklets, or small ‘safety-
cards’ handed to you in the reception. Other ‘expectations’ could include not running in 
corridors or stairs, not reading while walking, being careful with hot coffee, etc. Such  
‘house-rules’, of course reflected the essentially low risk environment of the ‘office 
workplace’. But they also ‘signalled’ the importance devoted to safety.  
 
From the point of view of the regulators, a diversity of perspectives could be found. The 
regulations clearly address ‘framework conditions’ and the managerial responsibilities; 
the Management Regulation specified in Section 1 that “Collective protective measures 
shall be preferred over protective measures aimed at individuals”. The responsibilities of 
the employees were specified in the WEA, adding to their rights to safety and 
participation, also their duty to cooperate.180 Beyond these requirements, no clear 
instructions existed for how ‘behaviour modification’ should be integrated in the risk 
management designs, and the agency had no mandate to interfere directly with 
behavioural programs in the industry. They could voice opinions, participate in 
discussions, attend parts of the programs, and so on. But the priorities in supervisory 
encounters were clearly on managerial and collective measures, and as noted in Chapter 
5, in terms of individual blame and punishment their position and policy had been firm 
and resolute. Clearly, the industry had some benchmarks contained in regulatory 
expectations about how far they could go.  
 
In the culture group, the paternalistic focus on the ‘sharp-end’ was a major concern. The 
role of the companies was to protect not to ‘raise’, or ‘educate’ the work force. But 
opinions also diverged in the PSA, as least as they were voiced and worded. Referring to 
                                                 
180 The provision reads as follows: “Employees shall cooperate on the design, implementation and follow-
up of the undertaking’s systematic work on health, environment and safety .... actively cooperate on 
implementation of measures to create a satisfactory and safe working environment …. use the prescribed 
protective equipment, exercise caution and otherwise contribute to prevention of accidents and injury to 
health .… immediately notify the employer and the safety representative and to the extent necessary other 
employees when employees become aware of faults or defects that may involve danger to life or health and 
they themselves are unable to remedy the fault or defect .… interrupt work if the employees consider that it 
cannot continue without involving danger to life or health” (section 2-3). The section further specifies the 
duties to notify the employer or the safety representative in the case of danger (ranging from harassment to 
physical injuries). 
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the dangers in only relying on ‘redundant systems and forgiving technologies’, the 
director for ‘professional competence’ had the following reply:  
 
If we’re going to devise systems covering up for all our errors, we end up drifting around in 
our own worlds, walking around in an empty space; I believe that would be fatal to all. I 
don’t believe the world’s like that, not at home, not in our kitchens, not anywhere. I believe 
it’s fatal to think that way to the very end …. Sometimes there are no barriers. If you walk 
out on the street, if you fool around under some hanging goods, there are no barriers. There 
may be administrative barriers and sometimes physical barriers. But if you’re allowed to 
recklessly fool around, empty headed, then we’ve done something wrong …. There’s a long 
tradition for working with physical barriers, like preventing oil or gas from leaking out .… 
But it’s very mistaken, as some of the unions do, to ridicule that we hold the rails, ridicule 
some simple things that contribute to our awareness. I believe that’s just what’s needed, to 
have some symbolic things that may seem simple and trivial, but still contribute to better 
safety. I remember we were ridiculed when we tried to promote the use of eye protection 
offshore. Eventually, it was required, and eye damages fell to 10 percent of the previous 
level. (disciplinary director) 
 
Although agency opinions were not all harmonized, or at least not diligently scrutinized 
to the effect of arriving at a ‘joint policy’ on the behavioural programs, the issues 
involved could not be ignored. One of the programs even reached the parliamentary level 
(the Storting), and the minister had to answer to critical questions posed by a 
representative from Rogaland.181 An American drilling company, Transocean, had 
devised a system, involving a ‘diagnosis’ of employees according to some pre-defined 
‘personality types’, called ‘beavers’, ‘lions’, ‘otters’ and ‘Golden retrievers’. The beavers 
were supposed to be introvert, careful, and prudent; the lions were born leaders, agile, 
and  impatient; the otters were playful, social, and inspiring; the Golden retrievers were 
loyal, compassionate, and a bit conservative. These types were then coupled with colour-
marks which all employees were supposed to wear on their helmets. The scheme was 
repeatedly exposed to ridicule, and ultimately seen as an intruding way of unduly 
stigmatizing employees, in particular by the leading OFS/SAFE representatives. As the 
issue was to be addressed in the Storting, the PSA was involved in order to investigate 
the scheme on behalf of the ministry, and for providing information in preparing the 
minister’s answer to the Storting (in the so-called “Question Time”). According to the 
supervisory coordinator responsible for the investigation, the issue more or less dissolved 
                                                 
181 The issue was obviously triggered by union representatives, some of whom were quick to detect such 
schemes and to voice their critique. 
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as they probed into it; basically, the scheme had not caused any local protests, appeared 
as rather innocent, and certainly not subject to any agency intervention.182 Still, the case 
is indicative of how much ideological energy that was provoked in the discussions about 
these schemes and programs.  
 
Clearly, there were the varieties of these programs (both between and within them). Some 
included a focus on management decision-making in terms of planning, scheduling, 
technological designs, resources, etc.; and the focus on behaviour at the lower echelons 
would involve the importance of care, trust, communication, etc., and in fact deliberately 
avoid any association between operational errors and ‘blame and shame’ (except in cases 
of gross negligence or wilful and repeated contraventions). The issue of ‘stopping unsafe 
behaviour’ had been a long term commitment in several companies, and campaigns had 
specifically addressed these and other aspects of organizational behaviour, with different 
levels of sophistication. And, certainly, such issues were far from trivial. The costs of 
error could be enormous, and membership in the so-called ‘million-club’ was a dubious 
honour (referring to the sometimes huge costs of operational errors). It seems clear, 
however, that these programs on the whole addressed issues of organizational redundancy 
at the operational levels, rather than at management levels and decision-making arenas 
affecting the overall organizational redundancies related to such issues as manning, 
resources, competence, structures, etc. Obviously, they neither addressed issues of 
‘structural’ redundancy and reliability, unless such issues were actively voiced from 
below (such as outsourcing effects and staff reductions). Such threats to redundancy and 
reliability, may however also affect ‘cultural’ redundancies at the interpersonal and 
operational levels (Rossness, 2001; Rosness et al., 2000).  
 
                                                 
182 First, the scheme hadn’t been properly addressed at the local level arenas, like the Working Environment 
Committee. As it turned out, the OFS source was only one employee, who’d been pressing the issue 
internally. Later, when it was taken up in the committee, it was more or less reduced to hinge on just his 
personal opinion; the rest appeared to be quite happy with the arrangement. It wasn’t perceived as 
stigmatizing, but more like a way of communicating to colleagues something about personal traits; this was 
seemingly done in a quite innocent manner, and in fact allowing for greater acceptance of differences in 
personal styles and behaviours, and facilitating better communication between employees. As when 
someone could appear reserved or uptight, others would be able to interpret this with some indulgence 
rather than suspicion. The PSA officials certainly had some professional reservations regarding the depth 
and validity of these personality tests, which were seen as “typically American”. 
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We review here the “Safe Behaviour Program” of Statoil, which was by far the most 
expensive, comprehensive, and ambitious of the non-technical and workforce oriented 
‘culture’ programs during the research period, and probably also in the Norwegian 
petroleum history as such. The program attracted much attention and was subject to 
vigorous debates, also within the research communities.183 
The  Statoil “Safe Behaviour Program” (SBP) 
The program was originally planned to comprise all Statoil employees in Exploration and 
Production Norway (UPN), and employees in commissioned contractor and supplier 
companies. It was gradually expanded to include all business areas in the company, and 
an English version was developed and made available for international operations and for 
non-Norwegian personnel in Norway. Thus, it has been presented by Statoil as “the 
group’s - and Norway’s - most comprehensive commitment to safe behaviour and 
changing attitudes”. Since the launch in 2003, more than 30 000 Statoil employees and 
contractor staff have attended the program. The program itself consists of a two-day 
“work-shop” in a Stavanger hotel, and a comprehensive and long-term follow-up to be 
carried out in the various parts of the organization.  
Origins, ideas, and design 
SBP largely originated from within the safety-staff of the UPN-organization, responding 
to a negative trend in the statistical records relating to injuries and fatalities. Apart from 
the established HSE-systems, large parts of which were considered to be unduly 
bureaucratic, many of the HSE- programs had the character of being short-lived 
campaigns, often dependent on a small number of committed individuals. The founding 
ideas reflected pervasive opinions among safety-officials in the industry: too much red 
tape, insufficiently entrenched procedures and systems, too many short term programs, 
and insufficient coordination of safety measures between operators and contractors. This 
program was going to initiate a long term commitment. It was to cover everyone, 
                                                 
183 The Norwegian version is termed “kollega-programmet” (the ‘colleague program’).The account 
provided here (see also Appendix 4) is based on my own participation in the work-shop conference, Statoil 
website presentations of the program, reports from former conferences in Statoil Magazine 2004 no 1, data 
from interviews with key members of the SBP-staff, PSA-officials, researchers, and discussions and 
presentations in a diversity of seminars and conferences. 
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including key contractors, and it was to be followed up locally over a four year period. It 
was to be ingrained at all management levels, including dedicated work-shops for leaders 
in the initial phases. The UPN director was perceived as fully committed to the project, as 
was the company CEO. Two union representatives and two safety representatives were 
included in the steering group.  
 
Two guiding principles were important in the preparations. One was that the workers 
should not feel they were being pointed fingers at and to preserve a context of mutual 
confidence. Still, a prime motivation was what they saw as insufficient attention to the 
significance of individual behaviour. As the originator explained it himself184: “Everyone 
who’s been working with accidents knows that behaviour means everything”, aptly 
adding: “and not only in the sharp end of operations”. The focus on behaviour was 
supposed to include all organizational levels, including management decisions. It was 
still clear that DuPont Safety Resources inspired much of the program-content.185 They 
had been hired in early in the process in order to “help the group achieve its zero harm 
target” and had produced a report that identified “the need for more focus on 
behaviour”.186 Although personal behaviour was key, they would not stress “bad 
attitudes”, but rather the positive values of work-mate concern, and even the significance 
of systemic failures related to bad communication, stress-full working conditions, 
systemic vulnerability of complex processes, etc. However, the role of individual 
alertness and concern was stressed also in these contexts: “everyone has a responsibility 
…. you cannot put everything on the system” (SBP originator). To balance these agendas 
– behaviour modification but with a no-blame approach – appeared then as a prime 
concern. The second principle was pedagogical. They wanted an un-academic and 
straightforward style of communication, relying instead on storytelling and participant 
                                                 
184 The founding ideas of the program are largely attributed to one person, often referred to as its ‘master-
mind’; here referred to as the ‘originator’. 
185 The industrial company DuPont has for many years been an influential promoter of various risk 
management ideas, largely based on the Iceberg philosophy, the so-called ‘zero-vision’, and a behaviour 
based approach to ‘error’. Their impact in the Norwegian petroleum industry has been considerable 
(Ryggvik, 2008). 
186 Citations from Statoil magazine (2004); it further explained that: “All the important conclusions from 
this study have been incorporated in the safe behaviour program. This drive builds on the recognition that 
everyone can make mistakes, and must reflect on their own choices and actions. The aim is to persuade 
people to change the way they behave. 
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involvement related to daily work activities. It was decided that the concept of barriers 
(defences) should serve as the recurrent image for conveying the key safety messages. 
They were critical of what they considered to be very academic and inaccessible accounts 
provided by various ‘professionals’, including the PSA. Rather, they wanted to relate it to 
some very simple and recognizable (precautionary) principles directly applicable to 
practical work-situations. “It may not have been right out of the book, but we had that 
discussion. We wanted a communications-platform; this had to work for 35 000 people 
out there” (SBP staff member). Also, the focus on ‘behaviour’, rather than ‘attitudes’ 
appeared as pedagogically justified; not because attitudes were not important, but it was 
clearly less tangible, unfit for the straightforward style of communication that was 
desired, and also more ‘intrusive’ on the part of the target groups. Five barriers were 
selected: correct prioritisation (‘safety first’), compliance (with procedures), open 
dialogue (trust and rapport), continuous risk assessment (within the work-place context), 
and caring about each other (work-mate observation and interference). These ‘soft’ 
(human and organizational) barriers served as key points of reference throughout the 
program. It was carefully explained and the “Swiss cheese” model, derived from Reason 
(1997: 9-13), served as an illustration, indicting what would happen if barriers failed and 
‘event-chains’ could ‘travel’ freely through all the holes in the defences.  
 
The main concern here is how the program served as point of reference in subsequent 
discourses about divergent risk management approaches, particularly through the strong 
associations that were made between HSE culture and the behavioural programs. Some 
general observations about the ideational content and communicative styles adopted in 
the work-shops should be noted, as this was a peak event in the program, a ‘kick-off’ that 
not only conveyed explicit and implicit risk management philosophies, but which also 
served as a point of reference in the follow up.187 First, it was a tightly directed seminar, 
with live and multi-media presentations, staged discussions, and pre-structured 
involvement from participants. Second, program messages were extremely well prepared, 
featuring leading company managers committing themselves to a ‘safety-first’ codex 
(apparently at all costs), testimonies and emotionally compelling stories about serious and 
                                                 
187 A more detailed ‘ethnographic’ report from this work-shop seminar is provided in Appendix 4. 
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fatal accidents, and regular reminders of the need for work-mate concern and constant 
care for safety in all behaviour. Third, the ‘Iceberg’ was displayed on wide screens, 
symbolizing the relationship between minor errors and fatal outcomes, and the 
corresponding need for constant vigilance in all behaviour; but also, examples were 
provided of dangers inherent in complex organizational and socio-technical systems. 
Forth, the promises for the future were unequivocal. This was not to be any passing 
moment of self-celebration, but the start of a long term commitment to safety.  
 
These ideological and professional foundations reflected an amalgam of established HSE 
philosophies that had developed in the practical, technical, and engineering communities 
throughout the industry. Terms and approaches were borrowed from a number of sources 
and moulded into a more or less coherent framework. The concept of barriers, as outlined 
above, served together with the Iceberg, as overall metaphors, with safe behaviours (and 
implicitly: attitudes) as constituent parts. The clearly stated idea was to influence people 
in order to modify their behaviour. Human agency was conceived as the prime cause of 
accidents, and the diligent manufacturing of ‘human barriers’ was intended to bring 
attention to the risk potential contained in individual behaviour. However, recognition of 
group level behaviour was evident in the focus on workmate observance, open dialogue, 
etc.  
 
The criteria suggested for how safety concerns – and measures – should be voiced, 
reaffirmed a rather ‘small-scale’ perspective, as phrased in the “Six rules for good 
measures”: 
 
• The measures should be specific –they can never be specific enough. 
• The measures must relate to what people do, not what people are. 
• Focus on “the little things” at your workplace rather that the broad external framework 
which can be difficult to influence (such as finance). 
• The measures must be practicable in relation to available resources. 
• It must be possible to implement the measures at your workplace. 
• Try to identify at least one measure which can be launched immediately. Small speedy 




The ‘stop-rules’ implied in these provisions reflected of course the ‘local’ perspective of 
the addressees, not necessarily the overall risk management policy. But they indicated 
that these larger concerns be a managerial privilege, and not a local concern. 
 
Another underlying metaphor throughout the conference was one of all being in the same 
boat, having the same concerns and interests regarding safety, evident in the repeated 
insistence that the company was not going to compromise safety for economic gain.  
The need for ‘internalizing’ the context as one of raising common concerns on equal 
terms, was evident also in how the ambiguities of influencing ‘attitudes’ were 
approached, and a paternalistic framing was in a sense both present and absent: Indeed 
one might say it was present in the way it was absent, or rather, insistently absent. As the 
Statoil safety director subtly explained:   
 
In the gatherings, no pointed fingers are lifted in order to urge anyone to behave more 
safely. The arrangement is cast so that everyone should be able to draw their own 
conclusions and adjust their behaviour based on their experiences from the gathering 
(Statoil, 2004).  
 
Or in the words of the program manager: “The aim is to get participants to think about 
their own choices and how they behave.” During the conference, there are several 
contextual framings to the same effect. “We’re not going to be obtrusive here; we just 
want to give you something to think about”. 188 Participants were praised for being honest 
and straightforward, and managers in particular were praised for being clear and explicit 
in their own priorities. Commitment and concern was cherished as autonomous 
sentiments to be extracted within the atmosphere and context of the gathering. This 
atmosphere and context occasionally resembled that of a religious gathering: a 
combination of personal testimonies and confessions, sometimes in a mood of penitent 
remorsefulness, and with an unquestioned identity of interest. 
 
The follow-up plans have covered a four-year period, partly governed by a pre-structured 
agenda and partly adjusted to locally defined problems and activities. This process has 
primarily been the responsibility of the line management, with the support of the SBP 
                                                 
188 We are reminded here of the classical motivation paradox, described by Watzlawick and others 
(Watzlawick et al., 1967). 
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staff and program material. A local SBP group has been established at all units, 
consisting of the line manager, the chief safety representative, and a safety officer. 
Everyone has participated in the follow-up, including most contract workers.189 The local 
units shall  systematically explore the five barriers, one by one, identifying specific 
challenges and obstacles to be overcome, devising action-plans, and conducting follow 
up assessments. The barrier related to ‘work-mate’ concern was the first on the list of 
follow-up items, and thus also the one with which they had acquired most experience. 
That choice was considered crucial for changing the traditional ‘tough-guy’ offshore 
culture, and thus also preparing for a more comprehensive motivational transformation. 
To re-establish the mood of the kick-off seminar, was considered vital in this follow-up 
process. As was observed by a member of the SBP staff:  
 
Those testosterone guys, drilling holes out there, they’re really tough guys. They’re not 
used to talking about human concerns and all that soft stuff. It’s not been easy to talk about 
soft barriers, about concern for each other. But that’s where we are now. The change has 
been tremendous. It’s all right to care, and to interfere; and to take the time needed to do a 
job. There’s a totally new way of working together. They can trust us, take the time needed. 
They stop, and talk about things. I’d never thought it’d possible, to make soft men out of 
those tough guys …. who invented the North Sea. (SBP staff member) 
 
Program evaluations 
Given the great costs and organizational energies invested in the SBP program, much 
internal prestige was tied up with its success. Although we are more interested here in the 
risk management philosophies of the program than in its actual impacts in terms of 
reduced risk or improved HSE conditions (to the extent that these could be ‘measured’), 
some preliminary evaluations should be noted; all the more so, as these also entered the 
subsequent discourses and disputes about the virtues of the program. Statoil 
commissioned a large evaluation program from the local research institute (IRIS), which 
included extensive questionnaires and later supplied with qualitative studies and 
interviews at a number of selected sites (Olsen and Nævestad, 2006). It turned out that 
more than 80 percent had a positive perception of the program and believed it had 
contributed to a better safety culture in the company. In particular, the work-shop 
                                                 
189 Normally, only the first ‘levels’ of suppliers/contractors join in the program, but may be extended to 
more levels if line directors decide so. .In most cases contracts are long-term. As one SBP staff member 
explained: “It’s a stable crew and they really belong to us even if they have other employers.” 
 272
conference received a positive response. Some 50  believed they paid more attention to 
risks at work, including unsafe acts of colleagues. More than 90  percent thought their 
leaders took the message from the program seriously. Managers reported improved 
openness about safety issues and that the threshold for interfering in risky situations had 
been lowered. But familiar challenges remained, like transforming the lessons into 
practice and keeping up the pressure and energy. Some employees reported a gradual 
deterioration in the face of day-to-day operational demands and that leaders that didn’t 
follow up on the commitments made in the gathering. Work pressure, sick-leaves, and 
reassignments were cited as examples of circumstances interfering with the follow up. 
Later studies, however, confirmed the impression that communication-patterns related to 
safety had improved, and in particular that contract employees now felt more ready to 
interfere in situations of perceived danger. The informal hierarchy between operator-
employees and contractor-employees has traditionally been strong, with high thresholds 
for contractor employees to voice their concerns. These signs of ‘levelling hierarchies’ 
were thus received with enthusiasm from the SBP-staff. Also, there was evidence that the 
high-profiled ‘safety-first’ statements so strongly conveyed in the work-shops had been 
used as internal ‘boomerangs’, where managers were confronted with earlier 
commitments and obligations (Nævestad et al., 2007). Of course, that there were varieties 
between teams and sites, came as no surprise to the SBP crew: 
 
But certainly, there are good teams and bad teams. Even on the same platforms you’ll find 
great differences. We don’t need any researchers to tell us that. …. and you still find 
remnants of that old attitude, that this is something we do to satisfy the system.  
(SBP staff member) 
 
Responses, disputes, and adaptations 
The responses to the program cover a range of viewpoints. To summarize, these can 
roughly be divided as unconditional approval, praising the conference, in particular the 
unequivocal management assertions about ‘safety first’, and adhering also to the 
importance of individual attitudes and behaviour; conditional approval, praising the 
conference and the ideational approach but expressing doubts about the follow up; 
conditional scepticism, praising the effort and the message from the management, but 
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expressing doubts and reservations about the strong emotional and behavioural focus, the 
danger of seeing risk only in terms of individual failures, and its reduction as a matter of 
improving personal morals and collegial concern, implicitly also neglecting the 
importance of management decisions and not giving due priority to more important safety 
measures; unconditional criticism, considering the whole program as a false show off, 
diverting energy and attention away from the really critical and important issues, abusing 
personal tragedies, and representing a traditional ‘blame-the-worker-not-the-hazard’ 
approach.  
 
This latter opinion was most fiercely voiced by the leading OFS/SAFE representatives, 
who saw whole program as a poorly camouflaged version of the (American and DuPont-
style) ‘behaviour-based-safety’ philosophy (BBS). The focus on individual morale, 
attitudes, and behaviour distracted attention away from occupational health and working 
environment, technical conditions, and the broader context of (potentially adverse) 
industrial relations. Examples were given of long term health injuries being ignored by 
the company, tri-partite relations being neglected, and a more sanctions based approach 
to critical failures. These provided a quite different context for judging the ‘human 
concern’ and ‘good fellow stuff’ presented at the conference. The program management 
was seen as authoritarian and unresponsive, directing a tightly orchestrated show. This 
radical critique pointed to what they saw as an underlying management orientation and 
paternalistic philosophy, where union representatives and safety representatives were 
only considered as ordinary participants in the program, or assigned to secondary 
(marionette) roles. When they appeared in the gathering, their specific role was not 
emphasised. Any conflict of interest between workers and management was suppressed 
or silenced, not necessarily in any visible or active manner, but in the whole orchestration 
of the program. The collective of the workers was replaced by the collective of the firm. 
Trust in management was assumed rather than challenged, and important decisions would 
still be made over the head of workers or their representatives.  
 
The program also entered into and involved the research communities: partly as hired 
evaluators, and partly as outside critics or timid observers. These ‘scholarly’ responses 
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largely reflected the same set of ‘response profiles’ outlined above. In the ‘OFS/SAFE-
camp’, critique was levelled against the DuPont-inspired, ‘American’, and union hostile 
management systems of behaviour-control. The Iceberg Theory and its local 
interpretations were seen to distract attention from proper risk management measures 
devoted to risk-elimination, technological substitution, technical and administrative 
barriers, etc. These critiques were not limited to the SBP, which was seen more as one 
particular instance of the same risk-management-philosophy: blaming the worker not the 
hazard; relocating safety issues from arenas of regulated and collective bargaining to 
management controlled arenas; departing from the Norwegian tradition of tri-partite 
cooperation, strong unions, and vigilant authorities. The dual effect of the program was to  
‘capture’ workers’ representatives and to individualize safety issues. References were 
also made to how Statoil operated internationally, where they apparently accepted both 
non-regulated and non-unionized systems, and ignored broader and societal human rights 
concerns. The program was interpreted in terms of its ideological ‘essence’. Behavioural 
focus was fair enough, but only organized through collective and institutionalized 
arrangements (Lindøe and Engen, 2007; Ryggvik, 2007).  
 
The fiercest critics were faced with the challenge of accounting for the positive 
evaluation. One response was blunt dismissal: if you invited people to spent two days in 
one of the finest hotels in town and treat them with excellent food and service, they’d 
certainly come up with a positive evaluation. A ‘false consciousness’ argument also 
appeared in various shadings: that most people wouldn’t be able to reveal the true 
ideological underpinnings, that the strong emotional appeal would lead to a containment 
of criticism, that the whole setting suppressed critical voices by treating worker 
representatives as ‘ordinary participants’, etc. Thus, the controversies surrounding SBP 
also reflected more deep-seated controversies about industrial relations, although critique 
was largely phrased by reference to the tripartite system, as the established Norwegian 




There was much discussion about the justifications for this radical critique, of whether 
the program ‘really’ was of the stigmatized BBS-kind, that there was really no blaming 
strategies involved, that a more holistic socio-technical perspective was evident in the 
program design, that unions were represented in program arenas, that safety 
representatives were largely positive, that Statoil did a lot for improving technical safety 
through other programs, and so on. These debates absorbed much intellectual energy 
within the research communities involved in the HSE research program. Somehow, the 
fierce critique served as a ‘discussion-benchmark’, and no ‘positive’ evidence about 
participant responses or safety improvements appeared to make any impression on the 
critics. Ultimately, within a more overarching risk management perspective, any ‘partial 
success’ would appear as just a sidetracking smoke-screen. Being emotional about a 
broken leg was really not ‘proportionate’ in the face of long term health impairments or 
major accidents; and departing from the ‘Norwegian-Nordic model’ was ultimately the 
greatest risk of all since, in the past as well as in the future, this model represented the 
only guarantee for a safe industry, not benevolent industrialists. 
 
However, more moderate critiques were also voiced, less ‘principled’ and ‘ideological’, 
and more ‘rational’ in the double sense that they reacted to both the moral-emotional 
evangelism and to the overall priorities apparently embedded in the SBP philosophy. This 
response was typical for the ‘un-political’ HSE-professionals (including several PSA-
officials): praising the professional make-up of the show, uncomfortable with its strong 
emotional and behavioural tenor, and a bit sceptically awaiting the results. As noted, the 
PSA was also confronted with the program and its effects. Several officials had attended 
the work-shop conference, and the Statoil supervisory team faced the follow-up activities 
in their encounters with the company. On the whole, however, the program was 
considered by PSA officials and managers to be ‘relatively balanced’. Their responses 
correspondingly oscillated between conditional scepticism and approval, partly 
depending on the specific experiences:  
 
I’ve been to the SBP-gathering, and it was really fascinating, with all the stories, and I 
remember them, so it works. But I reacted strongly to some of these testimonies, where 
they confess their violations. And the level was, like if they hadn’t used gloves while 
cutting a tomato .… If you’re going to cut five hundred tomatoes, that would be fair 
 276
enough, but one... ! So, then I think, that was just before the Snorre-incident, you know .… 
And the onshore people, their violations were of the kind, like you might get a thrombosis 
if you work too much …. work stress, and we must be kind to each other, and all that. Then 
I think, the Snorre incident, there they didn’t plan a well operation appropriately …. They 
didn’t really assess the well sufficiently prior to its opening, and they seem to have started 
out on something where they didn’t really know what could happen. And that’s really 
‘silent deviation’ onshore; no one talks about such issues .… If we have silent deviations 
here, it’s not when we don’t hold the rails; it’s when we fail to do the right thing, or if we 
do something wrong in our supervisions. That would be our violations, if we focus on the 
wrong issues, and don’t contribute to avoiding a major accident.  
(supervisory coordinator) 
 
Thus juxtaposing the SBP with the near-miss on Snorre A was a recurring way of 
addressing the issue of proportionality. The stark contrast between the focus on human 
error at the ‘sharp-end’ and the series of managerial and organizational failures 
uncovered in the SNA case was apparent. But as noted, these were ‘errors’ that the 
program also wanted to ‘include’.  
 
In some way, SBP appeared unassailable. For the program management, the most radical 
critique was largely met with indulgent disbelief. Primarily voiced by leading 
OFS/SAFE-representatives, the critique was seen as a response from the margins, not 
really reflecting the attitudes of employees, not even the main thrust of the union 
members. It reflected the old ‘us-and-them’ attitude. As noted by one staff-member:  
 
Some criticize just for the sake of it. Or they believe there’s something behind, some 
hidden agenda. That this is based on old American safety approaches where the employers 
just pass the buck, try to shift all the responsibility over to the employees .… SBA was 
established so that employees should not harm or kill themselves. Period.  
(SBP staff member) 
 
In fact, the critique was largely treated as opinions ‘in need of explanation’, to be 
externally diagnosed so to speak.190 The financial and professional investments by the 
company were seen as expressing a unique commitment to the common interest of all in 
improving HSE-conditions. They took great pride in the development of the conference 
program and its technical, organizational, and ideational make-up, but admitted that the 
real test of its success was the implementation process. 
                                                 
190 On one occasion, a large conference on HSE culture, one of the leading SBP representatives challenged 
a panel of researchers to provide such an ‘external’ explanation. The ‘base-rate’ of course, being the 
undisputable qualities of the program and the positive response given by most participants.  
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 But the staff also commented on the dilemmas inherent in the behavioural focus; in fact, 
there seemed to have been a development in focus as the program gradually involved 
onshore personnel, and eventually the whole organization. Obviously, this instigated 
some adjustments in terms of what risks to address. As noted by one staff-member: 
 
It was originally designed only for UPN-people, for the offshore workers. When it was 
decided that it should cover all of Statoil, we had to adjust. Some said: This program of 
yours is made for platform people, it doesn’t fit here; it doesn’t match our kind of work. 
And many onshore people don’t know much about life offshore. And they don’t know the 
philosophy. (SBP staff member) 
 
Initially, these adjustments resulted in a focus on ‘office risks’ and even on so-called ‘24-
hour safety’ (including both working time and leisure time). Holding rails and safe 
gardening thus appeared as equally legitimate work-shop themes, providing new targets 
for the BBS critique: a totalitarian ‘HSE fascism’ that required full personal self-control 
to be implanted in everyone’s minds and acts, at all times.191 Gradually, however, these 
adjustments appear to have caused a larger focus on framework conditions: When the 
audience consisted of onshore managers, planners, and designers, new kinds of issues 
appeared about how offshore safety were influenced by their behaviour, the choices and 
decisions affecting technical design, logistics, timing, schedules, etc. 
 
We had to step back, look at the whole process, the underlying philosophy. From planning, 
design, the choice of materials, the use of materials, the composition of materials, the 
choice of equipment, pumps, valves, everything. You have to take account of the fact that 
these installations are supposed to endure extreme pressures and temperatures .… We’re 
not distracting attention from technical safety. It’s a precondition that technical safety is 
maintained and developed further. (SBP staff member) 
 
So somehow, the ‘framework conditions’, the higher level decisions of planning, design, 
resources, time-schedules, etc., entered the program gradually, almost through the back 
door. Some sceptics from the PSA were even reported to have changed their opinion 
about the program after having attended these gatherings for the onshore units, 
comprising management, planners, technical staff, etc., and who had focused exactly on 
how their ‘behaviour’ laid foundations for the risk levels that had to be dealt with in the 
                                                 
191 In some of the early conference reports, several examples are given of how employees take great pride 
in using safety protection in their garden work, etc. 
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offshore operations.192 And as noted above, the original program ideas also contained 
socio-technical perspectives and ideas, dismissing the immediate causes as the most 
important, and most explicitly voicing a no-blame approach; as was explained by one 
staff-member:  
 
The iceberg is just an illustration. To remind ourselves that we do mistakes all the time. A 
pilot does 8 mistakes per hour. It’s a human right to make mistakes. But we must realize 
that fact, and recognize the errors. When everything else fails, the concern of our fellow 
work-mates is our last barrier. We must be able to admit errors; to have a culture for 
reporting failure. That it’s not to denounce anyone, to have something on them …. We 
needed a culture for acquiescence, not based on sanctions …. You cannot just focus on the 
guy who was present when the accident stroke, at the wrong place, at the wrong time. You 
must focus also on those who lay the foundations for safety. But originally, it was made for 
those at the sharp end. (SBP staff member) 
 
 
These adaptations in the program didn’t appear to have made much impression on 
fiercest critics. And the thresholds for distinguishing ‘individual’ and ‘environmental’ 
factors in the causal chains were infused with explanatory as well as moral claims. In the 
program vocabularies, ‘neglect’ and ‘carelessness’ were avoided, or subtly rephrased in a 
language of vigilance, care, and concern. But always to blame the ‘system’ was not seen 
as a viable solution. And a much bespoken ‘management-of-consequence’ policy in the 
company provoked controversy, and appeared to some to undermine the no-blame 
approach, or, worse, to disclose the true nature of the behavioural program. The 
thresholds for the application of behavioural sanctions within this policy was not 
altogether clear, however, and probably not uniformly applied.193 Publicly, the ‘repeated 
and voluntary’ violation of company procedures was explained as a critical edge: 
 
Everyone must take responsibility. When someone has done something really stupid, we’ve 
taken a lot of so-called ‘compensatory steps’; built ourselves out of the problem, with this 
or that device. And: if failures are repeated, it may have consequences. We need to follow a 
philosophy of consequence. The unions also agree to that. If it’s a slip or lapse, that’s all 
right; but if it’s really your way of doing things, and you don’t respond to corrections, then 
it must have some consequence. That’s like raising children. We had a situation with some 
scaffold workers; during the erection and dismantling of scaffolds, they where throwing 
                                                 
192 One of them had in fact himself written a critical PhD thesis on the application of ‘Iceberg Theory’, the 
use of LTI figures, and behavioural approaches to risk management.  
193 These policies appeared rather lenient, however, allowing for several loops of polite reminders and 
increasingly critical reprimands before any serious sanctions would be issued. Some examples of internal 
transfers were reported, however. 
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these coupling devises around, to each other and into a basket. They weigh about half a 
kilo, and people pass below all the time. As it happened, they lost one of these devices. 
Fortunately it didn’t hit anyone, but that was just luck. I believe they reported the incident 
themselves. A few days later they were observed, however, still throwing these coupling 
devices. So they were returned onshore on the first helicopter. When people don’t respond 
to warnings, and carry on doing dangerous things, then that must have consequences.  
(SBP staff member) 
 
This latter example appeared on several occasions, almost as a ‘benchmark-narrative’ for 
illustrating where the line should be drawn between acceptable human error and 
unacceptable negligence. The public debates (such as in seminars and conferences) 
seldom penetrated these issues down to concrete comparisons of examples, evaluated 
against more generalized norms about where to draw the line between ‘personal 
responsibility’ and ‘external conditions’. They were rather polarized, confirming and 
cementing the positions between no-blamism and collective protection, vs blamism and 
individual risk adaptation. The extreme positions appeared largely as attributions, 
however, since few would wholeheartedly embrace any one of them.194  
 
But although this mixture of moral and explanatory considerations was not only couched 
in these very polarized terms, the issue of explanatory primacy and strategic priority still 
pervaded risk management discourses, also seen from a more ‘professionally neutral’ 
point of view: 
 
I realize that it may be legitimate to focus on attitudes and behaviour, but then you must 
focus on all levels. If you look into Synergy [see Chapter 5] you’ll find thousands, hundred 
thousands of errors at the sharp end level. Go and search for any registrations of erroneous 
management decisions. You won’t find it here, you won’t find it anywhere. We have a 
mental picture that errors occur at the sharp end, that’s where it’s important to take action. 
But that’s not true. And it would take some self-scrutiny in many quarters to approach that. 
…. Then there’s something about the way of thinking that’s present here – that we shall 
stop people from doing mistakes. That’s important; but on the other hand, we know that 
people make mistakes, they’ll always do. We must rather construct resilient systems, which 
tolerate mistakes. That perspective tends to disappear. We think we can make people into 
angles, but we can’t .… That was part of my reaction against the Statoil program .... 
Implicitly, when you make a mistake you’ll feel guilty. But it is human to err. Why not 
                                                 
194 The issue appeared in virtually all HSE conferences and seminars, the last time in the summer of 2006, 
where a former UPN director gave a talk in which he referred to the need to ‘break the taboos relating to 
personal responsibility for safety’. This was soon commented on as a ‘cold rush from the past’, and also 
referred to on several later occasions as a ‘warning sign’ of the forces in motion and the need to resist.  
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focus on all the risky situations where people have intervened in sensible ways and 
prevented accidents? There are a many stories of such heroism from the shelf.  
(HSE manager) 
 
SPB as part of the Statoil risk management regimes 
There is of course no true or final story to be told of the SBP-program. The strength, 
diversity, and divergence of the ones that were still provided, illustrate under any 
circumstance how the recurring risk management themes appeared in familiar 
oppositions: Behaviour vs ‘systems and conditions’, blame vs no-blame, profits vs safety, 
managerial vs participative models, etc. As may be evident, the versatility and 
‘ambiguity’ of the program made it adaptable to a number of interpretations; nothing 
could prove any of them quite wrong – or quite right. It contains an amalgam of risk 
approaches and management ideas, making it possible also to find selective evidence for 
some ‘essential’ body of underlying principles. The ‘holding of rails’ and other ‘symbols 
of safety’, could be ridiculed and rejected for dislocating and sidetracking the risk 
discourses; but they were also justified, not essentially by the arguing for their 
importance in isolation, but just because of their assumed importance as symbols: they 
would signify a shared concern for safety and were as such seen as instrumental in 
spreading a general ‘culture of safety’. 
 
Beyond such discourses, the follow-up of the program takes place in a diversity of social 
contexts, thus mixing with local cultures and organizational settings that will shape 
interpretations and conversions into ‘facts on the ground’. But these ‘facts’ are also 
influenced by a number of other risk management systems and tools that are more or less 
adapted to each other, conceptually as well as practically. As noted, the SBP originated 
within the safety staff of the UPN organization. By 2006 the program had gained an 
unprecedented status and impact, as a world-wide safety program in the whole Statoil 
system. There was certainly an element of ‘internal imperialism’ in this, even if the 
program had not ‘replaced’ other instruments and regimes. But there was considerable 
overlap between these, partly reflecting the simple fact that Statoil was a large 
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organization, with different hierarchical, vertical, and geographical divisions.195 The 
UPN had implemented a specific tool for improving the manager-worker dialogue on 
safety issues, called “open safety dialogue” (although, by some, or in some cases, 
considered to be more disciplinary than dialogical). The Synergy system organized the
handling of ‘unplanned events’ and several other diagnostic tools had been in operation, 
including an “organizational safety assessment”, two work environment measurement 
systems, and also the data-sets available from the RNNS-project. Thematic overlaps wer
evident, in particular in relation to the overarching HSE culture concept, which appea
in the company HSE strategy for the years 2004-2008, with the prime purpose to “bu
strong HSE culture”. Two reports (partly internal) appeared in 2003-2004, identifying at 
least 7-8 systems and tools that in various ways addressed issues related to ‘HSE culture’ 
(Høivik et al., 2003; Høivik and Bye, 2004). These reports, however, also provided a 
conceptual demarcation of HSE culture, visualized as an umbrella with the following 
items: behaviour, attitudes and competence, interaction and collaboration, and procedures 
and physical conditions. In effect, the reports suggested that these items be normatively 





                                                
196 We may recall at this 
point also how culture was pigeonholed in the Statoil SNA report, located primarily as 
something related to ‘attitudes and competence’ within the framework of the ‘Pentagon 
model’. This proliferation of conceptual configurations at least appeared as one 
indisputable effect of the cultural turn, also at the company level. 
 
We may note, however, that in the SBP, ‘culture’ was not specifically addressed as such, 
and was not included in the basic vocabulary of the program (although it appeared 
occasionally, as seen above). The ‘pedagogical requirement’ was part of the reason why. 
‘Culture’ was considered by the staff to be a somewhat academic term, leaving more 
 
195 Occupational health issues were initially excluded from the program in order to preserve a dedicated 
attention to safety issues. Health issues were seen as ‘complicated’ and were organizationally and 
professionally dislocated from safety issues. As the program evolved, however, ‘safety’ was defined more 
broadly and working conditions more generally were frequently taken up in both the work-shops and 
follow up meetings. 
196 Each ‘component’ of the umbrella was to apply equally to both managers and ordinary employees. The 
inventory was based on work-shops and interviews with Statoil personnel with HSE-related tasks and 
responsibilities (safety representatives, HSE managers, etc). The report, typically, originated from the 
health and Human Factors units in Bergen (not the safety unit in the headquarters in Stavanger). 
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questions than answers, and more bewilderment than clear recipes to act upon; especially 
if unleashed in the diverse and primarily un-academic setting of offshore practitioners. 
But, as the originator explained: “deep inside, this is culture … everyone understands that 
this is all about culture”. And the term certainly appeared in the various gatherings, 
outside the ‘control’ of the crew. In short, HSE culture in Statoil appeared in many 
configurations, and even when the term was avoided, it was still there, at least the range 
of phenomena to which the word so ambiguously referred.  
Cultural imperialism, diffusion, and confusion 
As noted, HSE culture and the safety-programs became ‘associates’, although the concept 
itself only appeared in some of the programs. The SBP, clearly being the most 
comprehensive of these, was sometimes accused of ‘cultural imperialism’, as it 
comprised so many companies and employees in the industry. Statoil had some 60 
percent of the operatorships in the industry, and all important contractor companies had 
to attend and participate in the program. However, the other large operators, like Hydro, 
BP, Shell, ConocoPhillips, etc., all had their own, sometimes globally adopted, programs. 
This caused some frustration, especially in the contractor companies, who also had their 
own internal programs. Taken together, they required much time and resources, applied 
different approaches, and led also to some confusion. The ‘program-inflation’ (and 
overload) was finally addressed through the joint ‘Working Together for Safety’ group 
(WTfS) in the OLF (see Chapter 3), and an initiative was taken to establish a working 
group in order to ‘coordinate the ideas’ in a joint program for the industry. One of the 
participants in this process expressed his concerns in the following manner, adopting also 
a historical perspective:  
 
This cultural imperialism, you know…. Just think of Statoil and the SBP; they summon all 
their suppliers .… and think of the suppliers not so abundant in resources; what will shape 
their culture when everyone’s been to the Statoil program? And two weeks later they attend 
the BP program. And it’s required, you know. You really don’t have much time to develop 
anything on your own. That was really the background for the establishment of that group 
…. Critique was levelled through the OLF board from several supplier companies – who 
got somewhat tired of all these operator programs .… When I use the term culture 
imperialism, it’s seen from the supplier perspective. When I, as a responsible manager, shall 
build a good and sound culture in my company, I need time and money …. and you can 
become confused, you know, if you promote this or that … But this Statoil program, it’s 
really quite general, you know, like caring for each other and all that … and you have this 
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slogan, like “take two”, or like Transocean, with colour-dots on your helmet that says what 
kind of personality you are .... and it gets confusing, if you want to build an identity of you 
own. We also have our own slogans, and we spent much time to make people identify with 
this, like “this is us” or “this is ours”. And then we’ll have to send our people to all these 
arrangements that have this cultural imprint, that’s when I use the term cultural imperialism. 
It’s very important to have some humbleness in these initiatives .… But it’s really quite 
fruitless to be critical about the SBP; it really has so many good things in it …. and it’s 
really not worth while to use any effort in being critical. But the OLF board has addressed 
the fact that there is a worry among suppliers that there are so many initiatives among the 
customers, and that this has a cost in terms of their own culture building efforts. And we get 
questions when we submit a tender, what kind of culture initiatives we’ve taken .... and how 
do we respond to that? That we’ve had 50 people at the Statoil program? Or 20 people at 
the BP program? That’s just too stupid. (HSE manager) 
 
 
However, these concerns extended beyond the culture programs that had proliferated 
since the late 1990s. Largely, the cultural turn more or less rephrased issues that had been 
on the agenda for many years, ranging from work-process training to team-building, and 
largely seen as belonging to the same cluster of ‘non-technical’ programs. Referring 
specifically to a Statoil program from the 1980s (´called “Stuck in drilling”), one HSE-
manager recalled the following episode:   
 
R: I remember after the fist gathering, some of them came up to me: “Hey [N], this was 
really great!; and now we know something you don’t! And that was the meaning of the 
word ‘empathy’. So this was a lot about communication, about not misunderstanding each 
other, you know, all these ‘niceties’. So, in terms of content, this was really good .… For 
me this is much the same thing .… safety motivation, human factors, communication, hand 
over, that people know about the job, planning, treat each other respectfully; you know, all 
these things recur all the time; it hasn’t changed at all. 
I: So you believe that all these things that are now put under the label HSE culture, it’s 
really just exemplars of the same thing? 
R: Yes, that’s my view. We had a HSE culture then as well, right? And the good ones, they 
understood and did it instinctively, and the bad ones .... that’s the same today. So for me, 
these things are really about the same thing .… But what’s good about it is this awareness 
of the perspectives, like it’s easier to talk about, you know. Still there are things here that I 
believe we’ve not quite captured …. (HSE manager) 
 
 
Against this broader background, the things not captured were perhaps beyond the 
referential capabilities of this one word ‘culture’. What the interviewee did capture, 
however, was the conundrums of sorting out exactly what this new concept would add to 
the understanding of risk management, how ‘it’ – the concept as well as the phenomenon 
– related to all the programs, schemes, systems, tools, and other conceptual devices that 
had orbited the industry the last decades.  
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Concluding discussion 
The behavioural programs spawned competing narratives and served as triggers for 
accentuating some highly debated risk management controversies; and as they were 
repeatedly referred to as culture programs, HSE culture became closely associated with 
these same controversies. The contexts for interpretation include political perspectives 
relating to degrees of conflicting or convergent interests between employers and 
employees, moral perspectives related to the location of responsibility within the ‘causal 
chains’, as well as ‘instrumental’ perspectives relating to the efficacy of the programs in 
terms of reducing risk. These overall contexts and perspectives were not clearly 
distinguishable in relation to the ongoing discourses and controversies; instrumental 
arguments would blend in with moral and political ones, such as in discussions about 
overall priorities: if the investments devoted to avoiding injuries were justifiable and/or 
effective against the larger risk picture, if the addressees were properly selected  in terms 
of justifiable and/or effective intervention strategies, etc. The HSE culture concept thus 
came to carry the burden of ‘embodying’ several critical issues and controversies about 
risk and its (mis)management. And these were introduced sometimes simultaneously, and 
indiscriminately signifying a body of ideas and practices amenable to disparate 
interpretations and ‘disentanglements’.  
 
Could some of these confusions be straightened out with the aid of experts and 
‘scientifically’ produced knowledge? Starting with the ‘instrumental’ dimension, the 
assumption about there being a causal convergence between very different types of 
incidents, has been repeatedly criticised, as was briefly recounted in Chapter 3. Hopkins 
(2000) has pointed to the fact that major industrial accidents can occur in the face of 
exceptionally low LTI figures, and employs the term ‘mono-causality’ in a critique of the 
crude translation that often takes place from Iceberg Theory to ideas about causal 
convergence (Hopkins, 2006a). Hale (2001) refers to this idea as an ‘urban myth’ that has 
haunted several industries for years. This has resulted in working theories of risk 
management implying that accidents could be prevented only by reducing the total 
number of incidents and errors, large or small. Now, the attribution of ‘causes’ to human 
error is not intrinsically linked to this version of the Iceberg Theory. Psychological 
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research clearly demonstrates the role of human slips, lapses, mistakes, etc., as 
contributing factors in accident analysis (Reason, 1990; 1997). The analysis of ‘robust’ 
socio-technical systems has drawn attention to the role of ‘human redundancy’ in coping 
with ‘error’ (detecting, explaining, correcting, ‘comprehending’, etc.), which may support 
the legitimacy of focussing on work-mate concern or interference, internal ‘stop-rules’, 
communicative practices and qualities, etc. (Clarke, 2005; Rossness, 2001; Rossness et 
al., 2000). The understanding and promotion of such strategies has thus constituted an 
important interface between researchers and practitioners of organizational safety, and 
some key components of human redundancy have been integrated into the ‘behavioural’ 
safety programs. The important question of how this knowledge is fed into the essentially 
normative philosophies and strategies of risk management is still not exhausted, however, 
as this would involve also critical trade-offs between economy and safety, apparent in 
decisions related to such ‘redundancy-relevant’ factors as manning levels, contract 
conditions, and (costly) technical designs vs (cheaper) human adaptation. Risk 
management involves more than just a ‘scientific identification’ of instrumentally 
effective points of intervention within the complex causal chains and networks. 
 
Neither is the ‘scientific’ status of how ‘culture’ contributes to the reduction of risk 
altogether clear, and these ambiguities are not restricted to the controversies between 
Normal Accident and High Reliability theorists (Hale, 2000). Although evidence can be  
found that organizations in offshore environments who do well on safety climate surveys 
also have lower accidents rates (Mearns et al., 2003), such research, although carried out 
with much methodological sophistication, may not be altogether informative for the 
implementation of a ‘cultural’ risk management approach.197 As we shall see in the next 
chapter, the relationship between ‘sound HSE culture’ and prudent risk management 
occasionally appeared as synonymous, making the claim tautological rather than 
empirical. Apparently, the relationship between behavioural and cultural risk 
management strategies has also been victim to some conceptual confusion within the 
research communities, taking the former to be associated with ‘bottom-up’ strategies, and 
                                                 
197 Salient climate indicators in this study include exactly such factors (distilled through psychometric 
factor analysis) as communication, job satisfaction, management commitment, reporting practices, etc. 
 286
the latter with ‘top-down’ strategies (see DeJoy, 2005). Analogous examples of 
conceptual disorder were evident also in the local research communities. Occasionally, 
the safety programs, such as the SBP, were taken to represent a modernized version of 
‘behaviourism’ (in a ‘light’ Skinnerian sense). But clearly, the programs both 
presupposed and addressed ‘mental states of mind’ (like ‘mind-sets’, attitudes’, ‘moods’, 
etc.), both directly and indirectly. As noted, the deliberate use of ‘behavioural terms’ 
adopted in the SBP, was simply a moral and communicative-strategic choice in order to 
avoid paternalism and ‘intellectualism’. Behaviour modification was certainly the goal, 
but the instruments used were not of the stimulus-response kind, black-boxing the mind, 
even for introspection.198 This pragmatic psychology of addressing ‘behaviour’ was 
rather based on the idea that ‘attitudes’ would change as consequence of the former. In 
practice of course, these components of behaviour modification would appear 
interchangeably and non-linearly. 
 
As indicated above, such processes of attribution were evident also in the debates 
surrounding the programs; the critics were faced not only with counter-critique, but 
apparently also with ‘diagnostic’ labels. How could this, essentially irrational, opposition 
be explained? Whose interests were being served? This was the mirror image of the 
critique itself, which included not only instrumental and ‘scholarly’ arguments, but also 
references to concealed interests, and even to the suspicion that the amount of financial 
and institutional investment would make any substantial self-criticism cognitively 
difficult to handle.199 
 
Summing up, the PSA has had to confront a number of difficult tasks, making sense of 
the complexities of culture, making it operational within the framework of their 
regulatory strategies, and simultaneously facing industrial initiatives, programs, and 
‘cultural interpretations’, the latter covering an uncoordinated abundance of ideas and 
practices related to the significance of ‘culture’ in the management of risk. All the 
                                                 
198 Recalling the story of the behaviourist, asking his partner after making love: “this was really good for 
you; how was it for me?” 
199 Cognitive dissonance, it may be recalled, appears in its strongest forms when much mental effort is 
invested, and evidence of its futility will generate dissonance-reducing mechanisms, like ignoring or 
refuting such evidence (Festinger, 1957).  
 287
dimensions of ‘culture’ outlined in the PSA booklet thus reappears in various 
configurations: safe behaviour vs external frameworks, economy vs HSE, formalistic risk 
bureaucracies vs ‘cultural’ risk organisms, the value of statistical monitoring vs 
operational and local knowledge, etc. Whose behaviour and whose culture were really 
addressed, and what relation had ‘culture’ to other ‘shapers’ if they were not also 
themselves really a part of ‘culture’? The contract conditions, the time-schedules, and the 
rewarding systems, were these arrangements only shaping culture, or were they also part 
of the cultural?  
 
These discourses triggered practitioners and expert groups alike, and exposed 
divergences about industrial relations, causal relations, values, priorities, and disciplinary 
conceptualizations. In these controversies, conceptions of risk and its management lurk as 
benchmarks against which positions are interpreted and represented, and where 
researchers do not only represent the empirical realities they study. They participate in 
joint arenas, and introduce and impose frames of meaning onto each other in an ongoing 
‘dialogue’ between facts, interpretations, theories, and actors. The theorizers and the 
theorized are blurred categories, involving even the vested interests of the former in the 
sense that research agendas and funding schemes to some extent reward those actors who 
at any moment are taken to represent the favoured conceptual schemes.  
 
With these glimpses into the industrial codifications of culture and risk management, we 
now turn back to the agency, exploring how this cultural turn was perceived and 






9.  Lost in translation 
 
Preliminaries 
As should be evident from the foregoing accounts of the cultural experience, the 
challenges to be faced by the agency had many faces. And they were not faced by a 
uniform agency ready to provide clear guidelines for the cultural road to safety. The task 
was largely left to the culture group, with unclear mandates and fragile authority. The 
challenges appeared as an ambiguous mixture of conceptual and substantial quandaries, 
to be sorted out in a complex process of organizational sense-making, to borrow a phrase 
from Weick (1995; 2001). Although sense-making appears as both trivial and integral to 
organizational life, reflecting the inherent interpretive processes involved in transforming 
ambiguous ‘environments’ into minimally coherent and shared templates for 
organizational behaviour, the process of making sense of HSE culture appeared as more 
than ordinarily enigmatic. In this chapter we try to sort out the status and significance of 
HSE culture as it appeared after some three years of existence as a statutory provision, to 
explore the interpretive quests it caused within the institutional and socio-cultural context 
of regulation, and to tease out how the ‘cultural experience of regulating culture’ can be 
framed and understood within the multifaceted patterns of regulatory world views. We 
start, however, with a brief recapitulation.  
 
By introducing the concept of ‘HSE culture’ the regulators followed a well established 
line of regulatory philosophy, arguably as an attempt to penetrate even further into the 
self-regulatory mechanisms of the regulatees. The new provision was launched with some 
ostentation as, as a ‘new dimension’ adding to those focusing on technology and 
management systems. The agency had arranged several well-attended conferences 
specifically dedicated to the topic, produced a widely read and distributed booklet on the 
subject, and integrated a number of ‘cultural issues’ in the RNNS project. Integrating 
HSE culture in supervisory practices proved difficult, however, partly because the 
context of ordinary audits appeared as inadequately fit for making ‘cultural diagnoses’, 
and partly because the status and nature of such diagnostic practices were not quite sorted 
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out. Also, the status of the provision in terms of its regulatory enforcement was subject to 
much uncertainty, and gradually, a ‘policy of restraint’ developed. The obviously 
attractive, and perhaps also trivial, insight that cultural properties and processes play a 
significant role in how organizations encounter and manage their risks, was an important 
driving force during the initial stages of the process. As the real task of making the 
concept ‘operational’ within the regulatory context, more demanding challenges were 
encountered. These were related partly to the development of conceptual understandings 
that could be sufficiently shared and appreciated within the agency. Partly they were also 
related to the diversity and ambiguity of risk management strategies and safety programs 
that proliferated within the industry. In short, the status of HSE culture as part of the 
overall regulatory strategy was not altogether clear, and a decline in interest and attention 
was clearly apparent.  
 
Some critical factors for understanding this development have also been anticipated. 
First, there had been some critical organizational discontinuities in the process. The 
‘originators’ had left the agency when the new regulatory framework was finally 
launched. Their scholarly inspirations were drawn from several sources, such as the role 
attributed to ‘safety culture’ within the High Reliability tradition. Only sparse traces of 
these original thoughts were left behind, and to some extent, the content and significance 
HSE culture had to be reinvented. Second, the follow up was organized as a project 
largely manned by newly employed officials and not deeply entrenched within the rest of 
the organization. Third, no systematic analysis was provided of how HSE culture was 
related to the large and comprehensive body of regulatory requirements already in 
operation. Forth, there were several ‘competing’ approaches and methodologies that had 
obvious but not explicated linkages to HSE culture. Fifth, the HSE culture provision can 
arguably be rendered as a ‘hyper-functional’ requirement, highly abstract in terms of its 
potential meanings and possible contexts of application, and at the same time penetrating 
deeply into the ‘inner lives’ of the regulated companies. The linkages between means and 
ends were correspondingly blurred. Adding to this was the force of the ‘fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness’, which occasionally tended to produce somewhat reified and 
essentializing notions of culture.  
 290
No ‘causal’ analysis will easily account for the relative impact of any of these factors in 
‘explaining’ the observed outcomes of the culture project. Some conjectures may be 
explored, by tentatively posing counter-factual hypotheses about what would have 
happened if the originators had stayed, if the culture group had been differently organized 
and composed, if the enforcement policy had been more assertive, etc. But analyzing 
conditions of causal necessity or sufficiency in this process appears to render the outcome 
as almost ‘over-determined’, or at least as victim to highly vulnerable contingencies. In 
the following, we will explore the interaction between some of these factors, rather than 
specifying their relative impact. First of all, we trace the conceptual issues from the 
perspective of the regulators, as ‘reasoned explanations’ (Føllesdal, 1975; 1981; 1982), 
making sense of how the process was conceived and interpreted from the various 
positions within the agency. In this reconstruction, there was no point in conducting a 
‘poll’ for discovering the exact distribution of ‘opinions’ on a predefined scale or set of 
ideas about HSE culture. More important was to discover the local rationales, 
associations, ideas, arguments, stories, and examples. In terms of ‘samples’ it covered the 
whole management group and the culture group, and thus more or less exhausted the 
universe of key policy carriers.  
Culture: safe behaviour and/or ‘total risk management’ 
As argued above, the safety programs and systems that circulated in the industry reflected 
different and partly contradictory approaches to risk management, not always 
corresponding to agency notions about the proper understanding and management of 
organizational risk. Fending off the behavioural focus in the industry appeared as a 
recurring topic in the culture group. Some safety programs and schemes were clearly seen 
to distract attention from health related issues and from a realistic appreciation of the 
systemic and complex nature of organizational risk. They absorbed resources, framed 
perspectives, and inspired remedial measures. As they recurrently were labelled ‘culture 
programs’, or referred to as such, they also contaminated the cultural perspectives of the 
group, as presented in the booklet and in their external and internal presentations. The 
diversity and sometimes incoherent configurations of culture also added to the problems 
of matching the abstract word with references in the real worlds of local experience.  
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In the yearly safety conference of Safety Forum in 2004, just a few weeks before the 
Snorre incident, keynote speaker, professor Jan Hovden at the University of Science and 
Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim, addressed the question of why the Norwegian 
petroleum industry should be the leading industry within HSE (referring to the stated 
purpose of the 2002 White paper). He ended his presentation by questioning the 
usefulness of ‘HSE culture’ as this ‘approach’ seemed to have developed in the industry, 
and implicitly also in the PSA. He indicated that HSE culture could turn into a new 
‘cushion’, in the sense that it distracted attention away from the real ‘dangers’: the 
‘technology’ and the ‘energy’. Alternatively, he called for greater attention to the 
development of management systems furnished to handle the dynamic of integrated 
operations and other complex technologies, work processes, and organizational forms. As 
the prominent head of several educational programs in safety management at the 
country’s largest technical university, he was responsible for the education of numerous 
classes of engineers, and a particularly influential participant in both the professional and 
public discourses on risk management. Just a week later, the PSA (on the initiative of the 
group) made a public announcement on their website:  
 
Good HSE culture - more than behaviour and attitudes.  
HSE culture is not just about a focus on attitudes and behaviour. Companies with a good 
HSE culture keep up a continual, critical and extensive work with regard to technical safety 
and improvements in their management systems, while also carrying out measures that are 
directed towards the more interpersonal and behavioural issues. 
 
 
An explicit reference was made to the conference, expressing concern about the 
circulation of heretic ideas about HSE culture:  
 
During the Safety Forum's annual conference we also discovered a scepticism to the 
authorities' and the industry's emphasis on a good HSE culture, because this might be to the 
disadvantage of HSE issues related to technical safety and management systems. If it were 
true that the statutory requirement on HSE culture entailed a one-sided focus on behaviour 
and attitudes, such a concern would be understandable. However, the PSA has other, and far 
more extensive, expectations regarding the requirement of a good HSE culture. 
 
The unbecoming comment from professor Hovden clearly disturbed the group, and they 
felt a need to explicitly challenge his ‘claim’ by regularly quoting and commenting it in 
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public and in-house presentation, noting his possible misconceptions about HSE culture, 
and contrasting them with the ‘correct’ PSA approach.200  
 
The ‘episode’ was thus an unpleasant reminder of how HSE culture had become 
associated with contested risk management philosophies, and disturbed the attempts to  
justify ‘its’ relevance and merit. Cultural risk management had also become a contested 
paradigm. We shall return to the role of the culture project below, noting, however, its 
fragility against both external and internal forces. 
Managerial expectations and mandate 
We may recall and review at this point the rather open-ended expectations from the top 
management. HSE culture was a somewhat ambiguous heritage from the regulatory 
reform process, and its regulatory implications had not been clearly considered. Some 
wanted HSE culture to be formulated as part of the overall purposes. The decision to have 
one dedicated culture provision was intended to add force and focus. But as noted, it also 
exacerbated the conceptual challenges, since the ‘enforcement issue’ came to be more 
explicitly addressed. The amount of discretion involved in actually ‘diagnosing’ 
industrial practices in terms of HSE culture was clearly acknowledged by the top 
management; recognizing these difficulties, the General Director, still expressed 
optimism, with the aid of time and good thinking:  
 
It’s certainly not mathematics …. You cannot summarize components and figure the HSE 
culture to be …. like 90 percent satisfactory. That won’t work. You need a wholly different 
approach. A great deal of discretion and judgment is involved. So, you know, it requires 
something more in terms of good judgment in order to arrive at a reasonable picture, it’s not 
like saying that the steel construction is two millimetres short …. This is a real challenge. 
So I believe the process of developing this, both for the industry, but also for us as a public 
authority and the role we have .… this’ll take time. It’s not done overnight. But I have the 
belief that if we get a good hold of this, over time, that there is a challenge here in outlining 
a ‘culture-picture, that will be very useful in terms of processes of regulation and 
improvement in the companies. That’s my sincere belief. (General Director) 
 
                                                 
200 He later explained that the comment most of all was meant to promote some critical reflection, and 
indirectly as warning against the inherent dangers associated with managerial fads and trends: that people 
would stop thinking and just follow fashion.  
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The reluctance to define, coupled with an optimistic sensation about the potentials of the 
cultural perspective, provided much leeway but not much direction. The solution was 
largely to see culture as a part of a ‘developmental process’, and engaging with the 
industry in a joint effort to improve. 
 
But the ‘developmental approach’ applied not only to figuring out the content of culture. 
In fact, the cultural approach had in itself been presented as the ‘highest form’ of civilized 
risk management. As may be recalled, HSE culture was repeatedly displayed as 
representing a third wave or stage, superseding and succeeding the former ‘technological’ 
and ‘system-oriented’ stages, thus conveying the image of culture as being something 
substantially new. This clearly caused some concern and bewilderment, also in the 
culture group, who had inserted some ‘reversing’ arrows in their power point 
presentations in order to point out that technology and systems were still important, and 
that these factors also had to do with culture; culture was not to be seen as some entirely 
new or disconnected dimension.201 But the impact of this way of configuring the cultural 
dimension was still clearly felt, as was evident also from the account provided by the 
disciplinary director, when commemorating on the birth process of the cultural turn: 
 
R: …. there was much talk about the management systems, and how to move beyond and 
see what was involved in the compliance with management systems. Then there was much 
talk about culture. We found that the industry was very clever in making these management 
systems, some were incredibly professional. But still, not much came out of it. So in trying 
to look beyond that, a lot of people talked about the culture. And I believe the concept was 
used in a rather loose and wide-ranging manner in the beginning. And I’m not quite sure 
how it is actually used today. 
I: Like in the figure? 
R: Yes, but I’m a bit afraid of that figure, that you conclude that now we’re only going to 
work with the culture and forget the rest, like technology. We need to focus on the whole 
spectre in order to succeed. We cannot just say that “now, we’ve reached a new level of 
consciousness and we’re going to work with culture”. That’d soon turn out wrong.  
I: Have you found a balance - that communicates well with the environment? 
R: Well, the most conscious have, I surely believe that. Through the culture group, the 
booklet and so on, I believe we’ve been able to put this into words and express thoughts and 
descriptions that communicate quite well .… But after all, it’s a difficult and comprehensive 
concept; so I’m a bit unsure …. I’d think that what you establish regarding patterns of 
                                                 
201 The figure had obscure origins, but had appeared in the industry for some time, in various versions. 
Sometimes ‘human error’ appeared as the first stage, followed by management and steering systems 
Sometimes ‘behaviours’ appeared as the last stage, such as in the British petroleum industry Step Change 
program (http://stepchangeinsafety.net/ResourceFiles/Changing%20Minds%20Guide.PDF). 
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behaviour and values in a company, that in the end that would constitute a kind of culture. I 
guess that giving orders regarding culture, I don’t know if that would work. There are many 
approaches to this culture concept .… there are so many aspects to it.  
(disciplinary director) 
 
Trying to get an idea of the difference between the existing regulatory framework and the 
nature of culture as either the sum of these elements already present, or some additional 
or extended dimension beyond this ‘sum’, appeared difficult. And, of course, it was as 
difficult to provide an answer as it was to interpret the ones that were in fact provided, 
tentatively responding to the somewhat complex question: ‘what’s new’?  
 
We conclude this brief review of top management expectations by citing the supervisory 
director responsible for the culture project. We may note both the directional substance 
and the ambiguity contained in the response: the clear warning against behavioural 
reductionism, the sensation that much of culture was already present in the existing risk 
management approaches, but also the sensation that culture was something more, not yet 
fully explored:  
  
R: It’s the sum of everything. But in addition, if we find deficiencies in many areas, there is 
a lack of management focus, lack of steering, missing priorities on HSE, and also an 
element of attitudes. But it’s not only attitudes. We had a period with very much focus on 
attitudes and behaviour, making everyone responsible, like holding the handrail and so on; 
and that’s fine, but it’s much wider than that; it must be seen in a much more 
comprehensive context. And – that’s my personal opinion – that we address that aspect, lift 
it up and challenge the company management based on the sum of our knowledge about the 
company, and ask them: What’s your opinion about this? Do you share our assessment, and 
what are the implications in relation to the responsibility you have as managers? Do you 
take this seriously? It’s more like having a dialogue about it; rather than just issue an order 
about ‘bad HSE culture’ or branding a company. I’m more confident that this provision, in 
conjunction with other elements, can be used in a dialogue with the company management. 
Otherwise you risk just getting newspaper headlines and a totally sidetracked discussion.  
I: If you had a company that complied with all regulations, like management systems, risk 
analyses, etc…. would you then say they had a good HSE culture? 
R: I don’t know .... I wouldn’t have said that, I wouldn’t have used that word. It could easily 
been misunderstood as an endorsement or approval of an organization or company. Good 
HSE culture? No, that’s difficult.  
I: But that’s what it [the provision] says; that they should have a sound HSE culture …? 
R: Yes, yes … 
I: Is it something more then …? 
R: Well, it would be natural, if we can say the opposite, that here’s a poor HSE culture, 
based on the sum and plus something more, then the natural thing would be that we also 
could say that, well, here’s a really good HSE culture. It would be natural, yes …. But it 
would take a lot; to put it that way. But it doesn’t follow that if there are some slips 
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somewhere, that still, that wouldn’t mean that they didn’t have a good HSE culture. In a 
sense it’s the manner in which you deal with the failures that indicate how the culture is …. 
We’ve created some challenges for ourselves with that provision …. I belonged to those 
who thought that this shouldn’t have been an ordinary provision, it should have been an 
introductory declaration of objective, more like a statement of intentions, or something like 
that. One of the  reasons for why it became an article at the time was to get a focus on HSE 
culture. I see now that we’ve achieved that, definitely so, and that’s positive.  
I: Some say it’s become a ’cushion’. Do you agree with that? 
 R: It depends a lot on how we present it and how the industry perceives the concept of HSE 
culture. If we present it as an attitude issue, it may turn into a cushion; ‘cause then you 
don’t make the necessary technical or organizational improvements. But if we present it 
from an organizational and holistic perspective, and mobilize the industry along such lines, 
then it shouldn’t become a cushion; one element in this is for the management to claim 




The warning against motivational and behavioural reductionism had its corollary in the 
warning against cultural reductionism; that assessments about culture (if attempted) could 
only be based on very comprehensive evaluations of company performance, not on a 
series of isolated misconducts, but rather on their ability to deal with risk at a higher level 
of reflection and learning. Culture appeared then as a third wave, beyond technology, 
behaviour and systems, like an enlightened state of ‘total risk management’. Two 
important ‘themes’ are thus foreshadowed: both the respect for the ‘word’ and a belief in 
its potential as a trigger for organizational learning and self-reflection. But in sum, the top 
management did not provide clearly digested expectations; rather, they modestly joined 
in on the search for the philosophers’ stone of regulation.  
Culture in operational management 
First responses 
Apart from the top management and the culture group, the middle managers constituted 
the most important organizational echelon for sorting out and defining appropriate 
conditions and arenas for ‘applying culture’. The disciplinary leaders were faced with the 
task of making culture relevant to the risk management of the particular technologies and 
HSE issues within their fields, and the supervisory coordinators were faced with the task 
of making culture relevant in the supervisory strategies and auditing practices. Discussing 
HSE culture with the PSA disciplinary leaders and supervisory coordinators was an 
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exciting, enlightening, and bewildering experience. Everyone had developed associations 
and ideas about both the ‘concept’ and the ‘phenomenon’, and had more or less formed 
some opinions about how it fitted into the regulatory and supervisory strategies, also as 
judged against the responses and initiatives in the industry.  
 
There are clearly many ways or sorting out or organizing these responses: Degree of 
interest or investment, evaluative considerations about its usefulness, judgments about its 
usage in the PSA - and in the industry, and certainly: ideas about what it ‘really was’, in 
particular in relation to other and partially competing systems of ordering the components 
of risk management.  
 
To provide an initial summary, many responses could be placed somewhere around the 
middle on any one of these variables, oscillating somewhere between pending curiosity 
or interest and a somewhat resigned expectation. We shall not order the responses 
according to what ‘values’ they would be given according to these dimensions, but rather 
present positions within their argumentative context, and sort them according to some 
more general themes. To provide a preliminary outlook on this variation, and to illustrate 
some ‘gut reactions’, we present first a sample of immediate responses to ‘HSE culture’: 
 
What’s been decided is that we don’t run audits specifically dedicated to HSE culture. That 
would be mistaken. It’s so comprehensive, it would be too difficult .… it should rather be a 
natural part, or an approach, to supervision in general …. But I believe we have a way to go 
in terms of awareness and being more conscious in the more technical supervisions. 
(supervisory coordinator) 
 
I don’t relate very strongly to the culture concept. I have seen presentations from the culture 
group. For us it’s more like something underneath .… We don’t really ask many ‘culture-
questions’ directly as such. It’s more implicit when we review management systems and the 
‘steering wheel’. Also, messages and signals now are that we to a lesser degree will use 
HSE culture in investigations and so on, and say that the HSE culture is bad; that would be 
difficult to say. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
That’s a concept we’ve strived to get a hold on …. Most people here use HSE culture in a 
rather simplified manner, compared to the culture group. They stretch the concept a lot, 
have a more comprehensive approach. The current view is that it’s on an individual level, 




We are perhaps a bit cautious in using the culture concept and in making conclusions in 
terms of culture. That may be a little cowardly but it may also be wise, since, in order to say 
anything about the culture you need very strong, say, evidence for claiming that 
something’s wrong. Culture is so composite that you cannot claim that an incident …. 
indicate a bad culture. Such a foundation would be too narrow, you know. There may be a 
set of coincidences that gave such a result in just that case, and that in 99 percent of the 
cases it doesn’t happen. But it’s clear that if you find a whole lot of elements that point to or 
indicate a bad culture, then I think it’s perhaps a little cowardly not to use the concept, and 
to say just that. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
This is a professional area where the concept of culture is not the first thing on your mind. 
These are the cold and hard mathematical disciplines. “Psycho-somatic conditions in 
pipelines” is a phrase that was used here when the work environment wave came in the late 
1980ties .… working environment was going to be part of all supervisions. This is still a 
phrase that you’ll hear in the corridors here, as something really far-fetched and beyond 
reason. It’s a bit like that with HSE culture also, like in relation to estimating the carrying 
capacity of a load-bearing construction. There’s not a direct match, you know. So I’d say 
that in the professional work within this discipline, this perspective is not very present, and 
neither, I believe, has there been any great appreciation for the attention and effort devoted 
to this in the last White paper. (disciplinary leader) 
 
As to the disciplinary questions in this area, I am not competent .… I imagine this to be like 
a somewhat odd animal .… and as I understood from the group that designed the HSE 
research project .… they were to investigate ‘what it was’. There was no common 
understanding or definition of what this animal was really like, which elements were 
relevant; there was no unitary agreement on, say, one or two or three adequate models for 
what it was, how it was configured, how it could be managed; as far as I understood there 
was no agreement whether it could be managed - or not. So for me it’s always been a 
somewhat distorted ‘thing’, and I’ve been waiting for the experts to agree among 




Admittedly, it did appear surprising at first to discover that ‘HSE culture’ didn’t hit more 
fertile ground among these key actors within the agency. But the discovery certainly 
contributed to a certain change in the interpretive approach. The response from the 
disciplinary leader of the drilling and well unit, not included in the sample above, did 
however appear as a notable exception. It may be noted initially that he had the culture 
project leader in his disciplinary unit, most probably causing an impact on his response, 
and indeed his responsiveness, to HSE culture.202 Early in the interview, in replying to 
the more ‘instrumental’ question of how to avoid accidents in drilling operations, he 
made an explicit, resolute and unsolicited reference to HSE culture:  
                                                 
202 Indeed, the middle managers most closely involved with key members of the culture group and their 
activities, generally appeared as the most ‘culture friendly’. 
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Very much is done in the planning process. If you conduct a good planning process, 
including risk assessments and quality controls, and not the least, communicate this .… that 
is what we call a good HSE culture …. if this is communicated and that you make sure that 
what you have presented is understood, then you’ve really done a great deal. What we see is 
that they plan and do a great job; then they need to make a small adjustment, and then they 
forget to follow the good routines and procedures, meaning that they take the time needed 
to plan, check out, and assess risks related to these new circumstances. This happens often, 
not only at Snorre but also incidents with injuries .… “we were only going to …”, and so 
on. (disciplinary leader) 
 
 
We then engaged in a conversation about management errors in planning and design 
processes, as I took his choice of focus in the example to be an indication of the ‘cultural 
mentoring’ he’d been exposed to. He certainly dismissed the idea that everything was to 
be left to managerial decisions and ‘framework conditions’, adopting instead a balanced 
perspective: “You cannot eliminate everything. It’s very important that the people out 
there are so alert and awake that they can say: ‘stop, we cannot proceed now, this isn’t 
right’ .… If there’s acceptance for people to do that, even if it costs this or that amount of 
money each minute, then you can avoid injuries or even major accidents.” He insistently 
referred to the diverse responsibilities and tasks on all the organizational levels in a 
process, onshore as well as offshore. Specifically referring to drilling and well operations, 
he emphasized the gradual specification and detailing in such processes, how in each step 
one would need a sufficient understanding of conditions framed and assessments made in 
the former steps, down to the final performance of the operation. Responding to a 
somewhat simpleminded question about ‘generalized failures’ or ‘common causes’ when 
something still went wrong, he hesitated, referring to one of the older favourite ‘root 
causes’: “I’m sceptical to that. I believe we could go out on each and every supervision or 
investigation and say ‘poor management and deficient leadership involvement’. But 
that’s too simple. I can say that without even going out there. It’d really take a lot, to miss 
on that point.” He proceeded by instead pointing to the complexity and 
comprehensiveness of procedures and routines, in particular to the fact that some of these 
are only relevant on very few occasions, and that people often do not know the relevant 
procedure, or they think they know but in fact do not. Also, in cases of organizational 
change, when drilling contracts, for economic or other reasons, are transferred to new 
contractors, involving new groups of personnel and others to be reassigned under a new 
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regime, quite intricate organizational interfaces must be reconfigured and harmonized, 
and people must learn and adopt to new systems and procedures. Involvement with and 
knowledge of procedures and risk assessments in complex organizational contexts were 
thus singled out as important antecedents for failure. These challenges must often be 
handled in stressful situations, where on-going work processes may leave little room for 
getting acquainted with written documentation, that may even be barely known about. In 
particular at critical junctures, such as shift handovers, the passing and processing of 
information may fail, with possibly fatal outcomes.  
 
At this point in the conversation (or the lecture), the first explicit inquiry about HSE 
culture was made, to which he responded by relating it directly to what he’d been 
explaining: 
 
R: There’s much culture in this …. I believe that by focusing on how those activities and 
routines, that is, how things are organized and run and make specific verifications, and then, 
to relate this to culture .… I’m more confident in such an approach, rather than running 
‘culture audits’, like “how is the culture around here”, you know. That’s been our fear, what 
good would that bring us? I believe we observe lots of things that can be related to, say, a 
good or a bad culture, if you go in, like we did with [culture project leader], in an audit on 
well control. We looked at the interface between the operator and the contractor, how they 
worked together or didn’t work together, how they arrange and follow up on systems and 
routines, and especially, if they’re not followed, how these are either adjusted because they 
are inappropriate or address it by saying that there are so many violations and we cannot 
accept it. Or that we find that there are violations that they’ve known about, but not cared to 
apply to us for consents. I mean .… then you’ll have a lot of things that I believe indicate 
something about their culture.  
I: But these issues were also addressed earlier. Is there any added value then, by bringing in 
the cultural perspective? 
R: Yes, for me there would be, or there is, that you’ll have a larger context. It’s true we’ve 
had procedures, but there’s something about the connections, like the establishment, the 
usage, the follow up, and so on; that picture in that setting. Here I believe, at least how I 
interpret the culture concept, it has contributed to providing an overall concept or umbrella 
…. I’d think that this phenomenon .… that you fence in the drilling area, it wasn’t like that 
when I was out there; anyone, even visitors or any idiot could walk right across the drill 
floor in the middle of operations .… Or that no random person should climb the drilling 
tower, or bring with him just any object. Or that you don’t assign tasks to untrained persons 
without the company of a mentor.  
I: But this is very much about good HSE measures; is HSE culture synonymous with good 
HSE activities then? 
R: Well, it’s a part of it. You have the physical work environment, but also you have the 
whole conceptual framework for safe job analysis and all that, and judgments and 
communication, that people have respect for, say, “here it’s the drill floor operators who are 
responsible”; and not to mention the pipe deck, there the roughnecks are in charge. It 
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doesn’t matter if the drilling manager comes along, and is halted; if he does not respect that, 
then there’s certainly not a good HSE culture …. Until last year or something, I thought that 
culture was something rather elusive and vague. HSE culture was like some foggy mist that 
I didn’t really take hold of. It turned out to be a lot easier when we started to discuss it and 
[culture project leader] joined the drilling group, and we discussed what this meant from 
our perspective. Then we could apply it directly; that it wasn’t only about holding the rail 
and all that nonsense. That’s fair enough, but if that’s the only focus .… If you don’t have a 
culture where anyone at anytime can say “stop, this is not safe”. If you’re beaten up saying 
that, or sent on the next helicopter as it was in the so-called good old days, you don’t say 




What made this interview different from the others was not primarily the associations 
made to the concept of culture. Rather, it was the unwavering firmness of the response 
and the unapologetic use of ‘HSE culture’. The significance of this is not obvious, of 
course. But the fact that he’d been out in the field as a practicing auditor with the 
guidance of ‘culturally inspired’ ideas and mentoring must be seen as part of the picture. 
Since the ‘mentor’ himself was part of the disciplinary unit, digestions, interpretations, 
and discussions took place within a context of shared knowledge and practical 
experiences related to drilling and well operations. Obviously, the Snorre incident had 
been thoroughly discussed in the unit, also in ‘cultural terms’, as was apparent from the 
examples used; but the interpretations appeared as generalized, applicable to a range of 
comparable cases. Finally, the responsiveness to ‘new ideas’ reflected a good reputation 
and record of the disciplinary unit that had been apparent also in other cross-disciplinary 
projects.203 These factors may, however, be seen as necessary, more than as sufficient 
conditions in terms of embracing the ‘cultural dimension’.  
 
This is not to indicate that the explanatory perspective here is biased towards finding the 
‘causes’ of the reservations and scepticism to be observed from the majority of first 
reactions listed above. One might as well ask the converse question of why they should, 
uncritically, adopt HSE culture, given the rich variety of already existing regulatory 
‘tools’, conceptual apparatuses, and analytical approaches. In fact, it was of some 
importance during the interviews to adopt an ‘open’ or unbiased stance, not making the 
                                                 
203 The ”Human Factors” expert testified to this, referring to some creative and innovative projects on work 
processes in drilling teams, and the group was generally regarded by the working environment people to be 
open for joint projects.  
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interviewees feel obliged to defend any positions; in particular as I supposedly would be 
regarded as belonging to the ‘culture camp’. Rather, as may have been be noted, two 
related questions were normally forwarded in order to try to ‘distil’ what they saw as 
‘distinctive’ about the HSE culture provision: first, the question of what they regarded as 
the ‘value added’ by the provision, and second, if they regarded an otherwise fully 
compliant regulatee as also being compliant with the culture provision. The latter 
question was occasionally also phrased in terms of there being a synonymy between 
‘good HSE conditions’ and a ‘sound HSE culture’.  
 
The initial responses, I believe, more or less reflects the themes, associations, and 
perspectives that gradually had appeared; to some extent they also corresponded with the 
cultural sensations of the top management. A number of ideas about culture can thus be 
identified: the idea of culture as a ‘third wave’, an idea of culture as some ontologically 
existing ‘property’ or ‘force’, accessible perhaps only to ‘the culture experts’; culture as 
integral aspects of HSE systems and practices and visible through ‘indications’; culture as 
a normative superstructure of ‘basic attitudes’; culture as a set of properties, only 
ambiguously corresponding to social and organizational structures; but also, culture as re-
circulated wisdoms of the past couched in alienating newspeak. Some of these notions 
and ideas are clearly interrelated and not mutually exclusive; and, they are not always 
attributable to the individual interviewees en bloc, although some clearly could be 
squeezed into one or another category. In the following, we organize the presentation of 
responses under four headlines, starting with what may be called the ‘non-expert 
complex’. This refers to the simple observation that interviewees often appeared 
somewhat apologetic regarding their own ‘expertise’ on ‘culture’. Still, a number of 
observations and reflections appeared in trying to link the sometimes tentative and vague 
sensations and ideas about culture with the more established risk management approaches 
and topics. However, when applied to the relevant social and organizational structures 
and processes, it was difficult to make the culture label ‘stick’ to these in any simple or 
straightforward manner. Finally, the regulatory context provided some critical conditions 
and restrictions for how the label could in fact be used, most evident with respect to the 
‘enforcement-issue’. This four-fold approach thus structures the following outline. 
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“I’m not an expert, but…” 
We did have some supervisions on HSE management and maintenance management were 
the cultural perspective was integrated. So someone from the culture group joined in. But it 
hasn’t been so easily accessible to us ordinary mechanics. They have knowledge in this far 
beyond the ordinary PSA official. But they’ve had good presentations in the management 
group and the various teams. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
With the disciplinary leader of the drilling and well technology unit as one notable 
exception, a sense of intellectual or professional distance in relation to culture was 
apparent; that it was accessible only to ‘insiders’, but still something to take account of. 
From one of the other technical disciplines (structural integrity), there was also an 
awareness that culture mattered, but this time curiously attributed to a personal interest 
and thus presented as somewhat untypical for the general approach adopted in this 
department:   
 
So personally, I’ve had an appreciation for these perspectives related to culture, and for the 
effect it has on the physical behaviour .… I see the value of employing an abstract concept. 
I like abstract thinking myself, applying it in the real world. I wasn’t part of that process, 
but I’ve seen it from a distance and I’m fascinated by the cultural element and how different 
cultures do different things …. like how different companies choose fundamentally 
different incentive structures in contracts. (disciplinary leader) 
 
Starting with outlining the horrors of a recent and well known contract scandal, he 
explained how the oil company in question had been trying to induce the completion of 
the ordered installations, without success due to inadequate incentives and sanctions 
towards the suppliers. In the face of damage to local reputation in the case of large 
delays, they decided to finish the job in Norway, at their own expense. Annoyed at this, 
not without ‘nationalistic’ overtones in comparing with the straightforward cynicism of 
the larger multinationals, he then continued to describe the role of the local company 
representatives, the construction site managers:  
 
They all come from ‘Body shops’ .… except perhaps a company employee on the top. 
These are the ‘jack of all trades’ who’s been long in the game. What are their interests? 
Clearly, they’re interested in the next job …. I’ve seen these people in many contexts; they 
talk, and when you scratch the surface they’re quickly stripped bare. It happens all too often 
that these are people who’re clever talking and selling themselves in; they’re flexible and 
move around …. not everyone is interested in that kind of job, so there may be a shortage. 
But in terms of getting a tough business-like follow up .… you know, these people are 
interested in being popular. They must be ‘acceptable’ to the various suppliers and 
customers. It’s a quite small and transparent social milieu, and I believe there’s a play being 
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acted out, just to stay in that business. These are some personal reflections .… and much of 
the excitement I feel about the supervisory tasks has been related to these cultural matters. 
It’s been a personal motivation. And I’m annoyed that [the company] behaves in such an 
amateurish manner out in the world, compared to, say, ExxonMobile or Shell.  
(disciplinary leader) 
 
In terms of including cultural perspectives in the active engagement with the industry, 
however, he was also somewhat sceptical. They had a tradition for pointing to errors that 
could be subjected to the professional judgment of the engineer, and supported by 
uncontested evidential support. The ‘deeper’ social or cultural causes was partly reflected 
upon ‘privately’ and partly made subject to discussions with the industry in more 
informal meetings, challenging them to consider broader spectres of mechanisms than the 
purely ‘technical’. Partly, this had to do with the kind of evidential support that could 
possibly be gathered through relatively brief encounters in supervisions.  
 
There was thus a certain paradox in many of the responses to and accounts of HSE 
culture. Often it was talked about and used in a straightforward and seemingly 
uncomplicated manner, using examples and pointing to certain recurring characteristics 
of what was considered to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ HSE culture. But still, they almost 
unanimously qualified their presentations by occasional apologetic comments about 
themselves as ‘non-experts’, and/or by making reservations about ‘culture’ as a rather 
elusive and difficult term.  
 
This ‘expert complex’ could be approached in several ways; the majority did not provide 
themselves with membership in the expert club. Either one could talk about culture 
‘irresponsibly’ and uncommitted, more or less in the accessible codes of everyday 
speech, were everyone could call things ‘culture’ without being put (semantically) on 
trial. Once caught in the regulatory role, however, culture was treated more evasively, or 
one would resort to the known and familiar concepts and models within the existing 
framework (such as MTO analysis). As will be recalled from Chapter 5, ‘safety culture’ 
appeared frequently in the MTO-based investigations, although that practice waned 
somewhat due to a more restrictive policy propagated by the culture group. Culture was 
to be seen in a more holistic manner and used in a more ‘positive’ manner, as something 
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to be achieved; ‘bad culture’ could and should not be simplistically indicated by 
‘isolated’ cases. Perhaps this policy also contributed to a process of ‘professional 
alienation’. Ticking off ‘cultural failure’ in the MTO codification scheme, indicated, as 
the criteria prescribed, by pervasive and collective transgressions of procedures (see 
Chapter 5), was something that could be justified and substantiated through the relatively 
thorough investigation process. The ‘holistic’ approach made matters a lot more 
complicated. As was explained by one of the participants in the Gyda process:  
 
R: …. in that case it was about adherence to rules on the spot, and conscious violation of 
those rules .… and unacceptable behaviour that over time had become tacitly accepted. That 
kind of culture issues .… that was the reason why we used it. But I don’t have any 
knowledge about ‘culture’ as a discipline, I don’t.  
I: Do you think it’s something other than what you normally observe when you’re out, like 
decision making, management systems, maintenance systems, compliance with 
requirements and rules, assessments of consequences; all this that you observe, do you 
believe that this is part of culture, or...?  
R: Yes, this is part of culture.  
I: Is there something that’s not culture, then? 
R: Well, there are so many definitions of culture, what’s ‘in the walls’ and so on; but 
eventually I guess there is an element of culture in everything; but, you know, if a load-
bearing construction is culture, that might be a matter of dispute, or a valve on a pipe line. 
But in the end it always comes down to some people who have made a decision on some 
foundation, and then you have an element of culture.  
I: What about the MTO perspective, is the meaning of culture unclear in relation to that 
approach? 
R: Yes, I believe so. And that’s part of the reason why it is a little difficult to use also. It’s 
easier to point to a deficiency in an MTO interaction than to a deficiency in the culture …. 
MTO can be done very technically, culture cannot be done technically, with a conclusive 
answer …. MTO can be done technically, like in relation to the handling of alarms, with 
combined technical and human aspects .… pointing to the interaction between people and 
systems. While culture goes as far back as upbringing, view of life, attitudes, what’s in the 
spine of every one of us …. MTO is a lot more tangible in relation to some specific activity 
or interface. But certainly there are things regarding humans as such, deep inside the souls 
that also influence this. But I feel that culture is even more ambiguous and in the air, as a 
concept, than MTO. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
This ‘holistic’ concept of culture, partly inspired by anthropological usages and partly 
construed in order to counter the behavioural reductionism, thus opened a referential 
landscape within which almost anything of human origin could find its place. The 
justifications for this conceptualization aside, the somewhat bewildered retreat from the 
‘group of experts’ was highly comprehensible. Within the regulatory context, the 
‘holistic’ understanding of HSE culture thus entered a ‘game of competition’ with other 
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available models and configurations. We thus turn to the question of how culture could 
be related to the existing nomenclatures and understandings of risk management, 
particularly as these could be applied within the supervisory context.  
Configurations of total risk management 
For me it’s much the same thing, Human Factors, the MTO concept, HSE culture .... It’s all 
much to do with understanding why things happen, why it goes wrong. Are the operations 
here so difficult that it’s easier to make mistakes? (supervisory coordinator) 
 
Given the long tradition of looking behind immediate causes, and the plethora of 
available models for tracing and configuring underlying and systemic ones, HSE culture 
clearly faced some difficulties in finding its proper place. The MTO concept and the 
‘Human Factors’ perspective clearly constituted alternative configurations of risk 
management ‘factors’. Culture was occasionally referred to as just the sum of MTO, for 
instance by the in-house expert on MTO investigation techniques. The presentations by 
the Human Factors experts could be hard to distinguish from the presentation by the 
culture experts.204 These alternative models were thus referred as both ‘similar to’ and 
‘containing’ culture, but being significantly easier to relate to and apply. The MTO-
perspective somehow served as an all encompassing framework, not reducible to the 
MTO-investigation technique only. But the configuration of elements and connections 
within this overall perspective was an on-going endeavour.  
 
A project was started during 2005, in order to develop a more comprehensive system for 
assessing the HSE performance of companies. A number of critical categories were 
selected for ordering these assessments: ‘resources and competence’, ‘procedures and 
planning’, ‘communication and risk awareness’, ‘carrying out and following up 
activities’, ‘technical condition’ and ‘worker participation’. Scores were to be given to 
each company, admittedly with much caution and discretionary judgement. The system 
was to be a contribution to a more systematic kind of evaluation, partly to be used for 
                                                 
204 Apart from certain differences in scope (‘Human Factors’  was more oriented towards work processes 
and micro-environments), the focus was recurrently on such elements as communication, cognitive skills, 
interaction and interfaces, management, trust, etc. There was also some overlap of personal interest, and 
both Human Factors and HSE culture had strong roots in the working environment unit.  
 306
benchmarking companies and possibly also to promote incentives for improvement.205 
One supervisory coordinator (apparently not among the most ‘culture friendly’) made a 
reference to these headlines as a way of relating culture to the more ‘known and familiar’ 
classes of phenomena, acknowledged as meaningful, significant, and substantial 
(although perhaps as an act of courtesy, given the context of the interview).  
 
This is a kind of thing that might be used to indicate HSE culture .… It would be like the 
sum of all these elements. May be not all but at least it could be related to the carrying out 
and following up activities, including compliance and management, communication and 
understanding of risk, maybe procedures and planning and also resources and competence 
…. There are really a lot of management aspects that go into the HSE culture.  
(supervisory coordinator) 
 
We might refer to this tentative account of culture as the ‘sum of everything’ approach, as 
a kind of ‘total risk management’, recognizable also from the HSE culture booklet, 
presentations from the culture group, and the supervisory director to whom they reported. 
This, of course, made the process of teasing out the distinctiveness of the cultural 
perspective difficult. Still, some suggestions were provided, and largely these were 
related to some rather basic issues about overall priorities of HSE and the causes of these 
(like ‘management engagement’), to the capacity for organizational learning, and to the 
general efficiency and proficiency displayed in the multifarious practices of risk 
management. But the act of relating these organizational qualities to ‘culture’ was not 
always made explicit. 
 
R: You see that, when you have incidents, with hindsight insight, you see that they should 
have understood; there have been indications, that it nearly happened before, or that it in 
fact has happened, on the very same installation. That they should have used that 
knowledge …. 
I: How are your observations and judgments responded to in terms organizational learning, 
that is, do they more or less ‘passively comply’, are they surprised, do they recognize or 
realize the organizational shortcomings, or…? 
R: It varies. We’ve had audits where they don’t see any problem at all, that we just got it 
wrong, where there’s been much back and forth, but eventually they’ve acknowledged our 
claims and said “great, thanks for giving us that push forward”. They’ve then conducted 
their own supervisions and found that, “yes they’re right; we have no control or steering.” 
And that’s our hope or our aspiration; to extract that kind of recognition and understanding. 
…. But there are other situations where they do what they believe they’re expected to do, 
they just comply .… that’s not such a good feeling.. 
                                                 
205 The project was followed up in 2006, and a rapport was produced that suggested a common model of 
performance measurement to be used in all the supervisory teams. 
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I: So you feel you could find something quite similar on your next visit…? 
R: Yes. We have some supervisions where we look at, say the heli-deck, and we visit 
several platforms in the same company .… and we make the same observations all over. 
Then we challenge them, that this is really not necessary …. In that case we had a meeting 
where we challenged them on how they learned from supervisions, crosswise. And they 
said it themselves, quite resigned, that they’d had exactly the same experience from their 
own internal supervisions where they made the same observations. So in a sense, that’s an 
acknowledgement.  
I: Wouldn’t that be the difference between a good and a bad HSE culture? 




So, in the somewhat exploratory (and collaborative) mood of finding a proper place for 
culture as something recognizable in relation to what could possibly be seen as 
candidates of application, there was a relieving moment of ‘revelation’. Not that the 
revelation was ‘substantial’; these were ‘good’ stories about how supervisions were 
supposed to work: to make the companies realize how they should manage their risks in a 
proactive and enlightened manner, not dependent on any specified list of non-
conformities provided after authority audits.   
 
But as noted above, the tentative accounts that were provided, would often evaporate or 
merge into the established models and philosophies when followed up by questions about 
the distinctiveness of culture: was this something new after all? And did it add anything 
to the already present ambitions of promoting self-regulated processes of learning and 
improvement? 
 
R: In some cases we find the same non-conformities again and again. There is little learning 
from experience and positive management involvement and knowledge on NCS  rules is 
missing. In sum, many signals indicate sub-standard performance on HSE. Clearly, much of 
this must be related to HSE culture. It seems as though they just correct specific flaws that 
we identify, without also improving the system leading to the flaws. When we find things 
like that, we ask, ‘why haven’t you reviewed your organization and analyzed the underlying 
causes…?’ The good companies do that; if they find something somewhere, they will go 
through all their installations to search for similar flaws and issues. 
I: So this was your association to the concept of HSE culture, repeated breaches and lack of 
learning from experience? Isn’t this traceable to the beginnings of internal control in the 
early 1980ties? 
R: That’s true. But even in such cases we do not use HSE culture, or .… some may 
occasionally have used the word HSE culture, if many of these tings go wrong at the same 
time in their systems, in particular if the managers don’t grasp it or support …. in such a 
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case we might have used the word, formerly, to summarize, said that it was a bad HSE 
culture in the company ….  
I: Would the use of the word HSE culture add any meaning? 
R: No I don’t think so. It may be hard as it is to explain to some companies what they need 
to improve, even when we present a relatively concrete list of problems. If we used HSE 
culture, I don’t think they would understand more …. ‘Bad HSE culture’? Where would 
you begin? But I still think we have brought something with us from the project …. It was 
very fashionable for a while, big seminars and so on. Now it has waned a little. And then 
there is the question of what it is. Is it mainly behaviour, or is it something else? .... is it to 
hold on to the rail? .... in fact that’s a real question. We have been to companies, who have 
attended the Statoil Safe Behaviour Program, and they’re really into it, they back their cars, 
they have house rules that we’re informed about when we’re out on supervisions etc. Some 
go totally into this ….  And hold the rails …. 
I: Does that mean that the concept of HSE culture doesn’t bring in anything new compared 
to what’s already there, that it’s just a somewhat vague common term for issues that is 
already addressed? 
R: Yes, well ..for me it’s a little like that, yes; after having this strong focus on behaviour 
for a while .… I’ve been to the first two PSA conferences on HSE culture; and the first one 
was very much ‘behaviour and hallelujah’ .… In the next conference, behaviour was ‘out’. 
…. But generally, I feel HSE culture has been very much linked to behaviour, at least in the 
industry. I think most of the people here think about HSE culture as the sum of steering and 
management of HSE in all ‘parts and joints’, the ‘the-way-we-do-things-here’ approach ….  
I: Could it be the glue that ties the organization to the regulatory requirements then? 
R: Perhaps …. perhaps, because our regulations are very functional …. It’s more detailed in 
the standards, and if some companies …. just correct non-conformities, one by one, in line 
with standards, they may claim to meet the requirements, but we wouldn’t call that a good 
HSE culture – if you’re just into the detailed requirements. HSE culture is more about ‘the 
inside’, attitudes if you like, that you understand why …. risk understanding, not only to do 
exactly as you’re told without any understanding of the importance …. if you have the 
whole steering in place, including the execution in all its parts …. So I’m not sure if it adds 
anything, and we don’t use the provision very much, it’s more like a ‘visionary provision’. 
(supervisory coordinator) 
 
We may note also how the ‘expert complex’ would somehow fade to the extent that these 
associations to established risk management ideals were made. The following interviewee 
provides a somewhat analogous account of how this process of teasing out the evasive 
meaning of culture took place, but again, questioning the innovative potentials it would 
yield: 
 
I: How do you think the culture requirement should be addressed, like in supervisions? 
R: It must be presented as a natural part of the questions you pose, in relation to, say 
maintenance management. Some of the questions we pose in relation to maintenance, I 
believe that’s been done in the past also, they clearly have to do with culture. But it hasn’t 
been put into words. Like management engagement, which has always been a theme, that is 
also an ingredient in a HSE culture.  
I: Does that mean you’ve really had a way of talking about the same? 
 309
R: I believe that. We haven’t called it HSE culture. Some of the things we’ve focused on 
since the early 90ties, is how overall goals are transformed and made relevant, for instance 
in maintenance management …. Managers have a key role in this. What kind of 
engagement do leaders, like field managers, demonstrate? Are they really interested in 
maintenance, or is it only a cost in their accounts? If that’s the attitude of an operational 
manager, at least you have a problem of conveying the message that maintenance must be 
seen in a long term perspective, as costs that pay off. If that’s their philosophy, and you 
have an operational manager seeing this as only an expense, then you have a mismatch. 
These are questions we have focused on, at least since I came here, and that’s in a sense 
also part of a culture.  
I: Does the culture concept contribute anything new then, or does it only stir up mess and 
confusion? 
R: It does create confusion, so it does. Does it contribute something new, compared to what 
we’ve had, only that we’ve used different concepts? I’m not sure. That things are 
interconnected, that’s not a bomb either.  
I: So it’s been an important dimension all the time? 
R: I think so. But it may have been more important for those of us who’ve been working 
with management systems, HSE-management, maintenance-management, and so forth. It 
may be more difficult to see if you’re working with drilling operations and well-problems. 
But it’s presented as something new.  
I: It stirs up confusion, but still there seems to be a core of agreement, but not so clearly 
expressed? 
R: I believe you’re on to something. I believe there is a common core where we all agree. 
And that core is quite limited compared to the presentations given by the culture group. 
That’s an impression I have when I talk to others. And again, I think much of this is 
something we’ve focused on for a long time. Now, it’s been put into words, and put into a 
context. That may be the most significant improvement. And that it covers more aspects 
than just the individual. (supervisory coordinator)  
 
 
Three observations may thus be noted. First, that the value added by applying the concept 
of HSE culture was unclear; second, that it had the potential of causing communicative 
confusion, both internally and externally; third, that it tended to trigger the association to 
behaviours and ‘revealed attitudes’, considered to be trivial, sidestepping, or 
unproductive responses in relation to the real issues and causes. Even the call for self-
diagnosis could be double-edged, if only better attitudes and safe behaviour was called 
for. And simply applying the culture-label did not necessarily provide the proper insights 
for promoting desired organizational responses.  
 
But the ‘phenomena’ associated with the concept clearly exist ‘out there’; something that 
might deserve the label, which has to do with the organizational ability, or inability, to 
approach the desired level of purposeful, committed, and proactive risk management, 
incorporating reflective learning as a ‘collective conscience’. This organizational ‘ideal 
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type’ somehow served as the benchmark for HSE culture, as being present if the ideal 
type is approximated and absent or deficient if not. But the vision of this cherished 
regulatee existed before ‘HSE culture’ entered the scene, and since that word was new 
and at the same time vaguely presented or perceived as not just a new word for known 
qualities but as something ‘more’, discernable perhaps to ‘culture experts’ only, a 
multiple mental operation was required in order to sort out the referential impacts of 
‘HSE culture’. The final ‘test’ of whether the introduction of the cultural perspective had 
contributed to something substantially new, was only partially passed and perhaps not 
even completed. Several options remained open, ranging from seeing HSE culture as 
being a new word for known phenomena, facilitating an increased awareness and 
sensitivity for these, to seeing it as a confusing concept instigating futile searches for its 
meaning. A number of intermediate options were visible, although there had possibly 
been a deteriorating process toward the latter. Clearly, the general interest in and 
‘affiliation’ with the culture project would appear as a distinguishing factor in terms of 
how much energy was invested in these processes of translation.  
 
The largely affirmative response to the question of whether a ‘sound HSE culture’ would 
be ‘present’ if all regulations were complied with, fully and in agreement with the 
regulatory purpose, confirmed the ‘holistic’ interpretation of the concept. The responses 
could however contain ambiguities. There was regularly a certain surprise at the question, 
although sometimes bluntly affirmative, sometimes also hesitant and reflective. The 
surprise indicated that the ‘holistic perspective’ was not explicitly recognised in relation 
to the normative foundations embodied in the regulations; the more cautious responses, 
however, indicated that there was ‘more to it’. Again, this ‘added value’ appeared to be 
associated with the organizational ability to engage in sensitive and reflexive higher order 
learning strategies; regulatory compliance was not to be reduced to simplistic notions of 
‘going by the book’. On the contrary, such practices would be used as examples of bad 
management- or company cultures.206 
                                                 
206 This could be the case if procedures evidently appeared as bad substitutes for more basic changes in 
organizational or technological design, such as requiring the employees to use awkward equipment or 
protection rather than removing the risks that made them necessary in the first place. Sometimes such 
procedures also appeared to be devised in order to ‘cover up’ for the company, and possibly push 
responsibility on the workers if something happened (that they didn’t ‘follow procedure’).  
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 Despite confessions about these confusions and the challenges and ‘dangers’ associated 
with using the label, most respondent were both able and willing to provide both 
reflexive conceptual accounts, numerous examples, and empirical associations. Some of 
these were certainly associated with perceptions about how culture had been adopted and 
applied within the industry. Most were critical of what they saw as a one-sided focus on 
‘behaviour and attitudes at the sharp end’. It was in fact seen as a major effort and 
contribution of the culture group, both to warn against the behavioural biases, and also to 
conceptually dissociate these from HSE culture. Clearly, there were different and perhaps 
conflicting views about the substantial issues of how to manage risks in terms of 
distributing causal weight and moral responsibility in the multifarious continuum 
between persons and their environments. In accordance with basic regulatory principles 
and strategies, a focus on ‘behaviour’ would at least have to cover all levels of actors and 
decision-makers, even up to the licence committees.  
 
Opinions about HSE culture clearly diverged among the middle managers, about the 
virtues, vices, and ambiguities of the concept. But these differences did not necessarily 
reflect divergent opinions about the ‘substantial’ risk management issues. The most 
‘accommodative’ responses may also have reflected loyalty to the project and its 
members (and vice versa). It was in fact hard to find any neatly ordered correspondence 
between opinions about ‘HSE culture’ as such, and the substantial issues to which the 
concept could be seen to refer.207 The evaluative sensations influenced the dedication and 
interest in exploring the potentials of culture and not only discard it as substantially 
superfluous or semantically confused. But even the willing and accommodating 
responses reflected good intentions more than clearly defined strategies for how culture 
was going to enhance the supervisory practices: 
 
R: But all in all I believe it’s hard to grasp this cultural element. I’m planning to challenge 
that culture group on that. They appeared in the supervisory group, advertising the use of 
the members in the group .... So I plan to get a discussion with them on these things related 
                                                 
207 One supervisory coordinator, who deliberately refrained form using the concept since it just ‘stirred up 
confusion’, and with whom I participated in an audit, was on that occasion, as dedicated in teasing out the 
‘learning capacities’ of the facility as the more ‘culture friendly’ respondents.  
 312
to contractor issues, interface problems, and culture. Challenge them on that …. I think it’s 
important, but it’s very hard to take hold of. And I think that’s a common sensation about 
that concept.  
I: But do you think it has any added value, that it has any contributions to make, that it can 
fill in any holes .... or? 
R: Yes, I think so. I don’t know which yet, but I believe it can, and I feel that it’s very much 
…. like a comprehensive or holistic approach when you think about culture. And that’s a 
contribution. But I don’t think I will get, like 5 or 6 smashing culture-questions .… I doubt 
that. But I might get some input to how other kinds of questions might say something about 
culture and that may trigger yet other questions. It’s really not typical questions for 
engineers to probe into. And we have many engineers here, who might think that this is a 
bit too soft around the edges. And that’s understandable. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
The contrast, and possible contradiction, between ‘cultural perspectives’ and the 
‘technical mind-set’ of engineers was not an uncommon association, and as noted, 
culturally sensitive supervisions were supposed to supplement or replace the traditional 
inspection-like styles, to the extent that these were still practiced.208 But as noted above, 
such styles had for long been targets for reform, and the value added by introducing the 
‘cultural element’ was not clear. 
Culture, structure, and operational context 
I think it is a very demanding and challenging word to use. It opens a discussion about its 
meaning. They will say ‘we have it’, or it may be that parts of the company ‘have it’ and 
other parts does not. So it turns into a question about the use of words – if the ‘whole 
company has a bad HSE culture’ …. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
The Gyda case foreshadowed several problems of diagnosing cultures; not only in terms 
of ‘what it was’ and how it would be perceived, but also of how it could be attached to 
levels of intersected and increasingly comprehensive, oblique, and blurred operational 
and organizational systems. Did it apply to crews, shifts, installations, projects, fields, 
companies, licenses? How did cultures ‘correspond’ to such organizational boundaries? 
Could cultures survive organizational transitions, fusions, company take-overs, etc? The 
issue was raised not only in the Gyda accident. It was significantly addressed also in the 
Snorre incident. Was it only the Snorre-organization that had a ‘culture problem’, was it 
Statoil, was it a heritage from the Saga-years? In short, the question of how cultures 
                                                 
208 This was certainly not a universal rule, as some of the officials reported to have “fell in love with” the 
culture provision, clearly belonged to the technical disciplines.  
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could be attached to or matched with different social and organizational contexts was not 
clear.  
 
You have several perspectives. You have the license perspective, you have the project, you 
have the company; what is even more interesting is that you have the fields …. Seen in a 
broader perspective, that in terms of creating values for society, the fields as such are really 
the important unit. ‘Managing culture’, or whatever you might call it .… would then be a 
crucial element. Then it wouldn’t just be silly logic, but it would be a value adding activity 
to work with culture, I would think .… Should we then require that there should be a ‘field 
culture’? Fields are really very different, reflecting internal varieties in companies. This 
questions seriously any attempt to approach company cultures. I don’t know. Should we 
concentrate on the license level? Then the projects would have to adapt their cultural 
approach to that of the license?  (disciplinary leader) 
 
The issue of targeting the significant organizational units, with transient and blurred 
social borders thus complicated the uses of the label, adding to the other conceptual 
problems discussed above. But these were clearly relevant questions to address. Were 
there systematic differences between companies or installations, and which were the most 
appropriate units identifying cultures? And what was the impact of long and short term 
changes in such cultures?  
 
I believe the companies contribute to some extent. But I believe these differences were 
greater in the past. Now, there’s extensive cooperation across company borders through the 
OLF and working groups like Working Together for Safety. And we contribute 
significantly to greater cooperation through the regulation project. 20 years ago that would 
have been unthinkable, that you involve those you regulate in a project to develop new 
regulations that shall be applied to them. We included people who were deeply involved 
through the whole period. We’ve got a great deal of positive response on that approach …. 
And it has contributed to erasing differences between companies. Previously,10-15 years 
ago, we’d say that some operators, with their Americanized culture, were more like 
adhocracies. When something happened, and they decided to do something, they’re number 
one. For instance, one of the operators jacked up a whole field. Few other operators in the 
world would even think of doing just that. Had it been an other operator  they’d probably 
still been investigating what to do …. Historically, how to analyze incidents and utilize 
previous experience for continuous improvement, and that kind of thing, the systematic 
handling of such issues, that’s been more of a challenge. Some operators have been 
excellent in their systematic approach, steering documents, streamlining processes, etc. But 
then they have a problem of getting things done …. map and terrain doesn’t quite 
correspond. These may be two extremes, in my view. But this was like ten years ago. 
Differences have decreased considerably. Now they’re hardly discernible. I believe, or I 
like to think, it’s largely due to the processes mentioned. They may have realized that HSE 
is nothing to compete about; we should compete in other areas… (supervisory coordinator) 
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Despite these tendencies toward harmonization or development toward greater 
similarities on some dimensions, the differences between ‘local cultures’ were still 
observed, sometimes even down to the level of the crew; cultural difference was observed 
also in organizational interfaces and critical interactions:  
 
R: There’s a lot of culture in the interactions between the actors, I’d think. May be also 
cultural problems, given the fact that you have a lot of companies, with different 
backgrounds, different points of view, beliefs, contracts, economic conditions, interests, etc. 
.… And what the culture provision prescribes is that all participating actors have a 
responsibility. And everyone taking part in this chain, it’s about interaction, right, and how 
culture influences this interaction, or what is culture in this interaction, I believe that’s a bit 
hard to grasp.  
I: Do you think there are specific cultures in companies or installations ..? 
R: I believe there are differences between one company´s installations, and between the 
crews in, say, a well-service company …. Sure, you will find in a company, elements of 
what the company on an overall level gives priority, like through the programs and all that; 
but I think it depends just as much on the local management; that’s an element that I think 
influence culture – the management. But how, and all that, I feel that’s hard to grasp.  
I: Does that mean that the large programs …. that you don’t observe that they’ve had any 
impact when you’re out? 
R: It’s hard to tell and a bit early, really. There are different milieus on different platforms; 
that’s true. It’s more local. Every platform has its own framework conditions. On some 
platforms things are cumbersome, on other platforms things run smoothly. That’s one kind 
of condition, some struggle with old equipment; others have a Rolls Royce, right. Some 
have a manager who believes this is important, or that. So you’ll have small .… worlds.  
I: Is this apparent here …. that it’s talked about? 
R: I believe there are several levels here. If you talk to those who travel around, you’ll get 
that answer. That there are typical company cultures and typical installation-specific norms 
and rules, or what you would call it. In that sense I believe there are old histories, company 
histories, around …. (supervisory coordinator) 
 
These various ideas about how cultural attributes corresponded to different social and 
organizational units, and how such attributes changed in the course of time, thus added to 
the ambiguities of culture. 
 
But the problems related to increasingly ambient and dynamic organizational forms also 
triggered more existential regulatory questions, questions that could be seen as 
increasingly important and gradually making its impact on the very possibility of 
regulation. These had to do with organizational designs in very complex work processes, 
specifically apparent in the petroleum industry, with increasingly flexible and transient 
organizational patterns that could require rapid but non-predictable adaptations and much 
creativity in the execution of tasks. In particular, the introduction of new modes of 
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operation, based on the use of information and communication technology, has lead to 
the establishment of ‘virtual factories’ where the operating function (for drilling, 
production, maintenance, etc.), may be integrated between geographically separate teams, 
sometimes located in different parts of the world. The rule-bound and procedural style of 
management associated with HSE regulations and systems would meet serious obstacles 
facing these kinds of organizational dynamics; as was noted by one of the disciplinary 
leaders:  
 
I don’t think you can design a perfect system …. you manage in the face of great 
uncertainty …. but that doesn’t necessarily change the measures employed, only the 
perspective …. Or you will add something more .… you might want a ‘culture’, if that’s the 
right word, implying that improvisation is quite all right. That’s not acceptable in the 
present system; you design measures for controlling behaviour, etc., where improvisation is 
weird or unacceptable, where you have written and unwritten rules all around you …. I 
believe that what we are able to regulate will only decrease, not increase …. we’re heading 
towards more entropy, more chaos, a lot more dependencies, unpredictable dependencies 
and so on; like in integrated operations. The regulatory philosophy we follow presupposes 
that we can, say, draw up an organizational chart. To do this, draw a chart, specify the 
available recourses, consider how you can ‘manipulate’ etc., that’s really basic in our 
thinking about management. We’re moving towards organizational forms where you cannot 
draw such charts for vital work processes; you cannot predict them the day before, or even 
hours before they are created …. Hydro says something quite apposite about this: know-
how is invited into work processes through available electronic channels. They’re invited; 
may be they don’t respond, may be the invitation is sent to a lot more people than actually 
are going to meet to solve a task on an ad hoc basis. So you cannot plan ahead. That’s the 
kind of organization we’re heading towards. Ok: how are we going to manage that, how are 
we going to regulate its management? I don’t know. The only thing I know, or think, is that 
our influential capacities, at least through regulation, will only diminish. The significance 
of, say, a procedure will not be the same .… That’s important from a regulatory perspective, 
both regarding detailed and functional provisions …. In my view we must opt for a 
revolution; we are already late in the process. We’re caught in the same line of reasoning 
that we’ve been used to since the ‘cultural revolution’, or even the industrial revolution. 
This more organic and transient understanding of reality does not seem to be reflected in 
how we relate to the industry today …. Today’s solutions are poorly adjusted …. Then it’s 
extremely important, for culture to play a positive role in this picture, that culture 
‘management, or whatever you might call it, must also be quite flexible, and far more 
comprehensive than these ideas about holding the rail …. or whatever…  
(disciplinary leader). 
 
However, the acquiescent conclusion to draw from this somewhat exigent and perhaps 
defensive outline, was that ‘culture’, in its present shape, didn’t approach the kind of 
sophistication required to meet up to such challenges. But then, neither did the remaining 
contents of the regulatory tool-box. Still, given these developments, where it becomes 
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increasingly difficult to formulate verifiable requirements applied to relatively fixed 
socio-technical structures, a revitalized and more dynamic conception of the cultural 
could perhaps be envisioned in order to capture and adopt to these new realities. 
The regulatory context 
A requirement has no significance if you cannot verify the conditions for its fulfilment; this 
has been one of the discussions about the culture provision. It must be a tool for the 
authorities, actually relating so concretely to the realities out there that it’s possible to see 
what’s good enough and what’s not good enough. (disciplinary leader) 
 
Introducing culture in the regulatory vocabulary thus challenged not only the conceptual 
and diagnostic capabilities of the agency, but also the regulatory strategies and the 
possibility and even limits of regulation. Most respondents related these challenges to the 
already existing philosophies and approaches, trying to make ‘culture’ fit into these. For 
some, that process was relatively smooth; for others, it was more like a process of 
‘squeezing’ than of ‘fitting’. Although there were attempts at ‘culturalizing’ the audits, 
the results were far from clear. It’s not coincidental that the two occasions where the 
provision was actually used was in larger investigations, where they were able, with 
considerable detail and in-depth enquiries, to trace the complexity of technological and 
organizational trajectories leading up to an incident. As noted in Chapter 5, the context of 
an ordinary audit often proved insufficient for providing very thorough assessments of 
organizational or underlying reasons for (or ‘causes’ of) the ‘observed non-conformities’. 
Culturally attuned audits more than anything required a great leap beyond apparent and 
observable failures. The attempts of the culture group to develop supervisory guidelines 
reflected a desire to penetrate more deeply behind formal documents, and to use audit 
interviews more intensively in order to tease out what was really going on; emphasis was 
thus put on the context of communication, on establishing trust and confidence in order to 
get more truthful and realistic responses; they also had ideas about introducing group 
interviews in order to enhance the quality of the information, beyond what could be 
extracted from one lonely worker or safety representative. In a group, people might feel 
more confident, respond to each other, and provide more elaborate and realistic 
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information.209 But, as noted in Chapter 6, these attempts were terminated; and since 
cultural diagnoses appeared to be beyond the capacity of ordinary audits, the idea 
developed that culture should rather be addressed on the basis of several sources of 
information over a period of time. But that venture also appeared to have evaporated.  
 
Clearly, the ‘cultural discomfort’ was related to the experiences the agency had 
encountered in their relations with the industry. As one supervisory coordinator noted: 
“The industry asked: ‘what do you mean?’ And we were guilty of a meaningful 
response”. So they’d rather not use the ‘word’ themselves, much less enforce the 
provision. There was certainly a discrepancy between engineering and legalistic 
‘cultures’, oriented towards standards, criteria, right/wrong dichotomies, observable 
evidence, quantifiable indicators, etc, on the one hand, and the fuzziness of culture, and 
the interpretive and exploratory routes to its understanding. But the group resisted early 
attempts to ‘operationalize’ culture by using available ‘measurement scales’.210 We may 
recall also that the regulatory intentions, gradually adopted by the inheritors in the 
agency, were not that the provision should be enforced in the ordinary manner of 
measuring compliance. It foreshadowed a much more interactive and mutually engaging 
kind of follow up, requiring the agency to sensitize the industry to broader ranges of 
models and alternatives in attributing causes and designing safety regimes. Although the 
expressed experimental nature of the cultural quest also indicated their willingness to 
engage in more creative interactions with the industry, the regulatory context provided an 
unfavourable climate for ‘culture’. And although the value of regulatory provisions could 
not be judged solely on the basis of their formal enforceability, they would still be put to 
this kind of ‘test’, searching for the ‘evidence’ sufficient to justify their application, in 
particular when appearing as single provisions.  
 
                                                 
209 From the ethnographic point of view, the audit was mostly just a teaser in terms of access to the inner 
lives of the organization. As I joined one of my ‘peers’ (one of the in-house anthropologists) in a two day 
audit on a land facility, I could with some resignation sympathize with her expressed desire to be a ‘fly on 
the wall in one of those safety meetings’. 
210 Apparently, several attempts had been made by consulting firms to sell in such instruments to the 
agency. 
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The effects of the rather tentative and cautious diagnosis offered in the Gyda 
investigation testifies to the perceived ‘powers’ contained in applying the provision (see 
Chapter 6). But also, the rumours and misconceptions that followed, both inside and 
outside the agency, indicate that the ‘animal’ was perceived to be more monstrous than it 
actually was (or than some cared to check out).  
 
Under any circumstance, when challenged by the industry about the scope and content of 
the provision, the regulatory commitment had to be faced.211 The ‘enforcement issue’, 
having to provide evidence for transgressions, was thus a recurring concern, as was 
evident in the Snorre case. This reflected also the notion that ‘hyper-functional’ 
provisions were ‘void’ if not clearly related to more specified criteria. The parallel 
discussions, or occasional reflections, whether it should have been phrased and placed as 
a purpose provision, or even abandoned altogether, gave indications to this. As noted 
above, the provision thus also challenged more deeply felt concerns about the scope and 
limits of the regulatory role, as was bluntly spelled out by the disciplinary leader for 
HSE-management and legal affairs: 
 
I try to imagine what it would be like from the other side of the table, if you were the 
company; what can you do with an order about your HSE culture? Where do I start? And 
even if they start with the more specific observations from the report …. and if they fix that, 
does it imply that they’ve really fixed their culture? I really think this is quite difficult. And 
I think the companies really work hard to do their best, and then they deserve a critique 
that’s comprehensible, recognizable, manageable, as far as possible. I believe, if you create 
despondence, powerlessness …. nothing that adds value …. I really believe that we should 
contribute to value adding processes, we should make a contribution, it should have a 
positive effect. It can be really painful or uncomfortable, that’s not a problem …. but it 
should be value adding .… But getting the message that my culture is in pain, that’s a bit 
too much …. and then, how should I convince you that the pain is cured? And how many 
years should the treatment take in order to remove the pain, or to convince you that my 
culture no longer hurts? I really don’t know. I’m really quite at odds on this point, and I feel 
I don’t have the professional authority in this field to forward any qualified opinion …. As 
far as I understand, with respect to HSE culture, it’s still an animal that’s not very well 
defined, that there is no unequivocal model, or sets of models, or ideas about how you can 
‘fix’ a culture, or improve a culture. You know, this is still somewhat ambiguous. This 
means that the requirement we have is not so easy for us as a regulatory authority to relate 
                                                 
211 The importance of these environmental responses may be indicated also by the fact that the ‘stronger’ 
application of the provision in the Byford Dolphin case (see chapter 6), was apparently bypassed in relative 
silence; no one had challenged their diagnosis. And: the regulatory advisor in BP in fact also thought that 
the issue had been a bit dramatized, and that misunderstandings about the ‘scope’ of the formulations used 
had been sorted out and settled fairly soon; but even then, rumours persisted and were aggravated. 
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to in our supervisory activity, as say, the requirements of a BOP; these are also functional 
.... and there are references to international standards defining acceptable functionalities in 
given circumstances. We cannot have that in relation to culture. So then it’s perhaps a 
matter of questioning the whole image of which functions a regulatory framework should 





HSE culture was clearly not high on the agenda in the strategically important arenas 
within the agency. Leaders on all levels evasively referred to the ‘culture group’ when 
questioned about HSE culture, including also policy issues about enforcement practice. 
By delegating culture to a relatively isolated group of newcomers, it did not enter the 
strategic level of consideration or reappraisal, and several important disciplines were not 
represented in the project. It was left to the project group to sort out and resolve the 
meanings and impacts of culture, and then to present their revelations to the rest of the 
organization, to the industry, and to all others. The group operated largely on the outskirts 
of the organization, trying to sell out what had been manufactured and alchemized in 
their internal and external meetings; not without managerial support, but still with only 
vague organizational appreciation.  
 
The disintegration of the culture group culminated the summer of 2005 when the group 
leader left the PSA. He had been the most important ambassador for the culture project, 
both internally and externally. He could talk from experience, and street credibility was 
important, in particular when the topic was of the elusive ‘human factors’ kind; it had to 
be related to the recognizable and experiential contexts ‘on the ground’. He also had good 
communicative abilities and an open ‘un-fixed’ vision of cultural processes, although he 
would at times appear as somewhat apologetic in terms of his professional authority on 
the subject of ‘culture’ (such as by referring to himself as being “only an engineer”, thus 
also yielding to the ‘expert complex’).  
 
Combined with the contributions from social scientists used as external consultants, the 
in-house anthropologists, the in-house psychologist (and a few other dedicated 
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professionals), one would expect the group to be well furnished for the task. Still, in 
terms of enabling the organization to make sense of and actively adopt a cultural 
perspective in order to realize or ‘discharge’ the announced ‘cultural age’, these factors 
were (at best) necessary conditions only, and far from sufficient ones. More important 
was how the culture project as such was embedded within the organization, in particular 
within its higher echelons, and probably also how prepared it was for engaging in a new 
and elusive exploration of risk management approaches (given the ones already in 
operation).  
 
In a follow up interview after he’d left the PSA, the project leader admitted with some 
resignation:  
 
I soon realized that HSE culture wasn’t so deeply rooted in the leadership-group. I felt they 
hadn’t spent too much time in trying to get behind the wording of the culture provision, and 
therefore didn’t always provide any strong support or commitment. They didn’t clearly 
expect employees to read the culture-booklet and I believe some hadn’t read it themselves. 
It couldn’t be the responsibility of the group alone to be the bearers of the culture-message, 
explaining to everyone what was meant. The management had to be in the front line.  
 
 
Apart from the fact that the members of the culture group also contributed, to varying 
degrees, in their roles as ordinary participants in the disciplinary and supervisory groups, 
the group as such was rather isolated within the organization. The very role of having to 
‘spread the cultural perspective’ indicated that this was the mandate of the group in 
relation to the organization, not of the organization in relation to the environment. There 
was no ‘cultural movement’, only to be coordinated by the group; the venture was elusive 
and fragile. This was made particularly clear as the group, in early summer of 2005, was 
given the task of preparing a memo to be used as input to the new White paper, to appear 
in 2006. The memo was supposed to summarize experiences, make up a ‘status’ and 
provide some suggestions for challenges ahead. The task was organized as an afternoon 
workshop, outside the PSA premises to facilitate a dedicated and efficient work process, 
and I was fortunate to be able to participate. The occasion was thus unique, like a 
moment of truth, in terms of getting access to a concentrated review of the cultural 
experiment. Two key accomplishments were highlighted: The booklet and the 
conferences. Beyond that, discussions circulated around the strangely paradoxical issues 
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of (1) how HSE culture was to be understood and (2) how this ‘still-in-progress gospel’ 
was to be communicated in order to be appreciated by internal and external target groups. 
Clearly, a number of illuminating examples were provided of how cultural perspectives 
could enhance the understanding of underlying causes, could enrich supervisions, etc.; 
and the struggle against the disproportionate and ambiguous behavioural focus in large 
parts of the industry could be awarded some success. But the occasion made evident the 
difficulties involved in talking abstractly or generally about HSE culture, in involving the 
rest of the organization (particularly the management), and in evaluating the effects of the 
efforts made.212 
 
At this point there were discussions about the organizational follow up of the culture 
project. Some clearly saw it as a ‘project’, something to be ended when the job was done: 
Now they’d had a culture project over some years, they’d made the booklet, some 
‘cultural’ elements was included in the RNNS-project, and now they entered into a new 
phase. There were discussions about terminating the project and integrate the follow-up 
of HSE culture as part of the ordinary everyday business of the agency. This ‘diagnosis’, 
and its ‘logical’ consequences, reflected perhaps also a certain amount of organizational 
fatigue. Much work and energy had been invested, some achievements had been made, 
but the outcomes were dubious, and the prospects were somewhat intimidating.  
 
There was a certain disillusionment, however, with a remembrance of enthusiasm, in how 
the former culture group leader commemorated his experiences:  
 
The culture project wasn’t a fad. My industry experience made me interested. And I still 
don’t believe the provision should be removed. Some say it could, that one should rather 
speak of ‘management’. I believe that would reduce the quality of supervisory activities; it 
would be a poorer supervision, less able to creep under the skin of the companies. I’ve seen 
how one platform manager could break a code and really change a platform culture, almost 
overnight. He stood forth and declared his commitment; that everything was to be reported 
                                                 
212 After four hours of intensive work, everyone was more or less exhausted, as were ordinary working 
hours. I ended up writing the memo in collaboration with a newly appointed member and secretary of the 
group. This is clearly not meant to indicate that I at that point was any more clear-sighted than the other 
participants in the work shop. Rather, I had no evening obligations, and I was also a bit (ethnographically) 
thrilled by the opportunity provided by the whole occasion, and to change roles: from observer, to 
observer/participant, to (almost) full scale participant. But I also believe that there was some ethnographic 
significance to the fact that the other group members didn’t demonstrate a stronger dedication and concern 
for the end result. 
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in an open and trustful way, that he wouldn’t give a damn if he got anything on his record. 
This is much more important than fancy management systems. Then comes another 
manager along, and everything changes back to how it was before .… We must be able to 
understand the powerful dynamics of such processes if we are to improve HSE conditions 
out there. I really thought that the cultural approach would be a necessary asset in 
sensitizing the agency to such processes.  
 
 
Throughout 2005, there were indications that engagement in HSE culture no longer 
appeared as particularly attractive; the anthropologist originally recruited for the task had 
been on maternity leave for some time, but did not rejoin the project. HSE culture was 
associated with vague and soft human intangibles, as compared to the real and 
measurable and tangible stuff of engineers. And the intangibles of the ‘human factor’ 
could be more readily approached by the more established models available. The task of 
the project was correspondingly daunting: combining and integrating theoretical and 
practical knowledge on ‘culture’ with the existing risk management conceptions and 
strategies, all to be made relevant to the industrial context, and finally constricted by the 
regulatory role. HSE culture had to appear as something significantly productive in terms 
of developing supervisory skills, interpretive repertoires, and explanatory models. The 
question of how to integrate or relate HSE culture to the existing concepts and 
conceptions would have required more committed contributions from the various 
disciplinary groups, and a willingness perhaps to make some accommodations and 
sacrifices in the design of ‘classification systems’. 
 
Accordingly, there was a gradual shift in the burden of proof towards justifying culture as 
a significant contribution to the regulatory repertory. In some contrast to the initial period 
of legitimate exploration, this could no longer be taken for granted. The ‘unbecoming’ 
comment by professor Hovden, and the reactions it caused, was indicative of this shift 
and how it was felt by those involved. It questioned the implicit but fragile convictions, 
and despite the fact that it could be countered by restoring the ‘holistic approach’ and 
blaming the industry for the reductionism, it was still somehow challenging the 
existential foundations of their mission. And the ‘holistic approach’ would strike back: in 
having to the face up to the task of conveying the practical applications of the ever 
expanding and increasingly abstract contents of the cultural ‘black box’. The translation 
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process was all the more complex. First, by abstracting the cultural from complex and 
relevant experiential realities, then by making sense of the abstractions, and finally 
enabling a meaningful re-applications onto new and widely divergent experiential 
realities. The provision of ‘examples’ could in principle proceed infinitely, and the 
competence of the mentor would ideally comprise a rich combination of knowledge about 
the industrial risks, the successful design of their management, and knowledge about ‘the 
cultural’ as applied to these realities. It presupposed a lot of organizational patience, 
curiosity, and engagement across disciplinary boundaries, and probably a fair expectation 
that the effort would be rewarded. Faced with the organizational and communicative 
barriers, the task was overwhelming. As was somewhat more laconically commented by 
one project member, after it had been terminated in 2006: “very high interpretive costs 
were involved in the culture project”. She still felt that the project had contributed to 
changes in the agency in terms of greater awareness and sensitivity to how socio-cultural 
preconditions were instrumental in achieving the regulatory goals. As was also 
commented by the project leader: 
 
The discussions we had with the industry about HSE culture did provide an opportunity for 
more ‘enlightened’ communication , in particular to ‘undress’ some of the existing naivety 
about a ‘roboticized’ world of people, organizations, and technologies, where you can push 
a button in one end and painstakingly predict a result in the other end .... and, furthermore, 
the idea that incidents and accidents can really be ‘explained’ if only the forms and schemes 
are sufficiently comprehensive. These discussions revitalized more ‘holistic’ appreciations 
of the fact that life, onshore as well as offshore, is not static and fixed, but to such an extent 
dynamic and influenced by so many factors and ‘driving forces’ .... We need to draw 
attention to all these ‘relations’ between framework conditions, such as the action or ‘non-
action’ of the onshore organizations, the complexity of operational processes, the role of 
individuals and group-processes, being conscious about the importance of ‘time’ and 
timing, and so on and so forth. In short, we did have ‘value-adding’ and highly meaningful 
discussions that involved a number of people, also internally, that had not always been 
‘commonly accepted’, and I believe this contributed to more reflective considerations about 
risk management in the industry. 
 
 
As noted in the introductory chapter, the 2006 White paper had few references to HSE 
culture. Partly, it was referred to only as an aspect of the psycho-social working 
environment, partly as a topic requiring more research. The most extensive reference was 
made in relation to major accident risks, by pointing to the behavioural bias observed in 
the industry, and by providing a brief but quite comprehensive, ‘total risk management’, 
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account. The formulations used did not clarify much, but restored the idea that culture 
was sometimes just some aspect of some aspect and at other times it was all over the 
place.213 
Concluding discussion 
We conclude this chapter by recapitulating and exploring some implications following 
from the short version of the initial research question: ‘What happened to HSE culture?’ 
The title of the chapter draws attention to the interpretive and semiotic aspects, as did the 
introductory elaboration of this research question in foreshadowing a study of 
organizational sense-making. Evidently, the local practitioners of risk management could 
hardly have hit upon a more demanding and comprehensive term to cope with when 
choosing to introduce ‘HSE culture’ as part of the regulatory strategy.  
 
The questions prompted by the cultural turn were multifarious: How could the ‘culture 
label’ (or its composite properties) be attached in any meaningful manner to the highly 
complex and transient operational processes and organizational structures within the 
industrial complex? Was culture predominantly to be found in the attitudes and 
behaviours of workers within the constraints of the workplace context? Were these local 
workplace contexts shaped by decision making processes at higher echelons, also 
deserving to be addressed in terms of culture? Was culture to be revealed in the overall 
priorities and trade-offs made in the licence committees? Was culture the residual factor 
that either ‘escaped’ of ‘effectuated’ the formal systems of risk management? Was 
compliance with procedures good culture only if procedures were good? How could 
‘indicators’ of culture be interpreted and aggregated in order to justify cultural diagnoses? 
Was good HSE culture just another word for what any one authorized person considered 
to be good practices of risk management, inter alia as these could be extracted from the 
regulations?  
                                                 
213 The formulations read as follows: “HSE culture must also address technical and operational factors. 
HSE culture must be addressed in a way that places more emphasis on technology, quality planning, 
competence, management involvement and other framework conditions for prudent operations”. A list of 
suggestions of application is provided, including risk management, risk analysis, risk communication, and 
models for evaluating the human contribution to risk. The MTO concept was however used extensively, but 
never related to culture.  
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 These were local enactments of the blurred semiotic and substantial engagements with 
culture, and they challenged the interpretive and diagnostic abilities of engineers and 
anthropologists alike (as well other professionals). The somewhat resigned sigh about 
being ‘only an engineer’ could only be responded to with considerable sympathy (and 
occasionally causing an analogous self-reflection on behalf of the anthropological 
discipline). At the same time, understanding the technologies, the man-machine 
interfaces, the decision making contexts, etc., was largely the privilege of just these 
experienced engineers, calling upon others to act as ‘culture-experts’. A considerable 
amount of organizational energy and resources would be required in order to bridge these 
‘spheres of expertise’. But, as explored in this and the previous chapters, the bridging 
process proved difficult, and various ‘islands’ floated in the sea of risk management 
approaches. These approaches did, however, reflect a common and deeply rooted belief 
in the necessity of penetrating the layers of causes and antecedent conditions, beyond 
‘technical failures’ and  ‘operational errors’. Social and organizational factors had for 
years been addressed with varying degrees of sophistication and energy. If there was a 
‘culture’ to be found in the agency, in terms of ‘basic assumptions’ and ‘patterns of 
behaviour’, a place to start would be to analyze this relentless quest for ‘underlying 
causes’ and the classificatory systems devised for ordering them.  It was probably just a 
matter of time and necessity that ‘culture’ at one point or another would appear among 
the candidates. And as noted in Chapter 3, this was foreshadowed as far back as after the 
Bravo blow out in 1977. And ‘cultures’ were probably talked about even before that. The 
trajectories of how and why it made its way to a prominent place among the “principles” 
in the Framework Regulation may in this context seem incidental. But, as will be further 
explored later, the venture can not be reduced to only a simplistic instance of ‘imported 
fashion’ from the global menu of managerial vogues, in order to claim sophistication or 
buy legitimacy from the environs. Rather, it was part of a never-ending quest for 
penetrating the secrets of enlightened risk management. 
 
The interpretive conundrums of culture may tentatively be summarized as follows: First, 
what it ‘was’ in terms of empirical instances; second, the social or organizational scale 
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and boundaries of these; third, the semantic and pragmatic question of how they could be 
subsumed under the name of ‘culture’ according to ‘expert judgment’; forth, how they 
were labelled and conceptualized within the established regulatory models and 
vocabularies; fifth, the relationship between the conceptual labels applied (new and old) 
and their possible empirical applications; and sixth, whether culture referred to something 
‘else’, outside and beyond both established frameworks and perceptions. In sum, these 
uncertainties provided no clear strategies or templates for how ‘culture’ was to be applied 
in relations with the industry; some tended towards optimistic expectation, others towards 
reluctance or evasion. Many informants characteristically made it clear whether they 
were speaking for themselves, for others, or for the agency, indicating a lack of shared 
templates for conceptualizing culture. The act of labelling something by that name was 
typically accompanied with some reservation, and a sensation of relief could be observed 
when turning to the more familiar notions, such as ‘MTO interfaces’, which could be 
talked about with more straightforward confidence. Vague or implicit ontological 
assumptions could still be observed, about culture as being ‘something’, visible perhaps 
through certain indicators or that some competent observers possibly would be able to 
‘find it’. But occasionally, there was also a slightly ironic undertone indicating that there 
wasn’t really much to find that would add any significantly novel insights to the 
understanding of risk management.  
 
The culture group had moderately succeeded in deconstructing the most reified notions of 
culture and much energy was devoted to broadening its scope beyond the simplified ideas 
about culture as ‘revealed attitudes’ among offshore workers at the lower echelons.  But 
these were only partial victories; and they were also double-edged in the sense that the 
scope of culture was broadened and lifted to the most comprehensive level of ‘total risk 
management’. Dismissing the reified and reductive stereotypes also increased the 
interpretive costs. Even the more manageable interpretations employed during the initial 
phases, relating culture to collectively accepted practices within more localized 
operational contexts, were exceeded. The strategy of the culture group, as well as external 
‘culture experts’, appeared at times as an attempt to ‘attach’ HSE culture to as many of 
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the known and favoured aspects of risk management as possible, making conceptually 
and substantially more relevant, familiar, and recognizable.  
 
Culture was everywhere (as it arguably is). Almost by the same token it became elusive 
and obscure. The HSE culture booklet may not have eased this process of translation and 
application; it provided no clear exposition of how culture could be ‘positioned’ in 
relation to the established conceptual frameworks, or of how the cultural perspective 
would provide distinctively new approaches to understanding or managing risk. 
Curiously, hardly any references were made to the booklet in the interviews. But those 
who did, praised the content; among whom were some of the most unequivocally 
proclaimed sceptics. And as this scepticism was largely tied up with the behavioural 
biases associated with the ‘culture programs’, an almost self-defeating circle could be 
observed. But there is also another (perhaps paradoxical) side to this observation. The 
missing appeal of ‘the cultural perspective’ must partly be attributed to the simple fact 
that a number of the essential ideas it embodied were already deeply engrained in the 
regulatory ethos: no-blamism, openness and rapport, participatory designs, systems based 
and organizational approaches, tracing ‘causes’ beyond the immediate technical and 
operational antecedents, etc. Even if these regulatory philosophies provided a favourable 
climate for adopting received ideals of a ‘sound HSE culture’, the ‘translation processes’ 
were all the more challenging; in particular as this was perceived (and perhaps presented) 
as something significantly innovative. The fact that available vocabularies existed for 
much of what could be subsumed under the culture term abated the ability to identify the 
value added by employing a composite term with somewhat amorphous references. 
 
Still, there was a commonly shared sensation of value-adding dimensions that would 
contribute something significant, if not distinctively ‘new’, to the explanatory and 
managerial repertories. These ‘known’ and recognizable dimensions  were closely related 
to ideas about organizational mindfulness and learning; the ability of the regulatees to 
move beyond simple and single-loop ‘corrections’ of error, to re-consider their work 
processes and to incorporate the regulatory intentions beyond the ‘letter of the law’ or the 
wording of a procedure. These dimensions could be recognized in the ideals of 
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continuous improvement, and constant alertness to how existing systems and rules 
yielded to their purpose in the real-life technological, organizational, and socio-cultural 
settings. A sound HSE culture would thus embody the ultimate ‘high’ state of self-
corrective organizational learning beyond the mechanical following of rules or orders.  
The ability to learn and improve was not only not to repeat the mistakes of yesterday, but 
of being able to generalize across these mistakes, critically analyze underlying causes, 
and ‘predict’ or envision unapparent dangers. But to equate good HSE culture with 
‘organizational learning’ would occasionally beg the question. What was there to learn, 
and how was the learning to be transformed into action? What ‘messages’ were hidden in 
the failures? The behaviour based and error-correcting approaches had partly 
contaminated the culture concept, and employing the term without extensive elaboration 
would not guarantee any desired response from the companies. 
 
There would thus be different ideas about culture, just as there would be different ideas 
about risks, their relative importance, how to assess them, and how to manage them. But 
these latter ideas were not primarily related to different conceptions about ‘culture’; or 
rather, they were only partially made explicable within the ‘cultural frame of mind’. 
Certainly, reflections about how socio-cultural processes in organizations enabled or 
disabled them to take proper account of health and safety could be seen as a departure 
from both the confusions and the reifications surrounding the ‘concept’. These reflections 
referred to the way conceptions, values, and norms related to risk management (or 
mismanagement) was integrated in and pervading the socio-cultural systems of the 
regulatee. The obviously productive collaborations between the culture project leader and 
his professional superior appeared thus as a promising case of successful translation.  
 
These associations to culture were also in accordance with the original rationales, and the 
early enthusiasm and the traces of present optimism, could be interpreted as expressing a 
belief in culture as an almost self-evident understanding of the conditions of regulatory 
compliance as dependent on very real life socio-cultural processes in the industry. The 
originators’ accounts also supported this view (like ‘the breakdown of formal systems’), 
and so did many of the accounts rising above the apparent confusions associated with 
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understanding the ‘word’. Once the label was there, however, reified notions appeared of 
a compartmentalized condition ambiguously referring to particular spheres of reality 
within the landscape of organizational risk management. It was no longer seen as a 
genuine meta-regulation, but triggered instead a search for what was thought to be 
‘elsewhere’, because it had been linguistically labelled as ‘something’, accessible perhaps 
only to the professionally trained. There was, perhaps, a queer insight in the joke about 
the “psycho-somatic condition of a pipeline” (see p 289). But everyone still understood 
that the safety of pipelines would be the result of how interests, perceptions, and beliefs 
entered into decision-making processes in complex organizational contexts, 
encompassing, also their socio-cultural situatedness. 
 
The purpose of dedicating a section to the culture provision was to ‘lift it up’, attract 
attention, and provide regulatory force. The result may have been that HSE culture came 
to be seen as some particular kind of independent and measurable property, a reified state 
of organizational affairs. Although the culture group strived to adjust these images and 
associations, the relationship between ‘culture’ and the rest of the regulatory framework 
was not made clear; it was given a key position among the principles which were to serve 
as a general bedrock for both authority enforcement and regulatory compliance. ‘Culture’ 
indeed proved its position as a hypernym, comparable to the overarching purpose 
provisions about operations being ‘prudent’ and a working environment providing ‘full 
safety’. Such abstract and high level regulations were only made meaningful and 
applicable within the regulatory context if more specified, lower level rules or standards 
could fill in the criteria needed for claiming that compliance with the requirement could 
be assessed, and no comprehensive analysis or interpretation was made of how the 
remaining regulations could be seen as instances or even specifications of how good HSE 
cultures were to materialize in the industry. The fact that ‘HSE culture’ entered into an 
engineering and legalistic context of discourse, oriented towards measurements, 
indicators and ‘standards’, and even having to face the ‘enforcement test’, did restrict the 
scope applicability. Having ‘failed’ such tests and found unfit within these dominant 
discourses, the conditions for a viable existence were aggravated; some phenomena 
‘existed’ only outside the formal frames of reference; at lunch tables or other in informal 
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encounters where ‘evidence’ for their existence could be addressed in uncommitted and 
colloquial terms.  
 
But this alone cannot explain the translation problems. First, the organizational efforts 
devoted to the project should not be overrated; ongoing tasks absorbed the attention and 
the marginalized culture group was given the sole responsibility of providing translation 
manuals. Second, there were broader repertoires of supervisory strategies and arenas 
amenable to cultural sensitivities in agency-industry interactions that were only sparsely 
used. These did not necessarily require standardized codes of communication, and could 
be used for more explorative reflections about the complexities of risk management (as 
they probably also were, but, apart from the efforts of the culture group, evidently not in 
terms of ‘HSE culture’). Also, the supervisory context did allow for more subtle forms of 
communication and intervention, although the culture project as such provided no clear 
recipes for connecting to these. Third, the failure to juxtapose HSE culture more 
systematically to the existing and predominantly ‘rational’ plethora of regulatory 
expectations may have promoted a process where HSE culture receded into an ambiguous 
and mysterious residual. Normatively they might have cultivated a culture of rationality, 
but current understandings of culture also reduced it to ‘biases’, ‘rules’, and practices that 
operated according to less controllable mechanisms. Despite the elaborations made in the 
booklet, culture as intelligent design and problem-solving, faded, and culture lost some 
appeal by being dissociated from rationality at the organizational level and associated 
with ‘risk-adaptive’ behaviour at lower levels. 
 
The relationship between culture and rationality was not only an indigenous (if implicit) 
concern; and an inclination to dissociate the two, treating culture as the residual that 
escapes rational models of social (and organizational) life, can be found in academic 
schemes, as will be discussed below. As rationality is key in risk management, 
understood as ‘effective’ ways of risk reduction, the disengagement may have been 
critical. But it was neither total nor unambiguous; traces of reconciliation could be found, 
implicitly through the way in which the idea of culture resonated with the images of 
regulatory compliance as something more than simpleminded adherence to rules or single 
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loop learning from the lessons of error. These ideas of culture were of course normative. 
A good HSE culture implied a commitment to the regulatory purposes and the already 
existing plethora of provisions provided for fulfilling these, and to the expectation that 
regulatory resources and organizational mindfulness were mobilized in creative and 
intelligent problem-solving, properly shielded from economic and operational forces. But 
this grander vision, or idea, appeared then as more or less synonymous with the mission 
of risk management and its regulation as such; the synonymy would turn into tautology, 
making it superfluous to ‘test’ whether a sound HSE culture contributed to reduced risk. 
But even that synonymy was not unquestioned and a number of reductive and 
compartmentalized visions appeared.  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, the role of culture in the safety literature embodies some of the 
same enigmas, both conceptually and substantially. There is little agreement on the 
understanding of ‘safety culture’, and a number of variously structured configurations of 
cultural dimensions are available. The preceding accounts and interpretations of the 
cultural experiment should not be simplistically seen as an ‘exposure of cultural 
incompetence’. Firmly placed among the principles in the Framework Regulation, and 
elaborately outlined in the HSE culture booklet, comprehensive recipes and indications 
for a ‘sound HSE culture’ were available. But it was still not clear whether culture was an 
‘additional element’, or just encapsulating and expanding the existing norms and 
templates for prudent risk management. This resulted, not only in problems of operational 
and referential meaning, but created also some ‘paradoxes of classification’ since 
‘culture’ would move within and between such conceptual systems.  
 
Turner and Pidgeon (1997) pointed to another paradox of safety culture in drawing 
attention to how socially shared assumptions, beliefs, and practices can either facilitate or  
thwart the possibility for intelligent risk management, advocating of course, the 
‘cultivated’ and normative ideal: 
 
In exploring safety cultures as a route to institutional design we need to go beyond 
exploring individual attitudes to safety; to the level of shared cognitions, and the 
administrative structures and resources which support, rather than constrict, the 
development of organizational intelligence and above all safety imagination regarding risk 
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and danger. This can be seen as one part of the never complete process of active learning 
(1997: 188). 
 
These normative ideals were clearly embedded in the cultural strategy of the PSA, 
sometimes referred to as culture, sometimes seen as a continuation of a long term process 
of regulatory development – and learning.  
 
But such quests have their price, and make the task of regulation a lot more complicated. 
Identifying the contribution of the ‘human factors’ within the organizational, 
technological, and economic settings opens a landscape of opportunities and challenges 
diagnostic and intervening capacities, which are already severely constrained by the 
regulatory context primarily based on ‘remote control’. The limitations of this context 
were apparent, but still ambiguous in terms of what properties of the regulated organisms 
that could be seen as ‘auditable’ (Power, 1997). Within this context, ‘culture’ appeared 
almost as a ‘universal remote control’. The regulatory ‘wet dream’ appeared to rely on 
the capacity of culture to transform and incorporate regulatory goals, replacing 
proceduralism and bureaucratization, and tempering economic forces.  
 
The cultural experiment was in every respect also a cultural process: of interpretation, of 
re-interpretation, of sense-making, of relating new ideas to existing bodies of knowledge, 
etc., situated within the organizational context of solving internal and external tasks. The 
regulatory world views in operation comprised a large body of conceptual and 
classificatory systems, derived from various organizational and disciplinary sources and 
applied to complex and transient realities, contributing to the unhappy fate of ‘culture’ as 
sometimes a meta-system, sometimes a subsystem, and sometimes elusively floating 
around and in between.  
 
A rather simplistic conclusion would be that the regulators failed to follow up own 
regulations; a more benevolent interpretation would draw attention to organizational 
courage and regulatory inventiveness. Given the difficulty of the experiment, in the face 
of on-going tasks and absorbing challenges on all frontiers, one would not but expect 
extensive and protracted processes of digestion and maturation. In the next chapter, we 
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trace the ambiguities of culture within the academic setting, partly in order to prove just 
that point. The chapter may be regarded as a ‘parenthesis’ in the course of this text, as it 
basically explores academic struggles with ‘culture’, and may even be passed over for 
that reason. At the same time, it may serve as a ‘comparative analysis’ of such epistemic 
and semiotic quests, intended also to make the foregoing interpretive processes appear 
both comprehensible and reasonably ‘enlightened’. But first of all, it is an attempt to 
provide a ‘translation manual’ for accommodating culture to the diversity of academic 
and practical contexts of application, including the context of risk management. 
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10. What’s in a name? 
 
Whatever the infirmities of the concept of “culture” (“cultures”, “cultural forms” …) there is 
nothing for it but to persist in spite of them 
 
Clifford Geertz (1995: 45) 
 
Introduction 
As noted in the introductory chapter, the problems and research questions addressed here 
can be construed in several ways; they appear on different levels and can be approached 
from different angles. Multiple hermeneutics are required in order to address these 
configurations. The research project itself was part of the process of introducing HSE 
culture in the industry and in the regulatory strategy. Social scientists of most flavours 
contributed from all quarters (the industry, the unions, the authorities, the R&D networks, 
and other ‘consultants’). The various academic notions of culture were supposed to blend 
in with the technical and managerial risk management models, which had also been 
increasingly adapted to include human, social, and organizational factors. The 
recruitment of two anthropologists to the agency was added to the list of measures taken 
to follow up the culture project. The cultural quest was in this sense a joint venture, 
although the parties involved had vague contractual obligations. The confusions and 
controversies attached to the cultural turn involved and reflected disparate academic 
perspectives and interests, as well as substantial conflicts about risk management 
strategies. I myself was given access to the agency as part of the venture, partly justified 
by the assumed prospect of some reward for the resources consumed (including hours of 
interviews with busy managers and officials). A two-fold personal motive emerged 
naturally during this process: how could the ‘nature’ of culture be excavated from layers 
of academic traditions dealing with the ‘concept’ and the ‘phenomenon’, and could the 
outcome of such exploratory endeavours be meaningfully digested in order to arrive at 
any viable templates for culturally inspired and informed strategies of regulation? 
 
Personal motives aside, this chapter will resume the theoretical accounts of culture and its 
role within the conceptual, interpretive, and explanatory landscapes of social science, 
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notably in social anthropology and organizational studies. The purpose is partly to 
‘decompose’ some dominant usages of the term and its relation to the phenomena to 
which it is supposed to refer. The hermeneutics of this quest involves thus a double focus: 
the options on the academic menu served as inputs to the practical (and intellectual) 
endeavours of finding a proper place for ‘culture’, but the academic ventures resembles 
this process through the queer combination of attractiveness, triviality, enigma and, even 
reverence, involved in claiming something to deserve that label.  
 
And as noted in the preceding chapter, a comparison of these intellectual endeavours may 
provide some redemption for the former experiment, as yet another instance of the never-
ending quest for exhaustive and non-redundant classification systems devised for making 
sense of complex and ‘chaotic’ environments. More or less in the same vein, this chapter 
will also try to substantiate some ‘definitional’ claims, suggested in Chapter 2, as a way 
to make sense of culture in a manner that minimizes the theoretical commitments that 
might follow from such claims. The concept of ‘translation manual’ may thus be more 
appropriate for denoting the suggested outcome.214 Lastly, it may be added, the 
institutional contexts of risk regulation, within which the cultural experiments took place, 
are themselves embedded in and shaped by cultural processes, thus providing yet another 
reason for teasing out the modalities of culture.  
 
The title of this chapter occasionally introduces discussions of ‘essentially contested 
concepts’, a label that may be appropriate in this case.215 Juliet playfully and passionately 
discards ‘linguistic essentialism’ in denying the significance of Romeos family name. All 
though it may seem commonplace to remind oneself and others that concepts and their 
definitions are social constructions, the wisdom of Juliet is often forgotten in the 
turbulence of semiotic engagements with, and within, multifarious and ambiguous 
environments. But for such constructions to do their work properly, one cannot be all too 
                                                 
214 The term is used here in a manner not unlike what is suggested by Davidson (1974/1984), and applied 
also by Tambiah (1990) in a more practical attempt to accommodate ‘incommensurable’ conceptual 
schemes.  
215 The term was introduced  by Gallie (1956) to address "concepts the proper use of which inevitably 
involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users"; disputes about such concepts 
cannot be settled by appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone (see also 
Geertz, 1973: 29). 
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indulgent about them either. After all, Romeo was a Montague, and they both died – even 
if it was just a play.  
 
Against these reminders, two initial conditions for the following exposition should thus  
be noted. First, the rather trivial insight that culture, the word, is as man-made as the 
phenomena it tentatively or assertively refers to, just as the understanding of risk 
management is as man-made as its real-world successes or failures. Second, providing 
prescriptive ‘definitions’ of culture is a capricious endeavour, and may put you in the 
unfortunate position of Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, occasionally ridiculed by 
philosophers of language when reproaching the idea that ‘meaning‘ can somehow be 
determined by resort to some authorized ‘origins’ or to sophisticated semantic 
analysis.216 Culture is arguably among the least ‘professionally protected’ social scienc
concepts (compared to, say, ‘reciprocity’, ‘ritual’, or ‘cognitive dissonance’). One mig
say it belongs to the ‘linguistic commons’, both within the scientific communities an
society at large; as such it may also be victim to the ‘tragedy of the commons’, thus left 
both uncultivated and recklessly exploited (c.f. Hardin, 1968). But then, no Humpty 
Dumpty could ever be granted ‘property rights’. Culture notoriously defies any claims to 
definitional authority, due to both its ‘comprehensiveness’ and its ‘commonality’, Still, if 
used, it must satisfy some ‘cultural requirements’; that is, an understanding of the concept 
must be minimally shared in order for communication to take place. However, given this 
point of departure, culture should be explicated in a manner that allows for a viable life in 
the ‘commons’, making it adaptable to various theoretical approaches, and as far as 
possible by using translatable and corresponding terms. In other words, we need a 




                                                
 
This, in fact, appears as one of the lessons learned from the cultural experience outlined 
in the preceding chapters; that ‘culture’ repeatedly appeared as a separate order of reality, 
accessible only to ‘cultural experts’. But even within these tribes of experts, such as the 
anthropological communities, the confusions and bewilderments appear no less daunting. 
 
216 As famously phrased, adding to the confusions of Alice in “Through the Looking Glass” (1871): “When 
I use a word”, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean -- 
neither more nor less." 
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Living with such abstractions as ‘culture’ may be endurable in an un-ending academic 
discourse, with no external pressures for arriving at a final ‘consensus’; for a regulatory 
agency with ongoing practical and operational demands, it discharged a significant 
amount of organizational uneasiness and discomfort. Incidentally, we may interpret this 
difference in ‘operational context’ against Perrow’s notions of interactive complexity and 
tight coupling: academic communities scores high on the former but low on the latter 
whereas proactive regulators scores relatively high on both. The following outline is 
therefore the result of much digestion, instigated by observing and joining in with the 
local endeavours, and only made possible with the benefit of time consuming hindsight.  
In order to justify and substantiate the outcome, we need first to consider with some 
detail the theoretical sources, primarily as these emerge from anthropological and 
organizational studies. 
Theorizing culture  
In Chapter 2, the concept of culture was largely introduced and discussed in terms of the 
troubles it has caused, ranging from simplified reifications to  amorphous versatility. 
Also, its position within various academic traditions does not correspond (even within 
disciplines). In organizational studies and ‘safety science’, the somewhat 
incommensurable academic contexts of psychometric measurement and ethnographic 
interpretation, embody just some aspects of this ‘ill-structured’ state of affairs. The 
former approach, largely dissociating culture from behaviour, departs from the latter 
approach of seeing culture as behaviour embedded in real life contexts. The ‘pollster 
approach’, taking cultures to be discoverable through the statistical processing of 
‘individualized’ responses to ‘validated’ questionnaires, reflecting ‘states of mind’ at the 
time of filling out the form, appears almost exotic from the ethnographers’ point of view. 
Indications may be provided through such studies, but cultures in the ethnographic sense, 
emerge as highly contextual modalities to be discovered in real life interactions. The 
analysis here starts naturally with the latter tradition, but tries eventually to accommodate 
the final suggestions to broader spectres of application (including, hopefully, the 
institutional context of risk management). 
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Culture in anthropology 
Very briefly, the anthropological concept of culture was gradually developed from 
evolutionary and unitary ideas shaped in the 19th century, through emerging relativistic 
and pluralistic notions during the 20th century, to an increasingly complex understanding 
of ‘the cultural’ as something more or less deeply ingrained in highly dynamic and fluid 
social processes (Keesing and Strathern, 1998; Kuper, 1983; Peoples and Bailey, 1994). 
The most famous definition from the early period of evolutionary anthropology was 
provided by Edward Tylor: 
 
Culture or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which 
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society (1871: 1).  
 
Disregarding the implicitness of a ‘singular’ culture (not to speak of “civilization”) to be 
understood as a “complex whole”, we should note the familiarity of some basic 
components, such as knowledge, belief, custom, morals, etc. In fact, these inventories of 
culture appear to recur, despite diverse and changing ideas about ‘their’ constitutive 
nature, individually and taken together. In the evolutionary framework, the singular tense 
was crucial, since all societies were studied as instances of a continuous and unitary 
process toward the highest forms of culture and civilization. The plural notion of 
‘cultures’ was developed later from the ethnographic achievements of Franz Boas and 
others, in an attempt to classify and explain varieties in human societies, not only as 
isolated ‘experiments’ of social communion, but largely shaped by cultural diffusion and 
interaction. Still, this plurality retained an idea of each culture as an integrated whole. 
 
Culture came to be conceived of as everything specifically human, beyond nature and of 
human creation. The influence from psychology emerged gradually, and Ruth Benedict 
conceived of culture as “individual psychology thrown large upon the screen” (1932: 24). 
The interest in the concept of culture was largely American, and culminated in the 
famous article by Kroeber and Kluckhohn in the mid-century, identifying six categories 
of definitions of culture (descriptive, historical, normative, psychological, structural, and 
genetic), and providing themselves yet another definition:  
 
 339
Patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, 
constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments and 
artefacts (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952). 
 
In Europe (notably Britain) ‘Social Anthropology’ has been the more common 
denomination; a difference in labelling that also reflected substantial divisions between 
the two academic traditions. At the height of the structural-functional school, culture was 
dismissed as a ‘vague abstraction’, and the American ‘culturalism’ was taken to be too 
intangible and ambiguous; this of course, in contrast to social structure. This view was 
gradually challenged and expanded through the works of Evans-Prichard and Leach, 
pointing to the indispensability of culture for the understanding of social structures and 
processes (Kuper, 1983). Later, Mary Douglas noted that “if anthropologists neglect 
culture, we could well dwindle to a sub-section of sociology or even of geography in 
European thought” (1978: 1), pointing to the unique calling of anthropology to deal with 
culture “systematically”, given the neglect or incompetence of others (like philosophers, 
historians, economists, or psychologists).  
 
Just as the notion of generically developed societies, to be studied as structured wholes, 
lost sway with the demise of the structural-functional school, the notion of singular 
‘cultures’ gave way to far more fluid notions of loosely coupled cultural processes criss-
crossing social boundaries. From within the British tradition, Douglas criticized 
American anthropologists for treating culture as too autonomous: “Culture itself was its 
own explanation and explained what else could happen” (1978: 1). Culture became 
mysterious, unexplained, and unchallengeable, only to be understood through its inner, 
notably linguistic and cognitive dynamic. “The human person was made into an 
automation whose choices are controlled, whose thoughts and values are passively 
received from the ambient culture” (1978: 3).  Douglas’ main ambition was to reconnect 
the cultural and the social, and at the same time provide a more dynamic model for 
understanding the relation between the individual and the socio-cultural environment. 
The outcome was the now widely known grid/group model, placing itself within the 
family of two-dimensional typologies devised to bring parsimonial order to the 
complexities of social life. But the dimensions were far from simplistic. The (‘social’) 
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group dimension was intended to indicate the degree of social incorporation of any 
individual, measured by the amount of social interaction, the interconnectedness of 
networks, and the strength of group boundaries. The (‘cultural’) grid dimension covered 
the amount and strength of rules and classifications that regulate individual options and 
social interaction, such as the availability of roles (ascribed or achieved), the degree of 
specialization, and the strength of ‘insulating’ social controls. Thus she challenged the 
traditionally held assumptions about group membership always being tied to up with 
intrinsic rules and rights. Mechanisms of grid and group operate in more dynamic ways 
and allows for several combinations, although still caught within the framework of the 
model: Briefly put, high grid / high group produce traditional hierarchies, high grid / low 
group produce fatalism or hermits, low grid / high group produce egalitarianism, and low 
grid / low group produce competitive individualists and markets (1978).  
 
The model gradually made its impact beyond the disciplinary borders of anthropology. It 
even gave rise to a research tradition appearing under the label “Cultural theory” (c.f. 
Thompson et al., 1990), thus conveying the impression that this was what writers on 
culture (such as anthropologists) had come up with after some decenniums of 
investigation. This may perhaps disrespectfully be taken to reflect impoverished 
knowledge and academic neglect in the receiving end, be it political science, organization 
studies, or in the social theories of risk (Rayner, 1992). Despite the merits of ‘cultural 
theory’, derived mostly from the process and logic of its construction, it has also caused 
somewhat reductive applications of ‘cultural’ analysis, partly by diagnosing cultural 
‘types’ rather than analyzing cultural processes, biased also by a Durkheimian tendency 
to see social phenomena as ‘facts’. 
 
One of the most influential contributions in the anthropological study of culture came 
with the interpretive or ‘semiotic’ turn of Clifford Geertz, credited as perhaps the 
foremost reviver of interpretive and symbolic anthropology in the second half of the 
twentieth century. The following famous and programmatic statement still ranges as one 
of the most widely cited accounts of culture today: 
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Believing .… that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he has himself spun, 
I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental 
science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning (1973: 5). 
 
Geertz’ account of cultural analysis as interpretation of meaning must be seen against the 
mounting influence of what he saw as reductionist scientism within the social sciences 
generally, also making its impact in anthropology. To see culture as “webs of 
significance” was not to confine it to just the ‘semantic’ meaning of symbols, linguistic 
or otherwise. In fact, Geertz argued for a textual reading of social life in a broader sense: 
 
To see social institutions, social customs, social changes as in some sense “readable” is to 
alter our whole sense of what such interpretation is and shift it toward modes of thought 
more familiar to the translator, the exegete, or the iconographer than to the test giver, the 
factor analyst, or the polster (1983: 31).  
 
Systems of meaning were to be approached through “thick description”, a notion 
originally derived from the British philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1949/63). It was intended to 
provide an account of agency, beyond the level of simple (i.e. ‘thin’) description, by 
including the intentionalities, purposes, and circumstances that made human behaviour 
socially meaningful. This interpretive context is in an important sense local: human 
practice is intelligible first of all through the manner in which it is socially enacted. Acts 
are meaningful (such as the apparently exotic or opaque ones) only within the local 
context of beliefs, goals, and symbols. However, like language, culture is not imprisoned 
or hidden in people’s heads, but displayed through publicly available symbols. Just as 
there is no ‘private language’ (as noted by Wittgenstein) there is no private culture. The 
interpretivism of Geertz has been received as particularly productive in the understanding 
of agency; the understanding of actors’ intentions from within, as shaped by culturally 
mediated expressions of world views, desires, and emotions, forms a basic framework for 
un-reductive interpretations of social agency in all its variety. Comparison, then, is for 
Geertz a matter of attunement to difference, taking account of distinct forms of life but 
still engaging in mutual comprehension, rather than employing formal methods of 
concomitant variation, descending to the lowest common denominator or ascending to 
abstract universals (Ortner, 1999: 33). Explanations should be interpretive, seeing society 
less “as an elaborate machine or a quasi-organism and more as a serious game, a sidewalk 
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drama, or a behavioral text” (Geertz 1983: 23). Culture is seen as deeply entrenched, 
comparable to genetic programming, but located, not in our bodies, but as extrinsic 
sources of information in the inter-subjective world of common understandings. The 
genetic analogy points to the way culture provide ‘instructions’ or ‘recipes’ for the 
processes shaping public behaviour. Unlike lower animals however, such programming 
does not incite predetermined behaviours. In fact, the genetically programmed responses 
of humans are so generalized that they depend on the culturally manufactured sources of 
information available in the public sphere of significant symbols. Culture then, is intrinsic 
to our cognitive and emotional viability. Without it, a human “would be functionally 
incomplete … a kind of formless monster with neither sense of direction nor power of 
self-control, a chaos of spasmic impulses and vague emotions” (1973: 99).  
 
The strong belief in the public nature of culture has been criticised, to borrow a phrase 
from Wrong (1964), as being ‘over-socialized’ (Barth, 1989; 1992; 1994). The idea of 
culture as ‘public’ seems in large parts to be derived from the semiotic perspective. But 
taking language and symbols as the basic metaphors for understanding culture, may have 
caused insensitivity to diversity and individuality. Language is only partly an adequate 
model for understanding culture, since few of our mental models and practical skills, it 
can be argued, are to such an extent subject to ‘disciplinary controls’ and continuous 
public scrutiny and negotiation, at least in the more ‘denotative’ and ostensive contexts of 
language use. There are misunderstandings and confusion, but mostly (or at least 
potentially) there is understanding (Davidson, 1974/1984; Lukes, 1982). Although there 
are individual variation in the use of language, such variation is of minor importance, 
against the role of language as a communicative vehicle, compared to the varieties of the 
worldviews, beliefs, values, etc., taken to constitute cultural systems. The more 
‘distributive’ models of culture take these varieties into account by pointing to the 
partiality of cultural manifestations and the individuality and positioning of actors, 
without ignoring the transcendental capacity of commonalities (see Borofsky, 1994). 
Some have even argued that, if culture is primarily learned, “its ultimate locus must be in 
individuals rather than in groups” (Goodenough, 1981: 54). From the basic idea of 
culture as something learned, memorized and retrieved, there has thus been an increasing 
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interest among anthropologists in the cognitive sciences and has lead to re-examinations 
of the role of individual cognitive capacities in the analysis of culture (Bloch, 1994, 
Shore, 1996). 
 
The idea of culture as primarily belonging in the ‘ideational’ spheres of social life, has 
had some prevalence, often contrasted with the more ‘material’ spheres of social 
organization and structure (Keesing and Strathern, 1998). In this sense, culture is seen to 
provide both models of and models for reality, pointing to the dynamic relation between 
the descriptive and prescriptive uses of symbolic representation, and to the ‘double’ quest 
of making sense of, and acting in, the world through systems of (more or less) publicly 
shared conceptions and behavioural templates (Holy and Stuchlik, 1983). The observable 
social processes and patterns of interactive behaviour, referred to as ‘social systems’, are 
still not clearly distinguishable from the ‘cultural systems’. Culture and society have thus 
been seen as ‘two faces of a sheet of paper’, and Geertz, years before his more seminal 
essays, noted to the same effect that: “Culture and social structure are …. different 
abstractions from the same phenomena” (1957: 33-34). We return briefly to this 
‘dualism’ below. Under any circumstance, the tendency to devise abstract typologies of 
either social structures or cultures, has met criticism. Cultural aspects, the software of 
rules, meanings, values, epistemes, etc., both interact with, and enact, patterns of social 
behaviour configured within larger material, political, and economic structures of 
opportunities and constraints. And no neatly delineated ‘cultural system’ can be found to 
correspond with any given social structure (or even community). The ethnographic task, 
it has been argued, is largely to trace these interactions and enactments at the level of 
events, acts, people, and processes, rather than as structured wholes. As argued by Barth:  
 
To enhance the power of our analyses .… we must turn from totalizing cultural models to 
generative models of processes .… from an exaggerated focus on the abstraction of culture 
to a more versatile attention to the multiple levels of events, acts, experience, ranges of 
variation, contexts, and larger systems – all of them permeated by characteristically cultural 
processes, but not simply constitutive of a unitary culture (1994: 360). 
 
Simplified notions of culture have been particularly challenged in the face of increasingly 
complex worlds of floating and discontinuous social formations and hybrid identities 
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with no clear cut cultural boundaries corresponding to delineated social, political, or 
economic units (Barth, 1989; Keesing, 1994; Marcus and Fisher, 1986). Accordingly, the 
status of the ethnographic approach, relying on an intrinsically ‘localized’ methodology 
of linguistically competent in-depth investigation, is clearly challenged, as is the 
tendency to analyze social events as isolated texts to be understood as localized webs of 
meaning, disregarding the wider societal and historical processes. Rather than unfolding a 
relatively closed or bounded universe of exotic webs of meaning, it is argued, one should 
address “the clash of meaning in borderlands” (Ortner, 1999: 11). Instead of 
automatically reproduced patterns of culture we have multiple voices, ongoing 
negotiations and struggles, not only between broader categories of ‘peoples’ (“Balinese”, 
“Javanese”,  “Jewish”, “French”, or even “Western”) but also between and within social 
segments based on class, gender, ethnicity, etc., which unpredictably intersect with 
‘established’ socio-cultural divisions. If cultural analyses are to be productive, it is 
argued, they must capture these broader historical, political, and social processes (Marcus 
and Fisher, 1986; Ortner, 2006).  
Organizational culture 
As noted in Chapter 2, organizations could perhaps be seen as more readily amenable to 
socio-cultural analyses, given their apparently more bounded socialities; but the enigmas 
of conceptualizing culture has still haunted this tradition of research (Alveson, 2002; 
Martin, 2002). A difference in perspective and scope should be noted, however, in that 
‘culture’ in organizational studies appears as less engrained within the ‘discipline’ as 
such, compared to anthropology.217 The ideational conception of culture as systems of 
‘symbols and meanings’ is perhaps even more evident in this literature (Alveson, 2002; 
Frost et al., 1991; Schein, 2004; Smircick and Calás, 1987). It has drawn attention to 
rituals, myths, and stories that are seen to reveal underlying notions about what is 
believed, valued, and assumed, thus also providing recipes for thought styles and 
behavioural patterns. The organizational structures and decision-making processes have 
been taken care of in traditional (rational) organizational analysis, and the introduction of 
                                                 
217 At the level of social science, it may be argued, anthropology stands in the same relation to the other 
social sciences, as cultural studies of organizations stands in relation to organizational studies generally, 
thus making the role of culture in these traditions different. 
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culture has been launched as ‘supplementary’; but gradually, cultural studies of 
organizations also expand their areas of application (Martin 2002). Social processes and 
systems provide the infrastructure for meanings to be expressed and do their work. The 
components of culture (values, beliefs, assumptions, rituals, etc.) are considered on the 
basis of how meaning is communicated, misunderstood, shared, dispersed, etc., in 
ongoing social processes. These underlying structures of meaning are visible as cultural 
manifestations, which may include almost any aspect of organizational life, such as 
formal procedures and structures, behavioural norms, stories and rituals, physical 
arrangements, etc. (Martin, 2002).  
 
Again, such wide-ranging conceptions of culture also contain more deep-seated 
controversies about epistemologies, methodologies, ideologies, and theories, not only 
restricted to the ‘organizational culture’ literature. This has led some to conclude that 
there is “little sense of cumulative advances in knowledge in this topic area”, partly or 
largely due to struggles of intellectual dominance, resembling a “king of mountain” game 
(Martin et al., 2004). These struggles have been characterized by broadly defining three 
more or less conflicting perspectives, each containing a bias in seeing organizations 
respectively as dominated by integration, differentiation, or fragmentation. Although the 
perspectives are not defined as internally consistent schools of thought, their boundaries 
are seen as productive and sufficiently visible discriminations for fruitful categorization 
(Martin, 2002; Martin et al., 2004).  
 
The integration perspective resembles, as the label indicates, the older visions of cultures 
as coherent and unitary. In the organizational setting this amounts to organization-wide 
consensus on basic goals and values, consistent behavioural norms, common 
understandings, and integrative controls. A large body of integrationist writers have had a 
normative and managerial agenda, providing recipes for ‘value engineering’ and the 
building of ‘strong’ cultures for improving performance (Peters and Waterman, 1982). 
Culture has been seen as the integrative ‘glue’ of organizations. And, if organizations do 
not empirically fit the integrationist perspective on the outset, they can be managed into it 
by design and effort. Differentiation studies, on the other hand, discover differentiation, 
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allegedly due to greater empirical sensitivity and lesser commitment to managerial norms 
and needs. They find inconsistencies, segmentation, conflict, and different 
understandings and interpretive schemes. Divergence may occur between the espoused or 
formal appearance and actual or ‘informal’ reality, and it can be found as floating sub-
cultural islands (divided according to various professional, horizontal, hierarchical, or 
other demarcations). In the fragmentation perspective, consistency, consensus and clarity 
dissolve into seemingly anarchic chaos, at least in the extreme version. The patterns that 
occur are situational and transient; everything is ambiguous.  
 
Interestingly, it has been noted by promoters of this tripartite division of perspectives that 
from the fragmentation point of view, “the essence of any culture is pervasive ambiguity” 
(Martin et al., 2004: 16). Unwittingly, this may appear as a contradiction in terms. 
Pervasive ambiguity may be seen simply as absence of culture, at least in its essentialist 
clothing. This latter observation points to a certain ambiguity in these meta-studies, 
whether the perspectives are epistemologically or methodologically biased in what they 
look for and find or whether they reflect the empirical diversity of the organizations 
studied. Martin (and colleagues) confesses to the former view, but in such sweeping 
categorizations there is an intrinsic danger of tacitly implying the latter, and indeed, of 
confusing the two. Clearly, there will always be ambiguity and, arguably, intrinsic 
epistemological uncertainties regarding the relation between theoretical outlook and 
empirical discovery. Attempts to reflexively explicate divergent positions appear as all 
the more important. In Martin’s analysis, this is done by discussing how normative 
orientations associated with political interest’ can cut across the three perspectives. Thus, 
one finds ‘managerialists’ as well as ‘critical theorists’ represented in all camps. The 
former will find integration healthy or achievable; the latter will find it oppressive. The 
former will interpret differentiation and ambiguity as a challenge or opportunity for 
managerial control, while the latter will see signs of justified opposition, be they explicit 
or confused. And so on and so forth. And the parties will accuse each other of political 
bias and bad science (see Alveson, 2002; Gagliardi, 2003). Thus, by taking ‘political 
interest’ as the border-crossing approach, normative and epistemological issues are 
simultaneously introduced, and partly fused, triggering ill-structured controversies about 
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the relationship between what ‘is’ and what ‘ought’ to be (and between ‘positive’ and 
‘normative’ theory).218 
 
Martin (2002; 2004 et al.) encourage a multi-vocal and reflexive “conversation”, not 
subduing theoretical differences, but neither allowing them to overshadow the merits of 
either position. This involves constant alertness against conceptual and methodological 
biases that employ tautological and selective research strategies furnished to confirm one 
specific theoretical approach rather than to critically and continually examine its 
applicability. It further involves greater sensitivity to the complexities of cultural recipes 
and manifestations, not allowing some selected cultural property to speak for the broader 
picture. One will find, in most organizations, consensus, consistency and clarity, as well 
as conflict, divergence and ambiguity.  
 
Still, the power of theoretical perspectives to ‘frame’ what is found can be strong; reality 
does not speak directly and unequivocally to neither participants nor observers, 
recordable as ‘objective data’. Interpretation is not just a discovery; it involves also 
constitutive considerations about how ‘data’ are interpreted in order to justify the use of 
concepts like ‘choice’, ‘consensus’, ‘consistency’, ‘power’, ‘ambiguity’ and even 
‘culture’.  
 
Over and above this ambiguous landscape stands one of the most influential proponents 
of cultural perspectives in organizational research, Edgar Schein; his approach is 
therefore worth a brief summary. It seems to reflect quite widely held ideas and 
assumptions about the concept of culture, not necessarily due to his influence, but he has 
provided an elaborate theoretical and conceptual framework for these commonly held 
notions. Culture, according to Schein, is:  
 
..a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems 
of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be 
                                                 
218 Predictably, the meta-theorists will suggest meta-perspectives, transcending both normative and 
epistemological biases, thus attracting the attention of postmodernists and other academic suicide bombers 
de(con)structing everyone and everything in the surrounding areas, themselves included. 
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considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, 
think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein 2004: 17). 
 
For Schein, culture is strongly associated with leadership, as two sides of the same coin. 
The association is even unique, since leadership embodies the potential for the creation 
and management of culture. But there is also the possibility of leaders to be just victims 
of culture, unless they “step outside”, and themselves furnish cultural processes for 
meeting the organization’s adaptive needs. In fact, this ability is what distinguishes 
leadership from “management” or “administration”. Paradoxically then, the leader who is 
able to successfully discover and manage the ‘culture’ would, almost by definition, no 
longer himself be part of it. This vision of culture in fact combines several ‘classical’ 
notions of culture, such as the evolutionary, unitary, evaluative, adaptive, and holistic. 
Still, it would be a mistake to see it only as a retreat to the older notions of cultures as 
integrated wholes. Rather, it appears that Schein is interested in just those organizational 
societies that in fact match these older notions, either through empirical discovery or by 
managerial creation and design. The perspective is thus normative, not only in the 
‘integrationist’ manner, but also in the sense that it ‘normatively’ (denotatively) reserves 
the word culture for this particular empirical phenomenon, and not making any claims 
about how we generally should assume organizations to be like.219  
 
Schein thus takes culture to be the defining characteristic of groups having a shared 
history, its strength being dependent on “the length of its existence, the stability of the 
group’s membership, and the emotional intensity of the actual historical experiences they 
have shared” (2004: 11). Schein most strongly advocate an essentialist, normative idea of 
culture, superseding all of its constituent and “superficial” components (such as the 
espoused values, norms, and beliefs) through structural stability (it survives despite 
                                                 
219 This has caused some ‘misunderstanding’, since the ‘discovery’ of organizational differentiation or 
fragmentation would not really ‘refute’ the specific scheinian version integrationism. In this version, such 
ambient empirical phenomena (which he of course do not dispute the existence of) do not deserve to be 
called cultures at all. Schein even appeared with a brief commentary in Safety Science, (2004, 42/10: 979-
83) advocating this particular version of the integrationist view. The comment was a response to inquiries  
following an article that analyzed safety culture in terms of ‘integration’, ‘differentiation’ and ‘ambiguity’, 
and exposed these entangled comprehensions of conceptual constructs and empirical phenomena (see 
Richter and Koch, 2004; Hale, 2004). 
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changing membership), depth (it’s implicit and embedded), breadth (it’s pervasive and 
inescapable), and through integration and patterning (it provides meaning and order).  
Contrasts between “deep layers of essence” and “surface appearances” recur in this 
analysis, relating culture to “basic assumptions”, which operate below the level of 
espoused beliefs and values: “Culture is to a group what personality …. is to an 
individual” (2004: 8). Not surprisingly, Schein is often taken to be the proponent per se 
of managerially oriented integrationism. But, as argued above, this also points to some 
ambiguities involved in using such labels. The integrationism of Schein does not simply 
reflect a paradigmatic bias on the level of epistemology; rather, it reflects an interest in 
certain kinds of empirical phenomena, including a normative interest in promoting them.  
Discriminations 
Conceptions about ‘culture’ thus tend to blur substantial and semiotic issues, and actual 
usage may simultaneously reflect differences in both perspective and labelling. This may 
come as no surprise, given the range of phenomena that have been subsumed under the 
label, and we may appropriately ask what culture is not. The ‘answer’, as indicated, is 
partly dependent on the disciplinary tradition; not only in terms of empirical focus, but 
also in terms of the structure of academic nomenclatures. Culture may be taken as more 
or less the subject of a discipline as in anthropology, traditionally reflecting a holistic 
approach to community based studies, addressing modes of subsistence, political 
systems, ritual practices, cosmologies, etc., as components of more or less demarcated 
‘cultures’. Archaeologists and historians may also talk sweepingly about whole societies 
as ‘cultures’ of the past, or even civilizations of the present.220 Culture may furthermore 
be taken as some subsystem of society (as sometimes in history or sociology), it may be 
taken as indications of regional of global variations in cognitive processes (as in social-
psychology), and it may be taken as ‘residual’ properties of decision making processes, 
escaping the models of rational choice (as in political science or economics). Even within 
disciplines, the conceptual demarcations of cultural phenomena may be incoherent and 
ambiguous.  
                                                 
220 Most conspicuously known through the assertions made by Samuel Huntington (1993), that the future 
conflicts of the world will be due to ‘cultural’ differences between ‘civilizations’ (Christian, Muslim, etc.) 
rather than to political, social, or economic factors. 
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 One strategy, in eliciting the ‘implied’ or ‘assumed’ meaning of a concept, would be to 
look for conceptual juxtapositions, that is, what other terms are listed in conjunction with 
the concept, taking such juxtapositions to indicate a semantic differentiation of meaning.  
All though one cannot always assume that concepts thus are explicitly intended to be 
understood as distinctly separate and mutually exclusive, indications are still given about 
how they relate to one another, and usage indicates where confusion may arise. We 
briefly consider a selected sample of such ‘competing’ concepts below, notably social 
structure, power, and rationality.  
Culture and social structure (organization/system) 
As noted, the distinction between culture and social structure (or organization) is 
occasionally provided, and in anthropology it has even marked a division between major 
academic traditions. The two may, as noted, be distinguished as different abstractions of 
the same phenomena – as sheets of the same paper. Sometimes they are distinguished as 
patterns for and patterns of behaviour (Goodenough, 1994; Keesing and Strathern, 1998). 
These latter (‘social’) patterns range from residence, mobility, group-formations, 
hierarchies, statuses/roles, patterns of exchange, institutions, formal organizations, etc. 
The former patterns (culture) is thus conceptualized as an ideational property of social 
life, as the mental input factor, distinguished from its ‘material’ expressions in artefacts, 
observed behaviours, and institutional structures. The distinction is also drawn in 
organizational studies, sometimes taken to indicate a difference between formal structure 
and informal culture.  
 
Such distinctions may be considered as only of analytical value. The ‘ideational’ 
templates, partly contained in the Geertzian models of/models for dichotomy,  intersects 
with behavioural templates (patterns for) and their more or less patterned outcomes. 
However, the latter will seldom be unequivocally dictated by what the normative rules 
proscribe. The distinction between making rules and following (or not following) them is 
important, but would hardly serve as a viable operation for demarcating ‘culture’. Indeed, 
an understanding of culture depend on the analysis of how the two interact (Holy and 
Stuchlik, 1983). Rather than seeing ‘the cultural’ as a distinct analytic entity, it can be 
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seen as the “social viewed from another perspective”, the socio-cultural being more like 
“particular clusters of ways and products of thinking and acting” (Goody, 1994: 260). 
Clearly, (ideational) culture is conditioned by (social) structures, just as (social) 
structures are shaped by a number of culturally conditioned ideas about, say, hierarchies, 
rules, values, or even ‘world views’. In the organizational setting such configurations of 
the ‘socio-cultural’ would be visible in the aggregate patterns of handling tasks, solving 
problems, and reaching organizational goals in the face of environmental demands and 
constraints. Structure and culture are indeed only fragile and blurred distinctions in such 
processes. But in terms of actual language use, the distinction is alive, and it is of course 
highly relevant to excavate differences between formal rules, normative templates, and 
actual behaviour, however labels are used for such purposes. Although the ‘culture’ 
(being the core ‘topic’) will be used though-out this chapter, the term ‘socio-culture’ 
would be the more appropriate term, given these difficulties of differentiation.221 
Culture and rationality 
The distinction often made between culture and rationality, has some ambiguous 
similarities to that between culture and structure. On the one hand, rationality may be 
seen as embodied in structures while actual behaviours are the socially conditioned 
‘deviations’. On the other hand, structures are seen only as external constraints within 
which actors strategically follow their own ends. In both cases rationality appears as self-
explanatory and culture as conditional. Culture may impede rationality, while rationality 
may penetrate and supersede culture; when we consider ‘agency’, strategic or calculating 
(‘rational’) action somehow appears as less ‘cultural’.222 In institutional analysis, cultural 
and rational models are taken to represent ends of a continuum (Rothstein, 1996). 
‘Rational actors’ enter institutions, pre-determined to maximize expected individual 
utility, and the aggregate social patterns result from strategic interactions governed by a 
‘logic of exchange’. ‘Cultural actors’, on the other hand, have restricted cognitive 
capacities in processing information and transforming their desires into strategic action, 
                                                 
221 Note that the term socio-cultural is regularly used through-out the preceding chapters (unless ‘culture’ 
as the ‘object’ of research is referred to). 
222 The question of demarcation lines is apparent when we consider science as ‘cultural knowledge’, since 
often, when we talk of science as culture, we think of the socio-cultural contexts in which the scientific 
beliefs are produced, not the beliefs themselves, thus distinguishing between the context and the content of 
discovery (Hacking, 1999).  
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and are instead moulded into an organizational (‘institutionalized’) realm of rules, scripts, 
and templates characterized by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989). 
Choices reflect values and identities which are largely ascribed, shaped and defined 
within institutionally created universes of meaning and common understandings. 
‘Institution’ is the corollary of culture. We may note that this kind of two-partite 
distinction is evident also in the literature on organizational culture and safety culture. 
Alveson (2002: 6), explicitly reserves cultural phenomena for that which is “holistic, 
inter-subjective, and emotional rather than strictly rational and analytical”. Rational 
decision-making is thus seen as “thwarted” by “cultural” mechanisms (2002: 6). This, as 
may be recalled, has some relevance in relation to what was described as the paradox of 
safety culture (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997; Pidgeon, 1998). The assumptions, beliefs, and 
patterns of behaviour, taken to constitute a culture,  may be both part of the problem as 
well as of the solution. Only the normative promotion of organizational rationality, 
intelligence, and learning will generate a ‘safety culture’, thus also applying broader 
conceptions of rationality than the calculative behaviour of self-interested decision-
makers.  
 
These conceptualizations point to other paradoxes, involving both the relation between 
the ‘rational’ and the ‘thwarted’, and the relation between patterns for and patterns of 
behaviour (sometimes, as observed, taken to denote, respectively, culture and structure). 
Turner and Pidgeon, in referring to the distinctions between culture as observable 
behaviour (‘the way we do things’) as contrasted with culture as systems of symbols and 
meaning (shared cognitive models, stories, myths, rituals, etc.), adopt the second view. 
Culture is thus seen as an (‘ideational’) systems of meaning through which a given group 
understand the world. A safety culture is defined as “the set of assumptions and their 
associated practices, which permit beliefs about danger and safety to be constructed” and 
which is “created and recreated as members repeatedly behave and communicate in ways 
which seem to them to be natural, obvious, and unquestionable, and as such will serve to 
construct a particular version of risk, danger, and safety” (1997: 188). There is, it could 
be argued, a paradoxical absence of rationality implied in this mystifying use of ‘basic 
assumptions’, since it implies an understanding of safety culture, within the 
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organizational context, as something implicit, unquestioned, and biased, contrary to the 
stated ideals of prudent risk management. This, of course, may simply be a 
‘contamination’ from the ‘de-rationalized’ conceptions of culture from the organizational 
literature, but does still contribute to some ambiguity in the understanding of the 
concept.223 These ambiguities and paradoxes can be recognized more broadly in the 
safety literature, treating culture as inherent and encapsulating qualities beyond 
awareness, to be found in the deep layers of the organizational ‘personalities’. These 
‘contaminated’ notions of culture ‘co-exist’ with ‘enlightened’ notions, normatively 
promoting open learning processes, organizational resilience and redundancy, intelligent 
and ardent problem-solving, and all the other state-of-the-art approaches to risk 
management (Guldenmund, 2000; 2006; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). Only by arguing for 
the significance of culture as a ‘cultivating’ factor, is rationality reintroduced.  
 
From one perspective, conceptions of culture and rationality thus enter into ‘zero-sum’ 
games in the conceptual and explanatory battlefield; that which escapes models of 
rationality has cultural (institutional) causes, and vice versa; from another perspective, 
culture represents the enlightened state of organizational behaviour and problem-solving. 
This disconnection between culture and rationality, as indicated above and to be 
elaborated later, may in some respects ‘thwart’ the conceptions of ‘culturally’ sensitive 
risk management strategies, by ‘hiding’ the paradoxes in the referential claims.  
Culture and power 
Cultural modes of understanding and explanation are sometimes criticized for not taking 
power into account, a point made explicit in Perrow’s critique (1999) that ‘cultural 
interpretations’ neglect the impact of structural and power-based mechanisms (see 
chapters 2 and 7). Such critique reflects also more widely held notions about power as 
basically located in the societal hardware of material, political, and economic forces and 
constraints. Partly, it is also related to the consensual visions of culture as coherent, 
unified and integrated, as is evident in the critique of ‘integrationist’ models of 
                                                 
223 Even if they explicitly advocate the ‘normatively rational’ approach (the ‘way out’ of the paradox), we 
may still note the composite and ambiguous use of terms in the definition, in referring to ‘assumptions 
permitting beliefs’; the ‘rationality’ contained in this phrase may be elusive and ‘contained’; the phrase 
may even be reversed without any discernible change of meaning: beliefs permitting assumptions.  
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organizational culture. In Marxist analyses, culture appeared as epiphenomena of the 
superstructure, shaped by and reflecting fundamental material and economic conditions 
and cleavages of class and ownership. The Geertzian notion of culture as located in 
systems of symbols and meanings, although it points to differentiations and positioning 
of actors, social asymmetries and power relations are hardly visible. As has been aptly 
observed by Sherry Ortner: even in his famous discussion of “thick description”, 
ethnographically located in colonial Algerie, and involving the forceful abuse of a Jewish 
sheep farmer who was unjustly jailed and had his livestock confiscated, the interpretive 
account is void of references to the social asymmetries embedded within the colonial 
context. The case is rather discussed in terms of a “confusion of tongues” and a “clash of 
cultures” (1999: 4). In a critique against such applications of interpretive anthropology, 
Keesing (1987) has pointed to how cultural meanings are created and defined in 
asymmetric contexts, seeing them as “webs of mystification as well as signification”. But 
power and domination has also been comprehensively explored within the broadly 
defined realms of ‘culture’ by such seminal (although very different) writers such as 
Foucault (1980) and Said (1978). These explorations imbue cultural forces with intrinsic 
dynamics and impacts, not reducing them to epiphenomenal reflections. Locating culture 
in the sphere of ‘ideas’, has drawn attention to hegemonic discourses and ideological 
dominance, covering up basic social conflicts. And anthropologists have argued that 
‘localized’ cultural expressions must be understood as embedded within larger narratives 
that reflect social asymmetries and power relations (Marcus and Fisher, 1986), the latter 
turn also being referred to as the ‘power shift’ in cultural theorizing (Ortner 1999; 2006). 
Power, however defined, appears to pervade the spheres of culture, however defined: in 
values legitimizing hierarchies, in the powers of knowledge, in emotional deprivations, in 
manipulative uses of language, in behavioural controls, in restricted availability of 
options, etc. Whether or not power is included in a ‘definition’ of culture, may be a 
matter of analytical taste. The strong evaluative aspects of power, related to value-laden 
conceptions of interests, social asymmetries, and control mechanisms, may be an 
argument for analyzing it separately, but still as intrinsic properties of social reality 
(Lukes, 1974/2005; 1978). 
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Dimensions of culture 
We proceed in this exploration by keeping in mind that word processing, meaning 
construction, and linguistic agreements and disagreements are essential parts of social 
processes. Hermeneutic studies of language in use have superseded the older instrumental 
views, where meaning is understood in terms of simple designation (Taylor, 1985; 
Searle, 1995). However, these ‘older’ views still have a strong hold in living linguistic 
communities, often based on the idea of meaning as simple representation, that the 
meaning of a word can be explained by the way it can be used to depict the world (Taylor 
1985: 9). Although words have referential capacities, these are enacted in social 
communities. Searching for the ‘true’ or ‘original’ meaning overlooks the way language 
also have expressive-constitutive meaning. In the case of ‘culture’, these insights are of 
particular importance, for reasons elaborated in the introduction to this chapter, and 
presumably reinforced by the following excursion into the diversity of theoretical 
traditions occupied with making sense of the concept. Not even the brief attempt to tease 
out some distinguishing features of ‘culture’ as against some conceptual competitors, 
provided clear recipes for delineation.  
 
Instead of adopting a ‘definitional’ strategy then, the concept of culture will be 
approached here by identifying some of the key dimensions that commonly recur as 
culture is used. But even a more open ended perspective of the cultural, requires some 
agreement on the kinds of ingredients that go into it, and also on the nature of their 
composition The provisional understanding of culture provided in Chapter 2, assumed 
that culture, or the cultural, could be conceived as configurations of dimensional elements 
that appeared to form a more or less patterned ‘matrix’. This ‘inventory’ of culture 
included explicit or implicit normative and emotive prescriptions and bodies of 
knowledge and beliefs that are shared by social actors and communicated and reinforced 
through mutually understood (notably linguistic) symbols, thus providing viable recipes 
for relatively continuous patterns of social behaviour. Now, this account of culture may 
appear rather conventional and mainstream, but just for that reason its comprehensiveness 
and scope should be noted, opening as it does, a Pandora’s box of rather basic social 
science concepts: social agency, knowledge and beliefs, norms and values, meaning and 
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symbols, and including some ‘modalities’ of these components, such as patterning and 
continuity. We explore these components and modalities systematically below, by 
addressing them separately, as dimensions. The dimensional approach is critical in order 
to avoid essentialism and too many theoretical commitments, as was argued above. 
‘Culture’, or ‘socio-culture’, must be adaptable both to the variety of ‘its’ empirical 
manifestations and to the plethora of theorizing options. 
 
Arguably, the best starting point for approaching culture is the social agent. Agency is the 
necessary carrier and producer of culture; without living persons ‘it’ would find no 
expression, be it in the skilful manufacturing of technologies, the rule-bound behaviour in 
public places, or in the institutionalized behaviour in bureaucracies. The creative and 
productive role of agents in generating and transforming ‘culture’ is often downplayed, 
however, leaving them trapped as mindless robots in pre-produced structures of 
‘meanings’ and other constraints. Agency, as sketched out within the context of defining 
culture, is often couched in phrases like ‘codes of conduct, ‘customs’, or even ‘ways of 
life’. As noted, there seems to be a bias toward the traditional, customary, and habitual, 
implicitly implying the kinds of behaviour which are governed by rules and norms, rather 
than interests and rationality, an observation to which we shall return later. First of all, 
agency is ‘positioned’ and context dependent, as actors are situated within intersecting 
spheres of sociality. Sociality is of course as basic to culture as agency. Despite all other 
differences, writers on culture, like Geertz and Douglas, agree on the social and public 
nature of cultural processes. Culture is shared, and not private, although culture would 
not exist without personal carriers. As famously noted by George H. Mead: “Every 
individual has a slice of society in his head”; the individual mind can exist only in 
relation to other minds with shared meanings (1934). Without going further into the 
depths of the relation between agency and sociality (or the individual and society), it is 
sufficient to note at this point what seems to be the commonly accepted idea that human 
conduct is both shaped by as well as itself shaping the environment. This points to the 
highly dynamic nature of how socio-cultural systems are continually produced, 
reproduced, and transformed through social interaction, taking note of both resilient and 
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recalcitrant properties of structural forms.224 Such processes reflects as well as shapes the 
position of actors, but involves also an understanding of how both distant contemporaries 
(or even predecessors) and interactive social encounters, contribute to a sense of 
communal belonging and identity.  
 
Taking social agents to be the producers and carriers of culture, we may proceed by 
looking at the ‘content’ dimensions, that which is carried and produced. These involve, of 
course, rather basic human faculties, such as values, beliefs, emotions, and language, 
arranged in just that order.225 
 
Normative prescriptions may be seen here as broadly covering evaluative normative 
orientations, ranging from moral systems, deep-seated values and attitudes, to more 
mundane preferences and rules of conduct, without implying that the latter are simply 
applications or manifestations of the former, or that there is any overall consistency in 
these orientations as judged by inside or outside standards. Aesthetic norms might well 
deserve a category of its own, reserving this one for the basically moral norms. However, 
they might in some cases be hard to distinguish, and for the sake of simplicity we call 
them ‘norms’, thus also including the received humanistic conceptions of culture. Such 
norms of appearance, style, and form has been increasingly accentuated in studies of 
culture, from Balinese grace to communicative styles and among urban youths.  
 
Knowledge involves the employment of cognitive capabilities which produce beliefs, 
worldviews, modes of thought and reasoning, and thus also provide recipes, mental maps 
and models for engaging with the environment. It ranges in principle from scientific 
                                                 
224 This is of course one of the enduring and fundamental issues in social theorizing, famously encapsulated 
by Berger and Luckmann (1967: 79):” Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a 
social product”. A range of social theorists (like Giddens, 1984) have devised specific  ways of dealing 
with this basic relationships between ‘agency’ and ‘structure’. And we may note, the issue had its local 
expressions in the risk management controversies, evident from the attempts to locate causes, and 
responsibilities, within the range of available options.  
225 It may be noted that this inventory of content dimensions reflects some rather recurrent and fundamental 
categories in social theorizing. The basic distinction between the normative “ought” and the descriptive “is” 
parallels distinctions between “morals” and “epistemes”. By adding agency, we cover the basic components 
of rational choice theory and some philosophical theories of action: preferences, beliefs, and 
actions/choices (Elster, 1986; 1989).   
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theory to religious cosmology, from everyday practical knowledge to magical belief. We 
have knowledge through elaborate theory as well as through singular observations of 
‘facts and events’. At this point, there is no need to discuss the occurrence of cognitive 
bias and error, or (contentious) differences between well-founded or ill-founded beliefs; 
these questions will be more explicitly addressed later, pointing also to the reflective 
nature of knowledge as continually and constitutively produced, reproduced, justified, 
explained, caused, and questioned – in principle in endless ‘meta-games’ oscillating 
between making and revising maps, and following or violating them. 
 
Emotion, private and public, often furnish cultural modes with deep-felt commitment. 
Personal and public identities (national, ethnic, organizational, etc.) are invested with 
feeling. Behavioural norms are not only ‘moral’, but form part of the cultural order 
through internalized and exogenous mechanisms that are emotionally motivated, 
reinforced, and sanctioned. Beliefs (from religious to scientific) may also be entrenched 
with personal and socially conditioned feelings of vulnerability, strength, pride, joy, self-
complacency, fear, etc. 
 
Meaning and its symbolic expressions is often taken to be the very essence of culture; in 
particular in the wake of the Geertzian influence, “webs of significance” are the stuff of 
culture. Meaning in this sense extends, as noted, beyond the restricted semiotic symbol-
reference relation, sometimes even associated with a ‘way of life’. The world views as 
such are sustained in terms of the ‘meaning’ it conveys as representations (models of) to 
be acted upon (models for). Arguably, such a broad conception of meaning runs the risk 
of loosing analytical value, being more or less a corollary to culture. Meaning understood 
as ‘everything meaningful’ would (within the scheme suggested here) include most 
‘content elements’ of culture: norms, knowledge, identity, emotion, etc. Meaning as 
‘meaningfulness’ can in fact be expressed as certain combinations of these. By using the 
term “significance”, this double meaning of ‘meaning’ tends to get blurred, and appears 
almost like a new “ghost in the machine”, to borrow another concept from Ryle 
(1949/63). For the sake of clarity and analysis, it would be preferable to restrict the word 
meaning to its semiotic reference, including of course the meaning of gestures and non-
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linguistic symbols. That seems to be enough for one word to cope with, ranging as it does 
from ‘big’ meanings (like the meaning of ‘culture’) to trivial semantics, traffic signs, or 
symbols of matrimony (as against the institutions of marriage as a socially ‘meaningful’ 
phenomenon).   
 
Cultural processes can be seen then as social enactments of these rather basic building- 
blocks. Some crucial and dimensional features of these building blocks and their inter-
relations in cultural configurations must be noted, both in order to avoid reifying 
encapsulations of ‘cultures’ as delineated wholes, and to maintain the announced 
‘theoretical neutrality’. This can be approximated by considering cultural elements as 
‘variables’, appearing in forms, degrees, magnitudes, levels, ‘depths’, etc: Values and 
norms can be arranged hierarchically, emotions vary in strength, forms of knowledge 
differ in a number of ways, etc. But the elements are ‘independent’ only in the sense that 
they should be conceptually or analytically distinguished. In cultural processes they 
appear in numerous configurations that mutually qualify and influence each other. The 
dimensionality of culture appear in combinations and processes of mutual reinforcement. 
Values may be manifest on different levels of consciousness, from explicit to implicit, 
sometimes only visible in behaviour, as ‘revealed preferences’; social communities need 
not share all norms; beliefs may be socially shared to varying degrees, more or less 
emotionally invested, historically changing; and so on and so forth. Still, these elements 
of culture are not to be understood strictly as necessary and/or sufficient conditions for a 
culture to ‘exist’, so as to constitute a carefully structured inventory. One might 
convincingly argue that none in themselves are sufficient, although most seem necessary. 
Two qualifying dimensions (‘modalities’) appear as particularly relevant: continuity (like 
‘enduring patterns’), and ‘depth’ (like ‘implicitness’ and ‘basic assumptions’). 
 
Continuity, in various disguises, recurs in most definitions of culture. It appears in the 
older literature as ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’ – that which is passed on from ‘one generation 
to the next’. Most modern writers seem to settle with some degree of ‘regularity’ in order 
for habits, thought styles, preferences, etc., to be counted as ‘cultural’. There is still a bias 
toward the more deeply entrenched aspects of the cultural. Cultural constrains are 
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resilient. The ‘generational requirement’ has faded, but sudden and passing displays of 
‘life-forms’ cannot be taken as cultural either. Depth, for want of a better word, is meant 
here to signify one of the most common ingredients in definitions of culture: the implicit 
and tacit nature of much of the knowledge, values, rules, etc., that constitute the cultural 
domain. The prime model here would be linguistic abilities, like our (normally implicit 
and unconscious) use of grammatical rules. In the case of knowledge, the conscious 
attention that accompanies the process of acquiring knowledge often fades naturally as it 
is gradually transformed into effective action (Miller, 2002, Bloch, 1994; 1998). Indeed, 
much of what we do presuppose a more or less automatic embodiment, like when 
deliberate training is transformed into practical skill. Processes of thought do not follow 
the linear or logical-sentential model of linguistic learning and ability. Rather, learning is 
a highly complex and interactive engagement of simultaneous mental operations being 
performed and processed in active worldly pursuits of practical tasks and problem-
solving. Knowledge is connected and ‘chunked’, often implicitly, and only embodied in 
the practical and tacit management of skills (Bloch 1994).  
 
Un-stated and implicit rules of behaviour, and ‘tacit’ forms of knowledge, such as 
described by Polyani (1967), are thus often sources of reference when insisting on the 
implicit and deep layered and onion-like nature of culture. ‘Basic assumptions’, 
unquestioned and taken for granted, are seen as powerful shapers of cultural processes. 
There are also well known psychological mechanisms at work here, making its way to 
collective processes: What seems obvious needs no explication or explanation; the 
exceptional, rare, or queer catch our attention and provokes discourse (Plous, 1993; 
Fiske, 2004). Still, all this taken-for-grantedness may be overstated. At least, it cannot be 
taken as a defining characteristic of culture, leaving out everything consciously thought 
and talked about. Rather, there is an interesting dynamic between that which is stated and 
explicit and that which is not. Linguistic abilities, to take one paradigmatic example, are 
after all not located in mysterious and cognitively inaccessible quarters within our body 
of knowledge. Mastery of foreign languages improves by learning about syntactical and 
grammatical rules, by training the movements of the tongue, etc. But linguistic behaviour 
presuppose a considerable amount of automation, and ‘conscious’ linguistic knowledge 
 361
will recede or fade; however, such transitions do not imply any change of membership in 
the realms of culture, although the transitions are of importance for other reasons.226 
Also, these metaphors of ‘depth’ can sometimes lend themselves to reified notions of 
‘cultural cores’ or ‘essences of culture’. Cultural processes also involve active and 
conscious, and (arguably) strategic behaviour (Barth, 1966).  
 
It may be disturbing at this point to ask, ‘what’s not in a name?’ Clearly, these building 
blocs, as they are implicitly or explicitly contained in notions of culture, refer to familiar 
social science concepts regularly used and defined in more decomposed terms, such as 
‘normative structures’, ‘cognitive schemas’, ‘patterns of behaviour’, etc. Why introduce 
this overarching and dauntingly composite concept of ‘culture’ to cover them all, as if 
they’re not sufficiently complex on their own?  The notion of the cultural appears to rely 
on an idea that the sum contains some qualities that turn it into something more than the 
constituent parts, some organic composition of mutually reinforcing processes. The 
building blocks are not separate ‘components’ but intertwined in complex ways that need 
to be studied and understood in their particularly composite patterns, but still without 
assumptions about there being strictly bounded and stable ‘wholes’ – or ‘cultures’.  
 
These emergent, composite, and dimensional properties of culture cannot then be 
discovered by identifying one dash of values, one dash of beliefs, one dash of behavioural 
patterns, etc., that together would make up the total of any neatly delineated ‘culture’. But 
to preserve the label, if only in its adjectival form, one still needs to ask how deep-seated 
values or beliefs should be, how enduring or regular the patterns of behaviour, how 
emotionally invested the identities, etc., in order to deserve being termed ‘cultural’. 
Clearly, some degree of stability, continuity and comprehensiveness, etc., seems to be 
required for the term to make sense. We might talk of ‘national’ cultures, but also 
‘airport-cultures’, ‘group-cultures’ or even ‘project-cultures’ and certain sub-systemic 
phenomena like ‘reporting cultures’. Such ‘lower level’ phenomena may contain the 
same qualities in terms of socially sanctioned norms and worldviews, if only referring to 
                                                 
226 In psychological terms, much of these ‘tacit’ abilities fall under the category of ‘over-learning’ or 
‘automaticity’, not necessarily deeply ingrained in the ‘cultural’ domains. 
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some limited social of thematic field, not grand cosmologies or societies. But there would 
still be an uneasily defined borderline excluding the more transient, bounded, and 
situational human encounters, even if they inevitably include culturally conditioned 
properties. It might be argued that in complex modern societies, cultural configurations 
and forces often appear in just these ‘thematically’ and socially restricted fields of 
‘micro-cultures’, the total being all too diverse and complex ever to reach the level of 
anything more than traces of cultural components.  Cultural processes are always in a 
state of flux, its components are continually made and re-made, and no specific 
composition can be defined as a critical ‘threshold’ for ‘culture’ to appear.  
 
It would clearly be futile to try to set standards for what it takes to deserve the name of 
‘culture’ (or even ‘the cultural’), as if it could be defined by some minimum amount of 
values, norms, and beliefs, minimally shared and meaningfully communicated in some 
minimum sized community or group, with a minimum of deep-seated taken-for-
grantedness, for a minimum period of time. Still, it’s not all meaningless to think in terms 
of the cultural as tightly knit or loosely coupled, enduring or transient etc., but that would 
be more like thinking about a substance as thick or thin, rather than defining the exact 
state of thickness turning a soup into porridge; and conversely: even if we wisely abstain 
from defining that state, we realize that there’s a difference between the two. Cultural 
components are ‘variably present’ in different degrees and forms, making it perhaps 
meaningful also to speak of ‘cultures’ as both weak or strong, deep or superficial, 
comprehensive or restricted, extensive or partial, distinct or ambiguous etc., depending 
on the actual composition and ‘dimensionality’ of elements.227 Some ‘national cultures’ 
would then appear as rather thin soups, amounting perhaps only to some sense of shared 
territory, history, institutions, rituals, rules, and language. Some organizational cultures, 
on the other hand, might be considered ‘thicker’, such as can be observed in community-
like grassroots organizations. 
 
                                                 
227 What’s fascinating about, say, Schein’s perspective is how, within the organizational context, it takes 
culture to be just a combination of extremes on either of these variables. This is more a matter of 
definitional authority, which means that we must then label it  “scheinian culture” (he may be in a position 
to claim such authority with some degree of success). 
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Importantly, however, cultural building blocs and ‘borders’ are also actively defined and 
promoted by participants, and may be actively attributed by relevant environments. Such 
processes are not just based on (informed by) ‘existing’ commonalities and differences 
between members and non-members (regarding their values, beliefs, semiotic systems, 
etc.). Signs of distinctiveness can be actively mobilized and ‘constructed’, both as 
internal markers of identity, and as externally imposed, often stereotyped, labels and 
images. Such regulative mechanisms thus also serve as delineations between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, and may occasionally be quite fiercely evoked, such as in cases of ethnic 
conflict.228 
 
The concept of culture oscillates in quite complex ways between the comprehensive and 
the particular, or even the residual. By using the comprehensive approach, it looses 
referential capacity by throwing too much into one basket. By trying to restrict its 
meaning, there is bound to be confusion and disagreement about what is or what should 
be in the basket. These are the paradoxes that seem to haunt the fate of ‘culture’, whether 
it’s made to serve the understanding of societies and communities at large, near and 
distant, or the more bounded social worlds of organizations, even when applied to just 
some of their features (like risk and safety). The inventory and dynamics of cultural 
dimensions suggested here may not make the task of investigating culture an easy one,  
but they do reflect the comprehensiveness of culture and the great variety of notions it 
connotes in various communities. The intention here is to provide a framework for more 
consistent and structured communication about cultural phenomena, while retaining the 
possibility of divergent ideas about culture, but also by avoiding the less productive 
questions about what culture ‘really is’. Aspects of culture are interwoven into human 
societies and must be studied by combining analytic and synthetic approaches, 
decomposing cultural elements, and at the same time taking culture to be more than just 
an added up sum of parts.  
 
                                                 
228 Which is of course the reason why processes of ethnic and national mobilization to such an extent 
involves the ‘activation’ of such demarcating and identity-producing ‘signifiers’ (Anderson, 1991; Barth, 
1969; Pappe, 2004). 
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The approach suggested here, notably not radically different from other ‘dimensional 
approaches’ (such as Barth, 1989), does not constitute any ‘theory of culture’, containing 
propositions about cultural forms or typologies, although it’s presumably informed by 
and modelled from our knowledge about mechanisms that govern cultural processes. 
Theories specialized in some of the mechanisms operating within one or a selected group 
of cultural components (like rational choice, social cognition, or institutional ‘rules-of-
the-game’) are still addressing the ‘cultural’ in a broad sense. Calculating behaviour is 
also ‘cultured’, even if processes of shaping preferences and beliefs are largely black-
boxed in the explanatory models of rational choice. It follows from this approach that 
culture is not some residual category, evoked to explain that which escapes the 
conventional models of political, rational, or structural analysis. It may appear as such, 
because so many specialized models have been devised to account for its constituting 
components, talking about culture as if it was ‘something else’. The dimensional 
approach outlined here is tentatively visualized in figure 10.1. below, adding also some 
general and ‘local’ terms along the main content dimensions in order to provide some 
provisional clues as to how modalities of ‘(socio)culture’ and ‘HSE culture’ may serve as 
productive and  understandable templates for expanding the more sterile vocabularies of 
regulated risk management. We may leave it at that, recognizing that only the ‘insider’ 
would be fully able to continue the translation process in a manner that could recapture 
some of the initial intuitions and self-evident insights: that regulations will not produce 
the desired results unless they are adopted within and adapted to the socio-cultural 
contexts in which their intentions are supposed to materialize. 
 
As argued, no ‘theory of culture’ follows from the approach adopted here, quite the 
contrary. That it in effect can be accused of colonizing ‘non-cultural’ models and 
theories, subsuming them under its ‘imperialist’ domain, may largely be attributed to the 
nature (or socio-cultural history) of the concept itself. Evidently, concepts may serve 
different functions and purposes, analytic and explanatory, as well as exploratory, 
sensitizing, and non-reductive ones.  Terms that are too composite may lose both the 
capacity for referential clarity and explanatory power. As has been remarked by Etzioni 















































Figure 10.1. Dimensions of culture 
 
”Once a concept is defined so that it encompasses all the ingredients that are members of 
a given category .… it ceases to enhance one’s ability to explain”. Evidently, ‘culture’, let 
alone ‘socio-culture’ does not satisfy such analytical requirements, unless ‘captured’ and 
fenced in from the ‘commons’. The alternative may not be restricted to claims about 
culture as being just a very crude and catch-all outcome of ethnographic storytelling, 
compared to the scientific rigor of experimentally produced knowledge in social 
psychology, formalized comparisons of socio-political systems, or the psychometrics of 
organizational (safety) climate.  
 
The strategy adopted here, does not ‘exclude’ the formation of such more specified and 
rigorous hypotheses and theories within an overall ‘cultural’ framework, but doubts the 
ability of such approaches provide productive ideas about what cultures ‘really’ are like. 
But, given a reasonable degree of consensus on relevant dimensions and constitutive 
parts, the more important questions may be posed about the role of socio-cultural factors 
in understanding and explanation by referring to variables sufficiently specific to serve 
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such functions. This approach is preferable to the more analytically bounded 
categorizations of ‘cultural typologies’, whether referring to ‘societies’, nations, 
communities, networks, groups, or organizations. When the alternatives are already filled 
with theoretical assumptions about sets of configurations, the analytical approach will be 
more restricted. It creates, predictably, unfruitful discussions of ‘cultures’ tending toward 
either ‘type’, containing features of two or three or four types, of being in transition, 
etc.229 By starting with an anatomy of cultural dimensions, to be configured in a variety 
of ways, more analytical flexibility is allowed for by starting with the building blocks 
rather than with the buildings.  
Concluding remark 
Debates and disagreements about ‘culture’ tend to blur semiotic and substantial issues. 
On a very general level, there may be agreement about the kinds of phenomena that can 
be subsumed under that label (values, norms, beliefs, etc.), but as soon as the label is in 
fact applied to some slice of empirical reality and given denotative or explanatory 
functions, confusion or disagreement emerge. This appears to be the case in 
anthropology, in organizational studies, as well as in safety research. And as observed, it 
certainly was the case when applied within the practical context of risk management. But 
conceptual enigmas and competing systems of classification tend to produce ill-structured 
understandings and thwarted communication. In the case of the PSA, it was not easy to 
find any neatly structured correspondence between ideas about culture and ideas about 
risk management; and likewise in the industry. Moreover, proponents of ‘HSE culture’ 
would have rather different ideas about risk management, and proponents of any 
preferred risk management strategy could have different ideas about the merits of a 
‘cultural perspective’. Thus, the act of labelling also became part of the politics of risk 
management, not unlike how the naming of ‘cultures’ has become part of national and 
global politics, as well as of the politics and sociology of scientific knowledge.  
 
                                                 
229 This, it can be argued, follows from so-called ‘Cultural theory’ (Thompson et al., 1990), and from 
paradigmatic categorizations of organizations studies, or of organizations. Ref to argument by Barth, 
arguing against the use cultural ‘types’, preferring the study of generative processes through analytical 
modelling (1966; 1972). 
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I have argued here that confusions in terminology and naming reflect the inherent and 
rather basic difficulties of semiotic engagements with the experienced world – 
engagements deeply embedded within social processes of understanding and 
communication. The local endeavours in many respects appeared as no less ‘reasoned’, 
nor more enlightened, than parallel discourses within academia. The difference of course, 
was that their task was not only one of intellectual comprehension within local 
communities of discourse, but also of practical deployment in gradually expanding and 
‘unmanageable’ communities . Having to confront these enigmas myself, going hunting 
with the natives so to speak (if only in passing moments), didn’t really prepare for any 
easy return to the ivory towers of academia. And to be sure, they were not easily 
separable from the subsequent task of actually writing out the ‘final’ story. No ‘double’ 
hermeneutics would easily account for the levels of engagement and comprehension 
involved, but they provoked a return to some rather basic issues in the anthropological 
explorations of self-reflexive interpretations of self-reflexive agents and the role of 
rationality assumptions in these interpretive quests.230 We will further explore the role of 
such assumptions in the next and final chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
230 Even the old ‘positivist’ Otto Neurath expressed this ‘hermeneutic’ predicament of science, as a series 
of inherently conditional and provisional judgements, in the following memorable statement: “Wie Shiffer 
sind wir, die ihr shiff auf offener See umbauen müssen, ohne es jemals in einem Dock zerlegen und aus 
besten Bestandteilen neu errichten zu können”. The quote served as the epigraph to Word and Object, by 
W.v.O. Quine (1960). Incidentally, this seminal work contributed to re-configuring the philosophy of 
language by rejecting the notion of a language-transcendent “sentence meaning”, and insisting on an 
understanding of language as socially instilled dispositions, to be analyzed through the simultaneous 
observation of linguistic usage in social processes of  linking ‘words’ to ‘objects’. For those familiar with 
Quine’s argument, it should be no surprise that the referential capacities of ‘culture’ appear anomalous and 
contested, knowing how much intellectual effort he invested in analyzing the meaning of ‘rabbit’ (or 
‘gavagai’). 
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11. Risk, regulation, and rationality 
 
This final chapter will explore how regulatory regimes can be explained and interpreted 
from a more theoretical point of view, although occasional references to the empirical 
records will be offered throughout. The preceding discussion on the modalities of culture 
will also provide a frame of reference, both in terms of understanding regimes of societal 
risk management, and in terms of understanding processes and logics of organizational 
sense-making. Although this present piece of work is largely a study of the latter, 
incidentally dealing with anthropologically familiar words like culture, the worldly 
contexts in which these interpretive quests have taken place must also be addressed.  
 
The choice of the term ‘understanding’ is used deliberately here, to indicate some 
modesty as to how much explanatory power can be extracted from a single case study 
predominantly based on qualitative methodology. Such studies are often seen to be 
interpretive explorations of diversities and similarities of social phenomena, not for 
explaining them or ‘testing’ theories (let alone, making predictions). Case-oriented 
studies are sensitive to the complexity and contextual nature of the single case; they treat 
the case as a whole, not as collections of parts (or collections of scores on variables), and 
comparisons between cases tend to focus on commonalities. Quantitative studies explore 
and explain the co-variation between variables measured across a large number of cases. 
The first approach provides familiarity with the case but generalization is difficult. The 
second approach may provide generalizations, but the context of the case is black-boxed. 
In case studies, the relations between parts are understood within the context of the 
whole, while the context of quantitative studies are the general patterns of co-variation 
between variables characterizing the members of a population of comparable units. 
Multivariate statistical analysis breaks cases into parts, while case studies may tend to 
stay with the case. But there are also alternative methodologies for systematic 
comparison of cases in order to identify patterns of so-called conjunctural causation 
(Ragin, 1987; 1994; 2000). Howard Becker has somewhat disrespectfully summarized 
these varieties of social research as follows: “Where the causal analysis leads to a 
probabilistic statement of what might happen, and the conjunctural analysis leads to a 
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description of all the things that must be present for a particular outcome to occur, the 
narrative analysis leads to what might well be called a tautology, the statement of a 
sequence in which is prefigured …. the end result” (1992: 210).  
 
Most firmly placed in the latter tradition, the pitfalls of selecting the kind of evidence that 
will confirm the story you want to tell, must thus be closely observed. Within the 
confines of the case, however, this study may be of more value in terms of exploring 
dimensions of regulatory regimes, their ‘informational’ qualities, interrelations, and 
contexts for interpretation and understanding. Regulatory regimes also have their specific 
historical genealogies and path-dependent trajectories. The outcome could have been 
different with minor accommodations in some antecedent conditions. Thus, the ‘systemic 
isomorphism’ between industrial and administrative systems (and the ‘risks’ related to 
either), is evident. And similar models have indeed been used for explaining both. Sagan 
(1993) and Perrow (1999) both embrace models of organized anarchies, developed in 
studies of bureaucratic decision-making, in order to explain the emergence of 
organizational accidents.  
 
Getting inside the black box of government has been one side-effect of the emerging 
focus on institutional analysis of bureaucracies. As indicated earlier, rationality may 
suffer in the shadow of over-socialized rule-followers or whimsical slaves of fashion 
within this tradition. Although the ‘new institutionalism’ also address how the logic of 
appropriateness and the logic of consequence co-exist and interact (March and Olsen, 
2005), there is a bias towards the former. We return to this issue below, but note for the 
moment that the primary purpose in this study has been to uncover how knowledgeable 
actors solve problems and execute their tasks in a manner that hopefully has made them 
appear as more than rule-bound adaptors to local circumstance and normative scripts.  
Although the ‘rationalities’ adopted were not ‘perfect’, they still appeared, most of the 
time, as ‘perfectly rational’, which reminds us also that hindsight reconstructions of ‘ill-
structured’ problems may only imperfectly provide any comprehensive understanding of 
how organizational processes of sense making actually appear in the turbulence of day-
to-day problem-solving (Hutter and Power, 2005). The discussion here draws attention 
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not only to the indigenous rationalities, as understood from a ‘sociology of knowledge’ 
perspective, but addresses also how ‘theories of knowledge’ shape interpretations and 
thus blurs the delicate interface between the investigated and the investigators. But the 
latter must form some independent conception of the realities that local worldviews and 
conceptual maps refer to and cope with in order to provide ‘thick descriptions’. The 
dilemma then, is that we can neither assume privileged access to these realities, 
authoritative rules of language use, nor would we just report what people say and do; 
hence an interest in this chapter in exploring what kinds of assumptions that are made in 
the understanding of risk regulation and risk regulators. This ’realist interpretivism’, 
briefly foreshadowed in Chapter 1, has been densely phrased in the following manner: 
“interpretive social science requires that we master the agent’s self description in order to 
identify our explananda; but it by no means requires that we couch our explanantia in the 
same language” (Taylor, 1985: 118). 
 
The presentation, in the necessarily linear form, evokes the plethora of organizational 
options available. The structure of the argument, however, is basically like this: In the 
interpretation of social phenomena, (more or less basic) assumptions are made about 
social agency. Such assumptions are of course part of ordinary social life as they are part 
of the social science investigations. The difference is not trivial, as the latter, by its nature 
and self-understanding, assume some interpretive privileges which is ingrained in the 
very act of linguistically and theoretically representing socio-cultural agency. 
Understanding regulatory world views challenges such interpretive quests in the most 
‘ill-structured’ manner, as the management of risk ultimately involves rather profound 
epistemological and moral issues. Making assumptions about the world views of ‘local 
practitioners’, whose worlds must be ‘viewed’ with much enlightened rationality, 
requires great caution and self-reflective willingness to penetrate local rationalities before 
we turn to ‘external’ attributions and causal explanations. Explanatory models, eager to 
disclose the forces and biases that govern social agents, may themselves contain some 
inherent biases that flavour the manner in which the ‘factual’ interpretations are fed into 
the models and  processed though the explanatory machineries. 
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As noted in chapters 1 and 2, the rational pursuit of the ‘public interest’ appears to suffer 
in the analysis of public administration and governance, thus contradicting what might be 
theoretically expected to constitute basic rationales for such institutions. The discussion 
questions some assumptions inherent in such analyses, substantiated by excursions into 
the complexities inherent in the regulation of risk, and addresses some critical problems 
involved in attaching rationality assumptions to the local magicians of risk regulation. A 
bridge-head is needed in interpreting these local rationalities, and by evoking a ‘principle 
of charity’, it is argued that the ‘public interest’ deserves a more prominent position 
among the available explanatory and interpretive options as a reasonably robust (but not 
uncritically assumed) assumption in the study of regulatory world views and strategies. 
That’s about how far the argument goes.  
Understanding risk regimes 
As has been argued above, although risk regimes display patterns of continuity and 
consistency, they must also be decomposed, allowing for different combinations of 
antecedent conditions in each constituent part of the regime at different points in time. In 
Chapter 5 we tried to summarize some of these mechanisms as they could be exemplified 
in the Norwegian petroleum regime, tentatively referring to the analytical risk regime 
‘anatomy’ outlined by Hood et al. (2001). We return briefly to this anatomy below, and 
the explanatory ‘regime’ contained within it, but primarily in order to provide some more 
general, and critical, comments and reservations. Furthermore, we address the 
applicability of institutional perspectives in the understanding of risk regimes, both in 
terms of the specifically ‘risk-relevant’ aspects, but also in terms of addressing some 
salient features of the regulatory role, in particular as this role has become increasingly 
reliant on ‘decentred’ systems of ‘enforced self-regulation’. 
Contextual shapers of regime content 
The analytical scheme proposed by Hood et al. (2001; henceforth, TGR: The Government 
of Risk) provides a comprehensive attempt to facilitate comparative analyses of risk 
regimes by identifying and specifying common variables within a general control theory 
perspective. As will be recalled, it conceives of such regimes as combinations of control 
components (i.e. standard setting, information gathering, and behaviour modification), 
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distributed across the two instrumental-institutional dimensions of regime context and 
regime content. The various properties of the context and content variables can thus be 
expressed in conjunction with all the three components of the control system. The initial 
thesis is that the former explain the latter – that characteristics of the regime are shaped 
by the surrounding factors pertaining to properties of the risks as embedded within their 
societal contexts, notably the type of risk (evaluated in terms of market failure), public 
perceptions about risk, and the role of organized stakeholders. Taking regime context to 
be the independent variable, is seen to reflect some standard explanatory models used in 
policy analysis. Importantly, and as noted in Chapter 2, it is the first hypothesis or model 
which is associated with the ‘public interest’; that is, if regulatory content duly reflects 
the predicted and proportionate correction of market failure (according to the given 
delineations of such failures), then (and only then) is the public interest theory 
‘confirmed’ (see also Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Ogus, 1994). 
 
TGR uses this framework in a comparative analysis of nine regulatory regimes, arguing 
that the “regime context triangle”, taken together, gave “a fairly robust basis for 
understanding variety in the size and style elements of regime content across the control 
components” (p. 133). 231 Varieties of structure were least predictable from the contextual 
dimensions. The interest-group hypothesis fitted best with observed regime content, 
whereas predictions from the market failure hypothesis produced the largest number of 
anomalies. Also, there were significant varieties in just what kinds of mechanisms that 
operated between specific aspects of contextual shapers and their relative impact on the 
different content dimensions across the control components.  
 
Not primarily for the purpose of contesting these findings, we shall rather discuss some 
conceptual, analytical, and theoretical problems encountered by the use of the model. 
Some of these problems are apparent and discussed in the preceding empirical analysis 
(and some are also pointed to by the inventors). In particular, we are interested here in 
how assumptions made in such models contribute to the framing of the analysis and of 
                                                 
231 The regimes considered were related to such various risk issues as dangerous dogs, ambient benzene, 
paedophile release, pesticide residues in food, pesticide residues in drinking water, occupational radon, 
domestic radon, local roads, and occupational benzene. Note that these are largely ‘civilian risks’.  
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the explanatory outcome. Such assumptions may be contained in how the analytical 
models are conceptually structured, and they may be related to the normative and 
analytical benchmarks or yardsticks employed with respect to the role of regulatory 
‘agency’, and the rationality assumptions adopted in addressing this role. In particular, 
we consider the status of risk level (or magnitude) as a ‘given’ benchmark.  
 
An explicit trigger for the interest in explaining risk regimes is that regulatory size 
reflects the ‘residual’ (‘unregulated’) risks in a seemingly anomalous and 
‘disproportionate’ manner.232 It may thus seem that unless risk level can be treated as a 
‘constant’, the line of reasoning will be distorted in a manner that affects the explanatory 
powers of the model. Assumed magnitudes of risk are implicitly given a function as a 
benchmark, against which actors’ perceptions or choices are interpreted or explained 
(regulators in this case), and appears as the point of reference when the explanatory 
options are judged upon. Uncertainties and disagreements involved in making risk 
evaluations appear in TGR as an alternative option only at the third level of dis-
aggregation of the risk-type dimension, thus not clearly accounted for at the aggregate 
level of explanation. Furthermore, the ‘risk-benchmark’ is basically understood as 
‘residual risk’. This provides a double bias, as residual risk is largely understood as the 
kinds of risk that are not ‘adequately’ handled by market mechanisms, as normatively 
restricted to a narrow liberalist conception of such market failures. The argument then 
takes the form of discovering a ‘deficit’ or ‘gap’ between assumed risk and regulatory 
content (primarily regulatory size and style), which then serves as an indication that some 
other mechanism, like external pressure from the public or from interest groups, must 
have played a significant role in shaping regulatory content. Conversely, when there is a 
good match between assumed risk and regulatory content, this is taken to confirm the 
most ‘risk-responsive’ hypothesis, notably the market failure model (given, presumably, 
that perceived market failure triggers the response). 
 
                                                 
232 Such mismatches are of course (even more) essential in normative approaches to risk regulation (see 
Breyer, 1982; 1993; Shrader-Frechette, 1991; Sunstein, 1997; 2002).  
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A certain construction of ‘residual risk’ is thus given status as an implicit background 
condition and explanatory benchmark. The gap between assumed risk and regulatory 
response does not by itself dictate other explanations, but taken together with the other 
explanatory conditions following from the model, it is still given a decisive role. To the 
degree that market failure can be observed, thus leaving a large ‘residual’ of risk, the 
hypothesis would predict that regulatory intervention should be proportionately severe. If 
that is the case, the hypothesis is confirmed, if not, it is disconfirmed. In the latter case, 
some other mechanism is called for. Analogously, in assessing the opinion-responsive 
hypothesis, the level of media attention and public pressure is measured as the primary 
antecedent of regulatory responses (content). If regulatory action reflects this ‘level’, the 
hypothesis is strengthened, and conversely if not. But again, assumed risk level serves as 
a background condition: the hypothesis is strengthened only if the size of the regulatory 
intervention deviates from that which is deemed to be a ‘necessary’ or ‘appropriate’ 
response to the ‘residual risk’ (otherwise they would respond to the risk, not to the 
‘opinion’). So, contrary to the analysis of the market failure hypothesis, the opinion-
responsive hypothesis is correct if public opinion diverges from ‘objective risk’, but not if 
it converges. Similarly, arguments for the interest-driven regulator would be based on 
empirical findings showing them to respond more to interest-group pressure than to risks; 
but again, measured against an assumption about what would be counted as a ‘rational’ or 
‘appropriate’ response.  
 
A second ‘bias’ (also affecting the public interest theory) is related to two factors. First, 
as noted in chapters 2 and 5, the public interest is partly ‘hidden’ among the contextual 
factors. It could be in the public interest to follow expert advice, to follow public opinion, 
or even to follow industrial interests (in order for these industries to provide maximum 
value for the public, as would be particularly relevant in industries with heavily taxed 
windfall profits). But as noted, TGR primarily relates any confirmation of the public 
interest hypothesis to the ‘proper’ correction of marked failure, more specifically by 
assuming these ‘residual risks’ to be restrictively framed within a minimal interventionist 
(market liberal) model; this, in order to strengthen the (potential) explanatory powers of 
the theory. The latter condition seems justified from an ‘hypothesis-testing’ perspective, 
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since, obviously, if an hypothesis is too indulgently defined, any intervention could be 
seen as confirmatory evidence. On the other hand, it leaves the public interest theory with 
little ‘explanatory space’. The restriction is particularly evident in the reduction of market 
failure to ‘information failure’ and ‘opt-out costs’, to be ‘estimated’ as the possibility (or 
‘cost’) of those exposed to the risks in question to ‘know’ and to ‘avoid’ them. This 
restriction, it can be argued, reflects rather extreme market-liberal assumptions, leaving 
‘other’ market failures to unregulated market solutions or legal redress (notably private 
tort law).233 ‘Opting out’ thus appears as a ‘rationally’ available possibility, and 
implicitly ‘justified’ (theoretically, that is) within the explanatory framework. In sum, the
unhappy effect of this explanatory schema will be that, if risk-exposed and reasona
well informed individuals, seen from a market liberalist point of view, can ‘choose’ to 
‘opt out of the exposure’, no ‘rationale’ exists for public intervention; and if intervention 
still can be found, the public interest does not appear among the explanatory candidat
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Summing up, explanatory yardsticks make assumptions about social behaviour, 
sometimes in a very general and theorizing manner, ‘external’ to how the regulatory 
‘world-views’ and rationales actually manifest themselves in specific cases. Turni
to the ‘present’ case of risk regulation, located, as has been pointed out, within a 
Norwegian-Nordic context, several critical factors are salient: to give due protection t
workers and promote industrial safety, to avoid exclusion from the labour market, to 
involve key actors in policy making based on the participative tri-partite model, and to
encourage local work-place participation as an integral part of the politics of risk.
economic market-failure model, narrowly defined, would not duly capture these 
 
233 More precisely, it is argued (or ‘asserted’) that most externalities would be included in considerations of 
opt-out costs and information problems. External costs are normally considered to be major examples of 
market failure in the area of health and safety (and also, of course in the environmental area). Taking a 
broader view, however, the relevance of externalities could have a wider scope (compared to the 
restrictions imposed here), such as when the construction of rules create more extensive mechanisms for 
how regulatory costs are distributed, as in the case of mandatory health services paid by employers. 
Generally, considerations on externalities would predict high external costs to be matched by high 
regulatory costs put on risk producers, cf. Baldwin and Cave (1999), Stiglitz (2000). Typical interventions 
to ‘correct’ for externalities (apart from ‘direct’ regulation) would be levies and taxes. 
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‘indigenous’ rationales. ‘Opt-out costs’ would certainly not be considered a legitimate 
benchmark for regulation, specifically if reduced to a matter of economic calcu
the part of the ‘risk takers’. Rather, the ‘right to a safe job’ would serve as the 
justification and operating norm for determining regulatory interventions. Occupational 
risks are not (or rarely) legitimately considered as ‘willingly chosen’, even by
Furthermore, judgements about information costs would not be reduced to a 
‘measurement problem’, carrying the implicit presumption that once information is 
provided or ‘symmetric’, it can be freely acted upon by autonomous and instrumentally 
calculating agents. The thresholds and rationales for regulatory intervention advance fa
beyond such extreme market liberal ideas, and as may be observed from the empirical 
records provided here, the frontiers and controversies of risk management are arguabl
be found at the other end of the scale in terms of worker protection. More important, 
perhaps, the thresholds for regulatory intervention appear above all as highly politicized













ard to achieve under these highly complex and multidimensional 
ircumstances.  
                                                
w
 
Broader societal contexts thus constitutes crucial frameworks for understanding the 
content and the context of risk regulation, involving overall considerations about the 
societal and economic distribution of risk and welfare. Any conception of ‘residual r
will thus be normatively embedded in the political economy of public risk policies. 
Mechanisms for compensating power asymmetries play a crucial role in the regulati
working environment and safety, not reducible to purely utilitarian considerations. 
Assumed (‘predicted’) and observed assessments of ‘market failure’ must in this case be 
seen within a Norwegian-Nordic context of welfare-state interventionist politics, in o
to capture the kinds of considerations that actually shape the contexts of regulat
decision-making. This ‘ indigenous’ frame of reference may make explanatory 




234 It should be noted here however that the analysis in TGR addresses a series of relatively ‘isolated risk 
cases’, and primarily ‘civilian risks’, not primarily embedded in the organizational and institutional context 
of industrial relations. 
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 As noted, risks regimes are shaped though complex trajectories. Furthermore, ‘regime-
cases’ are also often ‘composite packages’, containing ‘singular’ cases with their own 
path-dependent history. As has been argued by Ragin and Becker (1992), question
What is a case?, the ‘units’ chosen for comparative analyses cannot be arbitrarily 
delineated, and may have a great impact on the explanatory outcome. Thus, explaining 
regulatory regimes cannot be done en bloc, Evidently, the Norwegian petroleum regime 
covers a number more or less loosely connected elements of regime context and regime 
content. The shaping mechanisms are to some extent specific to each ‘item’ of regulation,
combining several factors which operate in composite patterns. At the same time, within
the context of the larger case, there are commonalities in regulatory content and design 
integrated within the same basic institutional structure. Clearly, the great variety of risk 
















As reviewed here (briefly summarized in Chapter 5), contextual shapers have played 
different roles throughout the history of the Norwegian petroleum regime. Sometimes the
regulators appear to yield to strong industrial pressures, as arguably was the case du
the first years of regulation and in the NORSOK process during the 1990s. But the 
national (‘public’) interest in attracting industrial engagement and keeping up production, 
was also evident in these cases. And authorities did not act uniformly in either of them, as
was evident in the controversies about the introduction of the Working Environment Act 
in the 1970s (Chapter 3). Furthermore, the requirements on the separation of prod
and living quarters, the introduction of remote drilling systems, to mention some 
conspicuous and controversial cases, were arguably risk based, but the proportionality
and risk-cost-benefit trade-offs were highly contested at the time, although gradually 
accepted and even ‘unquestioned’ by the industry. In the risk controversies during the la
1990s, the NPD sided with the unions. But the various risk evaluations, and ultimately 
the first RNNS pilot report, seemed to prove them right. Were they yielding to ‘interest 
group pressure’ (i.e. the unions) before these reports appeared, but responding to the ris
afterwards? Or were they just yielding to ‘expert advice’? What was the ‘expla
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impact of their own independent assessments of incident reports, supervisory 
experiences, and observations of the developments in the industry? Alleged acquiescen
to union pressures appeared in the controversies about whether the enforcement of the 
working arrangement regulations was a justified and proportionate interpretation of the 
‘rest and restitution’ requirements (chapters 4 and 5). The PSA policy had to be defen
against a ‘double front’, certainly legitimatized as being risk based by the agency, as 
much as it was rejected and de-legitimatized as welfare-
ce 
ded 
based by industrial actors and 











Clearly, any consideration of the ‘risk residual’ will depend on how we evaluate the 
a
 
It is of course beyond the scope of this study to evaluate the relative impact of ‘driving 
forces’ in these ‘within-case’ cases. The point is rather to draw attention to the diffi
involved in judging whether the public interest is even-handedly considered in the 
regulation of the ‘residual risks’. The notion of residual risk itself would irrevocably b
caught up in broader societal, political, and normative contexts, making it difficult to
establish any clear yardstick against which to ‘estimate’ the relative impact of each 
explanatory factor. We might thus proceed almost in a case by case manner to find items 
and packages of regulatory interventions variably shaped by external forces and internal 
considerations. Obviously, the specific combination of mechanisms operating in each of 
these cases is not the same, nor is the relative contribution of each. Characteristically, the
explanatory contributors are highly entangled. As noted in Chapter 3, it has been argued
that strong unions and the protection of contractual rights, were critical in developing a 
prudent safety regime in Norway, adding to the understanding that the internal control 
reforms alone could account for the great improvements during the 1980s (Beck et a
1998; Ryggvik, 2000). At the same time, issues about the relative risk reduction of 
specific interventions have regularly been juxtaposed with issues about the relative social 
distribution of the enormous economic benefits from the petroleum sector. In the case o
whether sleeping alone was a risk reducing or a welfare based benefit, workers clea
also saw this benefit in relation to their relative contribution to both industrial and 
societal value creation, as much as other observers drew attention to the relative ‘luxury
of the benefit (compared to, say, their British colleagues or South-East Asian sailors)
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impact of such societal controls; but as the examples indicate, whether they cause an 
‘increase’ or a ‘decrease’ in the risk residual is not easily judged upon. 
 
Still, strategies of regulatory and supervisory intervention must ultimately, from a 
normative point of view, be evaluated on the basis of their expected (marginal) risk 
reducing effect. This involves a full account of available options across the whole spectre 
of control components, not only a static ‘reading’ of any given level of ‘uncontrolled’ 
risk. As argued in Chapter 5, not even a Laplacian Demon would be able to figure out the 
normative standard against which any level of regulatory intervention should thus be 
measured. And as noted, the grander issues about societal priorities would regularly 
appear in discussions about the ‘level’ of regulation and ‘comparative’ welfare in the 
industry; as one HSE manager at one point aptly commented in an interview: “You know, 
you can really get a head-ace when you start to think about all these things”.  
 
The ‘reservations’ forwarded in this section do not, however, imply a rejection of the use 
of risk evaluations as explanatory benchmarks in the analysis of regime content, nor of 
the use of ‘restrictive’ hypotheses. Conspicuous discrepancies between risks and 
regulatory responses call for some explanation (and certainly for normatively justified 
adjustments of regulatory priorities). But the analytic function of ‘residual risk’ as a 
benchmark for comparison must be made explicit in the argumentative structure. The fact 
that risks so often are intrinsically contextual and contested in terms of ‘measurement’ 
and that strategies of risk management (as would be evident on the preceding pages) are 
equally contextual and contested, must be taken into account. There will be a recurring 
risk of re-introducing normative biases, no withstanding any stated purpose of using 
normative theories only as benchmarks for testing positive ones. To have moving 
yardsticks (or an invisible or indeterminate ones), will of course be problematic in any 
explanatory model; the possible explanatory biases should all the more be explicit and 
discussed. An attempt will be made to elaborate and substantiate this more general 
argument below.  
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Institutional rituals, anarchies, and garbage cans 
But these are not the only biases inherent in explanatory models of regulation. First we 
need to consider the institutional perspectives that seem to account for the ‘residual’ 
aspects of public policies that cannot be captured by contextual factors. And again, the 
rational pursuit of the public interest seems to suffer. Returning to the analysis in TGR,  a 
significant number of the observed regime content elements could not easily be attributed 
to contextual factors at all, pointing to the role of institutional processes that operate 
outside the “triangle of contextual shapers”. The analysis thus turn to internal factors, and 
to “the way professional cultures or conventions evolve and the way policy domains are 
settled or captured by particular ‘tribes’ over time” (p. 143), referring specifically to the 
‘rediscovery’ of institutional processes in the understanding of policy regimes.235 Instead 
of using this as an opportunity to explore local rationalities in a ‘charitable’ way, the 
tribe-metaphor foreshadows instead rather patronizing portrayals of the regulators. In 
analysing the nine risk regimes in terms of responsiveness to change, in particular to 
pressure for more openness and transparency, the main conclusion is summarized in the 
rather discouraging neologism: “blame prevention re-engineering”. This refers to 
institutional ‘defences’ against external claims and pressures by a creative mixture of 
blame-avoidance strategies, such as institutional distortion, complexification, delay, 
rebuttal, and even data fabrication. Again, such interpretations appear to rely on implicit 
notions about what would have been the rational policy choice, as a background against 
which the interpretations appear credible.  
 
Although the ‘new’ institutional paradigms emerged as a remedy to some of the 
perceived anomalies of ‘rational’ and ‘functional’ models that were seen to rely on 
                                                 
235 March and Olsen (1989) summarized this ‘rediscovery’ of the institutional perspectives against several 
trends that seemed to have made them fade into the background: Contextuality: politics is seen as integral 
within society, largely influenced by societal, historical environments, rather than itself making significant 
impacts on society. It’s an epiphenomenon, reflecting and mirroring its context. Reductionism: politics is 
seen as aggregate consequences of action at individual or group level. There is no necessary presumption of 
conscious calculation at this point, only the assumption of “aggregation”. Preferences are largely 
exogenous and context-dependent. Utilitarianism: politics is the result of calculated decisions. Preference, 
information, uncertainty, assessing consequences, choice etc, are keywords within this framework. 
Decision-making typically also involves predictions of the behaviour of others. Instrumentalism: focus on 
outcomes and purpose-oriented action. Symbols, ritual, ceremony are interpreted within an instrumental 
context, not as substantial components in their own right. Functionalism: Politics seem to progress and 
develop toward some functional or critical state. 
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assumptions that appeared inconsistent with real-world observations, the ‘new’ 
assumptions appeared to turn actors into over-socialized rule-followers or ritualistic goal 
seekers; they “champion programs that are established but not implemented … gather 
information assiduously, but fail to analyze it”, and hire experts “not for advice but to 
signal legitimacy” (Powell and DeMaggio, 1991: 3). Although no observer of 
bureaucracy would doubt the occurrence of such phenomena, an aggravated counter-
reaction may also have just inverted the biases of rational choice models. 
 
In one of his award-winning novels, the Norwegian author Jan Kjærstad (1993) made his 
literary narrator provide an elated celebration of national heroes in recent Norwegian 
history. In this exclusive company he included Jens Evensen, the leading architect behind 
the resource management regime for the emergent oil industry in the 1960s, suggesting 
that every good citizen should keep bust of him on their mantelpiece. Another celebrated 
Norwegian, political scientist Johan P. Olsen, one of the leading architects of the new 
institutionalist paradigm, had some years earlier (with co-author James March) claimed 
that this regime was more or less a blueprint of earlier industrial policies (March and 
Olsen, 1989: 34-37). The policy makers had basically followed tradition, ‘standard 
operating procedures’ and ‘rules of appropriateness’, rather than rational strategies in the 
pursuit of the public and national interest.236 Two conditions seemed to account for this. 
First, there was no careful or systematic calculation of alternatives, but rather some 
simple experience-based rules. Norms of rational calculation, assessing policy options, 
considering alternatives and systematically estimating possible consequences were not 
really adhered to. Second, the processes of handling foreign investments and companies 
in the process of ‘Norwegianization’ and the securing of national control, were more or 
less duplicates of formerly applied policies in the energy sector (such as the policies 
adopted in regulating the waterfalls earlier in the century).  
 
                                                 
236 The theory of appropriateness (drawing on the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre)  typologizes action into 
anticipatory and obligatory. Anticipatory action follows the scheme of (1) considering alternatives, (2) 
identifying values, (3) assessing how consequences of alternatives satisfy values, and (4) choosing the best 
alternative. In contrast, obligatory action starts with (1) identifying the situation, (2) reflecting on ones 
identity, role and position, (3) considering the appropriateness of actions for oneself, and (4) do what is 
most appropriate.  
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We may ask if the prevalence of national ‘customs, rules, and traditions’ was no result of 
deliberate strategic choices. Theories of rational choice have been criticized for loss of 
explanatory power if ‘rationality’ is too broadly conceived (Douglas, 1986; Etzioni, 
1988).237 But we may also ask how ‘smart’ or rational a policy must be in order to 
disprove a nearly all-inclusive theory of appropriateness. The literary narrator reiterated 
pretty much the conventional national romantic narrative of heroism, often contrasted 
with the folly of the neighbouring Danes, who sold ownership rights to the (possibly 
existing) petroleum resources to a large ship-owner (they later bought it back). Although 
self-celebrating nationalism should be treated with some suspicion, there are also good 
reasons to (empirically) sympathize with the more romantic versions (Kindingstad and 
Hagemann, 2002). Noting of course that the outcomes of social choice cannot explain 
their causes (in order to avoid the functionalist fallacy, see Merton, 1957), the emergence 
of the Norwegian resource management regime, after all, generated vast incomes for the 
country, and developed its most important industrial cluster of technology and know-
how. 238 The architects became later to occupy leading positions in academia, law, 
industry, and politics. If this case exemplifies a ‘logic of appropriateness’ more than a 
‘logic of consequence’, the former ‘logic’ may appear as too all-encompassing for 
explanatory purposes, and the latter as a theoretical construct more than an empirical 
possibility. 
 
The vision of rationality in organizational decision-making appears perhaps most 
vehemently undermined in the ‘garbage can model’, which in its pure form appears to 
decouple problems and solutions altogether (Cohen et al., 1972). Two organizational 
structures, the access structure consisting of problems and solutions, and the choice 
opportunities available to participants, are linked in arbitrary and anarchic ways. 
Problems can be ill-defined, ambiguous, or contested; solutions may appear from 
unexpected sources, participants come and go, and choice opportunities appear and 
                                                 
237 As noted by Douglas (1986: 9): “Whittling down the meaning of self-serving behaviour until every 
disinterested motive is included merely makes the theory vacuous”. 
238 The Norwegian resource management regime has later become a flagship in the foreign aid portfolio, 
attracting interest from oil producing third world countries wanting to learn how to extract maximum state 
revenues from their emerging industries, and to resist exploitative strategies from the powerful 
multinationals; the general altruism of present foreign aid policies are regularly questioned, however, let 
alone the international engagements of the state-owned oil company Statoil(Hydro). 
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disappear. Goals and preferences are not clearly ordered and their realization is 
apparently not attached to the means available in any instrumentally rational manner. 
These elements constitute partly independent streams and flows, and the energies and 
resources devoted to particular problem-solving situations vary. Densely summarized, 
these organized anarchies appear as “a collection of choices looking for problems, issues 
and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions 
looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for 
work.” (1972: 2). A temporal order of chance and chaos substitutes a consequential order 
of rationality. Problems, solutions, information, preferences, decision makers, and choice 
opportunities flow in and out of decision arenas, and linkages appear as arbitrary and 
autonomous.  
 
Cultural scripts, values, and rules of appropriateness help agents in manoeuvring within 
these anarchic and decoupled streams of ambiguous opportunities (March and Olsen, 
1989). Although such manoeuvring practices may seem functional and even necessary in 
the face of the complexity of the problems and the environmental instabilities 
encountered, rationality, if allowed for at all, appear as basically incidental. Participants 
interpret the past, the present, and the future to the best of their abilities, victim to 
ambiguities and chaos, and for the most part resorting to (simple) rules of tomb. 
 
If there was a rationality bias in the models of rational choice, the anarchical models 
contain an inverted bias. And certainly: if anarchy is looked for, it is not easily missed.239 
                                                 
239 A good example of garbage can processes in the recent history of regulation in Norway is arguably the 
comprehensive reform on regulatory agencies emanating from the Report to the Storting in 2003 (see pp. 
101-102). It was hardly based on any in-depth analysis of existing problems of apparent role conflicts; the 
inherent (but reasonably organized and no great cause of critique) role conflicts in the NPD had critically 
surfaced due to the team-experiments, as these involved the partial dismantling of established systems of 
accountability and the divisional separation of resource and safety tasks (teams were mixed and the 
divisional model dissolved). However, the separation of the NPD only incidentally ‘solved’ this very 
recently created (or exacerbated) problem. But the ministry could add another ‘reform-item’ to their merit-
list. More generally, the decision to re-localize eight agencies appeared more or less as a solution from 
nowhere, to the great surprise of most observers and a shock to the 900 employees affected. The 
justifications provided traversed across an ambiguous argumentative landscape, with autonomy and capture 
arguments salient in early phases, but gradually replaced by ‘regional policy’ arguments as the 
parliamentary voting approached in the ‘district-friendly’ Storting. The autonomy arguments may have had 
some bearing in the case of liberalized network industries (where role conflicts of course would surface 
between new ownership-roles and regulatory roles) but the arguments were ‘generalized’ to all sectors, 
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But institutional theorists have also found ‘tribal customs and rituals’ in the ivory towers 
of academia, though presumably not within their own ranks, such as in the processes of 
constructing ‘institutional theories’.240 Incidentally, however, conjectures could be 
devised regarding the recurring identification of ‘culture’ with ‘Cultural Theory’ (as in 
TGR), where the role of ‘culture’ is drawn more or less exclusively from the grid/group 
typology of Mary Douglas, disregarding all the other alternatives available from the 
menu of cultural theories and conceptualization. ‘Cultural Theory’ then appears as just 
one option entering the scene of choice opportunities in a context were administrative 
scientists incidentally focused selective and limited attentive capacities on solutions to 
anomalies that escaped the conventional doctrines of rational choice. Once established, it 
endured as a convenient template, an appropriate convention for addressing the 
mysterious residuals of organizational and political life. But to see this only as ritualistic 
adaptations to organized anarchies of knowledge systems would possibly be opposed 
with much rational reasoning by the practicing academic agents.  
 
However, the new institutionalist perspectives appear in several guises and do not 
converge on single sets of assumptions or outlooks (Peters, 1996; Powell and DeMaggio, 
1991; March and Olsen, 2005). Although not the explanatory genus, self-interest and 
                                                                                                                                                 
appearing as a solution to rather vaguely identified ‘problems’. Problems that had in fact been identified, 
such as lack of coordination and cooperation between allied regimes, were ‘solved’ by localizing agencies 
in different parts of the country. Likewise, the lack of overall and regime-crossing risk-cost-benefit 
analyses was not addressed at all. This was all the more critical, as the proposal for adjusted interfaces 
between ‘political’ and ‘administrative’ decisions and increased autonomy basically resorted to some legal 
accommodations (although allowing for ministerial interference with respect to ‘politically significant’ 
issues). Problems related to the scope of discretionary administrative powers following from risk-based and 
functional regulations were hardly addressed. As might be expected, the public and parliamentary 
discussion concentrated almost exclusively on geography (adding only to the irony in that the proposition 
to set up independent appellate bodies was not accepted, despite the uncontrolled growth of such bodies in 
other areas). The only predictable (and predicted) outcome of the reform was a massive loss of 
professionals, virtually dismantling the existing agencies, seriously thwarting the stated reform purpose of 
‘strengthening their professional competence’. However, the decision processes regarding the 
comprehensive re-localizations appeared to have been conducted with much calculative ingenuity, a 
process that the former minister later have been reported to recount with some professional pride from his 
professor-position at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Rationality not 
only appears in different degrees and forms, it appears also in subversively perverted combinations.  
240 That such claims can thus be self-defeating, almost as relativist philosophies of knowledge, may be  
apparent from the following passage: “Expertise is a collection of rules. Although they may be rationalized 
to some degree, rules are learned by experts as catechisms: Physicists learn what physicists do; lawyers 
learn what lawyers do. The rules are enforced by the standards of professions and the expectation of 
patrons. As a result, within political institutions, physicists do what physicists do and are expected to do; 
lawyers do what lawyers do.” (March and Olsen, 1989: 30).  
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instrumental calculation are not out-ruled. Incidentally, the ‘inner lives’ of regulatory 
regimes as portrayed in TGR, appear as pervaded with strategies of self-serving 
calculation in the  ‘ingenious’ attempts to avoid blame. And rationality, more broadly 
conceived, may be apparent on a systemic level, even if rules and routines seem rigid and 
bureaucratic. Rules facilitate coordinated behaviour and agreement by constraining and 
channelling the allocation of attention, standards of evaluation, priorities, perceptions, 
and resources. Organizational systems are seen as “arenas for contending social forces, 
but also collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and 
defend values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs” (March and Olsen, 1989: 17). 
Trust is ingrained (and partly required) through processes of institutionalization, and 
facilitates operational smoothness as it does not depend on the more immediate reciprocal 
mechanisms inherent in calculative behaviour.  
 
However, rules are neither monolithic nor unambiguous, and the process of determining 
what is appropriate in the situation may be quite complex. As noted by March and Olsen 
(1989: 16-17): “The premise of organization is that not everything can be attended to at 
once, though in principle, such attention is required for comprehensive solution. Thus, a 
central anomaly of institutions is that they increase capability by reducing 
comprehensiveness”. A logic of appropriateness, assisted by norms, identities, routines, 
and rules, enters as a matter of necessity in coping with ongoing demands and 
informational overloads. As recently summarized, the ‘new institutionalism’ “tries to 
avoid unfeasible assumptions that require too much … in terms of normative 
commitments (virtue), cognitive abilities (bounded rationality), and social control 
(capabilities)” (March and Olsen, 2005: 20). The ideals of risk management do indeed 
embody all these norms of rationality (including norms of instrumentality and morality) 
as prescriptive templates for local action. Rationality assumptions pose problems for 
socio-cultural analysis not only when understood too narrowly, but also when understood 
too comprehensively. But in either case, ‘observed deviance’ from given norms appears 
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to prompt ‘external’ explanations in a manner that reduces local practices simply to 
socially conditioned rules and ritualistic practices.241 
 
This brief, if critical, review does not entail a return to simplistic models of rational 
choice, or that ‘rules of appropriateness’ are not of great importance for the 
understanding of institutional processes and decision-making. It should be noted, 
however, that the latter appear both as a consequence of complexity and as a way of 
dealing with it. But just these processes of dealing with complexity are common to agents 
and students of agency alike (be they risk managers, students of risk management or 
students of institutions and institutionalization). The choice of rationality assumptions is 
all the more critical; discarding the most restrictive assumptions about environmental 
dictates and rational choice or design, it still appears that far more comprehensive notions 
of rationality serve as yardsticks for identifying the ways in which institutions manage to 
get things done; the implications of such assumptions would clearly be most apparent in 
the case of risk management regimes, as will be further explored below. 
Understanding self-regulation  
One reason for reviewing these institutionalist perspectives and the garbage can model of 
organized anarchy is not only its general impact on policy analysis, but also the apparent 
applicability of these ideas to the case at hand. From a certain perspective it is obviously 
not difficult to find symptoms of anarchic and decoupled streams of problems and 
solutions if we trace the development of the cultural experiment: with a certain taste for 
caricature one could indulge in ironies about a culture-fad copied from recent risk 
management currents, suspended by a team-fad copied from the menu of organizational 
vogues, re-fashioned within the ‘single task’ agency modelled on New Public 
                                                 
241 In anthropology, rituals are conventionally understood as ‘standardized’ behaviour where the 
relationship between means and ends is not ‘intrinsic’. This, however, does not make them intrinsically 
‘irrational’. Rituals are separated from habit and routine by the symbolic meanings attached to them. 
Repetitive blue-printing of managerial designs and problem solving templates would match this 
understanding; but only pointing to the apparent isomorphism between the templates and their  re-
applications avoids the problem of demonstrating non-instrumentality as evidence for ‘symbolic 
reductionism’. Furthermore, as noted, the understanding of ritual in not exclusively related to their apparent 
‘non-instrumentality’, but rather to the presence or absence of institutionalized symbolic elements; rituals 
may just be more ‘expressive’ ways of getting things done (Keesing and Strathern, 1998). As Barth (1961) 
observed with the migrations of Basseri nomads of Southern Persia, they were both adapting (rationally) to 
their environment and engaging in one of their important rituals.  
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Management inspired ideas, distorted in the industrial environment dominated by 
imported behavioural programs, and then finally lost in translation (or alternatively, put 
to rest in the garbage can, from where it was once picked up as a fashionable ‘choice 
opportunity’).242  
 
That ‘culture’ partly remained as an ‘idea’, at least in the regulatory context, is still not 
very satisfactorily accounted for in terms of this scheme. Rather, it entered as a half-
digested solution to real problems in the first place, and not as a solution looking for 
problems; only later did it appear as a ‘solution’ trying to ‘re-connect’ to these. And as 
argued here, these ‘re-connecting’ attempts show traces of quite enlightened processes of 
organizational sense-making, reflecting enduring and familiar problems related to the 
introduction of new terms and models in organizational life, and in particular in public 
administration. The temptation to test a magical cure for enacting the regulatory will 
through the central nervous system of the regulated organizations, may at worst be 
regarded as a case of institutional hubris. The intellectual and practical struggles to 
temper the magical forces released were nevertheless performed with much 
argumentative sophistication, not so different from analogous struggles within the 
academic communities (as argued in Chapter 10). 
 
But the very idea of self-regulation and the introduction of enforced risk management 
may also be victim to the interpretive scheme of misanthropic institutionalism, appearing 
as convenient blueprints derived from the emerging standards of quality management, 
soon to become fashionable recipes for organizational, managerial, and regulatory design. 
The authorities could assume inventiveness and ingenuity, and at the same time escape 
                                                 
242 As may have been be argued by institutionalist writers such as Meyer and Rowan (1991). A 
comprehensive discussion of trends, fashions, and institutional copying, is provided in Røvik (2007). 
Although it was admitted by one of the originators that they wanted to be ‘part of the trend’ (see chapter 4), 
this consideration appeared neither as a justification of any great importance, and much less as a ‘cause’, as 
should be evident from the account provided here. To explore and exploit the insights of organizational risk 
management studies was the primary justification. It may be noted, however, that ‘safety culture’ obviously 
did hit this field of study with fashion-like strength during the 1990s. Perhaps ironically, one of the main 
inspirational sources for importing the concept, James Reason recently referred to ‘safety culture’ as the 
‘fad of the 1990s’,  suggesting organizational ‘resilience’ to be its most promising successor. (The 
comment was given in a key note presentation at a conference on risk regulation at the LSE in March, 
2007). 
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responsibility and let the industry do the job. Mechanisms of regulatory self-
management, such as the use of industrial standards, has also been interpreted as a tactic 
for ‘hiding’ behind expert advice (Hood et al., 2001), rather than a legitimate (and 
necessary) strategy for adapting to developing technologies, and the insistence on 
allocating full responsibility to the industry could be interpreted as just another case of 
‘blame-avoidance’. We may however distinguish between ‘blame-avoidance’ as a 
motivating rationale and as an ‘unintended’ side effect. The evidence, as argued here (see 
particularly chapters 4 and 5) point to the latter option, following from a fairly rational 
and strategically explicit insistence on industry responsibility and self-management as a 
necessary condition for the overall promotion of regulatory goals. Although blame-
avoidance is certainly an issue, these interpretations do not necessarily rule each other 
out. One important question would thus be to what extent reduced statutory responsibility 
would in fact imply reduced industry responsibility. Whatever answer is produced, 
‘blame-avoidance’ (intended or not) may still be justified from a public interest 
perspective by pointing to the importance of sustaining the legitimacy of the public 
authority. Indeed, these were some of the many delicate balancing acts of the regulatory 
role. Exposing the authority to ‘blame’, such as by taking ‘responsibility’ for a given 
standard, would (as was argued) distract attention and absorb resources in unproductive 
ways.243  
 
The development of self-regulatory systems may also be interpreted as more historically 
embedded responses to societal, public, and political concerns. As regulatory ambitions 
develop, in conjunction with governmental ambitions more generally, there will be a need 
for the introduction of self-regulatory mechanisms reminiscent of what Foucault 
(1979/1991) termed governmentality.  This neologism, an amalgam of government and 
mentality, denotes penetrating mechanisms of societal ‘hyper-controls’, replacing the 
crude and direct controls with schemes that regulate ‘the conduct of conduct’ (later re-
phrased by Rose (1999), as to ‘act upon action’). In his historical analysis, Foucault 
                                                 
243 It should be noted that issues about the standard setting role of the authorities was an ongoing concern; 
some unions clearly opposed what they saw as too lenient practices from the authorities, calling for more 
precise standards for worker protection, witch could also be locally used as benchmarks for demanding 
improvements.  
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points to the development of governmental rationalities and techniques, accompanied by 
the growth of specific forms of knowledge necessary for making populations governable 
(statistics, epidemiology, demography, etc.). This power/knowledge framework serves as 
the back-drop of regulated self conduct, and a system of self-governing subjects appear as 
intrinsically embedded in mechanisms and structures of societal power (Foucault, 1980). 
Detailed surveillance of conduct would be overwhelming given the growing complexity 
of large scale societies (although approximated within organized panopticons, like 
prisons). However, this Foucauldian outlook do arguably take the power/control 
perspective to the extremes, even if based on critical features of modern societies with 
ambitious and intrusive ‘governmental’ polities. If ‘governmentality’ is conceptualized as 
more or less as intrinsic and all-pervasive forms of dominance, neither feasible 
opposition nor legitimate authority is allowed for. If power is ingrained in the very fabric 
of sociality, almost as a zero-sum game, void of meaningful resistance and void 
enlightened democracy; no explanatory, imaginable, or legitimate alternative appears 
possible, allowing no freedom or resistance, just over-socialized objects, and unable to 
distinguish varieties of control and power, distinctions that are constitutive for the very 
idea of social interests, democracy, and legitimate governance (see Habermas, 1996; 
Lukes, 2005; Said, 2000). As argued by Taylor (1985: 152-184), the Fouchaldian power 
seems intrinsic to and even constitutive of social relations, independent of what interests 
or goals that are being promoted or curbed. The regulatory purposes of furthering social 
and democratic values are lost in this all-encompassing order of things. This is not 
indicated to under-estimate problems and controversies arising in the wake of new modes 
of social and corporate control, which may be related to broader societal concerns as well 
as to the ‘instrumental’ issues of control. The combinations of such instrumental and 
societal issues has attracted much academic (including anthropological) attention, such as 
in studies of modern audit practices and ‘technologies’ (Falk More, 2005; Power, 1997; 
Strathern, 2000). Importantly, however, such systems of control, notably within the area 
of occupational health and safety, are devised and justified just for their ‘instrumental’ 
capacity also to counter-balance existing (‘residual’) power asymmetries in society, such 
as between employers and employees, thus making it unduly one-sided to simply see 
them as stereotyped and abstract technologies of control.  
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 Whatever the ‘normative foundations’ of these forms of control, we need to consider the 
more general characteristics of modern societies, related to information asymmetries, 
regulatory oversight, surveillance capacities, and the increasing levels of complexity 
involved in making regulations work. As observed by Hutter (2001), there are parallels 
between regulatory modes of control and the more general patterns of social control, 
manifested by the nature of the economic activities to be controlled and the constitutive 
ambitions of regulation. In this context, “The overriding regulatory goal is to constitute 
risk management systems as an integral and important part of corporate activity and 
beyond this to engender a deep understanding of these amongst all parts of, and all 
individuals within, the company” (2001: 319). These features are of a general nature, and 
would not in themselves explain national or sectorial differences. In a comparative 
analysis they might simply appear as ‘necessary conditions’, and the societal orders (or 
disorders) seem intrinsically related to these new forms of control. And indeed, the 
proliferation of principles of internal control to virtually all regulatory regimes in Norway 
the last few years proves their structural attractiveness. It is thus instructive to observe the 
varieties of such regimes, and of how reconstructions of societal risk reflect different 
societal trends, moods, and cultures, such as welfare policies, national cultures, and 
historical contexts (Jasanof, 2005; Koht; 2000).  
 
The rise of self-regulatory systems appear as specific policy choices, growing out of 
identifiable historical conditions, the operating mechanisms of which may rest on both 
‘necessary’ and somewhat ‘accidental’ causes. Turning to some salient features of the 
Norwegian regulatory and socio-political context, one should draw attention to a certain 
level of mutual trust, the relatively ‘close’ relationships between industry and authorities, 
and, as noted previously, the availability of ‘big sticks’. Furthermore, the regulated 
industries consisted of large or medium-sized enterprises (with sufficient administrative 
and economic capacities), and with a gradually increasing impact of certain normative 
templates, such as quality management systems, preceding the reforms. An element of 
necessity was clearly apparent; there simply was no other option available than to 
mobilize systems of self control. The Norwegian petroleum sector still appears as a 
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pioneering example of such regulations. As was evident from the indigenous 
reconstruction of how this regime developed in the NCS-regulations, local inventiveness 
was emphasized (see Chapter 4). The manner in which inspirations were drawn from 
different sources, certainly in the face of the ‘external’ regulatory challenges, clearly 
point to how local initiatives were inspired by ideational currents and transformed into a 
gradually emergent regime of regulated risk management.244 But the specific form that 
these meta-regulations of self-control should take does not follow mechanically from 
these initial conditions. The heavy reliance on comprehensive managements systems, 
formal company procedures, and documentary overloads appeared perhaps as side 
effects.245 The regulation of ‘culture’ appeared in this context as an attractive ‘meta-
regulation’, fulfilling the ideal of regulated risk management by virtually injecting a self-
regulatory agent directly into the veins of the regulated bodies.  
Risk and rationality assumptions 
In this section we readdress the role of assumptions in the understanding and 
management of risk, using somewhat broader disciplinary and theoretical approaches, 
and specifically by analysing the status of rationality assumptions. The argument is 
basically of a more general nature, but still instigated by recurring reminders of the need 
for theoretical self-reflexivity encountered during the process of making sense of the 
indigenous patterns of risk regulation.  
 
                                                 
244 That these ideas later travelled across the North Sea is not always recognized in some versions of how 
the British offshore regime later developed. However, the Cullen Report (1990) was clearly influenced by 
the advice offered by officials from the NPD, including Magne Ognedal, and it was even (as noted in 
chapter 5) informally referred to as the “Ognedal report” (Beck, et al., 1998; Ryggvik, 2000). Neither was 
the debt to Norwegian regulatory ideas quite recognized when the report was launched; this was referred to 
with indulgent irony by veteran agency officials who had been present when Cullen presented his new 
regulatory ‘visions’; as noted by one of them: “He was sitting in his wing chair, stating solemnly that he’d 
‘had a vision’. We knew where that vision came from.” In fact, it was occasionally subject to some 
irritation that the Norwegian inspirations were not more explicitly acknowledged. Incidentally, however, 
most interviewees, when occasionally referring to the ‘British regime’, described this as (still) rather 
traditional and inspection-like, compared to the Norwegian supervisory policy. 
245 We should note, however, that these side effects appeared as equally dysfunctional when the reforms 
were applied on a wider nation-wide scale. Notably, small and medium sized enterprises experienced 
extensive bureaucratization as an unintended side-effect of the early attempts to regulate internal control 
systems on a general basis (Lindøe, 1992). 
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Summarizing the argument thus far, neither much rationality nor public spiritedness is 
granted to the regulators in some current models of explaining and interpreting public 
risk policies. To the extent that rationality is embodied within the regulatory ethos, it 
appears to be of the selectively instrumental and self-serving kind. In the preceding 
review, the rational pursuit of the public interest is basically ‘discovered’ only when 
market failures are ‘correctly corrected’, according to a narrow and liberalist 
interpretation of what constitutes such failures. These restrictions are theoretically 
justified in order to provide predictive determinacy, which seems reasonable, since too 
broadly defined hypotheses would lose explanatory power if any empirical finding would 
be consistent with its predictions.  On the other hand, if the purpose is to explore local 
rationalities and regulatory world views, such restrictions might also ‘exclude’ alternative 
insights about regulatory processes by defining a too limited range of local rationalities 
(seen from ‘within’) and likewise restrict a ‘reasonable’ interpretation of aggregate 
results, in particular as these are contained or anticipated in the processes of local choice 
and decision making.  
 
In the following, we address again the argumentative structures analyzed above, where  
the employment of normative benchmarks serve as standards against which behaviour are 
understood. If behaviours match the standard (as predicted by the theory), the theory is 
confirmed; if not, other theories are evoked. It follows that the specification of this norm 
is essential, as are the explanatory alternatives available. Seen from the ‘outside’, 
deviations from some norm (concentrating here on norms of rationality) often paves the 
way for a ‘next’ argumentative step: ‘something else’ must explain this phenomenon, 
either some causal mechanism, operating behind the back of the ‘natives’ (ranging from 
‘internal’ factors like self-deception to ‘external’ factors like culture, and including 
combinations of these), or some hidden agenda, normally not directly exposed to the 
observer/investigator, but still ‘deducible’ from the behaviour observed.  
The ‘what else’ argument 
One attribute of such ‘what else’ arguments will be to ‘bracket’ (and often de-legitimize) 
practices and beliefs by attributing them to psychological, socio-cultural, or even political 
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origins or causes. This appears as a commonly employed strategy in many contexts, in 
daily life, in political and public discourses, and also in scientific discourses. It follows a 
rather simple, if implicit, procedure, reminiscent of the argumentative structure outlined 
above: first, by identifying some ‘flaw’ (often in the reasoning) of observed agents, and 
second, by identifying some other, underlying operative mechanisms, such as prejudice, 
egoism, tradition, rules of appropriateness, routine, or even ‘culture’. Beliefs and 
practices are thus re-contextualized, virtually by the use of ‘quotation marks’, thereby 
objectifying them, drawing attention to their causes rather than to the evidence supporting 
them or to their local rationales.246 A possible source of error in such attributions is 
however related to the confusion between origins of beliefs and their justifications. The 
confusion (or error) is apparent in the so-called genetic fallacy, where providing causes of 
beliefs is taken to discredit them, such as Freud’s attempt to discredit (‘irrational’) 
religious beliefs by tracing them to their ‘psychological causes’ (see Shrader-Frechette, 
1991: 18). But although causes of beliefs alone cannot be taken to bear upon their 
justification as such, we still tend to think that the two are not wholly unrelated. Rather, 
the more ‘strange’, incomprehensible, and seemingly ‘irrational’ we take others to be, the 
more we tend to ask: ‘what else’ can explain this behaviour or belief.247 We pick up on 
that point below. 
                                                 
246 A primary source of inspiration for addressing these argumentative practices, has been a (locally) 
famous and widely read article by the Norwegian philosopher, Hans Skjervheim (1976). Addressing the 
mounting influence of the positivist and objectifying social science tradition (in particular in psychology), 
he argued for a dialogical and hermeneutic understanding. Objectification implied a strategy of always 
‘contextualizing’ the perspectives of one’s interlocutors, treating them as just ‘instances’ or symptoms of 
causal processes operating beyond their comprehension. This, it was argued, distorted the communicative 
and participative engagements with ‘the other’, and lead ultimately to alienating understandings of 
sociality. Another source of influence is, of course, the already mentioned philosopher Charles Taylor. He 
insistently referred to his preoccupation with countering the natural science based ideals of positivist social 
science as the work of a ‘mono-maniac’(Taylor, 1985). The corresponding term in this case might possibly 
be a ‘meta-maniac’, notoriously inclined to ‘bracket’ beliefs and practices within a larger explanatory 
scheme, within which they appear only as ‘instances’ of certain causally explicable phenomena. 
247 The term “what else” arguments is evoked by Shrader-Frechette (1991), referring to Quine and Ullian 
(1978). It may be noted that, despite reassurances from Shrader-Frechette, responding to an e-mail request 
about the correctness of the reference, I could not find any direct use of the “what else argument" in the 
Quine/Ullian book. What is discussed on the pages referred to (120-21), is in fact the phenomenon of 
“argument from want of evident alternatives”. This argument, and its explanatory function, may be 
legitimate in cases where no other explanation seem available. Even if there is little or no evidence to 
support it, it still serves the function of accounting for something otherwise unintelligible. It is, however, 
pointed to as a frequently abused form of argument, as when we ‘jump to conclusions’ (indicating that 
alternative explanations are not explored after all). There is certainly a connection between this 
phenomenon and the “what else argument” as used by Shrader-Frechette, all though I cannot find that 
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 Within the local arenas of risk politics, these mechanisms are visible in the way crucial 
actors mutually construct images of each other, as the when lay actors (the public, 
consumers, workers, etc.) are stigmatized as risk aversive or even strategically risk 
aversive, or when more powerful industrial actors are portrayed as calculating profit-
seekers paying lip-service to HSE-values in order to please workers, unions, regulators, 
and the general public. Such mechanisms, it may be recalled, appeared clearly in the 
discussions and controversies about behaviour-based safety programs.248 Risk, or rational 
risk management, is implicitly given a function in such argumentative strategies, as 
perceptions of risk and its management is benchmarked against some assumed, and 
notably more rational, alternative. The importance of stressing ‘good intentions’ is an 
evident reflection of this tendency to uncover the ‘fundamental’ operating mechanisms, 
and of the (often) accompanying, and (often) mutual process of attributing ‘motives’.249 
Typically, these mechanisms were activated in conjunction with deteriorating trust, but 
perhaps more as a consequence of broken trust than as cause of it (although trust would 
certainly not suffer less as a result). The level of trust between key actors in risk 
                                                                                                                                                 
Quine/Ullian use that specific phrase. The usage applied here, still derived from Shrader-Frechette (who 
then, perhaps mistakenly, derived it from Quine and Ullian) has more to it than the narrow interpretation of 
the ‘jump to conclusion’ mechanism, referring also to the mechanism of mixing causes of beliefs with the 
justification of beliefs, specifically apparent in the genetic fallacy and ad hominem arguments; this 
phenomenon, however, is also discussed elsewhere in the Quine/Ullian book (like in chapter 2) where they 
treat causes of beliefs vs beliefs acquired from evidence; and that is of course the phenomenon of interest 
here, not the reference details.  
248 As briefly noted in chapter 8, safety measures were re-interpreted as ‘symbol-safety’, acquitting the 
company and implicitly blaming the workers. Union resistance was re-interpreted as ‘sectarian’, and at one 
point even addressed as such an inexplicable positions so as to require ‘explanation’. In one of the HSE 
culture conferences, one of the key architects in the Statoil program, referring first to the IRIS-evaluations, 
which had provided an “academically objective” confirmation of its virtues, ‘challenged’ the researchers in 
a plenary debate to provide a ‘reasoned explanation’ of the resistance to the program, calling upon a 
‘scientific judgement of why it was stigmatized from peripheral quarters’. Perhaps taken by surprise, the 
framing of the question was not questioned at all in the response, but rather presupposed (by referring to the 
difficulty in finding ‘good reasons’ for the resistance, but still pointing to the possible role of the media and 
of the need for some actors to ‘position’ themselves).  
249 This was particularly evident in the many public arenas where the politics and rhetoric of displaying 
good intentions (‘HSE as first priority’, ‘safety first’, etc.), and evidenced by the costly safety programs, 
appeared partly as an insisting request for trust, and partly as a ‘disbelief of disbelief’. To the critics, the 
good intentions appeared, to rephrase the old quote, more as what the road to hell was paved with. Did they 
‘walk the talk’ as was claimed, or did, in the end, ‘money talk’? And conversely, the industry evoked the 
same strategy when confronted with ‘unreasonable demands’, not justified by critical and balanced risk 
evaluations. Most conspicuously, the ‘single cabin’ issue provoked attributions of hidden agendas and 
motives (such as ‘welfare’), and the risk benchmark was accordingly brought to the surface by insisting on 
risk-cost-benefit evaluations. 
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management discourses thus appears as an important condition for ‘explaining’ the use 
such genetic fallacies, notably through their close relatives, the ad hominem arguments. 
The need to search beyond the face value of stated positions appears for the most part as 
instrumentally redundant, unless you have good reasons to distrust your fellow 
humans.250 
 
These mechanisms of attributing causes in itself, has relevance for the discussion of risk, 
although not only for understanding ‘lay’ perceptions and beliefs, but also for 
understanding how more powerful actors, and even (social) scientists apply explanatory 
models in risk discourses. The exercise of juxtaposing accounts of risk and accounts of 
perceptions of risk, at least equals in difficulty the structurally similar exercise of 
juxtaposing rationality and its perception. As noted in Chapter 2, several mechanisms 
have been identified that appear to make people ‘fear the wrong things’, compared to the 
‘real and objective’ (probability times consequence) risk potential. This rationality 
‘deficit’ may be attributable to different psychological mechanisms, and various socio-
cultural explanations may also be suggested. The former can include psychiatric research 
to show that nuclear opponents are mentally ill or that environmentalists have paranoid 
and primitive fantasies. Socio-cultural explanations may interpret ‘risk-adverse’ attitudes 
as expressions of ‘anti-industrialism’, ‘sectarianism’, and ‘provinciality’. The purpose of 
such ‘explanations’ may occasionally be to demonstrate ‘pathologic’ fears and 
mechanisms as causes of risk aversion in order to stigmatize opponents of industrial and 
economic progress (see Shrader-Frechette, 1991, for a review).   
 
The simple form of the argument is based on a perceived gap between ‘rational’ and 
‘actual’ beliefs, the former self-explanatory and ‘caused’ simply by the way the world is, 
and the latter irrational or unjustified, and to be explained by some other external 
mechanisms of cognitive or socio-cultural origin. This is the simple structure of 
reasoning within so-called ‘public deficit’ models, the premise being some scientifically 
founded estimation of ‘real’ risk, against which public opinion is measured (Wynne, 
                                                 
250 Ad hominem arguments, a subtype of the genetic fallacy, is listed as an informal fallacy in philosophy 
textbooks, and take the form of refuting an argument by attacking the arguer’s character.  
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1992; 1996). Deviance is then seen as ignorance (deficit). People do not really know. The 
next step in this argumentative procedure is (often) to attribute their erroneous beliefs to 
some cause, psychological or socio-cultural. Apart from the more stigmatizing strategies 
of de-legitimation, the politics of risk may also involve educational strategies in order to 
‘inform’ people about the real nature and magnitude of any given risk. 
 
A more ‘democratic’ and participative procedure, however, is to let investigations of risk 
perceptions feed into the risk evaluation on the normative side: given that norms of 
acceptability and priority are not only questions of objective assessment, but also involve 
profound ethical questions where the moral preferences of ordinary people should be 
taken into account. Also, the more ‘experience-near’ position of the non-expert may 
generate factually quite appropriate perceptions of ‘real risks’; risks are often embedded 
in highly contextual environments which make the ‘lay-expert’ divide inappropriate for 
assuming a corresponding asymmetry in terms of really ‘knowing’ the risks (Otway, 
1992; Kasperson, 1992; Shrader-Frechette, 1991; Wynne, 1992; 1996).  
 
Such controversies and issues have often been related to a division in the risk literature 
between on the one side, scientistic perspectives presupposing the possibility of 
discovering real and objective risk, and on the other side, a subjectivist perspective 
rejecting objectivism and arguing for various shades of constructivist and relativist 
positions. A dichotomy is thus created between ‘cultural relativism’ and ‘naïve 
positivism’, carrying the implicit assumption of a single dimension capable of ordering 
the variety of risk perspectives along a continuum according to the extent to which they 
display ‘degrees’ of either extremes (Renn, 1992; Shrader-Frechette, 1991).251 Shrader-
Frechette takes these oppositions as a starting point in arguing for a “midway position 
between cultural relativism and naïve positivism”. However, trying to find a midway 
position between such ‘extremes’ may result, less in a midway, than in a landscape of 
                                                 
251 The dichotomy is employed in Ortwin Renn’s much sited classification of risk perspectives: “If risk is 
seen as an objective property of an event or activity and measured as the probability  of well-defined 
adverse effects, the policy implications are obvious. Order risks according to “objective” measures of 
probability and magnitude of harm, and allocate resources to reduce the greatest risk first. If, on the other 
hand, risk is seen as a cultural or social construction, risk management activities would be set according to 
different criteria, and priorities should reflect social values and life style preferences. These two positions 
represent extremes in a spectrum of risk perspectives” (Renn 1992:54). 
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criss-crossing positions of methodological, disciplinary, and value laden doctrines of risk 
management.252 Methodological value judgments are different from normative judgments 
about consequences, say, regarding the economic value of life as compared to other 
losses, and conversely, risk management controversies may be constitutive and value-
laden apart from the moral valuation of the possible outcomes.253 Some of these basic 
difficulties of ordering risk management discourses are evident in the conceptual 
organization of competing risk management doctrines referred to in Chapter 1, reflecting 
the complexity of possible combinations of judgments to be made in the management of  
risk. The deceivingly simple risk formulae, probability times consequence, for all its 
inherent complexity, does not provide more than a provisional point of departure.  
 
Adopting the perspective outlined above, this framing of risk positions may cause too 
much indeterminacy in terms of interpretive potential. Analogous to the employment of 
rationality assumptions, there are too many dimensions implied in the risk concept to be 
able to order intermediate positions along an unambiguous scale. Even the extreme 
positions would carry too many combinations of ‘sub-positions’ to be unequivocally 
categorized. This way of framing risk positions conceals important distinctions, such as 
                                                 
252 Although the initial framing is bounded by this one-dimensional view, her discussion takes into account 
the great variety of dimensions that go into the risk concept, arguing for more procedural, participative, and 
democratic processes of risk management. Admittedly, this presentation may thus be undeservedly 
caricatured for the sake of argument. As in Renn’s article, the details of these positions are extensively 
elaborated; the point here is rather how such dichotomies still tend to ‘order’ and frame discourses, as was 
evident in the aftermath of the Royal Society report on risk from 1992,  alternatively referred to as the “four 
chapters good and two chapters bad” and conversely as the “two chapters good and four chapters bad”. The 
two chapters on risk perception and management adopted an open social constructionist and deliberative 
approach, whereas the other chapters adopted a scientistic/probabilistic account (see Royal Society (1992), 
and Hood and Jones (1996) on the succeeding disputes. 
253 The two can converge, like in the case of methodological preference for type II statistical error, that is, 
failing to reject a false null hypothesis, over type I error, that is, rejecting a true null hypothesis This 
preference would be the equivalent of maximizing utility and industrial risk taking. Carefulness in the 
scientific enterprise thus equals carelessness in the industrial enterprise. This is at odds with precautionary 
principles and maximin principles, from which type I error would be preferable. Scientific conservatism 
dictates that it’s better to believe that no relationship exist (even if it does) than to believe it does (even if it 
doesn’t), equalling industrial activism. This structural similarity has been taken descriptively, to explain the 
preference for public risks, and also normatively, for its justification. Shrader-Frechette holds this to be an 
illegitimate epistemological analogy that amounts to some kind of prima facie universal epistemological 
preference: “judgments about societal welfare involve “cultural rationality”, and hence an assessment of the 
democratic justifiability of the risk imposition .… the fact that pure scientists minimize type-I errors 
provides no compelling reasons for arguing that societal decision-makers ought to minimize type-I errors” 
(1991: 135). She makes an analogous argument for not taking the inherent ‘innocence-bias’ of legal 
proceedings (of not convicting innocents) as a model for risk policies, involving an analogous innocence-
bias unduly benefiting profit-seeking industries .   
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the ‘factual’ (probabilistic/predictive) and the normative aspects (values to be protected 
and promoted) of the risk concept. Even if two ‘factually’ oriented assessors agreed on 
the (probable) predictions about outcomes, they might strongly disagree about 
acceptability thresholds and priorities (such as between human and material/economic 
losses). The entanglement is apparent when ‘cultural relativists’ like Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1983), hide objectivist assumptions about risk, paradoxically even 
constitutive of their ‘relativist’ argument. Thus, the cultural (‘relativist’) theory of 
Douglas and Wildavsky, in fact make ‘actual risk’ into an implicit benchmark. The 
‘cultural bias’ is identified (and can arguably only be so) on the basis of a discrepancy 
(gap) between the ‘real’ risk and the erroneously perceived risk. This discrepancy needs 
to be explained, in this case in terms of the cultural bias-mechanism. The structure of the 
argument is made explicit in an example from the Lele (1983: 6-7): Lele fear lightning 
more than leprosy, ulcers, and other tropical diseases Since these diseases clearly are 
more dangerous, some cultural bias must explain the ‘deficit’. 
 
In such multi-step (essentially infinite) argumentative procedures of assessing facts,  
beliefs, reasons and/or causes of beliefs, etc., Shrader-Frechette (1991) claims that 
Douglas and Wildawsky overemphasize value judgments in hazard evaluation. But more 
important is that they first overemphasize uncertainty as a justification of relativism, only 
to continue applying cultural biases, implicitly based on a non-relativist premise; that is, a 
rationality assumption is used to justify the demonstration of a cultural bias. Given this 
position, we may note also the possible ‘contradiction’ contained in attempts to ‘refute’ 
cultural relativism by providing empirical counter-evidence. Returning for a moment to 
the critique based on fallacious applications of genetic or ad hominem arguments, such 
‘evidence’ could be dismissed as irrelevant;  judgements of beliefs (true or false), should 
not be made on the basis of their assumed causes. But benchmarks based in a ‘realist’ 
conception of risk enter into the critique of relativism and scientism alike. Shrader-
Frechette uses such benchmarks several times, e.g. when referring to psychometric 
studies of risk perception, showing that risk aversion associated with externally imposed 
public risk, is greater than for privately chosen risks of the same probability. The point 
here is that such findings implicitly pre-suppose a separation of real risk and perceived 
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risk, which is in fact the kind of separation that Shrader-Frechette argues against. It 
would not be possible to isolate the effect of individual voluntarism if you didn’t keep 
other factors constant; and the important constant in this case would be either the factual 
(‘probability’) side or the normative (‘value’) side of the risk evaluation.254 
Risk and rationality  
In order to elaborate this argument further, we need to consider the status of rationality 
assumptions in the interpretation of social phenomena from a theoretical perspective. As 
would be evident, there is an obvious convergence between the concept of risk 
management and that of rationality. Indeed, it can be argued that risk management 
embodies ‘ultimate rationality’, given that we apply a more comprehensive normative 
understanding of rationality than just the utilitarian calculation of expected satisfaction of 
given preferences. However, the concept of rationality has a broad and varied usage 
within social theorizing. Rational choice theory has been less concerned with the other 
forms of rationality, such as the rationality of the preferences themselves, or the beliefs 
that link actions to the expected outcomes (see Elster, 1986 and 1989 for discussions). 
Rationality has also been a major concern in the anthropological study of culturally 
diverse practices and belief-systems, and interpretations cover a range of positions, from 
early ideas about ‘primitive’ and ‘pre-logical’ styles of thought, yet to arrive at the 
civilized and rational Western stage of evolution, to more modern attempts to judge and 
compare ‘irrational’ practices of magic, witchcraft, and ritual against standards of 
scientific rationality. Sometimes the latter attempts have tried to demonstrate common 
                                                 
254 The assumptions are contained in the following quote from Shrader-Frechette: “Cultural relativists need 
to establish that environmentalists are more risk averse than the facts about hazards dictate; they also need 
to show that this aversion is caused by environmentalists’ group-induced pessimism, paranoia and anti-
institutional sentiments” (1991: 38).” This two-step argument, implies both scientist assumption and social 
reductionism. There are thus hidden assumptions in the critique; first, claiming that hazards in themselves 
could “dictate” any risk perception, and second, implicitly claiming that causes of risk aversion has any 
relevance. The critique against cultural relativism can be taken to implicitly accept the same line of 
reasoning, if only in an inverted form. First, cultural relativists (and intellectual relatives) are attacked in a 
way that implicitly accepts some of the initial framework conditions. The psycho-social causes attributed to 
‘anti-industrialists’, varies from mental disorder to sectarianism. By arguing against these as hypothesis (we 
have no evidence to prove they are either mad or sectarian), in some way one accepts the premises of 
argument in the first place. For example, the fact that many environmentalist critics are not located in the 
periphery but rather belongs to the ‘centre’ is taken to refute the hypothesis of cultural bias. What if 
independent evidence could be offered to show the existence of such alternative causes of people’s beliefs, 
and what would the significance of such evidence be for the analysis of their risk perceptions in the first 
place? 
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structures of reasoning, and sometimes such comparisons has been discarded as 
misplaced, since different cultures, it is argued, must be judged against their own 
standards or ‘ways of life’ (for reviews and discussions, see Hollis and Lukes, 1982; 
Shore 1996; Tambiah, 1990; Wilson, 1970). 
 
Normatively, the concept of rationality can be seen as essentially comprising the 
following four notions: rationality of belief, of rationality of reasoning, rationality of 
action, and also moral rationality (Føllesdal, 1982). Within any of these forms, beliefs 
might be more or less well founded, deductions more or less logical and consistent, and 
actions more less effective for the accomplishment of some defined purpose; and it can 
be argued, following Rawls, that standards of rationality also apply to moral reasoning.255 
These notions of rationality are apparently all implied in the idea of rational risk 
management and, the uses of rationality assumptions in social theory have thus 
transferable applicability within the field of risk. Starting from this broad four-fold 
conception, forms of rationality can be used as ‘normative’ assumptions, construed as a 
hypotheses to be conformed or disconfirmed, and thus applied for explanatory purposes 
as benchmarks against which behaviour can be predicted or beliefs be interpreted. Within 
the comprehensive four-fold conception of rationality suggested above, ‘rational choice’ 
appears as only one such form. 
 
We may thus ‘explain’ human and social agency (beliefs, values, preferences, 
‘perceptions’, practices) against some of the idealized norms of rationality, demonstrating 
logical deficiencies, unfounded beliefs, etc., a practice, as noted, demonstrated by early 
students of ‘primitives’, and implied in other normative theories (for instance of 
regulation). ‘Deviation’ from an established norm, and even suggestions for ‘treatment’, 
may then be the diagnostic conclusion (and cure), as indeed it was for many early 
scholars of ‘the others’ in the mood of the civilizing colonialism.256  
 
                                                 
255 In particular, rationality norms are implied in the idea of reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 1973).  
256 One modern classic for deconstructing these traditions is notably Orientalism, by the late Edward Said 
(1978).   
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But the practice of attributing rationality norms to subjects as assumptions, against which 
explanatory or interpretive accounts of their practices are produced, is proportionally 
aggravated by the amount and nature of assumptions that are lumped together in any 
given conceptual-explanatory scheme. It would make little sense to employ rationality 
assumptions that in effect assume subjects to be fully informed, follow strict rules of 
logical reasoning, anticipate all outcomes of choices, etc. Even professional scientists and 
experts frequently make errors in statistical reasoning (Kahneman et al., 1982). And as 
argued by theorists of decision-making behaviour, different norms of rationality will not 
always be practically reconcilable, such as in the classical conflict between information 
processing and maximization of utility; it would simply be irrational to suspend 
decisions, awaiting full knowledge of alternatives and expected consequences.  The 
rationality of action is necessarily bounded or only satisficing (Simon, 1976). For the 
more sophisticated rational choice theorists, the rationality standards against which 
decisions or choices are predicted, do not assume perfect information or exhaustive 
availability of alternative courses of action; rather, reasonable judgements are made with 
respect to available knowledge, efficient amounts of resources spent on gathering and 
processing information, often within social processes of decision making (Elster, 1986; 
1989). 
 
This leads to the question of how ‘strong’ or ‘restrictive’ the rationality norms should be, 
in particular with respect to their status as explanatory and interpretive assumptions. 
Furthermore, we may question the significance of motivational complexities behind 
practices and beliefs (sub-intentionality), and whether knowledge of the origins of beliefs 
have any relevance at all for the assessment of their validity. As noted in the introductory 
chapter, a simplistic version of the ‘rationalist’ approach is to see rational practices and 
beliefs as ‘self-explanatory’, whereas irrational practices or beliefs need some other, 
asymmetrical explanation. Rational beliefs are explained by the fact that they are rational, 
irrational beliefs requires causal, socio-psychological or ‘external’ explanations (Hollis, 
1982). From the ‘relativist’ position, on the other hand, one must search for “contingent 
determinants of belief and reasoning without regard to whether beliefs are true or 
inferences rational” (Barnes and Bloor, 1982: 26-27). Investigators (historians, 
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anthropologists, sociologists, etc.) must search for the ‘local causes’ of their credibility. 
This symmetrical view, or ‘equivalence postulate’, is applied even to the investigation of 
scientific ‘rationalities’.257  
 
The attribution of ‘external’ explanations, is thus not necessarily reserved for the 
‘rationalist’, but the status of rationality assumptions in the understanding of beliefs and 
practices are not the same. On a trivial level, of course, all beliefs have some causal 
antecedent of a mental kind, intelligence and rationality are as ‘psychological’ in their 
‘origin’ as are stupidity and irrationality. But the search for ‘external’ explanatory 
mechanisms tend naturally to favour the latter, such as when cognitive processes are 
examined within social and cognitive psychology. Even if we approximate ‘scientific 
ideals’, much of the time behaving like ‘naïve scientists’, our cognitive resources are 
limited, we never possess full information, and processing the knowledge we have is 
subject to a number of biases and cognitive faults (Fiske, 2004; Plous, 1993). The social 
psychology of attribution demonstrates this most clearly by observing that, even if the 
attribution of causes reflects some basic features of rational reasoning, we still tend to 
deviate from these in some important ways. Most importantly, we tend to locate the 
causes of behaviour in some personal disposition of observed agents, rather than in the 
behavioural context, also known as the ‘fundamental attribution error’. Situational 
factors, carefully integrated into the experimental designs, are overlooked or downplayed 
by experimental subjects. The operation of this ‘erroneous’ mechanism is reversed 
however when subjects are actors themselves, tending then to explain their own 
behaviour in terms of situational requirements. Mechanisms of causal attribution include 
several such dispositions, such as the tendency to link causality to the most available, 
conspicuous, or salient feature of the situation at hand, and reveals also a certain self-
serving and egocentric bias in our attributions (like taking credit for success and blaming 
others for failure). 
                                                 
257 Within this relativist framework, the postulate holds also for the hard sciences. As formulated by M. 
Hesse: “Rational norms and true beliefs in natural science are just as much explananda of the sociology of 
science as are non-rationality and error”, cited in Hollis and Lukes (1982: 13). Scientific world views are 
essentially incommensurable, and there is no common ground from where to judge their rationality, a view 
normally associated with Kuhn (1962), arguing that scientists hold on to theories for all kinds of external 
reasons, like group pressure, scientific culture, historical conditions, etc. 
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 Attribution theory thus demonstrates, first, a psychological bias in our interpretations, 
justifying ‘asymmetrical’ explanations of lay beliefs; that is, explanations that ‘bracket’ 
beliefs as biased by some mechanisms operating behind the back of subjects. Second, the 
premises on which this research is based, includes rationality assumptions about some 
‘correct’ or rationally assumed procedure of reasoning against which lay beliefs are 
measured. Such assumptions are built into the experiments, like ‘base rate’ information 
(the relative frequency with which an event occurs), and consensus information (e.g. that 
people behave similarly when confronted with the same situation). ‘Neglect’ of such 
information is the implicit yardstick against which the asymmetrical diagnosis of 
cognitive fault is applied (Plous, 1993).  
 
Against a ‘relativist’ theory (or sociology/psychology) of knowledge, one might then 
formulate a ‘moderate rationalist’ (or ‘moderate relativist’) view, allowing for treating 
irrational beliefs differently than rational beliefs. Indeed, both the mechanism of 
attribution and the theory of attribution involves a search for motivational causes of 
behaviour, and in the latter case, the implicit rationality assumption serve as the 
benchmark against which the attribution of causal ‘second order’ motivations (such as the 
biases of egocentrism or self-interest) gain its significance. It must be emphasised, 
however, that specified rationality assumptions carefully integrated into an experimental 
design make interpretation ‘easy’, which is of course the purpose of such designs. Such 
simplified conditions cannot be transferred to real life, where ‘world views’ appear as 
comprehensive and composite systems of thought and templates for action; not even in 
the case of scientific theorizing would it be possible to exactly ‘locate’ the processes and 
mechanisms of belief-formation (Quine, 1953). Is it possible then, to provide explanatory 
or interpretive accounts without any yardstick or benchmark, however uncertain, transient 
or tentative? As noted earlier, the ethnographic credo of taking the ‘native’s point of 
view’ is not to be based on ‘naïvist’ assumptions, ruling out interpretations that surpass 
consciously recognized indigenous knowledges; interpretations and ‘thick descriptions’ 
may clearly be ‘asymmetrical’ within the context of socio-cultural theorizing. And to be 
sure, from a ‘meta-perspective’ all beliefs (including those experimentally and 
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scientifically produced) can in themselves be seen as involving ‘acts of attribution’ to the 
extent that all beliefs and perceptions can be located in personal dispositions or in the 
wider contextual environments of social agents. 
Beyond ‘what else’? 
We have argued here that assertions about ‘biases’ ( psychological and socio-cultural 
‘distortions’) in beliefs and practices, presupposes some alternative, presumably a 
rational alternative, against which the bias-argument can be considered valid or even 
meaningful, thus justifying the ‘what else’ question. This does not imply that ‘bias-
claims’ are illegitimate, only that they cannot be used as blanket explanations of socio-
cultural practices and beliefs that for some reason triggers a search for ‘alternative’ 
accounts. To be sure, such explanations may appear attractive to the ‘observer’: 
explanation is found, closure is established, and agents are framed - and ‘muted’. Again: 
how can we distinguish between legitimate argumentative strategies and the genetic or ad 
hominem fallacies, discrediting the justification of beliefs by referring to their origins? 
Do rationality assumptions and argumentative benchmarks enter into processes of 
reasoning, more or less implicitly and almost by epistemological necessity? How do we 
distinguish the interpretations and explanations found in the ‘naïve science’ of everyday 
life from those found in ‘real science’? Within the context of scientific discourse, these 
structures of reasoning pose some intricate challenges, as they simultaneously appear in 
several layers of perspectives and meta-perspectives. The psychological theories of 
attribution are in fact only a scientifically ‘institutionalized’ example.  
 
In the study of risk and risk management, matters are, if possible, even more complicated. 
It’s difficult to identify any ‘positions’, since different perceptions and beliefs about risk 
contain a number of ‘items’, ‘probability’ being only one source of agreement or 
disagreement. If only risk perception, as a composite term, is taken as the ‘thing’ to agree 
or disagree about, components in the risk evaluation can really be internally adjusted so 
as to make almost any configuration of (conflicting) positions possible.258 As noted 
                                                 
258 To take one example: Research by Otway (cited in Shrader-Frechette, 1991: 91-92), show that negative 
public attitudes toward nuclear power, taken to prove lack of public understanding of probability, rather 
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above, only a provisional list of such ‘components’ will indicate this, such as the 
evaluation of (often fundamental) uncertainties in probability-estimates, valuation of 
possible harms and costs, valuation of benefits, valuations of principles of precaution, etc. 
There may be no procedure available to establish what kind of risk ‘decision’ or 
‘perception’ is most rational in this amalgam, and it would be meaningless to explain or 
interpret individual beliefs or social action against such a composite benchmark. Almost 
any choice or course of action could be seen to follow from the ‘initial conditions’, and 
compatible with at least some assumptions about ‘reasonableness’.  
 
‘Perfect rationality’, sometimes implicitly contained within the idea of ‘prudent risk 
management’, can not serve as the benchmark against which regulatory policies should 
be interpreted or explained. In the case of societal risk management, even the arrival of a 
Laplacian Demon would just be a necessary, not a sufficient condition for ‘perfect 
rationality’. In terms of ‘explaining’ regulatory worldviews and strategies, the ideals of 
proportionality and effectivenes would not only involve the prediction of risk reducing 
outcomes of any given intervention, but also some norms of morally enlightened risk-
cost-benefit analyses. It can be argued, on normative grounds, that there is some 
deficiency in reasoning, knowledge claims, regulatory proportionality, etc.; but such 
‘deficiencies’, even if convincingly argued for, would only provide arguments for 
deviations from the normative theories of regulation, and not in themselves justify 
‘external’ explanations (implicitly converting normative theory to positive). Regulatory 
‘content’ cannot be seen as the potential outcome of fully rational decision making 
processes, reflecting or optimally approaching the ‘common good’. ‘Mismatches’ 
between risk levels and regulatory content are thus vulnerable indications for evoking 
‘external’ explanations; more effort is needed to explore the alternative rationalities of 
regulatory decision making. If narrowly defined rationality assumptions leave important 
aspects of regulatory behaviour out of view, extending the rationality assumptions to 
cover the ‘total, would be to assume too much rationality.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
reflect disagreements about values, specifically benefits associated with the energy source. In fact, pro-
nuclear and anti-nuclear groups didn’t differ significantly on any items related to probability.  
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This leads to a final remark about the role of the principle of charity in explaining and 
interpreting social phenomena. Most explicitly stated by the philosopher Donald 
Davidson (1974/1984), it holds that some minimal assumptions of agreement on beliefs 
are necessary for understanding to be possible at all. Without it, disagreements would be 
impossible or meaningless, since we would have no position from where to interpret 
them; interpreting beliefs and actions only against standards ‘intrinsic’ to any ‘conceptual 
scheme’ (strong relativism), is basically beyond comprehension; we cannot but carve out 
some common space for understanding. There is some divergence, however, as to how 
much agreement is needed in order for understanding, translation, and interpretation to be 
possible.259 But some consensus can be found in locating such areas of necessary 
agreement in “experience-near” contexts, like when people utter indicative sentences, 
confront practicalities of everyday life, etc. In the case of abstract theory, religious belief 
or other more elaborately construed systems of thought, it would be too difficult even to 
identify positions (Lukes, 1982; Taylor, 1985: 134-51). 
 
Not only stated beliefs, but also sub-intentional accounts of belief-formation, must be 
allowed for in interpretation, including constraints of simplicity, effects of social 
conditioning, and also knowledge of explicable error (common sense or scientific). 
Building on these considerations, Føllesdal (1982) suggests four such rationality 
assumptions: First, some degree of rationality must be assumed in order to be able to 
understand behaviour (following the charity-principle), second, reasons for actions 
should always be included in explanations, even when causal explanations seem 
sufficient; third, complete rationality can not be expected, and explanations should not 
seek to maximize it; forth, people should be interpreted as having rationality as a norm, at 
least in the sense that beliefs, actions, etc., would be adjusted when exposed to more 
rational alternatives. A crucial notion in this application of rationality assumptions is thus 
that people, although not complying with (indeed not being able to comply with) ideal 
rationality standards, nevertheless should be charitably interpreted as having the potential 
                                                 
259 Modified versions are suggested by several authors. Lukes (1982) suggests the principle of humanity as 
a somewhat weaker assumption, requiring only that we minimize unintelligibility by counting people right 
unless we arrive at better explanations by counting them wrong: it may be better to attribute to people an 
explicable error than a mysterious truth. This is also referred to as the “bridgehead argument” for necessary 
assumptions of interpretation.  
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of approximating them. Rationality comes in different forms, and it comes in degrees, but 
interpretation must always take into account the socially embedded context of linguistic 
usage, belief formation, and normative orientations.  
 
In the theory of attribution, it might be argued that ‘minimal and necessary agreement’ is 
integrated into the experimental designs, thus enabling researchers to locate processes of 
reasoning and belief-formation in specified and de-contextualized settings (or rather, the 
contextual conditions are explicitly specified through the experimental design). The same 
might be said of certain psychometric studies or risk perception (Slovic, 1992). 
Transferred to real-life situations, however, we might confront the same kind of 
contextual metamorphosis as Latour (1983) has observed in extending discoveries made 
under conditions of laboratory experiments, to the external world. In the field of risk, 
such transportation of knowledge seems risky indeed, as has been noted by several 
authors, underscoring the significance of qualitative in-depth studies that are sensitive to 
the contextual and multidimensional nature of this field of research (Wynne, 1992; 1996). 
Mechanisms of attribution and their second order explanations must then reflect all the, 
partially dislocated, processes that go into the shaping of regulatory world views and their 
outcomes.  
 
In the process of restricting and accentuating interpretive options we still need to consider 
the broader societal and institutional ‘location’ of the social agent. Following the calls for 
charity, such contextual dimensions are necessarily integrated in interpretive processes. 
The public regulatory role, dedicated to the prudent management of risk, may not be such 
a bad starting point for imposing some interpretive direction. Incidentally, it could be 
argued, this institutional role even provides an ‘enlightened’ and favourable context for 
escaping some ‘errors of attribution’ In the relatively firm stands taken by the Norwegian 
petroleum authorities in the case of individual blaming (even resisting the blame-seeking 
judiciary), it might be held that the ‘fundamental attribution error’ has been 
‘institutionally corrected for’, creating rather an almost reversed culture of contextual 
attribution (or ‘circumstantial causation’). We know that these psychological dispositions 
may be so strong that they can be preserved by subjects even when being exposed to ‘de-
 408
biasing’ information prior to (or during) an experiment. But they may also be reversed by 
such information (Plous 1993: 187-188). And furthermore, the mechanisms of attribution 
appear in fact to be relative to the wider socio-cultural context, showing for instance that 
so-called ‘collectivistic’ cultures tend to attribute causes to the collective (Fiske, 2004: 
115-116). Psychological mechanisms discovered in experimental settings with American 
college students as guinea pigs may provide no claim for having established universal 
‘psycho-facts’.260 Analogously, as has been observed by anthropologists, dating back to 
its formative years as an academic discipline, the variety and frequency of witchcraft 
practices may be highly contingent on a number of identifiable socio-cultural conditions.  
 
Just as we would be inclined to overcome errors of attribution, if properly exposed to the 
‘de-biasing’ information or to the mechanisms in operation (we would presume 
researchers of attribution mechanisms to be particularly alert to the kinds of errors that 
they study), in the same vein we could expect institutional and cultural contexts to 
promote enlightened processes of belief formation and strategies of interventions in the 
societal governance of risk. Although not yielding unwittingly to naïve trust in 
government, the alternative may not be much better substantiated if judged against the 
plethora of interpretive options. Some charity may also be needed in order to ‘localize’ 
the ‘errors’ of regulation, although such charity should still not be uncritically substituted 
with any ‘benevolent fallacy of genetics’. 
 
We do not accept the mechanisms of witchcraft as legitimate procedures for attributing 
causation and blame. We study witchcraft as social phenomena to be explained as 
historically specific ways in which certain peoples make sense of (harmful) events, and in 
conventional ethnographic analysis they appear as mechanisms of social control, 
sometimes backed by cosmologies of fortune and fate (Evans-Pritchard, 1976). Even  
radical relativists, in understanding these practises as embedded within the idiosyncratic 
world views of language communities, would probably appeal to other theories of the 
‘causal’ role of human agency within their own ‘language community’ (see Tambiah, 
                                                 
260 A term in fact used in a popular psychology text-book to convey to the students the impression that 
they’re now entering a science of man that will out-rule most errors of commonsensical ‘wisdoms’ (see 
Stanovich, 2004). 
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1990 for a comprehensive discussion). The employment of any ‘technique’ of social 
control  will certainly be embedded within larger systems of culturally conditioned 
beliefs and values (and even accusations of witchcraft can be done with much strategic-
rational calculation). Within these broader contexts we may have theories of risk 
management that find blaming-strategies to be counterproductive, as these reduce the 
information-processing and learning capacities of  organizations, promote inflexible rule-
following, transfer risks to other areas, or even discourage otherwise beneficial activities. 
Or we may (sic) have a deterrence theory of risk management, implying that the risk of 
blame and liability will provide incentives for decision makers to reduce risks (from 
whatever position within the hierarchy). Some would argue for sophisticated and 
differentiated targeting of these deterrence mechanisms, dependent on the ‘estimated’ 
effect in each case. Thus, even the support of deterrence mechanisms would yield quite 
different ideas about the targeting of deterrence instruments within the corporate and 
regulatory hierarchies, and thus of who should in the end be subject to moral blame 
and/or legal liability. It is not easy to reduce these issues to questions of effectiveness 
only. The calls for maximum ‘manageability’(see Reason, 1997, and particularly Chapter 
7 above) as an indicator for choosing just which conditions or triggers to ‘contain’, or 
which barriers or redundancies to promote in the virtually endless chains of ‘causality’, 
still leaves open a relatively large scope of normative and essentially constitutive 
questions. 
 
Theories of minds, of people, of societies – and of risk management, are not only 
‘responding to facts’. They are also, to some extent, normatively constitutive of their 
subject matter (Taylor 1985, Hacking, 1999). The broader understanding of rationality 
adopted here, include moral norms as well, not only at the level of ‘descriptive ethics’ 
(that is, empirically observed adherence to moral norms or values), but also normative 
ethics. Theories and practices of risk management appears  as inseparable from the moral 
and constitutive acts of attributing causal impacts to human agency in the object world 
with which they engage (Shaver, 1985). Even if causal mechanisms may be ‘discovered’ 
and inform the managerial approach (by addressing the most ‘frequent’ or the most 
‘underlying’ of the causal options), the interfering strategies are inevitably also 
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impregnated with moral value. Any control strategy presupposes and constitutes certain 
thresholds or interfaces between agents and their socio-technical environments, implying 
underlying ideas about voluntarism and determinism, choice and opportunity context, 
decisions and framing conditions, autonomy and adaptation, action and reaction, cause 
and pretext, reason and excuse, etc., that cannot be determined solely by ‘facts’ or 
theoretical inferences from facts. Rather, the management of risk involves also the 
creation of ‘facts on the ground’ (in more than the trivial sense, of course), even if they 
are not practically applied in any consistent of uniformly manner (even, as was observed, 
within the consistency-seeking context of law). Risk management is about efficiency, to 
be sure, but neither the goals nor the means are chosen in a moral vacuum detached from 
normative commitments. As the culturally enlightened risk management approach moved 
beyond the ‘modern’ witchcrafting practices of blaming just that part of the 
organizational machinery where fault and error could most easily be located, this also 
implied a commitment to the re-location of the ‘bewitched’. 
Final note 
This exploratory quest into the world of risk regulation started with a somewhat 
schizophrenic intent, both to understand from within, and to explain from without. By 
following the anthropological ethos of grasping the ‘native’s point of view’, we also 
accommodate to recent calls to pay more attention to regulatory world views. There is 
however a delicate balance between interpretations from within and birds eye 
explanations from without; it implies addressing and representing world views as 
representations, against claims to objectively representing these within their worldly 
‘realities’. As long as anthropologists could claim authority to these double (or multiple) 
representations simply by ‘having been there’, the Mise-en-Scène of fieldwork 
experiences could be orderly arranged with scenes, actors, narratives, artefacts, and so on, 
that would make up the discovered ‘cultures’. As the sites were revisited by others who 
returned with other stories, or worse still, countered by ‘natives talking back’ against the 
way their lives were being represented, the distinctive authority of the anthropological 
author evaporated (Clifford, 1988; Marcus and Fisher, 1986). The traditional ‘rapport’ of 
ethnography, based on having established confidence and understanding from the ‘inside 
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of exotica’ has caused much methodological and epistemological debate and self-
reflection within the discipline. These concerns appear no less challenging in encounters 
with the complex worlds of professionalized, specialized, blurred, and de-territorialized 
cultures of modern society.  
 
‘Complicity’ has been introduced as a new concept for making sense of ethnographic 
encounters with both familiar and alien cultures, not in the sense of a conspiracy, but 
rather as a term for seeing cultural sense-making as a joint process, with no clearly 
defined principal (Marcus, 1999). Geertz (1983: 57) argued against “an ethnography of 
witchcraft as written by a witch”. No witches appeared to protest against this warning, 
but Evans-Prichard (1976), another great anthropologist, had earlier been scolded for not 
being faithful to the idiosyncratic logics or language games of the Azande witches (and 
magicians and sorcerers) (Winch, 1970); mistakenly so, it is assumed here, as some form 
of normative assumptions of rationality seem inevitable, regardless of where and how the 
natives are situated. Paradoxically perhaps, the challenge of identifying such assumptions 
and their interpretive impacts seem more compelling when confronted with ethnographies 
of risk as written by risk analysts or ethnographies of bureaucracy as written by 
bureaucrats. Apparently, no regulatory actor would claim – or admit – that, they were 
really hard pressed due to their inability to cope adequately with the risks in question, but  
devised some ingenious blame prevention strategies and thus restored their fragile 
reputation. Although naïve reliance on indigenous representations is not state-of-the-art  
methodology, attempts to ‘look over their shoulders’ or to ‘explain from without’, pose 
some serious challenges in such highly expert-based and knowledge-intensive cultures. 
 
Starting with what would be counted as normative theory seen from the natives point of 
view, no one, evidently, would claim vulgar populism, business capture or institutional 
strategies of blame avoidance to have any role as normative templates for regulatory 
behaviour. But, as argued above, making a distinction between normative and positive 
theory is not easy within the complex and essentially normative field of risk regulation.  
The (implicit) ‘what else’ argument appears to make normative theory the standard 
against which to assess positive theory. The present argument calls for more patience 
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before evoking that step, and that complicity with native actors might open new 
interpretive options, even when only moderate rationality is assumed. And as argued, 
exploring world views requires that assumptions be made, also about the formation of 
beliefs and intentions. We do not only ‘explain’ these from the outside, at least not by 
discarding the former, simply on account of their causes. But there is no genetic fallacy 
involved in exploring the genesis of beliefs in their own terms. And the ‘genetic drive’ in 
the process of belief formation, as it appeared, was a strong and unequivocal commitment 
to the regulatory purpose. If the outcome did not always live up to the intention, no given 
scheme is readily available for reinterpreting the latter. Normative (even if ‘indigenous’) 
theories of regulation is what, on the whole, informs the process of regulation (however 
envisioned). But the choice of means and measures are rarely uncontested. Regulators 
also have (literally) multiple selves, and neither do these selves proceed unchanged 
through the regulatory processes. The response to complexity (and anarchy) may clearly 
be a lot of routine and rules of appropriateness (which may be perfectly rational, and not 
only ‘ritually accommodating’), Between mindless rule-following and perfect rationality 
there are reasonable adaptations to variable circumstances, requiring interpretive, sense-
making, discretionary, problem-solving, and strategic skills.  
 
We have here critically addressed how the analysis of regulatory regimes seems to 
disfavour public interest models and to embrace institutional ones. The preceding 
argument favours both, or perhaps more correctly, tries to demonstrate that the former 
appears as ‘justifiably charitable’, and that the latter must be more genuinely attuned to 
local rationalities and rationales. Regulatory regimes are shaped by contextual factors, 
responding to a diversity of ‘private’ and ‘public’ expectations and pressures. But such 
shapers may also (even by ‘definition’) represent ‘public interests’, and be legitimately 
integrated in a governmental risk regime. Single instances of regulatory behaviour may 
thus substantiate more than one ‘theory’ of regulation. Indeed, it has been argued that 
explanatory models of regulatory regimes contain so many substantial differences in 
terms of generality, scope and possible applications that it “makes little sense to say 
whether one explanation carries more conviction than another without reference to a 
particular issue and context” (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 32). This implies that theories 
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might as much serve as sensitizing perspectives drawing attention to the particular kinds 
of mechanisms operating in each case, thus providing assumptions and models for 
formulating ‘situated’ and exploratory hypotheses against which the available evidence 
can be evaluated (if not strictly tested). Regulatory regimes are extremely composite units 
of analysis, and they will often comprise a number of ‘regime cases’, each subject to their 
own trajectories, patterns of emergence, and worldly impacts. And their institutional 
emergence will not, on its own, explain their impacts, since the legislative intent may be 
thwarted in the encounters with the real world of risk; and the impact may explain the 
emergence only by discovering the mechanisms that lead the initiators to expect just that 
impact, if functionalist fallacies are to be avoided (Merton, 1957). Such features of 
regimes may even challenge the hypothesis testing approach to analysis, and strategies of  
inductive comparison based on case studies may offer a promising way of expanding the 
case-based approach. Traditional hypothesis testing may rely too much on the 
identification of variables that are exhaustive and relevant before the data sets are 
processed through the explanatory machinery, but risk regimes have some important 
composite and ‘configurational’ qualities that may support an argument for treating them 
as ‘whole’ cases (Ragin, 1987; 1994; 2000).261 Within such cases we find a number of 
‘mechanisms’ rather than causal relations, thus adding new items “to our repertoire of 
ways in which things happen” (Elster, 1989: 10). 
 
Some of the arguments provided above, raise quite fundamental issues about 
epistemology, ethics, and social theorizing that cannot be treated here with the 
sophistication and proficiency of the specialists in these fields. But some arguments for 
their relevance have been provided, and hopefully also for the importance of a 
                                                 
261 Comparative case methodology allows for sensitive interpretation of the specificities and uniqueness of 
cases, but also for identifying how causal mechanisms operate on a more general level through the analysis 
of how explanatory conditions are combined in variably configured cases, using quasi-experimental designs 
and set-theory. It is thus especially well suited for addressing questions about outcomes resulting from 
multiple and conjunctural causes, where different conditions combine in different and sometimes 
contradictory ways to produce similar outcomes. The potentials of this methodology have not been fully 
explored in the study of organizational risk or regulatory regimes, although some examples may be found, 
such as Levi-Faur (2003). Still, it is commonly agreed that the causes of accidents and harms should be 
sought within the complexity of technological, human, and organizational configurations and conjunctures. 
In fact, Ragin (1987) appeared in the reference list in the first RNNS report, where the basic 
methodological approaches were outlined; but it was not possible to find any discussion of the 
methodology in the text itself.  
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theoretically reflexive reading of regulatory world views and strategies. I found the issues 
encountered by the agents of regulation to provoke theoretically and morally rather 
profound questions, addressed by the ‘natives’ with much reflection and sensitivity to the 
scope and impact of their intervening strategies. Most of the time, their ‘instrumental 
knowledge’ of the application and effectiveness of these strategies would be superior to 
my own. They knew the jungle and the hunting techniques. Only when ‘culture’ was the 
issue, could I assume some professional authority. And then, was it possible to 
reconstruct the ‘narrative’ only with the help of privileged hindsight and much work. In 
this light, the troubles of culture appeared to resemble the conceptual and theoretical 
problems haunting the fate of culture in my own discipline, of never bringing culture 
down to the level of ’primary theory’.  The discourses were certainly furnished with 
‘examples’, but not in any systematic manner that could, for the future, provide for 
anyone in any given occasion, a template for what could be considered, say, an instance 
of ‘good HSE culture’. The perfectly sound and engineer-like appeals to ‘practical 
implications’ in the ‘harsh realities’, replicated the academic discourses. Culture thus 
remained as ‘secondary theory’ of a highly abstract and theory-laden kind, the 
operational instances of which could not be consistently tested against primary theory on 
the ground, seeing things, interpreting, calling them names, and agree on the future 
usages. And of course, all the competing or alternative theories of a secondary order 
available did not make the project easier; not surprisingly, the most ‘tangible’ and 
operational of these had the greatest success in surviving.262 The introduction of HSE 
culture, depicting as well as constitutive of the regulated space, was motivated by 
strongly internalized norms and regulatory goals, having the ‘public interest’ as the 
institutional bedrock. That the front line implementers of ambitious public policies 
searched for the philosopher’s stone seem rather reasonable. But at least they preferred 
magic to witchcraft.  
 
                                                 
262 The idea of regulating risk through the magic of culture thus resembles, it could be argued, the kinds of 
beliefs that could be seen as ’highly theoretical’. As argued by Taylor (1985) and Lukes (1982), 
asymmetrical explanations are difficult to apply with respect to such beliefs, since they are, in the imagery 
of Quine (1953), far removed from the observational periphery. The mechanisms of their adoption are not 
easily localized as ’explicable’ responses to states of affairs, and may also include a number of extraneous 
reasons (political, ‘religious’ etc.). As summarized by Lukes: “In short, their being held may often be over-
determined, so that it is scarcely possible to tell which reason was decisive” (1982: 295).  
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Understanding regulatory world views and strategies requires in-depth investigations of 
the regulatory rationalities from the ‘inside’; they are not simple ‘social facts’ to be 
explained only from the ‘outside’. In interpreting and explaining regulatory content, one 
must choose models that reflect the range of factors that can be expected to feed into the 
decision making processes at all levels, together with other factors that may ‘shape’ 
regulatory policies in more oblique ways. Regulatory intervention involves not only 
considerations of the nature or scale of the risks in question, but also of the opportunity 
structure of risk management at a corporate and societal level. Social and behavioural 
assumptions may feed into ‘probability' estimates (managerial behaviour, worker 
behaviour etc), including assessments of regulatory compliance, surveillance capacities 
and how broader societal factors influence levels of regulatory compliance (like 
economic conditions, labour markets, etc.) Regulators must assess also the benefits at 
stake, requiring a balanced appreciation of all the trade-offs involved in choosing 
regulatory policies. In short, the ultimate rationality requirement for the regulator would 
be based on dauntingly complex assessments of costs and benefits of risk management at 
a societal level, requiring not only an epistemologically and morally enlightened 
evaluation of risk, but also of the expected outcomes of the intervention options 
available.  
 
Regulation involves a number of trade-offs and balancing acts, taking account of shifting 
environmental and internal concerns. Selectively finding some of these practices in 
accordance with other interests than the ‘public’ is not difficult; the latter still appear as a 
reasonably justifiable assumption to rely on, as the minimal rationality bridgehead 
necessary in order to interpret orientations and strategies. This obviously does not 
exclude other interests or ‘regulatory deficiencies’, but it pushes the burden of proof in 
the direction of those claiming them to be more influential. After all, the basic rationale 
for keeping these bodies public, is the uniquely democratic mandate of serving the public. 
The ‘institutionalized’ absence of commercial motives provides the conditions for and 
allows public policy makers and agencies to act on that mandate. They are shielded from 
the whims of populist politics, and unlike other commercial or semi-commercial expert 
groups, they may even bite the hand that feeds them, without much risk of starvation. The 
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regulatory purpose appears as the institutionalized motivational rationale against which 
the outputs of the governmental ‘black box’ must also be interpreted, however ambitious 
(and ambiguous) the goals and contested the means.  
 
This institutional role presupposes professional self-management, politically attuned but 
not populist, professionally self-confident but not self complacent, sensitive to organized 
interests but not compromised by these. A culture committed to safety may only be a 
minimally necessary condition for tightly coupled and complexly structured high risk 
industries. Even in the more linear and loosely structured regimes of regulation, a culture 
of enlightened commitment to regulatory goals is but a necessary condition for treating 









Appendix 1: Methods and data collection 
 
General 
I entered this research project with no previous experience from the petroleum industry. I 
did however have experience from several regulatory authorities, including 3 years in the 
Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (the personnel and training department) and 3 
years at a County Governor’s office (as project coordinator for local and regional HSE 
authorities). I also served some 6 years as an advisor/consultant in the Directorate of 
Public Administration. The latter position involved working with several comprehensive 
studies and evaluation reports on regulatory regimes, including also the petroleum 
regime. In sum, I had extensive experience from working with a variety of regulatory 
regimes, in particular within the area of occupational health and safety, and I had worked 
closely with a number of various professionals and disciplinary groups (notably lawyers 
and engineers). This facilitated the data collection process in the sense that it provided 
some familiarity with current themes, regulatory challenges, supervisory methods and 
strategies, institutional structures, nomenclatures, etc. However, in terms of 
understanding the specific features of industrial structures, technologies, actors – and 
risks – I was a novice. The position of the novice is not necessarily unfortunate for the 
ethnographer, at least not in the initial phases; confronted with the rather daunting 
complexities of the case at hand, however, the position of the novice will haunt the 
ethnographer as ever-expanding fields of knowledge are encountered.  
 
A brief account of the process and methods of data collection is provided below. Note 
that much data collection occurred through informal meetings and talks with key actors in 
the agency, the industry (company representatives, safety representatives, union 
representatives), and among various expert groups (including the research communities). 
These are of course not counted or accounted for in detail, but are still significant sources 
of information gathered during the fieldwork period. Note also that interviewees are not 
‘coded’, since such coding in this context could compromise anonymity. A number of 
interviewees are of course not anonymous in the text due to their specific position.   
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Getting beyond the formalities and the often sterile language of regulations, public 
reports, and red tape accounts was normally a pleasant and rewarding experience. 
Informants were generally quite frank and outspoken, sometimes more so than was really 
needed for penetrating the historiography of events, and the regulatory ‘world-views’ and 
operating rationales. On the other hand, information gathered in the largely 
accommodative and sharing communicative climate of the interviews occasionally had to 
be ‘dressed up’ to some extent in the final expositions; as the issue of making data 
publicly available drew closer, considerations related to reputation and public appearance 
became more acute. However, this did not in any significant manner ‘corrupt’ or distort 
the final exposition to the effect of compromising the analysis. In particular, the PSA 
acted and responded very generously, not only during the research process, but also to a 
final draft of the thesis. In terms of ‘ethnographic validity’ they found the text to be 
‘recognizable and acceptable’ from their position.  
 
The process of discovery and exploration during the research was important, and no 
definite sets of questions with prefixed response-categories were used. A number of 
broadly defined themes and dimensions were outlined, however, with sub-categories and 
some ‘test-questions’ that could discriminate responses and elicit the kinds of distinctions 
that was looked for. Thus, a relatively open-ended interview guide was used (see below). 
But the questions were also developed along the way, and I was able to frame and 
reframe these issues as my own understanding developed. No prefabricated set of options 
for measurement were ‘respondents’ or ‘responses’ could be arranged or categorized 
could thus be used. In fact, mutual engagement with the topics occasionally made 
interviews resemble conversations, where they would supply superior knowledge on the 
substantial (regulatory and risk management) issues, and I could ‘direct’ the course,  
provide frames, sharpen perspectives and sometimes elicit contrasts and try to tease out 
nuances and distinctiveness in the responses. Importantly, the questions had to be adapted 
to the specific interviewee, depending on their background and positioning. 
This strategy applied in particular to the questions concerning HSE culture. No pre-
defined notions about what would be ‘professionally’ accepted conceptions about culture 
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or HSE culture were applied; rather, there was a collaborative search about possible 
interpretations.  
 
Most interviews were taped and later transcribed. Taping interviews was preferable for 
several reasons, the most important being that it made it possible to benefit from the 
richness of verbal presentations, and that it relieved reliance on faulty memory. Also, it 
enabled better concentration on the topics and less time and energy was lost on taking 
notes.263 All citations used in the text were later reviewed by the interviewees; some 
modifications have been adapted, but no significant change of substance has been 
necessary.  
 
Interviews and participant observations did not follow any strict ideal of distance. Rather, 
in order to extract good and rich data, it is important to establish an atmosphere of 
openness and confidence. This sometimes involves actively using ones own knowledge 
and background in order to immerse oneself in a mutual exchange of information and 
experience. As noted, I had the advantage of being a former civil servant in various parts 
of the state administration, also enabling better access to local codes and languages.  
Not altogether dismissing the old positivist ideals of distance and objectivity, the 
challenge of productive fieldwork and ‘informative’ interviews often involves personality 
and sensitivity; this involves, not mechanical adherence scripts and procedures, but 
adaptation to the mood of the situation and the person. 
 
Interviews and fieldwork in the PSA  
The bulk of the fieldwork period (some ten weeks scattered through the period from 
February 2005 to February 2006 was spent in the PSA. I was able to attend several 
meetings and seminars during this period, most notably with the members of the culture 
project group. I also attended two audits. Some thirty-five in-depth interviews have been 
conducted with agency officials, 15 of which with members of the leadership group 
(including all management levels). Apart from the leadership group, the categories of 
                                                 
263 Only one informant refused to use the recorder; a couple of times, I was asked to stop it as the 
conversation turned to sensitive issues, or they would plead me not to use the information indiscreetly.  
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agency officials particularly selected for interviews included those involved in the follow 
up of the HSE culture provision (the HSE culture project), a selected number of 
experienced ‘old-timers’, former managers, and  people with industry experience. These 
latter informants were in a position to provide some historical reflections and sometimes 
a more distanced and multifaceted perspective on regime developments and practices.  
 
Interviews with unions and industry representatives 
Interviews and several informal talks were conducted with representatives from the two 
major workers unions, OFS/SAFE and NOPEF/Industri-Energi, and also from the major 
Norwegian Oil Industry Association. A selected portion of HSE personnel at the 
corporate level has also been interviewed, including HSE directors, HSE professionals, 
and regulatory advisors. This group includes some 20 persons from 8 oil companies and 5 
contractor companies. 
 
Other interviews  
Other interviews included:  
• A group (4) of ministry officials / directors from the Department of Working 
Environment and Safety, in the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion 
• Two former directors of the same unit 
• A number (ca 10) of former agency officials (some also included in other categories)  
• Officials from cooperating regulatory agencies 
• The head of the NSE-unit at the Rogaland Police Department  
• The Public Prosecutor of the Rogaland District 
• A selection of HSE experts / consultants working with the petroleum industry 
 
Documentary studies  
There is an abundance of documentary material of potential relevance for any student of  
public administration and regulatory regimes, including laws, regulations, preparatory 
legal documents, public government reports, and formal correspondence between key 
actors (Ministry, agency, industrial actors, trade unions, etc.). From the position as a 
fieldworker in the PSA, I had unique access to a variety of such documents, public as 
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well as internal (audit reports, investigation reports, orders, replies to reports, general 
letters about enforcement policies, etc.). The bulk of public and official reports, statistics, 
regulations, etc., are available at the PSA web-site: http://www.ptil.no/ 
 
These data sources obviously have unequal relevance to the questions posed. The wealth 
of documentary data often made the problem of selection greater than the problem of 
want. Much ready-made evidence can be gathered from these documents (such as 
regulations and accident figures). Some documents, like investigation reports, would 
provide detailed accounts of facts and events, largely related to observed non-
conformities and their immediate causes, but also providing insights into the situational 
processes and the organizational contexts of the events. Still, these could often be written 
with a considerable amount of bureaucratic understatement and often retold more bluntly 
in later interviews with the authors/investigators.  
 
Offshore fieldwork 
As part of phase 5 in the RNNS project, a series of case studies / fieldworks were 
conducted at 3 different offshore installations. These were selected based on good or 
significantly improved HSE results, in order to identify reasons for their good 
performance, and subsequently for providing lessons for others in terms of ‘best 
practice’, specific HSE-programs, management involvement in HSE, local ‘culture’, etc. 
I was able to participate on one of these field studies together with a researcher from the 
International Research Institute in Stavanger (IRIS), in order to (albeit superficially) 
acquaint myself with the experience of ‘being there’, talking to people, participating in 
meetings, sightseeing the facility, and observing the technology, the organization, and the 
people in action. Some six days of intensive fieldwork was thus carried out on a 
production vessel in the Varg Field in the Southern North Sea. It included a number of 
loosely structured interviews (ca 15-20), attendance at several meetings (mandatory 
morning meetings, hand-over meetings, HSE meetings, etc.), surveys of the ship and the 
various work sites, and included also a number of informal talks (in the coffee shops, the 
cafeteria, the living room, etc.). The study also included a two day visit to the company 
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headquarters, with meetings, talks, and interviews with company management and HSE- 
personnel. 
 
Courses, conferences, and seminars 
• Offshore safety and emergency preparedness training. Mandatory one week course  
• Regulatory competence for the petroleum industry. Two day general course 
• PSA conferences on HSE culture 2003 and 2005 
• Annual Safety Forum conferences 2004-2006 
• Annual conference for the ‘Shelf Police’ 
• Annual conference for chief company safety representatives 
• PSA seminar on Human Factors 
• PSA seminar on crane and lifting operations 
• Statoil ‘Safe Behaviour Program’, 2 day work-shop/conference  





General background information 
• Education  
• Work experience 
• Present tasks and responsibilities 
• Crossover experiences (between the industry and the NPD/PSA) 
 
 
Overall perspectives on regulation  
• Regulation and supervision as instruments in improving HSE conditions in the 
industry  
• Perspectives on the development of the petroleum regime 
• The regulatory role  
• The basis of regulatory authority (trust, fear or professional respect?) 
• Introduction, philosophy, and strategy related to risk management, self-regulation, 
internal control, etc., and specifically to HSE culture 
• The legal context 
• Human error and organizational failure  
• Attribution of causes, responsibilities, and blame 
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The agency resources  
• Competence, recruitment, and mobility  
• Priorities and planning processes 
• Cost-benefit considerations 
 
Regulations 
• Regulatory processes of production and amendments 
• Involvement in the regulatory process (parties, expert groups) 
• Purpose orientation, design of rules and systems 
• The role of standards and internal company rules 
• The relationship between the legal context and the risk management philosophies  
 
The relations between the authorities and the industry 
• Degree of oversight , frequency of encounters 
• Roles: closeness, distance, loyalties, and ‘capture-mechanisms’ 
• Regulatory style (trust, dialogue, spot-checks, etc.) 
• Supervisory strategies (audits and investigations) 
• Collaborative arenas (industry and unions) 
• Professional cooperation (industry, unions, expert-groups, etc.) 
• Cross-over experiences  
• Informational asymmetries  
 
HSE culture 
• The role of HSE culture within the regulatory / risk management context 
• The value added by introducing HSE culture 
• The justifications, challenges, and experiences with the provision 
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Appendix 2: Risk and risk indicators  
 




Defined situations of hazard and accident 
 
Defined situations of hazard and accident is referred to as “DFUs”, which is a Norwegian 
acronym (‘Definerte Fare- og Ulykkessituasjoner’). The following items are included: 
 
 
1. Non-ignited hydrocarbon leaks 
2. Ignited hydrocarbon leaks 
3. Well kicks/loss of well control 
4. Fire/explosion in other areas, flammable liquids 
5. Vessels/ships on collision course  
6. Drifting objects 
7. Collision with field-related vessel/installation/shuttle tanker 
8. Structural damage to platform/stability/anchoring/positioning failure 
9. Leaks from subsea production systems/pipelines/risers/flowlines/loading 
buoys/loading hoses 
10. Damage to subsea production equipment/pipeline systems/diving equipment 
caused by fishing gear  
11. Evacuation (precautionary/emergency evacuation) 
12. Helicopter crash/emergency landing on/near installation  
13. Man overboard  
14. Injury to personnel  
15. Occupational illness 
16. Total power failure 
17. Control room out of service 
18. Diving accident 
19. H2S emission (hydrogen sulphide leaks) 
20. Lost control of radio-active source 
21. Falling object  
 
Taking note of the methodological issues involved in selecting and defining risk 
indicators, in particular in the face of sparse availability of historical data for major 
accidents, the DFUs were selected on the basis of the following criteria (the NPD, Pilot 
report 2000): 
 
• The DFU is an unplanned event/situation which has led, or may lead, to loss (of life 
and other values), and hence represents a risk contribution. 
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• The DFU must be an observable event/situation, and one which it is feasible to record 
consistently and near-completely in relation to activities on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf. 
• The DFUs must (as far as possible) cover all situations that can lead to loss of life. 
• The DFUs are important for motivation and awareness, since they are utilised in the 
planning and dimensioning of emergency preparedness. 
 
 
Total risk indicator for major accidents   
 
The figure below shows the development of an aggregated relative risk indicator from the 
years 1998 to 2005. It is based on a set of indicators from the DFU-list which are 
weighted according to their relative contribution to major accident risk (primarily items 
1-12).  
 
The figure shows a three year rolling average. The indicator is relative, and the level in 
2000 is set at 100. The prediction interval (right column) indicates a 90 percent 
probability that the future values will be within the interval. Values above or below the 
interval are regarded as a significant increase/decrease. Man-hours are used as a common 































Selected risk indicators related to injuries 
 
Injuries and injury rates on permanently placed facilities     
 
Activity   1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Administration Injuries 80 80 82 63 65 63 48 32 40 43
and production Injuries/mill. hour 15,8 14,7 14,4 10,7 10,4 9,3 6,6 4,0 5,1 4,8
Drilling and Injuries 141 133 117 124 111 103 90 54 59 51
well operations Injuries/mill. hour 28,7 26,8 26,5 26,4 21,5 18,7 15,4 8,6 9,4 8,0
 Catering Injuries 46 45 54 54 53 32 28 19 24 27
  Injuries/mill. hour 21,2 19,2 23,6 23,8 25,9 14,6 12,4 8,7 11,1 11,8
Construction/ Injuries 295 348 330 382 320 248 238 196 180 176
maintenance Injuries/mill. hour 32,1 31,7 34,4 35,5 31,1 24,3 20,7 19,3 18,2 17,1
Total Injuries 562 606 583 623 549 446 404 301 303 297
  Injuries/mill. hour 26,3 25,5 26,5 26,4 23,1 18,1 15,0 11,3 11,5 10,7
 
 
Injuries and injury rates on mobile facilities 
 
Activity   1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 Administration Injuries 8 10 10 0 2 0 2 4 1 1
  Injuries/mill. hours 10,7 11,5 7,8 0,0 1,0 0,0 1,8 3,9 0,7 0,8
Drilling and Injuries 158 157 152 146 92 68 40 39 47 37
well 
operations Injuries/mill. hours 41,0 39,2 42,6 48,5 26,6 27,0 18,1 16,8 14,6 10,8
Catering Injuries 12 12 17 10 12 8 8 4 5 2
  Injuries/mill. hours 21,0 19,8 24,0 15,6 16,7 11,2 16,9 7,9 7,5 2,7
Operation and Injuries 30 47 64 94 82 36 24 19 31 40
maintenance Injuries/mill. hours 22,0 30,4 34,7 43,1 37,4 17,4 15,5 10,6 14,7 18,7
 Total Injuries 208 226 243 250 188 112 74 66 84 80
  Injuries/mill.hours 31,8 32,2 32,8 33,7 22,5 15,8 13,8 11,7 11,4 10,7
 
 
Injuries and injury rates by operators and contractors on permanently placed facilities 
 
Activity Company 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Injuries Operators 130 140 151 158 155 135 96 67 90 82 
 Contractors 432 466 432 465 394 311 308 234 213 215 
Injury 
rate 
Operators 15,4 16,1 16,8 17,2 16,3 13,7 9,4 6,8 9,4 8,0 
























































 Scores are given from ‘fully agree’ (1) to ‘fully disagree’ (5) 
 Positive and negative statements are arranged successively for each major theme.  
 Minor changes from year to year are normally not statistically significant.  
 Number of respondents were (approximately) 3000 in 2001, 8700 in 2003, and 9800 
in 2005; average response rate has been some 50 percent.  
 
 
                   
Propositions (index) 
 
2001 2003 2005 
Leadership and company behaviour 
 
   
The company I work for take HSE seriously 
 
1,65 1,51 1,50 
My supervisor is committed to working with HSE on the installation 
 
1,83 1,70 1,70 
My supervisor appreciate that I call attention to conditions of significance to HSE 1,76 1,61 1,58 
Manning is sufficient for taking good care of HSE 
 
2,57 2,37 2,23 
I always know which person within the organisation to report to 
 
1,89 1,80 1,80 
The emergency preparedness is good 
 
2,05 1,95 1,91 
I would rather not discuss HSE with my supervisor 
 
3,30 4,41 4,41 
Occasionally I’m required to work in a manner that jeopardizes safety 
 
3,25 4,24 4,32 
When it comes to one’s career it is a disadvantage to be too concerned with HSE 3,22 3,94 3,99 
Lack of cooperation between operator and contractors often lead to risky situations 3,09 3,55 3,69 
Lack of maintenance has resulted in reduced safety 
 
2,88 2,88 2,96 
In practice the concern for production precede the concern for HSE 
 
3,02 3,11 3,40 
 
General HSE items 
 
   
The safety deputies’ suggestions are taken seriously by the management 
 
2,03 1,93 1,89 
The safety deputies are doing a good job 
 
2,02 1,92 1,90 
It is easy to tell the nurse/company health service about worries and sickness related 
to the work situation 
 
1,77 1,73 1,73 
My colleagues are very preoccupied with HSE 2,04 1,89 1,85 
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I can influence the HSE-conditions at my workplace 
 
1,77 1,68 1,67 
Information about undesirable incidents are effectively used to prevent them 
recurring 
 
2,09 1,93 1,91 
I do not participate actively at safety meetings 
 
3,20 3,89 3,84 
Reports on accidents or dangerous situations are often “smartened up” 3,07 3,35 3,40 
 
Regulations and procedures 
 
   
I think it’s easy to find the right steering document (requirements and procedures) 
 
3,08 2,97 2,96 
The HSE procedures are suitable for my work tasks 
 
1,81 1,87 1,87 
The regulatory requirements on HSE are not good enough 
 
3,11 3,59 3,66 




   
I have received sufficient safety training 
 
1,68 - 1,47 
I have received sufficient training in work environment issues 
 
- - 2,02 
I have the necessary competence to perform my job in a safe manner 
 
1,54 1,44 1,46 
My lack of knowledge of new technology can sometimes lead to an increased risk of 
accidents 
 
3,19 4,03 4,01 
I doubt I would be able to carry out my preparedness duties in an emergency 
 
3,27 4,19 4,22 
I’m not sure of my role in the emergency organisation 
 
3,31 4,35 4,35 
 
Work situations and behaviour 
 
   
I report dangerous situations when I see them 
 
1,37 1,32 1,34 
Safety has top priority when I do my job 
 
1,42 1,32 1,33 
I stop working if I think it can be dangerous for me or others to continue 
 
1,33 1,29 1,27 
I ask my colleagues to stop work when I think the job is being done in a risky 
manner 
 
1,58 1,48 1,47 
My colleagues stop me if I work in an unsafe manner 
 
1,93 1,79 1,72 
Risky work operations are always carefully examined before they are commenced 
 
1,62 1,42 1,41 
The work permit system is always lived up to 
 
2,03 1,92 1,86 
I have easy access to personal protective equipment 
 
1,30 1,26 1,26 
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I use personal protective equipment 
 
1,17 1,16 1,15 
The equipment I need to do my work is easily available 
 
- 1,71 1.71 
I feel sufficiently restitution   
 
- 2,15 2,07 
I sometimes violate safety rules to get the job done 
 
3,17 4,00 4,08 
The communication between me and my colleagues often fail in such a way that 
dangerous situations can occur 
 
3,32 4,49 4,48 
I find it uncomfortable to call attention to violations of safety rules 
 
3,17 3,63 3,61 
One can easily be perceived as an argumentative person when pointing out 
dangerous situations 
 
3,11 3,31 - 
There are often parallel work operations proceeding that leads to dangerous 
situations 
 
3,09 3,44 3,62 
My work site is often untidy 
 
3,15 3,90 3,86 
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Appendix 4: The SBP work-shop conference  
 
As indicated, the term ‘workshop’ is only partially appropriate for describing the 
conference. Rather, participants are witness to a tightly directed multi-media 
performance. The conference hall is provided with three large screens, massive sound 
effects, cameras, and a professional media crew. The conference crew (5-10 people) is 
uniformly dressed. A number of pre-recorded films and presentations are shown, 
conveying clear and emotionally compelling messages and stories. Participants (usually 
some 200) are seated in roundtable groups of 5-10. A conference-manager sits in a deep 
armchair up front, leading the audience through the program with serene authority, 
including well-orchestrated panel discussions. Occasionally, ordinary participants are 
invited to answer questions, comment on presentations or topics, or report from group-
discussions. This is all filmed and displayed directly on the screens.  
 
Right from the start participants are told that this is going to be something different from 
what they’re used to: “Forget meetings which show safety statistics on overheads and 
give admonitory speeches about the importance of taking the time to work safely.” Only 
a simple overview is briefly displayed on the screens, showing the number of serious 
accidents in previous years, reminding the audience of the “zero-mindset” adopted by 
Statoil, and that “every single one of them is one too many”. One of the directors in the 
panel even states that “if this program can save one person’s life it’ll be worth it”264 The 
audience is told that this conference will focus on attitudes and behaviour, and contribute 
to raising the consciousness of all. A director from one of the participating drilling 
contractor companies makes a short statement, praising SBP for fitting 100 percent in 
with the HSE-activities and philosophies of their own company. He describes two recent 
fatal accidents as an “awakening”: “we couldn’t live with that”. In retrospect, they’ve 
realized that they’ve failed, and that they must plan their work better and take the time 
needed to complete jobs safely.  
                                                 
264 Implicitly estimating the value of one (‘statistical’) human life to some 180 000 mill NOK (which is 
more than 10 times as much as the standard suggested in the guidelines for economic impact analysis from 
the Ministry of Finance), thus reflecting the  general high-spirited and ‘evangelical’ mood of the 
conference. 
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The scene is then set by a popular and well-known Norwegian entertainer (writer, 
humorist, singer), appearing on the screens. He is impersonating a laid-back, disarming 
but concerned communicative style, talking directly to the audience from an old wooden 
sailboat (sailing is a well known passion of his and a recurring theme in his songs and 
writings). He is a recurring figure throughout the program, giving queer comments and 
‘safety messages’, often seen through his seafarer perspective, thus providing a 
communicative framing quite different form the well-worn reiterations of safety 
postulates and glossy presentations of management policies. The context of the message 
is one of credibility, trust, and everyday commonsense knowledge and morale.  
 
The whole first day is devoted to case stories exploring the causes and consequences of 
accidents, partly through documentary films. Some have a strong emotional tenor 
dwelling on losses and tragedies, such as a heart-breaking movie featuring the family of 
an off-shore worker who was killed in an anchor-handling accident, and a live personal 
testimony from a safety trainer who got seriously injured in a fire drill. Others present 
more ‘informative’ documentaries of causal antecedents of accidents, technical, 
organizational and human, with examples ranging from aircraft accidents to the falling 
off a ladder. The participants are regularly invited to provide examples of their own 
through brief discussions in the groups. In order to promote frank and open discussions 
they are given a general ‘amnesty’: No one, no matter how grave the violations they 
expose, shall suffer subsequent sanctions of any kind. Some are then interviewed by the 
conference manager, simultaneously displayed on the screens. Company reporters thus 
describe the mood of the session:265 
 
Drawing on their own experiences, members of the audience talk about such issues as the 
feeling of being pressured to complete a job on time. One after another admits that they often 
create their own expectations at work, and can thereby become trapped by their own 
willingness to take hasty decisions.  
 
In one case, a flare tip weighing almost 500 kilograms fell onto the platform and then into the 
sea – fortunately without injuring anyone. An analysis of the underlying causes indicated that 
the accident was due to a poor technical solution and a failure to pass on experience. On 
another occasion, a major crane lift was carried out on a platform without prior warning. 
Nobody was hurt then, either – but participants are asked about what corners they cut at work. 
                                                 
265 From the Statoil Magazine 2004, no 1. 
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One principal issue recurs: The danger of sacrificing safety for economic considerations 
and the need to keep up production. And the message from the panel is crystal clear: 
Safety first! One field director states: “This is the message to everyone: safety must 
always be the first priority. And if you’re in doubt, you test us!” The conference manager 
responds approvingly: “isn’t that a great thing to hear?” At the same time he sides with 
the presumably sceptical fractions of the audience in repeating the call to ‘test’. The issue 
of ‘production vs safety’ is not only couched in terms of management pressure and 
economic considerations. Apart from the avowals from the panel about the overall 
company policy, much attention is later paid to lower level choices and practices 
compromising safety. Only once is there a reminder from one in the conference crew that 
management decision-making must also be subject to the same scrutiny.  
 
The concept of ‘human error’ is introduced, as caused by loss of focus and concentration, 
absent-mindedness, forgetfulness, lack of risk-awareness, etc. Sometimes crews get too 
caught up in getting the job done; sometimes people behave less safe just for 
‘convenience’; short cuts may become part of daily routine, a phenomenon recurringly 
referred to as “silent deviance”. One panel participant also makes a subtle distinction 
between short cuts and silent deviance, explaining the former as more like impulsive acts 
and the latter as more like established practices. Participants are invited to reflect on the 
phenomenon of silent deviance, and several explanations are offered: Professional pride, 
group cultures, a productive ‘mood’, but also a sensation of external pressure. The 
conference manager summarizes by referring to the near-miss at Snorre A as a dramatic 
consequence of “28 silent deviations”, apparently referring to the 28 non-conformities 
discovered in the PSA-investigation report. A new group of managers in the panel are 
invited to present their own personal plans for “eliminating the nuisance”. The recurring 
response is that they will all “put the issue on the agenda” in the upcoming department 
meetings and HSE-meetings.  
 
The lessons to be learned throughout the seminar are summarized in the five barriers, also 
visualized in the program’s logo. The concept of barrier is explained in quite ordinary 
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terms, as “measures to prevent an accident when something unexpected happens.” Also, 
all accidents are explained as the consequence of weak or missing barriers.  
 
Five barriers of the SBP program 
 
Caring about each other: 
Nearly all the behaviour which leads to accidents is unconscious - either because we haven’t 
been paying attention or because we’re not aware that what we’re doing represents a risk. 
One of the five barriers is intended to help us compensate for this lack of awareness by taking 
a minute before starting a job to assess any risks we need to take into account. And we’ll 
assess risk continuously while doing a job. People may always make mistakes, however, and 
not even the systematic use of risk assessments in advance of starting work can wholly 
compensate for that. We depend on each other, not least by having workmates who show 
concern for us and intervene when they see we’re making a mistake and exposing ourselves to 
risk. This collegial concern often represents the final barrier in preventing an accident. 
 
Correct prioritisation:  
Correct priorities concern the way we deal with safety in relation to other important areas. 
Statoil has a principle which specifies that, in the event of a conflict between safety and other 
important considerations such as productivity or costs, safety will take first priority until the 
conflict has been resolved. This means that, if we are unsure that a job can be executed in a 
safe manner within the specified time or with the available resources, it must be postponed 
until we feel that we are in control of safety. 
 
Compliance: 
Compliance is about loyally observing decisions, requirements, guidelines and procedures. The 
challenge here lies in the scope and diversity of our formal requirements and procedures. We 
have a number of requirements for virtually every job, and must admit that knowing them all 
could be almost more than is humanly possible. So we cannot expect everyone to know 
everything. But everyone must be familiar with our system of governing documents, and must 
know and observe the rules and requirements which apply to the job they are doing. 
 
Open dialogue: 
A necessary requirement for good safety is that we maintain an open and trusting dialogue 
between managers and employees, between Statoil personnel and contractor staff, and 
naturally between Statoil employees themselves - in other words, at every level. The aim is 
that each of us must find it entirely natural, and preferably a bit enjoyable, to raise safety-
related issues with our immediate superior and our colleagues. We must be able to pose 
critical questions about whether a job we have been asked to do can be executed in a safe 
manner under the prevailing conditions. And we must be sure that personal problems which 
could pose risks when executing jobs are openly discussed. 
 
Continuous risk assessment: 
Statoil has a number of formal systems for assessing and reducing work-related risks. 
Examples include risk analyses, safe job analyses (SJAs) and pre-job talks (PJTs). These 
represent excellent and necessary solutions for ensuring that we work safely. Even with such 
systems in place, however, we still suffer accidents. This is often because too many jobs do 
not call for the application of our formal risk assessment procedures. Nor can any available 
tools or systems replace the human brain and the senses it controls. Continuous risk 
assessment is about using our senses – and our common sense. It’s not a question of making 
complex risk evaluations. The primary requirement is to pause for a minute ahead of a job and 
considering what the chances are for being injured if anything unexpected happens. You can 
then take the necessary steps to avoid such accidents. So the message is that it’s better to 
take a minute or two before or during a job than to spend the rest of your life regretting 
something you failed to do. 
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Thus, barriers are seen as “the safety net underpinning all operations”. Even more 
inclusive definitions also appear, as “everything we do to prevent accidents”. Participants 
are urged to remind themselves of “why these barriers are established and the 
consequences of removing them”. The concept of technical barriers is referred to, as its 
original meaning, but now, it is stated, focus is on “soft barriers”. Focus is put on “one’s 
own behaviour”, the rationale for this being that: “Virtually all serious incidents and 
injuries at our workplaces are due to some form of human error. So everyday life can 
only be made safer by paying constant attention to our own behaviour in order to avoid 
mistakes.” Each of the barriers are carefully explained and referred to throughout the 
seminar, in line with how they are presented in writing in the program documentation 
(see text-box).  
 
In addition to the concept of barriers, another well-known metaphor from the safety 
nomenclature recurs throughout the seminar, and visualized several times on the screens: 
The Iceberg. There is certainly no reference to the theoretical or historical roots of the 
Iceberg Theory, but the purpose is clear enough: everyone is to be reminded of the 
potential harm contained in even the slightest failures or mistakes. References are still 
made to the to the idea of an aggregating proportionate relationship between minor 
failures and major accidents: “Injuries in Statoil are likened to the tip of an iceberg. 
Errors lurk beneath the surface along the whole chain, and small margins determine 
whether these become visible in the form of accidents. Participants bear witness to risky 
behaviour and near-misses caused by taking shortcuts and by “silent deviance’” (Statoil 
Magazine 2004/1). This adds to the clear emphasis on the importance of individual 
behaviour; implicitly embodying the idea that other measures have more or less been 
fully exploited. As pointed out in one work-shop ‘report’:  
 
“A great commitment has been made to improving our technology and systems,” 
observed one manager. “We can’t get any better now without putting people in the centre. 
That’s got to be done through open dialogue and by talking to each other” …. It was 
personal, gripping and direct. We’ve heard the message before, but it somehow came 




Care, vigilance, thoughtfulness, and concern for others are repeatedly stressed by the 
conference crew and in questions posed for group discussion. Readiness to correct or stop 
the behaviour of others is underlined as a particularly important, but also sensitive issue. 
Reasons for not doing anything to prevent a colleague from dangerous behaviour are 
discussed, ranging from personal reluctance, group mechanisms, and even national 
culture:  
 
It must be permissible for colleagues to interfere in such circumstances – even though this 
runs counter to a Norwegian reluctance to criticize workmates. On the contrary, the 
speakers agree that the work culture must build on openness, trust, a sense of security and 
concern for others (Statoil Magazine, 2004/1). 
 
The staged interviews and ‘panel discussions’ occasionally arranged from the podium, 
mostly feature directors, managers, safety officers and safety representatives. The 
messages range from the importance of personal diligence in safety matters, to the 
sincerity of company commitment. The latter is repeatedly underscored by management 
representatives (supervisors, platform managers, field directors etc.). Lower level 
managers typically express their willingness to spend more time near operations and be 
more ‘hands on’ in their leadership role, while higher level managers make bold 
statements about the priority of HSE goals, the ultimate test being situations of conflict 
with operational goals. The thrust of the message from the top was also evident from the 
fact that representatives from the top management of the UPN (and occasionally even the 
CEO) would always attend the work-shops and convey their safety commitment 
personally, as in the following statement from the executive vice president for UPN:  
 
“Good production won’t be attainable unless we have safety under control,” he affirms, and 
promises to put safety before output when asking questions of platform managers …. “If a 
conflict arises between production and safety, we must opt for the latter,” thunders Mr 
Carlsen from the podium. “You must put us to the test if you’re in doubt”. Mr. Carlsen 
promises that management will get better at accepting criticism and at adjusting its course 
accordingly (Statoil Magazine, 2004/1). 
 
The conference is concluded by stressing the importance of the follow up; that this is 
only the beginning of a long term process and commitment. Participants are challenged to 
state their own promises for the future. Testimonies from the round tables include:  
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 a well engineer wanting to contribute to a good working environment by being 
cheerful and good-humoured 
 a manager wanting to motivate his subordinates to speak up if they observe 
departures from safe working practice and to remind everyone to accept greater 
responsibility for their own safety 
 a production planner for new wells stating that she’ll be more careful about subjecting 
offshore personnel to unnecessarily stringent deadlines when they’re working on 
wells 
 a well supervisor wanting to convey the message that they have time to work safely 
and to create room for dialogue within the team 
 a chemicals manager wanting to sharpen up the compliance with procedures  
 a supervisor for chartered drilling rigs, wanting to make sure that all reported 
incidents are passed quickly along the right channels.  
 
The dedication to the follow up is aptly visualized by the role of the ‘log’. All 
management statements are carefully recorded and put in a ‘postbag’, firmly placed in the 
hands of (notably) the platform managers. Back at work, management and employees are 
supposed to open the postbag together and “systematically incorporate the proposed 
changes in their working routines. The hope is that this will contribute to an injuryfree 
life at work for all the group’s personnel.” (Statoil Magazine, 2004/1). Both during the 
conference and in official presentations, a strong message is conveyed that this is not just 
another fashionable and short-lived safety campaign. Evidence for this – albeit 
conditionally – is provided in some selected post conference comments from participants:  
 
“I’ve been with Statoil for 25 years, and have experienced pretty well everything .… One 
improvement program has given way to another without being properly completed. This 
was different. It got you to think, and gave me a good gut feeling.” Without wanting to 
promise too much, he believed that, once everyone had been through the program, it 
would be easier to discuss issues with colleagues without being regarded as critical. 
(Statoil Magazine, 2004/1). 
 
 
Another basic ‘motif’ also recurs throughout; that the program is motivated by an 
altruistic concern for the well-being of all employees. Even the writer-entertainer makes a 
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disarming comment from his boat, reflecting on the fact that Statoil, after all, is a 
commercial company: They may have calculated that the whole program will provide 
return for investments and that the underlying motive is money. He thoughtfully rejects 
the idea, referring to his meetings with the company and the crew: “I’ve met these people 
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